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Strasbourg, 23 March 1999 CDL-RA(98)001
ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES FOR 1998
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
MEMBERSHIP. 5
ACTIVITIES. 7
I. Activities
of the European Commission for Democracy through Law in the field of democratic
reform.. 7
A. Description of the Commission’s activities 8
1. CO-OPERATION WITH ALBANIA 8
2. CO-OPERATION WITH ARMENIA 9
3. CO-OPERATION
WITH AZERBAIJAN 9
4. CO-OPERATION
WITH BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 10
5. CO-OPERATION
WITH BULGARIA 13
6. CO-OPERATION
WITH CROATIA 14
7. CO-OPERATION
WITH ESTONIA 16
8. CO-OPERATION
WITH GEORGIA 16
9. CO-OPERATION
WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 17
10. CO-OPERATION
WITH KYRGYZSTAN 17
11. CO-OPERATION
WITH LATVIA 18
12. CO-OPERATION
WITH MOLDOVA 18
13. CO-OPERATION
WITH MOZAMBIQUE 21
14. CO-OPERATION
WITH ROMANIA 21
15. CO-OPERATION
WITH SOUTH AFRICA 23
16. CO-OPERATION
WITH “THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA” 24
17. CO-OPERATION
WITH UKRAINE 25
18. SITUATION
IN KOSOVO 26
B. Opinions
of the Commission 28
i. Opinion
on recent amendments to the law on Major constitutional provisions of the
Republic of Albania, adopted by the Sub-Commission on Constitutional Reform on
15 April 1998 28
ii. Opinion
on the competence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Criminal law
matters adopted at the 34th Plenary Meeting (6-7 March 1998) 38
iii. Opinion
on the number of municipal courts to be established in Mostar 43
iv. Opinion
on inter-entity judicial co-operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted at the
35th Plenary meeting (12-13 June 1998) 45
v. Interim
report on the distribution of competences and structural and operational
relations in the Ombudsman Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, prepared by
the Working Group on Ombudsman Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
approved at the 35th Plenary meeting (12-13 June 1998) 48
vi. Opinion
on the competence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in electoral matters adopted at the
36th Plenary Meeting (16-17 October 1998) 53
vii. Opinion
on the need for a Judicial Institution at the level of the State in Bosnia and
Herzegovina adopted at the 36th Plenary meeting (16-17 October 1998) 56
viii. Opinion
on the admissibility of appeals against decisions of the Human Rights Chamber
of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted at the 36th Plenary Meeting (16-17
October 1998) 60
ix. Opinion
on the constitutionality of international agreements concluded by Bosnia and
Herzegovina and/or the entities adopted at the 37th Plenary Meeting
(11-12 December 1998 65
I. Introduction 65
General procedural considerations 65
General procedural considerations 66
Agreement on the Establishment of the
Joint Council for Co-operation 68
Procedural questions 68
Substantive questions 69
- Agreement
on Economic Co-operation 70
x. Opinion
on the constitutional issues involved in Estonia’s accession to the European
Union adopted at the 35th Plenary Meeting (12-13 June 1998) 75
xi. Opinion
on the question of the reform of the system of constitutional control in
Estonia adopted at the 35th
Plenary Meeting (12-13 June 1998) 79
xii. Consolidated
opinion on the draft law on Referendum and Citizen Initiative drawn up on the
basis of the comments by Ms Ana Milenkova (Bulgaria) and Mr Sergio Bartole
(Italy). 84
II. Co-operation between the Commission and the statutory
organs of the Council of Europe, the European Union and other international
organisations 88
- Co-operation
with the Committee of Ministers 88
- Exchange
of Views with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe 90
- Co-operation
with other international organisations 91
B. Reports adopted by the Commission 92
i. Control
of internal security services in Europe adopted at the 34th Plenary
Meeting (6-7 March 1998) 92
ii. Opinion
on the legal problems arising from the coexistence of the Convention of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States and
the European Convention of Human Rights adopted at the 34th Plenary
Meeting (6-7 March 1998) 110
III. Studies of the Venice Commission 119
1. Prohibition
of Political parties and analogous measures 119
2. Legal
Foundations of Foreign policy 121
I. International
law 124
II. Democracy,
Human Rights, the Rule of Law 124
III. Democratisation
of foreign policy 125
3. Constitutional
law and European integration 125
4. Participation
of persons belonging to minorities in public life 126
IV. Documentation
Centre on Constitutional Case-Law 127
Bulletin
on Constitutional Case-Law 127
V. The UniDem (Universities for Democracy) Programme 129
1. Seminar
on “New Trends in electoral law in a pan-European context” 18-19 April
(Sarajevo) 129
2. Conference
on “Democratic Institutions and Civil Society in South-Eastern Europe” 5-6 May
(Strasbourg) 129
3. Seminar
on “The principle of respect for human dignity in European case-law” 2-6 July
(Montpellier) 130
4. Seminar
on “Constitutional developments in the Transcaucasian States : the Division of
powers” 7-11 September (Baku, Tblissi) / 13-14 October (Yerevan) 131
4. Preparation
of forthcoming seminars 132
APPENDIX I - LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW 133
APPENDIX II - OFFICES AND
COMPOSITION OF THE SUB-COMMISSIONS 137
APPENDIX III - MEETINGS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW IN 1998 139
APPENDIX IV - LIST OF
PUBLICATIONS OF THE VENICE COMMISSION 144
At the end of 1998, the Commission totalled 37 full
members, 5 associate members and 8 observers.
Members
No States acceded to the Partial Agreement during 1998.
Mr Kaarlo Tuori, Professor of Administrative law,
University of Helsinki, was appointed member in respect of Finland, Mr James
Hamilton, Director General; Office of the Attorney General, member in respect
of Ireland, Mr Valeriu Stoica, Minister of Justice and Mr Alexandru Farcas, Counsellor,
Embassy of Romania in Geneva, member and substitute member in respect of
Romania, Mr Hjörtur Torfason, Judge, Supreme Court of Iceland, member in
respect of Iceland and Mr László Sólyom,
President, Constitutional Court of Hungary, member in respect of Hungary
respectively replacing Mr Antti Suviranta, Mr Matthew Russell, Mr Petru
Gavrilescu, Mr Magnus Hannesson and Mr Janos Zlinszky whose mandates had
expired.
In addition, Mr Luan Omari, Vice President, Sciences
Academy of Albania, was appointed member in respect of Albania, and Mr Hans-Heinrich Vogel, Professor of Public Law, University of Lund substitute member in respect of Sweden.
Observers
Kazakhstan obtained observer status, and appointed Mr Oljas
Souleimenov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan in Rome as its observer on the Commission.
In addition, following a request from the First
Vice-President of the National Assembly, Mozambique was admitted by the Committee of Ministers to
co-operate with the Commission in the process of revision of the Constitution
of this country.
The full list of members, associate members and
observers by order of seniority is set out in Appendix I to this report.
Proposed amendments to the Statute
During 1998 the
Commission considered the possibility of transformation to an Enlarged Partial
Agreement. This change would allow for full membership of non-member States of
the Council of Europe and, consequently, would entail a budgetary contribution
from them. In the light of the fact that
there was increasing interest in the work of the Commission from outside Europe,this step would allow non-European states to participate in the Commission on a
more or less equal footing with European member states.
The proposed amendments to the Statute will also take
into account the Report of the Wise Persons Committee.
Other proposed changes to the Statute, of a mainly
formal nature, include :
- the majority required for
decision-making
- co-operation with the Congress of Local
and Regional Authorities of Europe
- co-operation
of the Commission with other similar bodies on other continents, Latin America, Southern Africa
A decision from the Committee of Ministers is expected
before summer 1999.
Sub-Commissions
No new Sub-Commissions were created during 1999.
The composition of the Sub-Commissions is set out in
Appendix II to this report.
During 1998, the Commission continued to co-operate with
many countries for the consolidation of
democratic institutions and the strengthening of the rule of law.
In particular, the Commission was
very closely associated with the drawing up of the new Albanian Constitution,
adopted by referendum on November 1998.
This was achieved following a long constitutional process which was
often disturbed during the last few years by the political and economic
instability of the country. The
Commission is convinced that the new Constitution will enable solid democratic
institutions to be established and to function correctly. These institutions
should be capable of managing the social and political conflict which have
poisoned the country’s democratic life and facing up to the future challenges
of Albania within the Council of Europe.
The Commission also continued to
provide assistance to the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the effective application of the Peace agreements
and with regard to the country’s constitutional regime. The Commission gave several opinions on subjects
concerning, amongst others, the question of electoral law, the functioning of
the judicial apparatus, the distribution of competences between the two
entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Republika Srpska), the integration of international treaties in the
domestic legal order, the functioning of institutions dealing with human
rights. The Commission’s co-operation
with Bosnia
and Herzegovina should become even more intense during 1999.
The Commission as a European
consultative institution in the field of constitutional engineering, gave
particular attention to the Kosovo crisis and to the constitutional aspects of
a possible solution. It actively
followed the work of the Contact Group in autumn 1998 and, in 1999, the Peace
Conferences in Rambouillet and Paris.
The Commission is ready to make every possible effort to facilitate the
success of the negotiations and to contribute to the establishment of a
constitutional regime in Kosovo which will ensure the democratic functioning of
institutions as well as the protection of human rights and the rights of
minorities.
Deeply concerned by the crisis
situation and the instability which exists in this region of Europe, the
Commission, in co-operation with the Greek presidency of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, brought
together in Strasbourg in May 1998, within the framework of a Conference on the
theme “Democratic Institutions and Civil Society in South-Eastern Europe” a
large number of principal personalities from the political, social and economic
life of the region. The encouraging conclusions which the President of Albania,
Mr Rexhep Meidani, gave at the end of the Conference reinforce the Commission’s
conviction that democratic development and an efficient protection of human and
minority rights within the framework of pan-European integration are the key
points for the solution of the conflicts which weaken the societies in these
countries.
If crisis situations and the
management of conflicts constitute a natural priority in the Commission’s
activities, the consolidation of democratic institutions and the rule of law in
the member States of the Council of Europe and on the whole continent remains
and is increasingly an operation to which the Commission attaches a great deal
of importance. Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia all co-operated with the Commission during 1998 in this
field. With the backing of other Council
of Europe bodies and institutions, in particular the Parliamentary Assembly,
the Commission hopes it will be able to continue the fruitful co-operation
already started. Finally, the Commission
continues working to spread, even beyond the continent, the principles which
are at the basis of the democracies which make up the Council of Europe. In particular, its co-operation with South Africa and Mozambique fall into this category.
A short description of the
Commission’s work in this area (Part A) is followed by the presentation of some
opinions which the Commission has decided to make public (Part B).
A Working Group for Albania had been set up within the Commission in 1997. This group, under the auspices of the
Sub-Commission on Constitutional Reform, continued its close co-operation with
the Albanian authorities during 1998. In
addition the Commission was represented by a liaison officer in Tirana during a
great part of the year.
At the request of the Committee on
Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly the Commission
examined amendments to the major constitutional provisions of Albania which
were in force at the time, concerning :
- the High Council of
Justice
- additional rules on the
rotation of judges of the Constitutional Court
- new rules on the public
administration of unlawful economic activity
This question was discussed at the
Commission’s 34th Plenary Meeting in the presence of representatives
of the Albanian Parliament. At a meeting
of the Sub-Commission on Constitutional Reform held in Paris on 15 April 1998
the opinion on amendments to the law on major constitutional provisions of the Republic
of Albania was adopted. The
text of this opinion appears in Part B.
The Commission was also requested
to participate in the preparation of the new Albanian Constitution. The Sub-Commission on Constitutional Reform
commenced its examination of this text in the presence of representatives of
the Constitutional Commission of Albania at the Commission’s 35th
Plenary Meeting. Several meetings were
held throughout the year at which various versions of the draft Constitution
were examined article by article. The
Commission was invited to give advice on some major issues within the draft
such as the choice between a unicameral or bicameral system. In addition, most of the articles of the
Constitution were discussed in detail and a considerable number were amended to
take account of the suggestions from the Commission.
The new Constitution as adopted by
referendum is the result of close co-operation between the Venice Commission
and the Albanian Constitutional Commission.
- Control of constitutionality
The Commission continued its work on this matter during 1998
and in particular held an exchange of views with the Constitutional court and
the Armenian authorities in Yerevanin May 1998 on constitutional reform and the introduction of individual
constitutional complaint. A
Constitutional Commission has been set up in Armeniaand has already started work. In
addition to appeals before the Constitutional Courtthe main areas of work of this Commission are, a reduction of the President’s
powers and the introduction of decentralisation in Armenia.
The Venice
Commission expressed its readiness to assist the Armenian authorities on all
these issues as well as any other issues of constitutional reform in Armenia.
A new request to examine the amendments of the
Constitution should be forthcoming during 1999.
- Electoral
Law
Mr Owen had
assisted the Armenian Central Electoral Commission in the preparation of the
presidential elections and had also commented on the draft electoral laws of Armenia drawn up by
Messrs Yegorian and Sahakian. As far as possible another draft by Mr
Khatchatrian had also been taken into account. The Commission underlined that
the main guarantees to be ensured in electoral legislation are an impartial and
competent composition of the electoral commissions by including party
representatives but also external participants (administration, judiciary), a
sufficiently long registration period and transparency of the voting procedure.
The Commission was
informed that the presidential elections had taken place on 16 March 1998 according to the old electoral code.
* * * *
* *
In addition, the Commission organised a Seminar on
“Electoral disputes before the Constitutional Court” in co-operation with the Constitutional Court of
Armenia in Yerevan on 15-16 October 1998.
The Commission continued to follow constitutional
developments in Azerbaijanduring 1998 and was informed that the rules of procedure of the Constitutional
Court had been adopted.
It is proposed to hold a seminar on the constitutional status of
self-governing local authorities during 1999.
Throughout the whole of 1998
co-operation with Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the Commission’s
priority activities. The effective
implementation of civil aspects of the peace agreements, and in particular the
establishment of a coherent constitutional regime and the rule of law, were the
Commission’s primary objective. The
Commission is particularly satisified with its intense and fruitful
co-operation with the Office of the High Representative, as well as with the Constitutional Court, the Human Rights Chamber
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the
Ombudsperson for Human Rights and the OSCE.
At its 34th
Plenary Meeting the Commission held an exchange of views with Mr Carlos
Westendorp, High Representative of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Mr Westendorp highlighted the
important role the Venice Commission had played in Bosnia and Herzegovina and stated that his office had already several times
asked for opinions by the Commission. He
stated that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had improved significantly. The Bonn Conference had given the High
Representative substantive new powers which were important in order to achieve
a democratic State in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An obstacle in this process was the party structure
which was mostly monolithic and monoethnic. Only in the Republika Srpska had
parties also formed along ideological lines.
Obstacles to further progress were the economic situation, the parties
and the media. It had been necessary to take over the TV stations in the
Republika Srpska in order to guarantee a free flow of information. Now the media
in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina might need to be reconstituted. Moreover, Mr Westendorp indicated that on
certain points the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina would need to be revised.
The following opinions were given by the Venice Commission
at the request of the Office of the High Representative :
- Opinion
on the competence of the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in
Criminal law matters (CDL-INF (98) 5) adopted at the 34th Plenary
Meeting (6-7 March 1998);
- Opinion
on the number of municipal courts to be established in Mostar (CDL (98) 37);
- Opinion
on inter-entity judicial co-operation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina
(CDL-INF (98) 11) adopted at the 35th Plenary meeting (12-13 June
1998);
- Opinion
on the competence of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in
electoral matters (CDL-INF (98) 16) adopted at the 36th Plenary
Meeting (16-17 October 1998);
- Opinion
on the need for a Judicial Institution at the level of the State in Bosnia
and Herzegovina
(CDL-INF (98) 17) adopted at the 36th Plenary meeting (16-17 October
1998);
- Opinion
on the constitutionality of international agreements concluded by Bosnia
and Herzegovina and/or
the entities (CDL-INF (98) 20) adopted at the 37th Plenary Meeting
(11-12 December 1998).
In addition, on a proposal from Mr Gewirtz, Observer in respect of
the United States, and following the previous opinion on the constitutional
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning the human rights protection
mechanisms, the Commission gave an :
- Opinion
on the admissibility of appeals against decisions of the Human Rights Chamber
of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(CDL-INF (98) 18) adopted at the 36th Plenary Meeting (16-17 October
1998).
The text of these opinions can be found in Part B.
Moreover, during 1998 the Commission continued its work
on the establishment of a coherent Ombmudsman system in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
At its 34th Plenary Meeting the Commission examined a preliminary draft law on
the Ombudsman of the Republika Srpska (CDL (98) 12). Work on the
draft law had continued during the first months of 1998 in spite of the
institutional crisis in the Republika Srpska.
Its main principles were : Firstly, wide competencies for the Ombudsman
including the protection of human rights.
Secondly, the Ombudsman's independence should be effectively
guaranteed. To this end, the preliminary
draft law provides for a series of immunities and incompatibilities of the
Office of the Ombudsman. A third
requirement was the possibility for the Ombudsman to entertain relations with
the judiciary. Finally, a composition analogous to the one of the Ombudsmen of
the Federation would be desirable, i.e. an ombudsman from each of the three
ethnic communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
On 23 October 1998, a delegation of the Working Group on
the Ombudsman Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, set up by the Commission
and the Council of Europe's Directorate of Human Rights, contacted the new
President of the Republika Srpska, N. Poplasen, in Banja Luka with a view to
promoting the draft Law for an Ombudsman in this entity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The meeting showed that an
agreement existed in principle on the usefulness and importance of instituting
an Ombudsman in a situation of social conflict and on the organisation and
functioning of this institution in the constitutional system of the
entity. However, there was disagreement
as to its composition: the Serb authorities seemed fundamentally opposed to the
working group's proposal that there should be three ombudsmen (ie a
multi-ethnic composition), which had the backing of the entire international
community, and even challenged the very constitutionality of this
proposal. It should be noted that the
Peace Implementation Council of Madrid (December 1998) expressly supported the
draft drawn up by the Working Group.
On 3-4 December 1998, the Working Group had also held a
meeting in Sarajevo with
the Ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
discuss the draft organic law concerning this institution. Representatives of the Office of the High
Representative and the OSCE had taken part in the meeting, at which the main
points of the organic law had been approved.
However, no decision had been taken on the proposal to appoint the
ombudsmen during the transitional period, their immunity and their removal from
office; a meeting would take place in January or early February 1999 to settle
these questions.
On the same dates, the Working Group met Ms Haller,
Ombudsperson of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
the staff of the Ombudsperson's office, in Sarajevo. This meeting provided the opportunity to
clarify the concept of a possible Organic Law for the Ombudsperson of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in
particular the ombudsperson's powers and responsibilities and his/her relations
with the other institutions responsible for mediation in the entities). Draft legislation was currently being
prepared and might be presented to the Commission for approval in 1999.
Moreover, at its 35th Plenary Meeting, the
Commission examined the structural and operational relations in the Ombudsman
Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
adopted its draft report on this question.
The text of this report can be found in Part B.
In addition the Commission organised the following events
in Bosnia and Herzegovina during
1998 :
- Round
Table on the functioning of the system of constitutional control in
co-operation with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Office of the High Representative, the American Bar Association and the Phare
programme of the European Union 4-5
April (Sarajevo)
- Round
Table on Constitutional Justice in co-operation with the American Bar
Association and the Phare programme of the European Union 23-24 October (Banja Luka)
Work on four further requests for opinion from the
Office of the High Representative is on-going and will continue during 1999 :
- Opinion
on the modalities for election of the Presidency of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and
the President and Vice-President of the Federation;
- Opinion
on the restructuring of Human Rights protection mechanisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the end of the transitory
period forseen in the Dayton Agreements;
- Opinion
on the competence of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in the
conclusion and implementation of international agreements, according to the
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Opinion
on the scope of the responsibilities of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in the
field of immigration and asylum with particular regard to possible involvement
of the Entities;
The Commission co-operated with Bulgaria on
several issues during 1998.
At the
36th Plenary Meeting the Commission was informed of the request from
the Parliamentary Assembly to give an
opinion on the draft Bulgarian Law amending and supplementing the Law on the
Judiciary and on the draft Bulgarian Civil Service Act. Rapporteurs were appointed on these two laws.
- Bulgarian law amending and supplementing the
Judicial System Act
During its 37th Plenary Meeting the
Commission held an exchange of views with Mr Gotsev, Minister
of Justice of Bulgaria, and Mr Toshev, chairman of the Bulgarian delegation to
the Parliamentary Assembly, on the Bulgarian law amending and supplementing the
Judicial System Act.
Mr Gotzev underlined the difficulties in the transition
from totalitarian regime to democracy.
The most important reforms which had already taken place included the
introduction of a further tier of jurisdiction (by the setting up of courts of
appeal) and some increase in the powers assigned to the Minister of
Justice. The Minister could, for
example, ask for disciplinary proceedings to be instituted. The powers of the Prokuratura had been
amended, in that public prosecutors could only prosecute cases which had been
referred to the court where they worked.
On the other hand, only the Principal State Prosecutor still had
authority to withdraw immunity from judges and other members of the judiciary,
and only for crimes liable to more than five years’ imprisonment. The disciplinary sanctions applicable to
judges had been changed. Following the creation of the appeal courts, the
judges at these courts had elected their representatives on the Supreme
Judicial Council. Parliament had also elected its eleven representatives to the
Supreme Judicial Council by simple majority.
Eleven of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council - who were elected
for a five-year term - were elected by Parliament from among its own ranks, six
by the judges, three by the Principal State Prosecutor’s Department and two by
the special investigation services. The
Prokuratura still had to be reformed and the criminal code was being revised.
The Commission was informed that these amendments had been submitted
to the Bulgarian Constitutional Court and that the Court will hand down its decision in January 1999. The Commission decided to continue the
examination of the above amendments after having taken note of the decision of
the Constitutional Court. The opinion on the Bulgarian legislation
amending and supplementing the Judicial System Act would be presented to the
Parliamentary Assembly in March 1999.
- Draft
Civil Service Act
During this same meeting the Commission examined the
draft Civil Service Act. The Commission
was informed that a new draft Civil Service Act, introducing the office of
ombudsman, would be forwarded to the Commission for consideration.
Work on this issue is continuing in 1999.
At its 34th Plenary
Meeting the Commission adopted its second progress report on co-operation with Croatia. There had been
positive developments in this co-operation: the Council of National Minorities
had been set up and several Conventions of the Council of Europe in the field
of Human rights and the protection of minorities had been ratified by Croatia. Other elements were however less satisfactory: the
Council of National Minorities had not been established by law, the process of
amending the partially suspended Constitutional Law on the Protection of
Minorities of 1991 had been halted since May 1997 and the system of
international advisers for the Constitutional Court had never been used by the
Court. Since then, however, co-operation
with the Constitutional
Court has
developed positively.
- Co-operation with the Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court had invited the advisers to participate in its work in
five cases. These concern legislation on
property, access to public functions of members of minority groups and
curricula in Italian language schools. Preparatory meetings have been held
between the advisers and the Court in all these cases (on 15-16 June, 10 July
and on 15-16 December) and the advisers’ preliminary opinions have been sent to
the Court. It is expected that the hearings with participation of
the Council of Europe advisers and the final deliberations in these cases will
be held in 1999.
During its 35th, 36th and 37th
Plenary Meetings the Commission expressed its satisfaction regarding
co-operation with the Constitutional Court which
is an important contribution towards the honouring of Croatia’s
commitments as a member State of the
Council of Europe.
- Revision
of the Constitutional law on rights of national minorities
Co-operation on the revision of the Constitutional law on
the rights of national minorities was on the agenda of all the Commission’s
meetings during 1998.
At its 37th Plenary Meeting, at the request
of the Rapporteurs of the Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on the honouring
of obligations and commitments by member States, the Commission considered
progress in its co-operation with Croatia in this field. Ms Busic, Member of the Croatian Sabor
and Deputy Head of the Croatian Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly, Mr
Jansson, Representative of the Parliamentary Assembly, Ambassador Guldimann,
Head of the OSCE Mission in Croatia, Mr Packer, Representative of the OSCE High
Commissioner on Minorities and Ms Zoricic Tabakovic and Mr Vojta, respectively
President and Vice President of the Croatian Council of National Minorities,
took part in the discussions.
It
was recalled on this occasion that, within the framework of the procedure for
Croatia’s accession to the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission recommended, inter alia, that the
suspended provisions of the 1991 Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Rights
of Minorities be revised as soon as possible in order to ensure that persons
belonging to minorities are guaranteed rights in the field of local autonomy in
accordance with the European Charter of Local Self-Government and
Recommendation 1201 (1993). On its accession to the Council of Europe, Croatia undertook to implement these recommendations (cf.
Parliamentary Assembly’s Opinion No. 195 (1996) para. 9.vii on Croatia's request for membership of the Council of
Europe). Furthermore, under Committee of Ministers Resolution (96) 31, such
membership is subject to the requirement to co-operate with the Council of
Europe, inter alia, in applying the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and
Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities. In
October 1996, the Government of the Republic of Croatia established a commission entrusted with the task of examining the
Constitutional Law and making proposals for its revision. The Venice Commission appointed Rapporteurs (Messrs
Batliner, Helgesen, Maas Geesteranus, Matscher, Özbudun and Ms Suchocka) to
participate in the work of this commission. The members of the Venice Commission met the Croatian Commission for the
Revision of the Constitutional Law in Zagreb in March and May 1997. Following these meetings,
in June 1997 the Venice Commission forwarded a memorandum to the Croatian
authorities containing the orientations and conclusions concerning the revision
of the Constitutional Law. In accordance with the Venice Commission’s proposal, a consultative body, the
Council of National Minorities, was set up in which representatives of
minorities sit and discuss questions concerning minority protection policy with
Government representatives and officials.
The
Venice Commission Rapporteurs noted however that, regrettably, no significant
progress has been made with regard to the revision of the law. They also noted
that the Croatian authorities had not yet indicated any time-table for the
revision.
Participants
in the meeting agreed that provisions concerning electoral rights of members of
minorities and representation of minorities in the Croatian Parliament should
be dealt with as a matter of urgency, having regard to the forthcoming
legislative elections. The present electoral practice could raise doubts as to
its compatibility with the Framework Convention for the protection of national
minorities and it might be appropriate to revise the relevant provisions in
order to safeguard the interests of minorities and voter anonymity. Proposals
made by the Council of national minorities should be carefully considered,
together with comments by other governmental and non-governmental institutions.
It
was further felt that action should be taken without any further delay to
enshrine specific minority rights at a constitutional level. This can be done
either by the revision of the suspended provisions or by drafting an entirely
new constitutional law. The proposals included in the Venice Commission Memorandum
are still very relevant and should be taken into consideration. Participants
invited the Croatian legislative authorities to take action in this respect and
to communicate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the
Venice Commission the time-table for the revision. It was also stressed that
the forthcoming elections should not be regarded as a reason for further
delaying the drafting of the revised (or the new) Constitutional Law.
The Commission considered that the adoption of legal measures
regarding the status of minorities in Croatiawas now urgent, in particular as regards electoral rights and procedures for
the election and effective participation of members of minorities in public
life. It invited the Croatian authorities to start, without any further delay,
the drafting of a revised Constitutional Law on the Rights of National
Minorities and to inform the Parliamentary Assembly and the VeniceCommission of the time-table scheduled for the revision.
Active co-operation with Croatia in
this field is expected in 1999.
During 1998 the Commission
continued its examination of Estonian constitutional reform concerning the
constitutional issues involved in Estonia’s
possible accession to the European Union and the
question of the reform of the system of constitutional control in Estonia. Both these
opinions had been requested by the Minister of Justice during 1997.
- Accession to the European Union
At the 34th Plenary
Meeting, the Venice Commission Rapporteurs underlined the profound changes due
to accession to the European Union which are accompanied by a massive transfer
of sovereignty to the EU. They highlighted the principles of direct effect and
primacy of Community law over national law, including the Constitution. By
comparing the Estonian Constitution to those of members of the European Union
they came to the conclusion that a general empowerment clause was advisable.
This would both allow for the participation of Parliament in EU affairs, which,
being foreign affairs otherwise would fall exclusively within the competence of
the executive, and for guaranteeing the primacy of European law in the Estonian
system of quasi diffuse constitutional control.
In subsequent meetings, the
Commission noted with satisfaction that its suggestions on this issue had been
taken into account by the Estonian Governmental Commission and there had been a
proposal in the intermediary report of the Estonian Governmental Commission to
reform the Estonian Constitution by creating an empowerment clause making
possible the transfer of competences to the European Union. Some other issues,
however, remained unresolved
- System of Constitutional Reform
At its 34th Plenary
Meeting the Commission was informed that the governmental commission on the
revision of the Constitution had elaborated proposals for the creation of a Constitutional Court and a reform of the Supreme Court respectively. The Commission favoured this development.
* * * * * *
The consolidated opinions on these
two questions drawn up on the basis of the rapporteurs’ comments were adopted
by the Commission at its 35th Plenary Meeting. The text of these opinions appears in Part B.
The Commission followed closely constitutional
developments in Georgia
throughout 1998.
Mr Özbudun reported to the Commission on the meeting held in Tbilissi
on 7-8 July which dealt with the possible revision of the Constitution of
Georgia which would introduce a rather parliamentarian style of government as
opposed to the current presidential system.
However, developments in this direction were not regarded as imminent.
Moreover, the Commission was informed of the activities of the Constitutional Court. There had been considerable opposition to a decision
taken by the Constitutional Court of Georgia on Item 1, Article 86 of the
Georgian Organic Law “on courts of ordinary jurisdiction” which precluded the
mass removal from office of ordinary judges.
The Commission declared its readiness to assist the Georgian authorities
and the Constitutional Court in
establishing a well functioning system of constitutional control.
Mr Kim, Senior Prosecutor, Ministry
of Justice of Korea, participated in the Commission’s 35th
Plenary Meeting and presented a report on "The Legal Analysis of the
Special Relationship between South and North Korea and the accomplishment of the rule of law in the Korean
peninsula".
The Commission noted that the
situation in Korea raised a number of questions in which the Commission is
keenly interested, such as the legal engineering by which states co-operate
with each other and form special relationships and the solutions which can be
found to bring states gradually closer together while at the same time
guaranteeing rights for individual citizens.
The Commission declared its
willingness to remain in contact with the Korean authorities.
During 1998 the Commission continued its co-operation with Kyrgyzstan and followed the process of constitutional reform
in this country.
At its 36th Plenary Meeting the Commission was
informed that a referendum on a modification of the Constitution had been held
in Kyrgyzstan. Major
points of the constitutional reform, which had been instigated by the
President, were:
- the
introduction of private ownership of land (this point had encountered
resistance from Parliament);
- a modification of the structure of the two chambers of
Parliament and new electoral districts;
- the obligation for candidates in elections to have lived at
least five years in the Republic;
- the introduction of a functional immunity for
parliamentarians as opposed to the existing system of full immunity;
- the need for an agreement by the government, before
Parliament can introduce new taxes;
- the prohibition of any laws which will
restrict the freedom of the press.
Moreover, the following workshops and seminars were held in Kyrgyzstan during 1998:
- Workshop
on Judicial independence and incompatibilities of the function of judge with
other activities (Bishkek, 20-21 April 1998);
- UNESCO
seminar on Democratic Governance in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society
(Bishkek, 7-11 September 1998)
At its 37th Plenary Meeting the Commission was
informed that the chapter on human rights and freedoms of the Latvian
Constitution had been adopted. This text
was intended to supplement the 1922 Constitution, which did not contain any
human rights provisions, even though a Constitutional law on human and
citizens’ rights and obligations had been passed in 1991. Almost all the rights safeguarded by this
text were secured to foreign nationals as well as Latvian citizens, with the
exception of political rights, the right of access to the civil service and the
right not to be extradited.
There were plans to introduce a right of individual
petition before the Latvian Constitutional
Court. It was envisaged that the Commission and the
Sub-Commission on Constitutional Justice would be asked for their opinion on
this matter.
By a letter dated 29 January 1998 and following
discussions between representatives of the central authorities of Moldovaand the Council of Europe, the President of the Parliament of Gagauzia, Mr
Pashali, submitted the draft Legal Code of Gagauzia to the Council of Europe
for opinion. Mr Malinverni was appointed Rapporteur together with Mr De
Bruycker (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE)).
The rapporteurs visited Chisinau on 16 March 1998 to meet representatives of the Moldovan authorities and
the Gagauz community as well as the group of experts involved in drafting the
Legal Code. The discussions focused on
the content of the Code and the holding of a referendum on the basic principles
of the Code, on the same day as the general elections.
A further meeting was held in Strasbourg on 9 April 1998 at
which the rapporteurs adopted an opinion which was forwarded to the Moldovan
authorities as requested.
At the Commission’s 35th Plenary Meeting, in
the presence of Ms Gorea Costin, Permanent Representative of Moldova to the
Council of Europe and Mr Pashali, Chairman of the People’s Assembly of
Gagaouzia, the rapporteurs summarised the
main comments made in the opinion. These included:
a) the
hierarchy of norms to be applied in Gagaouzia: the Statute did not make clear
the position of the Moldovan legislation with respect to the Statute;
b) the
distribution of powers was not clear from the text and some articles attributed
powers to the bodies of Gagaouzia which belonged to the central government of
Moldova, notably giving them the power to organise local referenda on
constitutional issues;
c) legislative problems relating to the
fact that other texts had been copied by the Statute;
d) the
chapter on human rights had been copied from the Constitution of Moldova and
therefore did not introduce anything new in the legal order of the region;
e) some
provisions of the European Charter of Local Self-Government had not been
respected;
f) the
electoral system was not sufficiently defined;
g) the text
did not clearly state that Gagaouze courts could not be responsible for the
control of constitutionality.
The rapporteurs added a certain
number of issues arising from the text approved by the Popular Assembly. They
noted that provisions which state that the Gagaouzian court rather than
Moldovan authorities should decide on whether local entities join Gagaouzia are
contrary to the Moldovan Constitution.
There is also a question relating to whether the rights in the
Gagaouzian Statute apply to everyone or only to citizens.
Ms Gorea Costin expressed the
gratitude of the Moldovan authorities to the rapporteurs for their work and
pointed out that the concern over certain provisions of the Statute outlined by
the opinion was shared by the governmental experts dealing with the issue. She
suggested that the co-operation over this issue between Moldovan authorities,
representatives of Gagaouzia, the Venice Commission and the Congress of Local
and Regional Authorities should be pursued.
Mr Pashali thanked the Commission
for its assistance. He recalled that the decision to create Gagaouzian autonomy
was taken by the Moldovan Parliament in 1994 and outlined the progress which
had been made since then. He informed the Commission that the text had been
approved by the People's Assembly of Gagaouzia on 14 May 1998. There was
however still a need for further co-operation.
At the 36th Plenary Meeting, the Commission
examined the Statute of Gagauzia as
adopted. The Statute did not correspond to the comments made by the Commission
on the following points and seemed to be in conflict with the Constitution of
Moldova :
Gagauz autonomy
Article 2 of the Code, on the hierarchy of legislation, still
appears to omit Moldovan laws and talks only of the direct and exclusive action
of the Legal Code on Gagauz territory. According to Article 2, paragraph 3 the
hierarchy is as follows: (i) the Moldovan Constitution; (ii)
the Legal Code of Gagauzia;
(iii) Gagauz laws.
However, certain other articles include the law on the
special legal status of Gagauzia (Articles 70, 98 and 100) and Moldovan laws
(Articles 6, 8, 83 and 89) in this hierarchy just below the Moldovan
Constitution, which may give rise to confusion.
There has been no change to
the wording of Article 8 (numbered Article 7 in the version examined by the
experts) on the incorporation of areas with a majority Gagauz population into
Gagauzia, in spite of the fact that the Working Group considered that it failed
to comply with the provisions of the Organic Law on the status of Gagauzia
(particularly Article 5 thereof).
According to the Organic Law on the status of Gagauzia the organisation
of a referendum is the responsibility of the Moldovan authorities. Therefore,
the Court of Gagauzia is not entitled to confirm the results as stated in
Article 8, paragraph 7 of the Legal Code.
Human rights
The text of the Legal Code adopted by the People’s
Assembly of Gagauzia has retained the chapter on human rights, thereby
reiterating the guarantees provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.
The original wording of
Article 19, stipulating that “no-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life”,
has been retained, although the death penalty has been abolished in Moldova;
this statement may be regarded as contrary to Moldovan legislation because it
could be construed that it is possible to inflict the death penalty in a
“non-arbitrary” manner.
It is not stipulated in Articles 25 paragraph 2, 26, 27,
37 paragraph 1 and 40 whether the fundamental rights guaranteed therein apply
to everyone on Gagauz territory (including foreigners) or just to Gagauz
“citizens”.
Separation of powers
Though some of the
rapporteurs’ recommendations on the powers of the People’s Assembly have been
taken into account in the new version of the Legal Code, Article 51 paragraph 7
still states that the Assembly is entitled to “decide on the procedure for the
composition and functioning of the local authorities”. This provision may be
regarded as contrary to the European Charter of Local Self-Government which
grants local authorities a considerable degree of independence in the area of
management. This is not taken into account in the latest version of the Legal
Code.
Electoral system
There are no articles on the electoral system in the
Legal Code.
Conclusions
The Commission concluded that quite a number of positive
changes have been made in the Legal Code adopted by the People’s Assembly of
Gagauzia compared to the text originally submitted to the Council of Europe
experts. However, it is to be regretted that some of the recommendations
contained in the opinion on the Legal Code of Gagauzia have not been taken into
account.
However, the Commission understood
that a political compromise had been reached between the Gagauz and Moldavian
authorities not to touch on the subject for the time being. Work is continuing in 1999.
By letter dated 29 June 1998 from Mr Issà, First
Vice-President of the National Assembly of Mozambique, the Commission received
a request for assistance in the process of the revision of the Constitution of
Mozambique. The Committee of Ministers
of the Council had authorised co-operation between the Commission and Mozambique. This work would be financed by an Italian
contribution managed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
in Maputo.
At
its 36th Plenary Meeting the Commission held an exchange of views
with Mr Issà. He informed the Commission
that since 1975 Mozambiquehad had a Marxist constitution. In 1990, a new pluralistic Constitution based
on a market economy had been drawn up with the help of, inter alia, the
Portuguese member of the Commission. Now, a new draft constitution had been
drawn up. The main points of the reform were citizenship law, better developed
fundamental rights, a prime minister who would head government as opposed to
the President in the current system, a State Council which would advise the President
following the Portuguese model, the creation of the institutions of an
ombudsman and a constitutional court. Most points were already agreed upon.
Transitional provisions had yet to be drafted. Public hearings were about to
start and would last until the end of December 1998.
The Commission declared its readiness to assist Mozambique in its
process of constitutional reform.
The Commission’s fruitful
co-operation with Romania continued during 1998 in particular concerning the
draft laws on the organisation of Government and on the functioning of
Ministries.
At the 34th Plenary
Meeting the rapporteurs presented their opinions on the above draft laws in the
presence of Mr Nastase, Deputy Speaker of the Romanian Parliament, representing
the Parliamentary Assembly. The latter informed the Commission on the recent
normative activity of the Parliament.
The Rapporteurs’ comments on these
laws were forwarded to the Romanian authorities.
During its 35th Plenary
Meeting the Commission held an exchange of views with Mr Stoica, Minister of
Justice of Romania. Mr Stoica thanked
the Commission for its role in developing democracy in central and eastern Europe and in
particular in Romania. He referred, in particular, to the above-mentioned
examination by the Commission of the draft laws on the organisation of
government and the functioning of ministries.
Mr Stoica indicated that the
crucial issue for the current government in Romania was the deepening of institutional reform, including
central government. Its goals are the modernisation of the state and
decentralisation by developing local government. Reform of key institutions -
including the parliament, the judiciary, the electoral system and local
government - is underway. He mentioned that the parliament had now regained
much of its importance vis-à-vis the government and that draft laws had been
prepared to change the electoral system from political parties list to
individual candidates competing for places. He also referred to reform of
public administration, which will be forced to devolve some of its tasks to a
local level, and the statute of public servants which is being rewritten.
With regard to the judiciary, he
noted that efforts had been made to help the judiciary handle the high number
of cases. In the past, the major threats to the judiciary included low
salaries, complicated judicial procedures, lack of trust from ordinary
citizens, poor working conditions and lack of human resources. Although
problems remained, he noted that substantial progress had been made. Major
changes to the law on judicial organisation, although not welcomed by all
prosecutors, had highlighted the distinction between them and judges. He
mentioned that the new National Institute for Magistrates had been reformed in
order to respond to the need for new entrants to have both practical skills as
well as theoretical knowledge. Salaries for judges had doubled. He also noted
that reflection groups had been set up to consider improvements to the civil and
criminal procedure and the criminal law. The aim of all these measures was to
strengthen judicial independence and bring justice closer to the citizens of Romania.
Mr Stoica agreed that the role and
place of prosecutors was a crucial issue for democracies in transition and had
caused much debate in Romania. He noted that it was particularly pertinent in
post-Communist countries, where prosecutors had previously had a continually
increasing power which they tried to keep after the changes. When the constitution
in Romania had been drafted, the prosecutors had formed a very
efficient lobby and it was not possible to have a clear constitutional rule on
the relationship between judges and prosecutors. It had been possible to
establish that all prosecutors were under the authority of the Minister of
Justice but the meaning of this concept was not easy to determine. In Romania, a specific law had been adopted in which the principle
of the separation of powers had been clearly expressed. It stated that the judicial
power was independent and equal to the other powers and that the judicial power
included prosecutors. After the elections in 1996, Mr Stoica had proposed that
the law be changed to have a clear distinction between judges and prosecutors.
After much debate, the law was changed and it was made clear that the judicial
power included judges but not prosecutors. The meaning of "under the
authority of the Minister of Justice" was also clarified. In Mr Stoica's
opinion, it was not so important to say whether prosecutors belong to the
executive power or not but rather to distinguish between judges and
prosecutors. It was also not appropriate to speak of the executive
subordination of prosecutors: while the executive power could communicate
general criminal policy to prosecutors it should not interfere in prosecutors'
work.
The Commission took note of the
information and developments which are of particular importance for the reforms
which are taking place in several countries in transition.
i)
Chairs
in Intergovernmental Relations and Co-operative Governance
1998 was the year in which a
second programme between the Commission and South Africa came into force, once again funded by the Swiss
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Two chairs in intergovernmental
relations and co-operative government were established in early 1998 at the University of Natal and the University of Fort Hare.
Co-operative government which signifies co-operation between local,
provincial and central levels of government, is a new concept in the South
African Constitution of 1996 (see Chapter 3). According to the Presidential
Review Commission, which undertook a major review of government in South Africa in 1998, the structures of intergovernmental relations
are identified as being particularly weak. The two chairs aim to establish a
permanent research capacity on co-operative government, to promote the
understanding of co-operative government and the functioning of the South
African system of government among prospective public officials, to support the
Department of Constitutional Development in developing the concepts of
co-operative government and to develop a theoretical basis for developing
intergovernmental relations in South Africa. Both chairs became fully
operational in 1998. Details on the functioning of the two chairs can be found
in the Annual Reports for 1998 (CDL-INF (99) 2 - University of Natal, andCDL-INF(99)3 - University of Fort Hare).
ii)
« Democracy,
from the law book to real life »
The Commission continued to implement activities within
the framework of the programme « Democracy, from the law book to real
life ».
One of the highlights in 1998 was the organisation of two
major conferences with the South
African Constitutional Court. The
first dealt with « Equality
Jurisprudence ». A large delegation from the Commission attended the
conference, led by Mr La Pergola and composed of constitutional court
presidents and judges and constitutional experts from Austria, Belgium, Canada, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Spain and Switzerland. The
second conference focused on « National
and international human rights law, with particular reference to customary law
and freedom of expression ». This conference was enlarged to include
judges from a total of nine countries in the Southern African region. One of
the aims of the conference was to examine the possibility of developing closer
links between courts in Southern Africa, using
the Commission as a model. The conference provided an opportunity for the
Commission to develop its vision of regional co-operation, an initiative which
is strongly supported by Mr Valli Moosa, Minister for Constitutional
Development, and which the Commission hopes to pursue with the Department for
Constitutional Development during 1999 with a conference for the Southern
African region on « African renaissance ».
Other activities which were carried out included :
- three
workshops in South Africa on
local government training, local government elections and the rationalisation
of laws;
- provision
of a European expert to spend four weeks in South Africa delivering training on
local government finance around the country;
- two
visits for South African experts to Europe on the process of establishing a
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Cultural, Linguistic and
Religious Communities in South Africa and on civic education;
- two
visits by European experts to the National School of Government, Administration
and Development at UNISA to deliver lectures on intergovernmental relations;
- four
scholarships for young lecturers from the National School of Government,
Administration and Development at UNISA to carry out research in Europe;
- participation
of South African experts in two seminars organised by the Commission :
« New trends in electoral law in a pan-European context » in Sarajevo and « The principle of
respect for human dignity in European case-law » in Montpellier.
A more complete description of activities can be found in
the Interim Report of the programme « Democracy, from the law book to real
life » for 1998 (CDL-INF (99) 1).
Although the programme
was originally to finish at the end of 1998, it was decided to extend it until
the end of 1999.
Co-operation with “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” continued
during 1998 in particular concerning the following questions :
- Opinion
on the laws on referendum and citizen initiative
During 1997 the Commission had been
requested by the authorities of “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” to
examine the draft law on referendum and
citizen initiative of "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia".
Rapporteurs were appointed.
At its 35th Plenary
Meeting the Commission examined the rapporteurs’ comments on the law and held
an exchange of views.
The representative of “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” informed the Commission that the Parliament had
already made several amendments to the draft examined by the Commission. The law had been adopted on 9 May 1998. Some of the
proposals made by the Rapporteurs had been followed, in particular the proposal
to allow the constitutional court to decide on the legality of the decision to
hold a referendum.
A consolidated opinion
was drawn up based on the Rapporteurs’ comments. The text of this opinion appears in Part B.
- Discussion
on the draft law on the election of members for the Parliament
At its 35th
Plenary Meeting, the Commission discussed the draft law on the election of
members to the Parliament in the presence of Mr Owen, Rapporteur. Mr
Owen noted that there are certain practical problems in the draft law which may
be difficult to resolve. He however considered that a balance between democracy
and efficiency had been found in the draft law in the context of the electoral
commission, which was divided between judges appointed by assemblies and party
delegates (5 from the party in power and 5 from the opposition). In respect of
the electoral system, Mr Owen noted that the current system is a majority and
uninominal system based on two rounds. The draft law will allow for part of the
seats to be allocated on the basis of proportional representation, with a
threshold of 5%. Under the majority system, a successful candidate needs to
obtain one third of voters registered in the first round. Mr Owen considered
this participation threshold to be too low if the holding of a second round is
to be avoided. Although in new democracies there is a tendency for the level of
voter participation to decrease at first when the obligation to vote is taken
away, it nonetheless rises subsequently. For this reason, Mr Owen considered it
dangerous to fix thresholds at all.
Following a request from the
Ministry of Justice, the Commission examined, at its 35th Plenary
Meeting, a report drawn up by the Ukrainian authorities on the reform of the
executive branch in Ukraine. The
Commission’s comments were forwarded to the competent Ukrainian authorities.
In addition the following seminars were organised in Ukraine during
1998 :
- Seminar on The budget of the Constitutional Court : control and management - 19-20 January (Kiev)
- Workshop
on the principles of constitutional control : techniques of constitutional and
statutory interpretation in co-operation with USAID - 5-6 June (Kiev)
- Seminar
on the role of the Constitutional court in the implementation of constitutional
law in co-operation with USAID - 7-8 October (Lviv)
The Venice Commission was contacted, first by the British
and then by the Austrian Presidency of the European Union, with a view to a
possible contribution to the solution of the Kosovo crisis.
The Commission set up a Working Group on Kosovo, chaired
by Mr Scholsem (Belgium) and
including the participation of a representative of the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE). Following meetings in Rome on 16 July 1998 and,
at the invitation of the Austrian Presidency of the European Union, in Vienna on 21 August 1998, the
working group approved a Draft Outline of
main elements for an agreement on Kosovo. This text tried to outline a
possible future status of Kosovo, taking into account both the realities on the
ground, the constitutional developments on the territory of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in particular as from 1974, applicable
international law and relevant precedents from other countries. The main
features for the proposed agreement between the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia and
Kosovo may be summarised as follows:
- Kosovo would remain part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia;
- The
Republic of Yugoslavia would exercise on the territory of Kosovo only such responsibilities as are defined by the agreement;
- The
Republic of Serbia would no longer exercise any
powers on the territory of Kosovo, responsibilities exercised
elsewhere within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia by the Republics would be exercised by Kosovo;
- Kosovo
would however not obtain the status of a third Republic of Yugoslavia;
- Kosovo
would be represented within the Chamber of Citizens but not within the Chamber
of the Republics of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Kosovo would not be represented within the
organs of the Republic of Serbia;
- Kosovo
would have its own constitution;
- The
material provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights would be
directly applicable within Kosovo;
- The
rights of members of national minorities would enjoy particular protection
within Kosovo, including the application of Council of Europe standards and
specific additional rules;
- The
Agreement would prevail over any inconsistent provision of the constitutions or
laws of the Parties;
- A
special Court with international participation would be set up to ensure that
the Parties respect the provisions of
the agreement.
The text approved by the working group was made available
to the member States of the
Council of Europe and representatives of the international community dealing
with the Kosovo issue. The committee of Ministers took note of the text and
encouraged the Commission and the CLRAE to pursue with their efforts.
Following the approval of the draft agreement prepared by
Ambassador Hill as the basis for further negotiations, the working group was
invited on several occasions to comment on various versions of the draft or
certain aspects of it. A considerable number of these comments were taken into
account by the negotiators, although the fundamental structure of the paper
remained unchanged. The chairman of the Working Group took part in two sessions
of the contact group at expert level on the Kosovo issue as part of the
delegation of the EU Presidency.
1. By letter dated 4 December 1997, the Chairperson of the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly, Mr
Birger Hagård, asked the European Commission for Democracy through Law to give
an opinion on recent amendments to the major constitutional provisions of
Albania, concerning:
- the High Council of Justice
(Article 15 of Chapter V of the Law on the Major Constitutional Provisions);
- additional rules on the rotation
of the judges of the Constitutional Court (Articles 18 and 18/1 of
Chapter V of the Law on the Major Constitutional Provisions);
- new rules on the public
administration of unlawful economic activity (Article 10 of Chapter I of the
Law on the Major Constitutional Provisions).
2. The Minister of State for Legislative Reform and
Parliamentary Relations of the Republic of Albania, Mr Arben Imami, addressed
a further request to the Commission to examine these three issues.
3. The Commission held a preliminary discussion at the
meeting of the Sub-Commission on Constitutional Reform on 5 March 1998 and at its Plenary Meeting on 6 to 7 March 1998, on the
basis of written contributions by Mr Bartole (Italy), Mr Holovaty (Ukraine), Mr Lopez Guerra (Spain) and Mr Said Pullicino (Malta).
The present text was
approved at the meeting of the Sub-commission on Constitutional Reform on 15 April 1998 in Paris with Mr Triantafyllides (Cyprus) in the chair.
I. ARTICLE
15 OF CHAPTER V ON THE HIGH COUNCIL OF JUSTICE
A. The
new law
4. Article 15 of Chapter V of the Law on the Major
Constitutional Provisions was amended on 27 August
1997. The additions made are
shown in italics in the following amended version of Article 15:
"The High
Council of Justice is headed by the President of the Republic and is composed
of the Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation, the Minister of Justice, the
General Prosecutor, and nine lawyers distinguished for their abilities. They
are elected once in five years as provided by Law, enjoying no right for
immediate re-election, as follows:
- Three members are from the ranks
of the Judiciary;
- Two members are from the ranks of
the prosecutors;
- Four members are elected by the
Parliament out of whom two are from the ranks of lawyers, one from the
professors of the Law Faculty and one from the ranks of the Judiciary.
The High Council
of Justice is the only authority which decides upon the nominating,
transferring and disciplinary responsibilities regarding the judges of the
first level, those of Appeal and prosecutors, as well.
The High Council
of Justice's way of operation and exercising its activity is defined in the
internal rules it approves."
B. Observations
by the Commission
- The role of a High Council of
Justice
5. Many European democracies have incorporated a
politically neutral High Council of Justice or an equivalent body into their
legal systems - sometimes as an integral part of their Constitution - as an
effective instrument to serve as a watchdog of basic democratic principles.
These include the autonomy and independence of the judiciary, the role of the
judiciary in the safeguarding of fundamental freedoms and rights, and the
maintaining of a continuous debate on the role of the judiciary within a
democratic system. Its autonomy and independence should be material and real as
a concrete affirmation and manifestation of the separation of powers of the
State. Obviously, such a Commission or Council could, if abused, be an
instrument of undue interference by the Executive and a means for undermining
the independence of the judiciary. This situation would be further aggravated
where this body merely appears to have the legitimacy of a constitutional organ
that should ensure the independence of the judiciary, but, in practice, it is
used to subjugate the judiciary on behalf of the Executive.
6. The main task of such an institution is to exercise powers
formerly attributed to the executive power and parliament concerning the
administration of the judiciary. Among these powers, the Albanian Law includes
"nominating, transferring and disciplinary responsibilities" with
respect to judges.
7. Although from a comparative standpoint, the composition
and powers of these Councils vary considerably, all of them share a common
characteristic. The reason for their existence is due to a desire to safeguard
the independence of the judiciary, i.e., to guarantee that the judge, in his or
her capacity as the solver of conflicts, is subject only to the law and the
Constitution and free from all other influences, be they public or private.
8. The Albanian Law on the Major Constitutional Provisions
proclaims the independence both of the judicial power as a whole (Article 1,
Chapter V: "The judicial power is separate and independent from the other
powers") and of the individual judge (Article 8, Chapter V: "In
exercising their competencies the judges are independent and subject only to
the Law on the Major Constitutional Provisions and to other laws in
general"). The collective independence of the judiciary as a whole must be
considered as a guarantee of the individual judge’s independence with respect
to the Executive. This collective independence is reflected in the powers
vested in the High Council of Justice as an autonomous constitutional organ.
- Composition of the High
Council of Justice
9. An autonomous Council of Justice that guarantees the
independence of the judiciary does not imply that judges may be self-governing.
The management of the administrative organisation of the judiciary should not
necessarily be entirely in the hands of judges. In fact, as a general rule, the
composition of a Council foresees the presence of members who are not part of
the judiciary, who represent other State powers or the academic or professional
sectors of society. This representation is justified since a Council’s
objectives relate not only to the interests of the members of the judiciary,
but especially to general interests. The control of quality and impartiality of
justice is a role that reaches beyond the interests of a particular judge. The
Council’s performance of this control will cause citizens’ confidence in the
administration of justice to be raised. Furthermore, in a system guided by
democratic principles, it seems reasonable that the Council of Justice should
be linked to the representation of the will of the people, as expressed by
Parliament.
10. Another reason for including members other than judges in
the Council of Justice is to counteract the tendency to protect one’s group to
the detriment of the common good.
11. Constitutional provisions often require other
professionals apart from judges to be present in these entities. This is the
case in Italy, Spain, France, Greece and Portugal. As far as the appointment
of the members is concerned, a majority of constitutions provide for some of
the councillors to be elected by members of the judiciary, but the provision that
some members must be either ex officio or elected by the executive or
legislative power is also common. A combination of these two elements may also
be found, e.g. in France, Italy and Portugal.
12. However, no uniform standard rule appears to exist concerning
the composition of the High Council of Justice. Nevertheless, a basic rule
appears to be that a large proportion of its membership should be made up of
members of the judiciary and that a fair balance should be struck between
members of the judiciary and other ex officio or elected members. The
Commission has underlined the need for such a balance already in its opinion of
4 December 1995 on Chapter VI of the
Transitional Constitutional of Albania (documentCDL(95)74 rev.).
13. The composition of the Albanian High Council of Justice
seems to follow this pattern and the numerical balance struck appears to be
substantially acceptable. It presents a reasonable mix as to the qualifications
of its members, as well as a diversity of political backgrounds, the
Councillors being integrated in, or emanating from, different powers of the
State.
14. The High Council of Justice includes five judges (the
President of the Court of Cassation and four other career judges), three
prosecutors (the General Prosecutor plus two others), two lawyers, one
professor of law and two high-ranking members of the Executive (the President
of the Republic and the Minister of Justice). Therefore, from a professional
viewpoint, judges and prosecutors are clearly in the majority (eight out of
thirteen members). Experience and understanding of the problems confronted by
judges and prosecutors are thus reasonably guaranteed.
- Selection and appointment
procedure
15. Four members of the Albanian High Council of Justice are
ex officio members. These are the President of the Court of Cassation, the
Minister of Justice, the General Prosecutor and the President of the Republic.
16. The presence of the Minister of Justice on the Council is
of some concern, as regards matters relating to the transfer and disciplinary
measures taken in respect of judges at the first level, at the appeal stage and
prosecutors. The nomination of these judges and prosecutors has been
exclusively entrusted to the High Council of Justice, thereby removing these
decisions from undue political influence. However, it is advisable that the
Minister of Justice should not be involved in decisions concerning the transfer
of judges and disciplinary measures against judges, as this could lead to
inappropriate interference by the Government. It should be noted that in France the President of the
Republic and the Minister of Justice do not participate in the debates
concerning disciplinary sanctions.
17. Four other members are elected by Parliament and the five
remaining members are elected, as provided by law, from the ranks of the
judiciary (three) and of the prosecutors (two). Since only two members actually
belong to the Executive branch (the President of the Republic and the Minister
of Justice), sufficient independence from the Executive power is guaranteed.
The members elected by Parliament are actually six, since it also elects two of
the ex officio members: the President of the Court of Cassation and the General
Prosecutor (under Articles 6 and 14 of Chapter V of the Law, respectively).
This contrasts with only five members elected by the judges and prosecutors.
The Commission would have preferred, in accordance with its opinion expressed
already in documentCDL(95)74 rev., that a majority of the members be elected
by the judiciary.
18. As for the five members elected from the ranks of judges
and prosecutors, according to the information available to the Commission, they
are elected in separate meetings of all judges and prosecutors. This is however
not expressly provided for by the Constitution. While other matters may be left
to ordinary legislation, this important issue should be addressed by the
Constitution itself. A Statute might then specify that the three members who
are elected from the ranks of the judiciary should represent the various
judicial categories. Furthermore, the pool of judges from which the selection
is made might also be specified, such as two from the Judges of the Court of
Appeal and one from the judges of first instance.
19. The Albanian opposition has expressed concern about the
high number of members of the Council to be elected by Parliament. In general,
it seems legitimate to give Parliament an important role in designating members
of the Council. Taking into account the highly confrontational nature of
Albanian politics, a concern that all members elected by Parliament may tend to
represent the point of view of the parliamentary majority can however not be
dismissed out of hand. A solution should therefore be found ensuring that the opposition
also has some influence on the composition of the Council. One possibility
would be to require a two-thirds (as in Spain) or three-fourths majority
for the election of members by Parliament, another to provide that one of the
two lawyer members should be designated by the parliamentary opposition. In any
case, the presence of members nominated by the opposition but elected by
parliament should be ensured while taking procedural safeguards against the
risk of a stalemate.
- Re-election
20. Councillors who are not ex officio members may be elected
for a five-year term, with no possibility for re-election. The preclusion from
immediate re-election is destined to enhance the guarantees of independence of
the Council’s members.
21. Since there is no gradation in the turnover of the
Council, the elected members would end their terms simultaneously. Thus the
composition of the Council would change almost entirely, with the exception of
the ex-officio members. The influence of the ex-officio members within the
Council might thereby be unduly strengthened. In addition, a severe lack of
continuity in the Council’s work might result, due to the fact that the new
members would have to familiarise themselves with the tasks of the Council and
the transition from one composition to another would cause certain initiatives
undertaken by previous councillors to be abandoned or forgotten.
- Functions and powers
22. The Albanian constituent power has opted to give the High
Council of Justice an executive function, and not a consultative one. It is in
fact the only authority which decides upon the nominating, transferring and
disciplinary responsibilities regarding judges at ordinary and appeal levels,
as well as prosecutors. Thus the Executive and Parliament have renounced these
powers, delegating them to this Council. Some other countries have given to
their Council in addition the possibility to render advisory opinions on
envisaged legislative measures concerning the judiciary. The Albanian
authorities might wish to examine this possibility.
23. Whereas judges of both stages and prosecutors are subject
to the authority of the Council in matters of discipline, the President and
members of the Court of Cassation may be removed from office only on the basis
of a reasoned decision of the People’s Assembly where it is certified that they
have committed a serious criminal act, specifically provided for in law, or
where they are mentally incapacitated (Article 6 of Chapter V). It is debatable
whether the protection against removal accorded to the Judges of the Court of
Cassation is preferable to the protection granted to other judges and to
prosecutors under Article 15, since this article purports to have matters
relating to their duties and discipline decided by a body which is essentially
made up of their own peers.
- Procedural matters
24. Taking into account the specific situation in Albania, it would seem appropriate
to grant by statute to the members of the Council immunity from prosecution for
acts carried out in the exercise of their functions.
25. Article 15 finally provides that the High Council of
Justice defines its way of operating in the internal rules it approves. Any
such rules should be well defined and accessible for verification, especially
where proceedings regarding transferring and disciplinary responsibilities are
concerned. In matters of discipline, these internal rules should provide
adequate guarantees for the judges or prosecutors involved to have a fair and
impartial hearing with proper and sufficient safeguards for their fundamental
rights.
C. Conclusions
26. The setting up of bodies such as the High Council of
Justice is nowadays considered to be a means of achieving and strengthening the
autonomy of the judicial power. The Venice Commission has reasons to
expect that the amendments to Article 15 Chapter V, introduced by Law 8234 of 27 August 1997, provide for a High Council of Justice comparable to
those found in other European countries. Some technical improvements should be
made, such as providing for a gradual renewal of the Council. Taking into
account the specific situation in Albania, it seems advisable to take steps to
ensure that the parliamentary opposition also has a say in the designation of
the members of the Council; if this is respected and if Article 15 is correctly
applied, it should provide an effective tool for an independent judiciary in
line with those existing in other democratic countries.
II. ARTICLE
18 OF CHAPTER V ON THE ROTATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES
A. Background
27. To understand the present conflict between Parliament and
the Constitutional Court on this question, it is
necessary to give a brief overview of the developments leading to the present
situation.
28. Articles 18 and 23 of Chapter V of the Law on the Major
Constitutional Provisions on the Composition of the Constitutional Court were worded as follows:
"Article
18
The Constitutional Court is composed of nine
members, five elected by the People's Assembly and four by the President of the
Republic.
The members of the
Constitutional Court elect, through a secret
ballot, their chairman, who holds this office for three years with the right of
re-election.
The term of the
three members of the Constitutional Court, selected in the first election, ends
in three years. They are selected by casting lots among each group of judges
elected by the People's Assembly and by the President of the Republic. After
three other years, three other judges are replaced in the same way, by casting
lot. The newly elected judges hold their offices for a 12-year term.
Article
23
The term of a
Constitutional Court judge ceases when:
a) he does not exercise his duty for
justified reasons for more than six months;
b) he presents his resignation;
c) he is appointed to another position
which is not compatible with his judicial function;
d) his term expires; in this case, the
judge may continue to perform his functions beyond his term only if a case that
has begun cannot be concluded within his term.
When, for one of
the above-mentioned reasons, the term of the Constitutional Court judge ends
before the expiration of his stated term, either the People's Assembly or the
President of the Republic, depending on the means by which the judge was
initially elevated to the Court, elects a new judge who will remain in this
office until the end of the term of the replaced judge."
29. The members of the Constitutional Court took their office
in May 1992. Under section 3 of Article 18, the first rotation of
Constitutional Court judges therefore should have taken place in May 1995.
30. In late 1994, three judges of the Constitutional Court
resigned. These judges were replaced by three new judges in January 1995.
31. On 2 June 1995, the Constitutional Court, acting on its
own initiative, took a decision that the object and purpose of section 3 of
Article 18, to provide for a gradual renewal of the Constitutional Court, had
already been achieved by the resignation of the three judges and their
replacement and that therefore there was no necessity to proceed to a rotation
in May 1995. In the decision the Court
notes that the interpretation of constitutional laws is its prerogative and
that therefore its decision does not violate the principle of nemo iudex in causa sua.
32. On 19 November 1997, Parliament adopted a
Constitutional Law, Law No. 8257, adding further sections to Article 18 and
introducing a new Article 18/1 into the text of the Major Constitutional
Provisions:
"Article
18
......
The replacement of
a judge of the Constitutional Court for the reasons provided by
Article 23 is not considered as a rotation.
If the three-year
term finishes or when one of the reasons provided by Article 23 is verified,
the selection or the appointment of the new judge is done within 30 days.
The non-execution
of the rotation suspends the functions of the Constitutional Court.
If after the
execution of the rotation the new judges are not selected or appointed within
the above-mentioned term, the Constitutional Court functions with the members
left.
Article
18/1
The Constitutional Court should accomplish the first
rotation within 30 days of the entry into force of this law."
33. In a decision of the Constitutional Court of 5 December 1997 the reasons leading Parliament to the adoption of this
constitutional amendment are described as follows:
"In the
accompanying report justifying the law presented by a group of deputies, which
was turned into law upon its approval by the People's Assembly, the reasons
that dictated the need for the proposed law in question are set out. In
summary, these reasons are:
a) the Constitutional Court has not carried out its
duty, but has acted in contravention of the norms that require its renewal at
the end of the first three year term after its election;
b) the Constitutional Court has continually, and
especially with its last decision (the declaration of Article 7 of Law No. 8227
dated 30 July 1997 "On the financial
control of judicial non-banking persons who have borrowed money from the
general public" as unconstitutional) violated the major constitutional
provisions and the spirit of those provisions;
c) because the renewal that is ordered
by law was not carried out, ‘it is necessary to prohibit the Constitutional Court from the further performance
of its functions, as constitutionally delegitimated’;
d) the mistaken interpretation made by
the Constitutional Court of Article 18 of Law No. 7561 dated 29 April 1992 and the failure to perform the renewal show that it has
a political character, something which is also demonstrated by the position
that it has taken against measures of a social nature taken by the
Government."
34. On 5 December 1997, the Constitutional Court, acting on its own
initiative, decided that Article 2 of Law No. 8257, introducing the new Article
18/1 into the Major Constitutional Provisions, is unconstitutional since it
repeals a decision of the Constitutional Court and delegitimises the
Court.
B. Observations
by the Commission
35. Both the actions of the Constitutional Court and of Parliament require a
number of comments from the point of view of the Commission.
- As regards the decision of the
Constitutional Court of 2 June 1995
36. The Commission does not in any way question the fact that
the Constitutional Court of Albania is the body competent to interpret the
major constitutional provisions of this country. Nevertheless, the decision
taken seems unfortunate.
37. First of all, it is undisputed that the wording of Article
18 requires the replacement of three judges selected by the casting of lots
after three years. The Constitutional Court relies on the purpose of
Article 18 to arrive at a result which differs from the fairly clear wording.
As a matter of principle, it is true that the Constitutional Court does not necessarily have
to stick to the wording only but may take into account the object and purpose
of provisions as well as other relevant factors. However, it always requires
particular justification to arrive at a result which, at first sight, is in
contradiction to a fairly clear wording. The arguments put forward by the
minority of three judges, voting against the decision, seem convincing, in
particular that Article 23 of Chapter V of the Major Constitutional Provisions
provides that the term of office of a judge replacing another judge who has
resigned runs until the end of the term of the replaced judge. The replacement
of the judges did also not coincide with the date at which rotation should have
taken place. There was therefore no gap in the text which required having
recourse to general principles of interpretation.
38. The Constitutional Court should also have exercised
self-restraint since the personal interests of the judges taking the decision
were at stake. This necessarily diminishes the authority of the decision. The
Court itself was obviously aware of the circumstance as is evident from its
reference to the principle nemo iudex in
causa sua.
39. It would therefore certainly have been better if the Constitutional Court had stuck to the wording of
the constitutional provisions.
- As to the constitutional
amendments adopted on 19 November 1997
40. It is the prerogative of the constituent power to adopt
constitutional amendments. In the Albanian constitutional order there is no
provision which would prevent the constituent power from amending the
Constitution in order to make it clear that the interpretation given by the Constitutional Court to constitutional
provisions may no longer be regarded as valid. A requirement of rotation of Constitutional Court judges, even though some of
these judges have previously been replaced in a different manner, also in no
way violates Council of Europe standards. It was therefore legitimate for the
constituent power to change the Constitution after the Constitutional Court had
rendered a decision in contradiction to the intentions of Parliament,
especially as the amendment has an effect ex
nunc with the first rotation taking place within a month after the entry
into force of the amendment and not ex
tunc.
41. However, a number of qualifications have to be made:
a) First of all, it has to be noted that, if it is in
principle legitimate for Parliament to amend the Constitution to get around the
consequences of a decision of the Constitutional Court, this possibility should be
used sparingly. The authority of the Constitutional Court suffers if Parliament acts
in this way. In the present case, having regard to the problematic character of
the Constitutional Court's decision, the reaction by
Parliament seems nevertheless entirely understandable.
b) It is however disturbing that Parliament adopted these
constitutional amendments not as a reaction to the Constitutional Court's decision soon after the
decision but only 2 years and 5 months later. This gives the impression that
the intention of the amendment is not to rectify an interpretation by the Court
but to punish a Court which had rendered other decisions disagreeable to the
parliamentary majority. The texts cited by the Constitutional Court in its decision of 5 December 1997 confirm this suspicion. In a constitutional democracy,
the various State organs have to fulfil their role and such acts of one organ
against the other do not contribute to the consolidation of the democratic
institutions.
c) In addition, the provision that "the non-execution
of the rotation suspends the functions of the Constitutional Court" is inappropriate and
might harm the constitutional order of Albania. It goes against the common
interest both of the citizens and of the State, as the citizen is deprived of
the protection of his/her constitutional rights and the State is deprived of
the guarantees of one of its essential constitutional and democratic
institutions. Other solutions which would safeguard the proper functioning of
the constitutional order would have been more appropriate. An amendment of
Article 18 could, for instance, provide that, in the event of the Constitutional Court failing to perform the
rotation, there would be an alternative procedure, e.g. the President of the
Republic and the Speaker of the People's Assembly would perform the drawing of
lots for the rotation.
- As to the decision of the
Constitutional Court of 5 December 1997
42. If the constitutional amendment adopted by Parliament
deserves criticism, this decision of the Constitutional Court seems even more
irresponsible.
43. First of all, the major constitutional provisions of Albania provide no basis for the Constitutional Court to control the
constitutionality of constitutional amendments. The Constitutional Court could therefore not oppose
a constitutional amendment which in no way violates fundamental principles.
Secondly, the constitutional principle, that the decisions of the Constitutional Court are final and binding, does
not prevent the constituent power from amending the Constitution and thereby
depriving a previous decision of the Constitutional Court of its basis. The
Constitutional Court therefore overstepped the limits of its authority and
entered into a political dispute with the People's Assembly which can only be
to the detriment of the functioning of both organs.
44. In this context the Commission noted
that the President of the Constitutional Court, Mr Gjata, has been removed from
his office because of alleged co-operation during the communist period with the
Albanian security service and the security service of a neighbouring country.
The Commission is not called upon to express an opinion on this issue and will
not do so. It is also not in possession of all the facts. It wishes however to
underline that in proceedings against a judge of the constitutional court any
suspicion of a politically biased decision has to be avoided and that
applicable procedures have to be scrupulously respected.
C. Conclusions
45. In conclusion, the Commission would appeal both to the
Parliament and to the Constitutional Court of Albania to co-operate in a
climate of mutual respect between the organs of the State, with each organ
staying within the limits of its own powers. Each organ has its own functions
and has to resist the temptation to become a mere instrument in the partisan
struggle between political forces. Especially in a new democracy, such as Albania, it is important that the
citizens learn to respect the constitutional organs of the State and do not
regard them as simple emanations of political parties. This is only possible if
the State organs themselves act responsibly and show respect for each other.
46. The Commission therefore calls on the Constitutional Court
of Albania to respect the wish of the constituent power that the rotation of
the judges should be performed. It calls on the Albanian Parliament to modify
the provision leading to a suspension of the Constitutional Court. It expresses the hope that
both organs will, in the future, co-operate with each other and not fight
against each other.
III. ARTICLE
10 OF CHAPTER I ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF UNLAWFUL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
A. Background
47. Article 10 of Chapter I begins with a statement
proclaiming the freedom of economic enterprise, with the provision that this
freedom "should not affect the security, freedom and dignity of man".
The following four sections were added to Article 10 on 19 November 1997.
The unlawful
activity of private subjects, which widely touches the interests of social groups
or individuals, which opposes and damages the principles of the free market
economy and of the national and international economic and fiscal policies,
which infringes the economy and social stability of the country, is placed
under specialised national and international public institutions for
administration.
The degree of
intervention, as well as the control and administration of these private
subjects by the above-mentioned institutions, is defined by the law.
In these cases,
the State has the right and the duty to take possession of the property of
private subjects only for defence of the interests of injured parties.
No-one can be
denied the right to file a complaint in court against the control measures, the
administration and the disposal of his property, as well as to ask for full
compensation of damages suffered.
It should be noted that the
right to property appears in Article 27 of Chapter VI of the Major
Constitutional Provisions.
48. The Minister of State for Legislative Reform and Parliamentary
Relations of Albania, Mr Imami, has on two occasions provided the Venice Commission with
explanations concerning the background for the adoption of this constitutional
amendment. This amendment is, in fact, a reaction to problems caused by the so-called
"pyramid financial schemes" in Albania. In accordance with the
recommendations of the international financial institutions it proved to be
indispensable to put these schemes under the control of State-appointed
administrators to protect in particular the interests of the people having
invested in these schemes. This was done by a special law. The Albanian
Bankruptcy Law of 1995, is, according to the explanations given, a law drafted
outside Albania which has never been
applied within the country and which, under present conditions, it would be
impossible to apply to the pyramids.
49. By a decision dated 13 November 1997 (Appendix
III), the Constitutional Court of Albania declared this special law
incompatible with Articles 3, 10 (before the amendment) and 11 of Chapter I of
the Major Constitutional Provisions.
50. The constitutional amendment is destined to give a
constitutional basis to the control of the pyramid schemes by State-appointed
administrators.
B. Observations
by the Commission
51. There is no doubt that the social crisis precipitated by
the pyramid scandal warrants direct State intervention to control and rectify
the problem. The constitutional amendment therefore has a legitimate purpose.
It would certainly have been preferable had the legal order in Albania, in particular the
bankruptcy laws, provided a sufficient framework to cope with the scandal
without the need for specific ad hoc legislation. Nevertheless, the argument
that this was not possible in the Albanian case seems plausible.
52. The fact that the Constitutional Court had decided that there was
no sufficient constitutional basis for such State intervention does not prevent
the constituent power from introducing such a constitutional basis (see above,
para. 43). The need for State regulation of private property is acknowledged in
other constitutions and in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European
Convention of Human Rights.
53. The Commission sees therefore no reason to object to the
principle and purpose of the constitutional amendment.
54. However, the issue is whether Article 10 as amended is the
best means to achieve this purpose. The first section of the amendment, which
provides the basis for the State intervention, uses a large number of broad
concepts to which it is very difficult to give a precise legal meaning. The
Commission notes that Minister Imami has confirmed that for the State
intervention to be legal, all the various conditions have to be fulfilled
cumulatively and not alternatively. Therefore, the vague character of only one
or the other condition would not seem to matter so much. However, all three
conditions, i.e. that the activity
a) widely
touches the interests of social groups or individuals;
b) opposes and damages the principles of a free-market
economy and of the national and international economic and fiscal policies;
c) infringes the economic and social stability of the
country;
are difficult to define as a
matter of law.
55. It has to be acknowledged that already the previous text
contained general concepts, such as "the social interest".
Nevertheless, these concepts were more appropriate since the social interest is
linked to the general interest while now more problematic notions such as
"interests of social groups or individuals" are introduced.
56. The Commission notes however that the statute providing
for the administration of the assets of the pyramids contains a detailed
definition of the entities concerned.
57. The fact that only unlawful activities are concerned
according to the text introduces a more legal element. The exact meaning of
"unlawful" remains however puzzling. An activity which is as such
unlawful, e.g. drug-trafficking, can hardly be put under State administration.
The meaning seems more to be an economic activity which has been unlawfully
managed. If the unlawfulness resulted from the existing Albanian legislation,
it would seem that the amendment does not add a lot to the possibilities of
State intervention. It the unlawfulness does not result from existing legislation,
the constitutional amendment does not provide any basis for State intervention.
58. The definition of the conditions for State intervention in
this section therefore cannot be described as very successful. It has however
to be admitted that the very broad and general terms of the decision of the
Constitutional Court and the very succinct reasoning made the task of the
Albanian legislature very difficult. It also had to act under time pressure.
59. It is certainly welcome that the further sections require
that the degree of intervention is defined by law, that intervention should
only take place for the defence of the interests of injured parties and that
the control measures may be appealed to in court. The courts must have the
possibility to intervene at the different stages of the procedure.
60. Nevertheless, the impression remains that the text, which
responds to a pressing social need of the moment, is not viable as a long-term
principle of the Albanian constitutional order. In fact, it would have seemed
preferable, if indeed the Constitutional Court considers that the present
constitutional rules do not allow for such an intervention, to introduce a
provision on the right of the State to regulate private property into Article
27 of Chapter VI on the right to private property or to deal with this specific
problem within the framework of Article 41 of Chapter VI on the temporary
restriction of rights. A re-drafted Article 41 could specify conditions under
which the State is allowed to interfere in the private affairs of individuals
in order to preserve national security and to protect the public. Such
restrictions would have to be temporary in character and be replaced afterwards
by a comprehensive regulatory system designed to promote private sector
development as well as to control abuse.
61. A well-functioning bankruptcy, securities, taxation and
financial institutions framework will do more to stabilise Albania's society in the long-term
than the open-ended threat of State administration and expropriation.
Constitutions, by definition, should be difficult to change and the specificity
with which the issue of control of economic activity is set out in the law may
undermine the government's desire to restore public confidence in the stability
of Albania's institution and economy.
C. Conclusions
62. The Commission therefore notes that the constitutional
amendment has a legitimate purpose and may have been required by specific and
temporary needs. It cautions however against the repeated use of such ad hoc
constitutional amendments in the area of economic regulation and considers that
the text actually chosen should not be integrated as it is into the future
Constitution of Albania.
Introduction
1. In a letter of 25 September
1997,Mr Mato Tadic, Minister of Justice of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, requested the opinion of
the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) as regards the
competence of the Federation in criminal law matters. The request should be seen in the context of
the criminal code being drawn up by the Federal Ministry of Justice, with the
Council of Europe's assistance.
2. The Commission considered this matter at its 32nd
plenary meeting (Venice, 12-13 December 1997), on the basis of the
preliminary opinion of Mr Scholsem, Rapporteur, and in the presence of Mr Van
Lamoen, Deputy to the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Commission decided to resume its
examination at its next plenary meeting and invited Mr Scholsem to present a
draft report on the subject.
3. This opinion takes account of the views expressed at the
32nd plenary meeting, together with the explanations and clarifications
supplied to the Rapporteur by the Office of the High Representative and the
Council of Europe's Secretary General on the subject of the draft criminal code
prepared by the Federation authorities and Council of Europe experts. It was adopted by the Commission at its 34th
Plenary meeting (Venice, 6-7 March 1998).
Purpose of this opinion
4. The question is being interpreted in a broad sense to
include the Federation's competence to legislate in the fields of substantive
criminal law and criminal procedure, areas that are, to an extent,
interlinked. The reply necessarily
entails a examination of the division of competence between the State of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BH hereafter) and the two
entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH hereafter) and the
Republika Srpska (RS hereafter). It also
requires an examination of the division of powers in this area between the
Federation and its cantons.
The competence of the FBH regarding criminal law
vis-à-vis the State of BH
5. The fundamental rule for interpreting the constitutions
of BH (Appendix IV of the Dayton Agreements), the FBH and the RS is that the
two entities enjoy residual powers. The
Constitution of BH assigns only certain specific areas of competence to the
State, while the remainder lie with the federated entities (article III-3-a of
the Constitution of BH). The entities'
competence in principle for criminal law and criminal procedure is beyond all
doubt. It is simply limited by the
competences of the State of BH in this area, as provided
for in the Constitution of BH.
6. Of the areas of competence assigned to BH, only one
directly concerns criminal law matters in the broad sense of the term: this is
article III-1-g, which gives BH responsibility for "international and
inter-entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with
Interpol". This provision
undoubtedly confers a degree of competence upon BH in the area of criminal law
and criminal procedure. Our task is to establish the scope of that competence
as accurately as possible.
7. To assist in interpreting this provision, a comparison
may be made between article III-3-a of the Constitution of BH and the
equivalent provision of the Constitution of FBH (article III-1, as modified by
amendment VIII: "It is an exclusive
competence of the Federation ... stamping out terrorism, inter-cantonal crime,
unauthorised drug dealing and organised crime". The first version of the FBH Constitution
granted the Federation powers in the field of international criminal law, which
patently clashed with the Constitution of BH.
Although the new version has rectified this situation, it has still left
a certain ambiguity. The Venice
Commission had stressed the need to avoid any overlap with the powers granted
to the State of BH and proposed the setting up of joint institutions to
guarantee co-operation between BH and the Federation in the enforcement of
criminal law in international cases and cases involving more than one entity
(Commission opinion on the compatibility of the Constitutions of the Federation
of BH and the RS with the Dayton Constitution,
CDL (96) 56 revised 2, 4 September 1996, p. 7; Venice
Commission, Annual Report 1996). The
Commission does not appear to have identified in the wording of the two
constitutions a risk of conflict with regard to the exercise of legislative
power, but rather in the implementation of crime policy. The wording of article III-3-a of the
Constitution of BH seems to show that the competence it grants is a competence
in the field of implementation ("enforcement") and
co-ordination. It seems to be more a
matter of crime policy concerning crime on an international scale or extending
beyond the borders of the entities than competence for criminal law or criminal
procedure in the full sense of the term.
Article III-1-g of the Constitution of BH, which expressly refers to
relations with Interpol, is indicative in this respect.
8. Article III-1-g of the Constitution of BH does not
therefore appear to undermine the competence in principle of the FBH in the
field of substantive criminal law, that is the power to determine offences and
penalties.
9. However, that does not mean that article III-1-g is the
sole source of the competence of BH in criminal matters. BH may define certain acts as offences and
provide for punishment insofar as it needs to use the machinery of criminal law
to implement its powers and responsibilities.
Although such competence is not explicitly provided for in any text,
this is a logical consequence of the statehood of BH and the tasks entrusted to
it. Customs policy, for example, is a
prerogative of BH (article III-1-c of the Constitution of BH) and manifestly
requires the existence and application of a range of criminal measures for
which BH has competence and indeed sole competence. The same applies to criminal law relating to
the currency and monetary policy, immigration and international transport and
communication.
10. Similarly, it is clear that when the criminal law is
intended to protect certain values that fall within the state's area of
competence, BH must be responsible for enacting it. This will apply, for example, to the
protection of the international frontiers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its territorial
integrity, the symbols of the state, such as its flags and emblems, and its
constitutional system. The competences
of the two entities in criminal law do not therefore cover this field.
11. The above-mentioned competence of BH is admittedly
implicit, but this does not make it any less certain or exclusive. It is bound
up with the nature of the state and cannot be exercised by, or even delegated
to, the entities. If the two entities
were to start legislating in place of the state, the same subject matter would
be governed by different rules (leading, for example, to a conflict of rules
for protecting the frontiers), which could result in absurd, or even dangerous,
situations.
12. One suggestion is that the entities could legislate
provisionally in this area to avoid any possibility of a legal vacuum created
by the failure of the BH legislature to take action. For the reasons set out above, the Commission
cannot support this interpretation. The
Constitution of BH makes no provision for the entities to perform the functions
of the state on a substitute basis and such an initiative on the part of the
entities would appear to be in breach of the constitutional order of BH. It would in any case have little
justification since there appears to be no danger of such a legal vacuum. Thus, article 2 of Annex 2 of the
Constitution of BH ("Transitional Arrangements") clearly states that
"all laws, regulations and judicial rules of procedure in effect within
the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina when the Constitution enters into force
shall remain in effect to the extent not inconsistent with the Constitution,
until otherwise determined by a competent governmental body of Bosnia and
Herzegovina".
13. It should be noted, finally, that in another area the
Constitution of BH itself establishes a rule of criminal law by providing for
parliamentary immunity (article IV-3-j).
14. Subject to these reservations, it can be concluded that
the entities' competence in substantive criminal law is clearly established in
the constitutional system of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15. Regarding criminal procedure, the conclusion that BH is
not competent is strengthened by the fact that BH has no powers to establish
courts, other than the Constitutional Court. It difficult to envisage BH establishing a
system of criminal procedure before courts that do not come within its
jurisdiction. Moreover, the Constitution of the FBH contains numerous
provisions concerning criminal procedure, which have never attracted any
criticism (articles II-2-1 (b) and (e)relating to habeas corpus and fair
criminal proceedings; article IV-C-3 empowers the Federation to prescribe such
rules of procedure as may be necessary to ensure uniformity with regard to due
process). Article IV-C-8 establishes a criminal police
service responsible directly to the federal courts. Article V-11 institutes cantonal courts and
article VI-7-1 establishes municipal courts with general jurisdiction in all
civil and criminal matters.
16. It is clear from these provisions that criminal procedure
lies within the competence of the entities.
17. It has been asked whether, in the areas of criminal law
for which BH has exclusive competence, it should not also have the power to
establish rules of procedure concerning their implementation, including the
establishment of special courts. The
Commission believes this would not be compatible with the Constitution of BH,
which, as already noted, only provides for one court at state level: the Constitutional Court. Besides, there is nothing to prevent the
entities' courts from enforcing the laws enacted by the BH legislature. Admittedly, in the absence of a court of
ordinary instance at the state level, these laws might not always be uniformly
interpreted. However, any divergences in
the interpretation of state laws that might occur need not create significant
or insurmountable problems. In any
event, if variations in the interpretation of state laws by the entities'
judicial institutions does raise serious problems, these could be seen as a
threat to the constitutional order of BH and could thus be set aside by the
Constitutional Court of BH.
18. Briefly, the FBH is competent in the criminal field in all
the areas where BH has no specific competence.
BH has competence regarding criminal law and criminal procedure :
a. under
article III-1-g of its Constitution, for the implementation of a co-ordinated
crime policy, both internationally and between the entities;
b. whenever
the use of the criminal law is necessary for the exercise of one of its
constitutional powers or to protect the values of the state.
In the absence of any other
explicit granting of competences in this area, BH has no authority to lay down
the general principles or basic rules of criminal law or procedure. The drawing up of a criminal code containing
the above principles and rules is certainly outside its competence. It is thus an entity responsibility.
The competence of the FBH vis-à-vis the cantons
19. While the FBH is undoubtedly competent to draw up a
criminal code and a code of criminal procedure, it still has to be decided
whether this is the responsibility of the Federation itself or the
cantons. According to the Constitution
of the FBH, the cantons have residual powers (article III-4: "The cantons
shall have all responsibility not expressly granted to the Federation
Government. They shall have, in
particular, responsibility for: ...").
Prima facie, therefore, the cantons have competence in criminal
matters. However, a close examination of
the FBH Constitution reveals that the FBH has broad competence in this area and
that the constitutional logic points to a shared competence between the cantons
and the Federation.
- The Federation's
competence regarding specific areas of criminal law
20. Article III-1 of the Constitution lists the exclusive
competences of the Federation and article III-2 those that are shared between
the FBH and its cantons. These
provisions, as modified by amendments VIII and IX of 5 June 1996, contain no specific references to the criminal law,
apart from the aforementioned article III-1-f:
("stamping out terrorism, inter-cantonal crime, unauthorised drug
dealing and organised crime"). This
article appears to give the FBH a certain measure of competence in the criminal
field. Like the similar provision of the
Constitution of BH, it gives the FBH special competence regarding situations
exceeding the jurisdiction of cantons (inter-cantonal crime) or certain
particularly serious offences (terrorism, organised crime and drug
dealing). However, the competences of
the FBH, unlike those of BH, are not confined to the problems of co-ordinating
crime policy – the term criminal law enforcement does not appear in the FBH
Constitution. The FBH has the right to
draw up the relevant substantive criminal law provisions (see article IV-20-d
of the FBH Constitution). This is
clearly a broad competence since it covers all the types of criminal offence
likely to have inter-cantonal implications, which given the size of the cantons
will not be the exception.
21. Moreover, just as is the case with BH, the Federation's
competence is not simply based on article III-1-f of its Constitution but
extends, implicitly but unambiguously, to defining and punishing any act
established by it as an offence within the exercise of its exclusive powers and
responsibilities (for example with regard to the economy, land use or energy
policy) or shared powers and responsibilities (for example with regard to
guaranteeing and enforcing human rights, article III-2-a).
22. It also has exclusive competence to enact criminal
legislation to protect values – for example, symbols or territory - which, by
their nature, it alone is capable of protecting (see also para 27 below).
- The Federation's
competence regarding criminal procedure and the criminal justice system
23. It should also be borne in mind that the Federation has a
constitutional responsibility for ensuring respect for human rights (article
III-2-a) and for certain fundamental rules of criminal procedure. It can easily
be inferred from several constitutional provisions that the FBH has numerous
competences in the fields of criminal procedure and the criminal justice
system. For example, there are several
provisions of the FBH Constitution relating to criminal procedure (articles
II-2-1 (b) and (e) are concerned with safeguarding habeas corpus and the right
to a fair trial). It establishes courts
with general – and thus criminal – jurisdiction, at both the federal and
cantonal levels; it contains rules that are applicable to all federal and
cantonal courts (articles IV-C 1 to 4) and makes fairly detailed provision for
the election of judges (articles V-11 and VI-7). Finally, and above all, article IV-C-3 grants
the Federation the – particularly wide - power to determine "such rules of
procedure as may be necessary to ensure uniformity with regard to due process
and the basic principles of justice in the proceedings of all
courts". On the other hand, the FBH
Constitution makes cantonal legislatures responsible for laying down
supplementary rules governing cantonal and municipal courts (ibid) and
determining the jurisdiction of cantonal and municipal courts (article V-6-d,
see also para 30 below).
24. It is clear from the foregoing that, as a matter of
principle, competence to determine rules of criminal procedure in the FBH lies
with the Federation itself, with the cantons' responsibility being confined to
laying down supplementary rules.
- The Federation's
competence regarding general criminal law
25. It has been shown that the FBH has a fairly considerable
competence in the fields of special criminal law and criminal procedure. It remains to be considered whether the
Federation or the cantons are competent to determine the general principles of
criminal law (imputability, complicity, aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, reoffending). This issue
seems to be not covered at all in the FBH Constitution. A literal reading of the Constitution would
suggest that this competence must lie with the cantons, since it is not
referred to in either the exclusive competences of the Federation or those it
shares with the cantons. However, this
interpretation should be approached with caution, in that it would lead to a
fragmentation of legislation which appears completely at odds with traditional
practice (the matter was previously dealt with at the federal level in the
former Yugoslavia). A reading of the
Constitutions of the FBH and the RS gives the impression that competence for
the basic principles of criminal law has been in some ways
"forgotten". In this context,
it may be considered that, by granting the Federation the right to establish
courts with general jurisdiction and competence for criminal procedure, the
Constitution of the FBH also makes the Federation competent for establishing
the basic principles of criminal law. It is nevertheless true that this area of
competence is not expressly listed in Articles III-1 and III-2. Were this
situation to be regarded as a source of ambiguity or controversy, it will be
desirable to revise the Constitution of FBH as regards this point.
26. It is clear from the foregoing (paras. 20-25) that
competence in criminal law is in fact shared between the Federation and its
cantons, despite the fact that it is not included in the list of shared
competences in article III-2. This incompatibility with the exhaustive list in
article III-2-a is more apparent than real.
In practice, this provision grants the FBH and the cantons shared
responsibilities regarding human rights and it can be validly maintained that a
large part of criminal law and criminal procedure comes within the scope of
"guaranteeing and enforcing human rights", in the broad sense of the
term.
27. There can be no doubt that the FBH Constitution provides
for substantive criminal legislation at the federal as well as the cantonal
level. For example, article IV-B-7(a),
sub-paragraph vii, on the power of pardon of the Federation's President, makes
a clear reference to "pardons for offences against Federal law";
similarly, article V-9-d, on cantonal responsibilities, refers explicitly to
the "prosecution of crimes against cantonal law".
28. Turning to the laws governing criminal procedure and the
criminal justice system, the FBH Constitution grants the Federation
responsibility for determining the rules of procedure (IV-C-3) while cantons
are given the task of adopting supplementary rules and determining the extent
of the jurisdiction of cantonal and municipal courts.
29. Finally, competence in this field is already shared
between the Federation and the cantons for a completely factual reason, since
it appears that many cantons have delegated their criminal law powers to the
Federation, in accordance with article V-2 of the Constitution.
30. Article III-3 of the FBH Constitution establishes the rule
that, in areas where competence is shared between the Federation and the
cantons, it may be exercised separately.
Under the powers granted to it by the Constitution, the FBH can enact
its own criminal code and code of criminal procedure or legislation governing
the criminal justice system. However,
article III-3 of the FBH Constitution also requires it to respect cantonal
prerogatives and the need for a certain flexibility in enforcing federal
legislation. For their part, the cantons
can also legislate in this field, but only to supplement federal
legislation. With particular regard to
the criminal justice system, the cantons must establish the rules governing the
jurisdiction of cantonal and municipal courts (article V-6-(d)). In view of the Federation's responsibility
for ensuring uniformity with regard to procedural safeguards – including access
to the courts (article IV-C-3) – cantonal legislation must take into account
the federally established rules governing the competence ratione materiae of the various cantonal courts; on the other hand,
cantonal legislatures are free to determine the number and territorial
jurisdiction of the courts operating within their canton.
31. Finally, it must be emphasised that, while recognising the
shared competence that the FBH and the cantons have in this field, federal
legislation is based directly on the Constitution itself and not on a
delegation of powers from the cantons.
Federal law is thus applicable in all the cantons, including those that
have not delegated their competences to the Federation or that have revoked
that delegation.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. By letter dated 26 February 1998 the Office of the High
Representative asked the Venice Commission to provide an opinion on the
question of whether, within the City of Mostar, a separate court has to be
established for each municipality unless the municipalities concerned agree to
establish a common court. The City of Mostar is composed of six
municipalities and one central zone.
2. Under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two Entities are
competent for the establishment of courts. The City of Mostar is within the territory of
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Herzegovačko Neretvanska Canton). The question is therefore to be
decided on the basis of the Constitution of the Federation.
II. THE
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
3. Article VI.7 of the Constitution of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina is worded as follows:
"(1) Each
municipality shall have courts, which may be established in co-operation with
other Municipalities, and which shall have original jurisdiction over all civil
and criminal matters, except to the extent original jurisdiction is assigned to
another court by this or the Cantonal Constitution or by any law of the
Federation or the Canton.
(2) Municipal
courts shall be established and funded by the Cantonal government.
(3) Judges
of the cantonal courts shall be appointed by the President of the highest Cantonal Court after consultation with the Municipal Executive."
...
4. The first and the second sections of art. 7 might seem
contradictory at first sight. Section 2 attributes the power to establish a
court to the cantonal government, section 1 gives the impression that the
municipalities are competent to establish courts. Both sections may however be
reconciled by distinguishing between the power to decide on whether to
establish a municipal court, which belongs to the municipality, and the
establishment itself. Under section 1 a court common to several municipalities
may be established only "in co-operation with other Municipalities".
Co-operation is a voluntary process and the establishment of a court common to
several municipalities therefore requires their consent. The importance of the
role of the municipalities is confirmed by the fact that the municipal courts
appear in the chapter of the Constitution on municipality governments.
5. One may wonder whether it is wise to give such an
important role to the municipalities if the financial consequences are then
borne by the cantons. But this corresponds obviously to the will of the
constituent.
6. It may also seem surprising to foresee such a large
number of courts. The provision that each municipality shall, in principle,
have its own court is understandable only if one knows that municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are fairly large.
Nevertheless, it seems questionable whether this rule facilitates the
establishment of an efficient court system. At least if, in accordance with
certain intentions, a municipal reform is carried out in the Federation which
would substantially increase the number of municipalities, this constitutional
provision will have to be reviewed. These considerations however do not justify
a departure from the clear wording of the existing Constitution.
III. PROVISIONS
SPECIFIC TO THE CANTON AND TO THE CITY OF MOSTAR
7. With respect to the establishment of courts, the
Constitution of the Herzegovačko Neretvanska Canton is
less specific than the Constitution of the Federation.
"Article 79
The municipal courts are established by the Law of
the Canton.
The municipal courts are financed by the cantonal
budget.
Article 80
The municipal court is established for the territory
of the municipality. One municipal court can be established for two or more
municipalities."
8. The second sentence of art. 80 does not explicitly
provide that the establishment of a municipal court competent for more than one
municipality requires the consent of the municipalities concerned. This article
has however to be interpreted in accordance with the Constitution of the
Federation (see art. V.4 of the Constitution of the Federation) and the consent
requirement therefore also applies within this canton.
9. It remains to be considered whether the above-mentioned
principle is also applicable within cities. It should be noted that initially
the Constitution of the Federation did not provide for cities and that city
authorities were created only by Amendment XVI to the Constitution. Amendment
XVI does however not mention judicial matters among the powers of cities. The
establishment of a city instead of a municipal court could therefore only be
based on the provision that cities are responsible for "other competence
the city is being entrusted with by the canton or municipalities". The
canton may not entrust the city with a power not belonging to it, therefore
only the municipalities concerned could jointly decide the establishment of a
city court.
10. As regards the central zone of the City of Mostar, it does not have the
status of a municipality. Article VI.7 is therefore not applicable and there is
no obligation to establish a municipal court in this zone. The cantonal
legislature is free to adopt a solution compatible with the general court
structure of the Federation. If the central zone seems too small to justify a
specific court, other solutions may be found. Possibilities include dividing
the territory between neighbouring courts, detaching one judge from each of the
other municipal courts of the City of Mostar on a part time basis (eg for one
day a week) with a rotating chair or a rotating competence of the neighbouring
courts for the central zone. Attributing competence directly to the cantonal
court would seem less appropriate since parties would lose one instance.
IV. CONCLUSION
11. In conclusion, the text of the Constitution of the
Federation clearly requires the consent of the municipalities concerned for the
establishment of a court competent for the territory of more than one
municipality. The municipalities concerned would certainly be well advised to
give this consent: otherwise Mostar may well be the only town of this size in Europe, if not the world, to have
six courts of general jurisdiction.
Introduction
1. When speaking before the Venice Commission at the 34th
Plenary meeting in Venice on 6 March 1998, the High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Carlos Westendorp,
asked the Commission to provide an expertise on the issue of inter-entity
judicial co-operation against the background of the complex federal structure
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH).
2. By letter of 7 May 1998, the Office of the High
Representative provided some background material of interest to this question,
in particular the text of a draft agreement on the regulation of legal
assistance between institutions of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(FBH) and the Republika Srpska (RS) and an opinion of the Ministry of Civil
Affairs and Communication of BH of 16 February on the constitutionality of this
draft agreement. The Office of the High Representative asked the Commission to
provide an opinion, in particular on the following two questions:
a) is inter-entity judicial co-operation within the
competence of BH?
b) are the Entities entitled to conclude an agreement on
inter-entity judicial co-operation?
3. It is recalled that the Commission has already given an
opinion on the competence of the FBH in criminal law matters (documentCDL-INF(98)5 ).
The competence of BH in the field of inter-entity
judicial co-operation
4. The question of the competence of the State of BH in the field of criminal
law and criminal procedure has already been addressed in the abovementioned
opinion on the competence of the FBH in criminal law matters, although mainly
from the point of view of substantive criminal law. The Commission came to the
following conclusions:
5. "The fundamental rule for
interpreting the constitutions of BH (Appendix IV of the Dayton Agreements), the FBH and the RS is that the two
Entities enjoy residual powers. The
Constitution of BH assigns only certain specific areas of competence to the
State, while the remainder lie with the federated Entities (article III-3-a of
the Constitution of BH). The Entities'
competence in principle for criminal law and criminal procedure is beyond all
doubt. It is simply limited by the
competences of the State of BH in this area, as provided for in the Constitution of
BH.
6. Of the areas of competence assigned
to BH, only one directly concerns criminal law matters in the broad sense of
the term: this is article III-1-g, which gives BH responsibility for
"international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, including
relations with Interpol". This
provision undoubtedly confers a degree of competence upon BH in the area of
criminal law and criminal procedure. Our task is to establish the scope of that
competence as accurately as possible.
7. The wording of article III-1-g of
the Constitution of BH seems to show that the competence it grants is a
competence in the field of implementation ("enforcement") and
co-ordination. It seems to be more a
matter of crime policy concerning crime on an international scale or extending
beyond the borders of the Entities than competence for criminal law or criminal
procedure in the full sense of the term.
Article III-1-g of the Constitution of BH, which expressly refers to
relations with Interpol, is indicative in this respect".
These considerations remain
valid. They have however to be further refined with respect to the specific topic
of this opinion, judicial co-operation, which was a topic not really envisaged
in the previous opinion.
8. The reference in Article III-1-g to
"enforcement" makes it clear that, as stated in the previous opinion,
Article III-1-g in no way intends to give BH wide-ranging powers in the field
of the adoption of substantive criminal law rules. With respect to criminal
procedure, this is less obvious since criminal procedure is aimed at
enforcement of the criminal law rules.
9. The term "law enforcement" in the English
language is usually associated with the police and might therefore be
understood in this context as referring mainly to police co-operation. A
further indication in this respect is the reference to Interpol. Nevertheless,
it does not seem possible to draw a very clear line between co-operation at the
police and at the court and prosecution level. Law enforcement may also refer
to the tasks of the Public Prosecutor's office and of the criminal courts and
in many countries the police acts in the field of criminal law under the
instructions of the prosecutor or an investigating judge. A very clear-cut
distinction therefore cannot be made and it seems not possible to exclude any
competence of BH at the level of co-operation between prosecutors and courts.
10. On
the other hand, it seems also not possible to provide for an exclusive
competence of BH for all matters concerning judicial co-operation in the
criminal law field. The simple fact that all criminal law courts are courts of
the Entities requires an active rule of the Entities in this field. The State
of BH, which does not itself have the instruments to
enforce criminal law, cannot claim to have a monopoly on regulating such
matters. It would moreover be surprising if judicial co-operation in the
criminal law field were an exclusive prerogative of BH, while judicial
co-operation in the field of civil law undoubtedly is within the powers of the
Entities.
11. Having
regard to the situation that practical implementation is a task of the two
Entities, the only possible interpretation seems to be that Article III-1-g
intends to give to BH in the field of criminal procedure powers to coordinate,
to harmonise and to initiate co-operation with respect to all cases involving
the two Entities or other countries. The precise extent of these powers will
have to be assessed on a case basis.
Power
of the Entities to enter into an agreement on inter-entity judicial
co-operation
12. The
above-mentioned opinion of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communications of 16 February
1998 considers that thetwo Entities do not have the right to conclude agreements among themselves on
inter-entity judicial co-operation. This position, and in particular some of
the arguments used, is in contradiction with the modern theory of federalism
which more and more emphasises the need for co-operative federalism.
13. The
simple fact that the Constitution of BH does not explicitly provide for such
agreements seems not relevant, provided that these agreements respect the basic
principles on the division of powers.
14. It
is also not true to say that such agreements would be similar to international
agreements and would give to the Entities the attributes of sovereign States.
In a large number of federal States (Belgium, Canada, Germany, United States) agreements and conventions between federated
Entities (or between some or all the federated Entities and the federal State)
are quite usual and nobody pretends that such agreements would give to the
federated Entities the attributes of a sovereign State. In Belgium, certain co-operation agreements between
Entities or between Entities and the federal State are even explicitly required
by the laws on institutional reform.
15. The
specific situation of BH and its Entities where the central State only has very
few powers makes this "co-operative" approach to federalism
particularly necessary, especially in the judicial field. In effect, even if
one arrived at a different conclusion from the one set out above concerning the
possible powers of BH in the criminal law field, judicial co-operation in the
civil law field is entirely within the powers of the federated Entities and may
therefore only be implemented by way of voluntary agreements.
16. The
BH constitution is therefore no obstacle to such agreements. On the contrary, several of its provisions
seem to invite (or even impose) the conclusion of agreements between the
Entities. The following provisions may be cited:
a) Article III-2-c requires that the
Entities shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their
respective jurisdictions, inter alia, "by taking such other measures as
appropriate". The conclusion of
mutual agreements is one of the possible "other measures".
b) Article
III-2-d enables the Entities to enter, under certain conditions, into
agreements with foreign States. This power is fairly rare in comparative law
(it exists, for example, in Belgium). It
would seem paradoxical that the Entities may conclude international agreements
and may not conclude mutual agreements although this last possibility is very
frequent in most federal States.
c) By
virtue of Article III-4, the BH Presidency may decide to facilitate
inter-entity co-ordination on matters not within its responsibility (and which
therefore are within the responsibility of the Entities). One way of achieving such co-ordination may
be to conclude agreements between federated Entities on the exercise of their
respective powers.
d) Article
III-5-a of the BH constitution provides that the State of BH may assume responsibility for such other
measures as are agreed by the Entities. This provision therefore envisages the
possibility of transfers in the exercise of powers resulting from an agreement
between federated Entities. It would
seem difficult to conceive that the constitution provides for this kind of
agreement and does not permit the federated Entities to agree on the way of
exercising their proper powers as is the case in the agreement to be concluded
on judicial co-operation.
17. There
seems therefore no doubt that the Entities may enter into an agreement on
judicial co-operation.
1. Introduction
In the course of its work on
the setting up of an Ombudsman institution in the Republika Srpska (Bosnia and
Herzegovina) and the drafting of a law instituting the Ombudsman of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission) was requested by Mrs Gret Haller, Human Rights
Ombudsperson for Bosnia and Herzegovina, to give an opinion on the distribution
of competences between the Ombudsman institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Working Group set up by the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Human
Rights to study the Ombudsman institutions in this country was entrusted with
this task. The Working Group, composed of Mr J.C. Scholsem, Vice-President of
the Venice Commission, Mrs Serra-Lopes, member of the Commission, Mr Gil Robles
Gil Delgado, former Defensor del Pueblo
in Spain, and Mr Bardiaux, who is in charge of international relations in the
Office of the French Médiateur de la
République, has held two meetings, one in Strasbourg, on 19 and 20 May 1998
and one in Paris, on 27 May 1997. At these meetings it heard Mrs Gret Haller,
Human Rights Ombudsperson for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mrs V. Jovanovic, Mrs B.
Raguz and Mr E. Muhibic, Ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Mrs M. Picard, President of the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The Working Group would like
to underline from the outset that the Ombudsman institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still in a state of
flux. The Human Rights Ombudsperson is now halfway through its first five-year
term, and it has not yet been decided in what manner it will continue its work;
the Ombudsman institution of the Republika Srpska is still at the project
stage; finally, an Act defining the modus
operandi of the Ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is
currently in preparation. It is not possible at this time, therefore, to
present a final report on the distribution of competences and structural and
operational relations of these changing institutions. The conclusions contained
in this interim report are therefore the provisional findings of the Working
Group. They may be reviewed in the light of future developments.
2. The
institutions and their functions
- The Human Rights Ombudsperson
The Ombudsperson of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (instituted in conformity with Annex 6, Part B of the Dayton
Agreement) is an independent institution constituting one of the two branches
of the Human Rights Commission (provided for in Article II, para 1 of the BH
Constitution and in Annex 6 of the Dayton Agreement, Chapter II, Part A), the
other branch being the Human Rights Chamber. The two institutions are jointly
responsible for investigating manifest or alleged violations of human rights
enshrined in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and its protocols, and discrimination in the exercise of
fundamental rights enshrined in other relevant instruments.
The Office of the
Ombudsperson is empowered to investigate alleged or manifest violations of
human rights. Upon receipt of a complaint, it may inform the accused party and
ask it to comment. The applicant then has an opportunity to respond to these
comments, following which the Ombudsperson invites the parties to reach a
friendly agreement. If no such agreement is forthcoming, the Ombudsperson then
drafts a report stating whether or not there has been any violation of human
rights, and if so, it may make recommendations with a view to securing fair
satisfaction. The party at fault must then state how it intends to comply with
the findings of the Ombudsperson. Should that party fail to reply or refuse to
comply, the Ombudsperson publishes its report and submits it to the High
Representative and the Presidency. It may also refer the matter to the Human
Rights Chamber. For the purposes of its investigation, the Ombudsperson must
have access to all official documents, even those which are confidential. It
may open an investigation at its own initiative (Annex 6, Article V, para 2).
Under Article V, para 5 of Annex 6, the Ombudsperson may decide, at any stage
in its examination of an allegation, to refer a case to the Chamber. According
to Article 37 b), adopted in September 1996, it may also refer to the Chamber
“any case referred to it for this purpose by the Ombudsmen of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina or by an equivalent
institution of the Republika Srpska”.
The Human Rights Chamber
(instituted by Annex 6, Part C, Articles VII to XIII) is a court composed of
fourteen members. Complaints of human rights violations are referred to it by
the Ombudsperson, on behalf of the complainant, or directly by the complainant.
It examines the admissibility and the level of priority of the complaints it
receives and decides whether the complainant has exhausted the available
domestic remedies. The rulings of the Chamber are final and binding.
The organisation of the
Commission is similar in some respects to that of the European Human Rights
Convention, the Ombudsperson being comparable to the European Commission of
Human Rights and the Human Rights Chamber to the European Court of Human
Rights. While Article VIII, para 1 authorises cases to be referred directly to
the Human Rights Chamber, in principle all the complaints referred to the Human
Rights Commission are first presented to the Ombudsperson (Article V, para 1),
which may refer them to the Chamber when it considers that there has been
violation of human rights.
- The Ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Three Ombudsmen – a Bosnian,
a Croatian and one “other”, currently a Serb – are appointed for a term of office
similar to that of the President and judges of the Supreme Court. Each appoints
one or more assistants, with the approval of the President. In particular, they
must appoint assistants at municipal level where the composition of the local
population does not reflect that of the whole canton. The Ombudsmen form an
independent institution. They are empowered to examine the activities of any
federal, canton or municipal institutions, as well as complaints from people
whose dignity, rights or freedoms have allegedly been violated, particularly by
or in the wake of ethnic cleansing. In order to accomplish their task,
Ombudsmen must have access to all official documents, even confidential ones.
They may bring proceedings before the competent courts and take steps to settle
pending cases. The Ombudsmen present their annual report to the Prime Minister
and Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation, to the President of each canton
and to the OSCE; at any time they may present special reports and enjoin the
local institutions to reply.
- The
Ombudsman of the Republika Srpska
The Ombudsman of the
Republika Srpska has not yet been instituted. A preliminary draft law drawn up
by the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Human Rights of the
Council of Europe, with the help of the OSCE and the Office of the High
Representative, has been submitted to the authorities of the Republika Srpska
for consideration (CDL (98) 12 def). The comments in the present report are
based on this draft law. It provides for the institution to be composed of
three Ombudsmen, belonging to the constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Ombudsman of the
Republika Srpska has competences both in the human rights field and in
administrative affairs. Without being structurally related to the Ombudsperson
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it should (according to
the draft law) be able to refer matters to the Human Rights Chamber via the
Ombudsperson.
The Venice Commission proposed setting
up this institution in its Opinion on the constitutional situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, with particular reference to the human rights protection
machinery (CDL-INF (96) 9). According to the Commission, setting up such an
institution, equivalent to the Ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will help to establish a
balanced, coherent system of human rights protection throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3. The
parallel functioning of the ombudsman institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In terms of their functions,
there are as many similarities as there are differences between the three
institutions mentioned above. All three may receive complaints from individuals
or initiate investigations ex officio.
The Ombudsmen of the
Federation and the Ombudsperson of Bosnia and Herzegovina are more human-rights-oriented,
whereas the Ombudsman of the Republika Srpska also has the more conventional
role of monitoring the proper functioning of the administration.
The Ombudsmen of the
entities have dealings with all the administrative authorities in their
respective entities, while the Ombudsperson of the Bosnia and Herzegovina has dealings only with the
entities and the state, as such.
The Ombudsmen of the
entities are competent only in matters concerning the administrative
authorities of the entities concerned, while the Ombudsperson also deals with
affairs concerning the state authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Whereas the powers of the
Ombudsmen of the Federation seem to be unlimited in time, those of the
Ombudsperson (and according to the Venice Commission’s draft law, those of the
Republika Srpska Ombudsman) apply only to events which occurred subsequently to
the Dayton Agreement.
The main difference between
the Ombudsmen of the entities and the Ombudsperson of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, is the latter’s
special relationship with the Human Rights Chamber, within the framework of the
Human Rights Commission.
Indeed, the main activity of
the Ombudsmen of the entities consists in seeking solutions acceptable to the
parties in certain cases of human rights violation or maladministration.
Although the FBH Ombudsmen are empowered to take matters before the ordinary
courts and the RS Ombudsman may refer a case to the Constitutional Court, and both may refer cases
to the Human Rights Chamber, their main activity is to seek settlements
acceptable to the parties, in a spirit of respect for human rights. They tend
to resort to the justice system only in exceptional cases, generally expressing
their disagreement with the authorities’ reactions to their work by publishing
reports, particularly special reports. So their action is mainly of a
non-judicial nature.
The Ombudsperson of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, on the other hand, is a
hybrid institution. Set up very shortly after the peace agreement, the Office
of the Ombudsperson was for a long time the only institution responsible for
introducing the European Human Rights Convention into the legal system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whatever those who drafted
Annex 6 had in mind, this task has been carried out successfully, with the
result that the institution has acquired a quasi-judicial status. The
Ombudsperson thus rules on the admissibility of the complaints it receives,
seeks a friendly solution, investigates and communicates its findings to the
party allegedly at fault and, if it is not satisfied with that party’s
response, refers the matter to the Chamber. At the same time, at the hub of the
human rights machinery provided for in Annex 6, the Ombudsperson has a
non-judicial activity when it decides, of its own accord, to conduct
investigations and draw up special reports.
This difference between the
institutions accentuates the confusion as regards their competences ratione personae, materiae, temporis and loci and the various means of action
they tend to privilege (reports; referral to the competent courts; negotiations
with political authorities, etc.). It also renders the structure of the whole
ombudsman apparatus in Bosnia and Herzegovina particularly complex. The Venice Commission has already
established that the human rights protection machinery in the legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is, on the whole, unusually
complex. The co-existence, side by side, of judicial bodies responsible for
specific human rights tasks, courts expected to rule on cases of alleged human
rights violations which are brought before them, and non-judicial institutions
for the protection of individual rights, evidently results in some overlapping
of competences which, along with the large disparities in the human rights protection
systems in the two entities, may undermine the efficacy of the protection
provided. To guarantee a balanced and coherent system for protecting human
rights throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina requires a certain
equilibrium between the legal systems of the two entities, and a clear
definition of the respective competences of the institutions operating within
the legal systems of the entities and the state.
4. Proposals
concerning the distribution of competences and relations between the ombudsman
institutions
4.1 The brief but conclusive experience of how the ombudsman
institutions function in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly shows how useful
these institutions can be in a society still haunted by the trauma of war. By
their flexibility and the flexibility of their procedures, and their
multi-ethnic or international composition, the ombudsman institutions are able
to react promptly and effectively to the urgent situations created by human
rights violations.
4.2 The ombudsman structures of the constituent entities
need to be more similar in terms of their composition, powers and means of
action. As the laws governing these institutions are currently being drafted,
care must be taken to avoid disparities in the manner in which they operate.
4.3 In the not-too-distant future, however, and if possible
before the end of the Ombudsperson’s first term of office, a structural
reorganisation of its modus operandi,
and consequently that of the Human Rights Chamber, must be undertaken. The
quasi-judicial sorting role now performed by the Office of the Ombudsperson
should in fact be taken over by the judicial body responsible for
protecting human rights. This would be in keeping with the trend in the organs
of the European Convention on Human Rights, where the original Court and
Commission have been merged into a single organ, the European Court of Human
Rights provided for in Protocol No 11 to the Convention. The Ombudsperson
could then concentrate more on its more conventional mediation functions,
without so many procedural constraints (application deadlines, exhaustion of
other remedies), which are uncharacteristic of the ombudsman’s work. This
should not prevent the Ombudsperson from referring cases to the proper courts
(the Human Rights Chamber or even the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina).
Reorganising the work of the
Ombudsperson in this way does raise certain practical difficulties.
The Chamber will have to be
given the powers of investigation and examination currently enjoyed by the
Ombudsperson, particularly the power to investigate and prepare cases brought
before it. This means extending the powers of the Chamber (investigation,
hearing of cases referred by the Ombudsmen of the entities, locus standi of same) and also its
wherewithal (large secretariat with a good knowledge of the ECHR, judges to
report on investigations). Indeed, such a move seems not only recommendable for
the coherency of the ombudsman system but actually necessary for the
functioning of the Chamber itself; many of the cases brought before the Chamber
even now are brought not through the Ombudsperson but directly by the
applicants.
4.4 The competence of the Ombudsperson should also be
confined to matters concerning the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and “inter-entity” questions. Clearly as the state
institutions are gradually set in motion and begin effectively to exercise
their powers under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the citizens will be
increasingly concerned by the decisions of those institutions. Similarly, the
co-operation required in numerous areas under the Dayton Agreement -between the
entities themselves or between the entities and the state - seems to point to a
likely increase in the number of cases involving both entities. It is in this
field that the Ombudsperson will have to develop its activities, while in the
medium term questions concerning only one entity should fall within the exclusive
ambit of the Ombudsmen of the entities.
In the interim, however, the
Ombudsperson will have to have parallel competences to those of the Ombudsmen
of the entities.
4.5 Clearly, therefore, there will be no hierarchical
relationship between the three institutions; they will each function
independently. In particular, there must be no possibility of appealing
decisions of the Ombudsmen of the entities before the Ombudsperson.
4.6 However, the Ombudsperson must be empowered to organise
co-operation and consultation between the institutions. It is important
that there should be arrangements for communication, mutual information and
consultation, or even co-operation in certain cases, particularly when a case
is brought before the wrong institution, or where it emerges in the course of
proceedings that an institution lacks jurisdiction. Regular meetings of the Ombudsmen
of the entities and the Ombudsperson should be held in order to determine what
form co-operation should take and, where necessary, decide on joint action to
be taken. The initiative to convene these meetings and the form they should
take, as well as the procedure for taking decisions and their scope, could be
agreed jointly. The flexibility and the informal nature of the ombudsman
institutions should favour this development.
4.7 The reform broadly outlined above will, of course, require
the amendment of certain fundamental texts of the institutional apparatus in
Annex 6. One should note, in this respect, that provision is actually made, in
Article XIV of Annex 6, for revision of the modus
operandi of the institutions concerned, starting five years after the entry
into force of the Dayton Agreement. As responsibility for the continuation of
the institutions provided for in Annex 6 lies, in principle, with the
institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems that the most appropriate means of carrying out the
reform would be an organic Law to be adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
vi. Opinion on the competence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in electoral matters adopted at the 36th
Plenary Meeting (16-17 October 1998)
In a letter dated 22 May 1998, the Office of the High
Representative asked the Venice Commission to give its opinion on, inter alia, the
competence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in electoral matters (CDL (98) 26 Add). A
Working Group, composed of Mr Helgesen, Mr Scholsem and Mr Steinberger, was set
up within the Commission to study the question. The group met during the
Commission's 35th Plenary Meeting (Venice, 12-13 June
1998) and again in Heidelberg on 7 July 1998. The
Rapporteurs held an exchange of views with a delegation from the Office of the
High Representative on the basis of preliminary reports. Following these
meetings, the working group prepared the following opinion, which was adopted
by the Venice Commission at its 36th Plenary Meeting (Venice, 16-17
October 1998) and was sent to the Office of the High Representative.
I
In the Dayton Agreements,
electoral matters are primarily dealt with in Appendix 3.
This Appendix includes an
agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska to
establish a Provisional Election Commission, under the auspices of the OSCE,
which would be responsible for organising the first election in the country.
It also includes an
agreement between the same parties to create a Permanent Election Commission
responsible for future elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("with
responsibilities to conduct future elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina").
This commitment should be
interpreted broadly, as applying to all elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at whatever level (state,
Entity or local event). In this respect reference may usefully be made to the
competence of the Provisional Election Commission, from which the Permanent
Commission is clearly to take over, and which, according to Article II(2) of
Appendix 3, concerns the elections for the Parliamentary Assembly and the
Presidency of the Republika Srpska and also cantonal and municipal elections.
By stipulating that an
institution (the Permanent Election Commission) which emerged from the Dayton
Agreements and which is independent of the Entities is competent in the conduct
of all elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Appendix 3 accepts - tacitly but
unavoidably - that the legislative framework for the elections in question,
including the rules on the competence and working of the Permanent Election
Commission, will be determined by a legislative text, to be adopted in Bosnia
and Herzegovina at state level. In fact, since the Dayton Agreements and the Constitution
of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not contain explicit and
uniform regulations on the conduct of elections and on the competence and
working of the Permanent Election Commission, the state legislator, namely the
Parliamentary Assembly, is alone able to adopt this law.
This being so, the effect of
Appendix 3, Article V, is to accord a certain competence to the state
legislator in electoral matters, both for elections in the Entities and those
at cantonal and municipal level. This must be understood in the special context
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where, given their crucial
role in preserving the delicate balance underpinning the peace agreements,
electoral matters are dealt with separately and given the same importance as
the Constitution itself. In this respect, it is appropriate to recall that the
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is contained in Appendix 4 of the Dayton
Agreements, signed and approved by the same parties as Appendix 3 (see also
Articles IV and V of the General Framework Agreement). The two annexes should
be read in conjunction, and each interpreted in the light of the other.
II
The fact that the State of
Bosnia and Herzegovina is competent to legislate
in electoral matters does not infringe on the allocation of competence established
in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Admittedly, Article III
(3) states the principle that competence not expressly assigned to the State
belongs to the Entities, and there is no general electoral competence listed
among the state competence (see the list of exclusive state responsibilities in
Article III (1)). However, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina may assume
responsibility for other matters on the basis of a joint agreement by the
Entities (Article III (5) a), and it can reasonably be assumed that, as
signatories to Appendix 3, the two Entities have tacitly but unavoidably
admitted that the State has a certain competence in the matter.
III
The constitutional texts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the two Entities
also contain rules concerning elections.
Thus, Article IV (2) of the
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina grants this state
competence to legislate on elections to the House of Representatives.
In addition, Article IV (A)
1-3 of the Constitution of the Federation also contains certain fundamental
provisions concerning elections to the House of Representatives of the
Federation: the Constitution of the Federation already establishes the
principle of election by direct, universal, secret and equal ballot, in a
single constituency based on proportional representation with a threshold of 5%
of votes cast. Likewise, Article 71 of the Constitution of the Republika Srpska
states that the electoral system for national Assembly- elections must be
established by the parliament of the Entity.
Rightly, Articles IV (A) 1-3
of the Constitution of the Federation and Article 71 of the Constitution of
Republika Srpska have not been viewed as encroachments on the competence of the
State (see the Opinion of the Venice Commission on the compatibility
between the Constitutions of the two Entities and the Constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Annual Report on Activities for 1996). In fact, it seems natural
that the entities in a federal state should be competent to administer their
electoral system, especially when the state in question is highly
decentralised, as is the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it is clear that
the Entities' competence in this area is not unlimited. The electoral system of
the federal entities must respect the fundamental regulations of the Federal State. This is especially so with
regard to human rights regulations including non-discrimination, the principles
of a democratic state (universal, secret and equal suffrage ensuring freedom of
expression for the population) and those which guarantee the balance
underpinning both the State itself and the peace.
IV
It is clear from the
preceding remarks that competence in electoral matters is in fact divided
between the Entities and the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It is also clear that the
State will have to adopt the electoral law on elections to State institutions.
In this matter, the competence of Bosnia and Herzegovina is absolute.
It is also the State's duty
to establish the principles of the country's electoral law, in legislation that
will define the fundamental parameters applicable in all elections. As noted
above, these refer on the one hand to human rights and democratic principles,
and, at the same time, they guarantee the balance underpinning the State of
Bosnia end Herzegovina.
Thus, in addition to the
principle of universal, secret and equal suffrage, it is possible and highly
desirable - if not essential - that certain aspects of the right to elect and
be elected are regulated in a uniform manner for all elections. This is
particularly relevant for issues such as the right of displaced persons and
refugees to vote, the grounds for ineligibility; the choice of the electoral
system (proportional representation); electoral lists and the procedure for
establishing them; political parties and their registration, and registration
of individual candidates and coalition parties; access to the media for
candidates during electoral periods; funding of electoral campaigns; the voting
procedure; complaints and the associated procedure; and publication of the results. Equally, the law
must establish the membership, competence and working on the Permanent Election
Commission and may delegate powers to it to enact the necessary regulations for
the conduct of elections.
On the other hand,
regulation of other questions, for example the creation of electoral
constituencies, can be left to the competence of the Entities, or even to the
cantons, as long as the principles established in the State law are respected.
In addition, any special provisions regarding implementation of the parameters
of State legislation can be adopted only at Entity - and possibly cantonal -
level.
V
The question of which courts
will have competence in the area of electoral disputes has also been raised.
There is no doubt that the
courts of the Entities have jurisdiction with regard to elections at Entity
level.
With regard to elections to
the State institutions, this competence must be assigned to a court. The choice
of court is left to the state legislator, who may decide to set up a new
electoral chamber or to assign these disputes of a specialised division of the Constitutional Court. The practical details for
the second option require careful consideration. Furthermore, if, as the High
Representative's question suggests, an
administrative jurisdiction had to be set up at state level in Bosnia and Herzegovina, competence in electoral
matters could be assigned to it. However, it is worth noting that, due to the
specific nature of the issues involved and the urgency of most of the
decisions, separate courts, distinct from the ordinary courts of law, are
frequently established to deal with electoral matters.
Appeals to the State
electoral authority against decisions by courts in the Entities are also
necessary: these would have the advantage of ensuring the development of case
law and of standard approaches to interpreting the electoral law. However, for
the reasons indicated above, time limits for appeals and for the proceedings must
be very short.
At the 34th plenary meeting of the
Venice Commission (Venice, 6 and 7 March 1998), the High Representative of the
international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Carlos Westendorp, asked
the Commission to give opinions on certain questions of constitutional law,
including the need to establish a judicial institution at the level of the
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Mr Westendorp's address to the Commission,
CDL (98) 26).
The Commission appointed a number of its members
as rapporteurs, to examine the issues raised by the High Representative. The rapporteurs held meetings in Venice, on the
occasion of the Commission's 35th plenary meeting (12 and 13 June 1998), and in
Heidelberg (7 July 1998). At
these meetings, they also had an exchange of views with officials from the
Office of the High Representative.
The opinion set out herein was adopted by the
Commission at its 36th plenary meeting on the basis of a paper
submitted by Mr Jean-Claude Scholsem, rapporteur.
***
1. The Constitution's failure to
provide for a supreme judicial institution at the level of the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
The Commission has
already found that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex IV to the Dayton Agreements) establishes a
particularly weak federal state. The
Constitution defines the two entities of that state, the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (hereafter the FBH) and the Republika Srpska
(hereafter the RS), and allocates powers between those entities and the state
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BH).
It also establishes BH citizenship.
Lastly, it proclaims its own precedence over the laws and constitutions
of the entities and sets up a Constitutional Court to guarantee the compatibility of those laws and
Constitutions with the state Constitution.
However, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina has no own resources and is therefore dependent
on contributions from the entities. From
a legal standpoint, its weakness is primarily apparent from the fact that all
essential functions not expressly assigned to the state come within the
competence of the entities, and from the lack of any express guarantee of the
state's inherent powers. Another sign of
this weakness is the complete separation of the entities' legal systems,
discernible, inter alia, in the lack of a supreme judicial institution at state
level responsible for guaranteeing uniform application and interpretation of
the law.
It follows that the lack
of a supreme judicial institution at the level of the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not an "oversight" on the part of the authors of the
Constitution, who seem to have been convinced that such a Supreme Court would
be superfluous in a system where the main spheres of public and community
affairs are governed not by laws of the state but by laws of the entities. The legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina in fact permits the existence of two sets of
rules, even in such essential fields as criminal law and civil law. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court (Article VI of the Constitution) was established
in answer to a real need to ensure consistency in the application and
interpretation of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Commission
accordingly considers that the lack of a supreme judicial institution at the
level of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not inconsistent with BH constitutional
system, having regard to the latter’s particularities.
2. Does
the BH Constitution allow for the creation of courts at state level?
Although the lack of a
supreme judicial institution can be regarded as a specificity of BH's
constitutional system, this does not mean that any state-level court is
expressly banned under that system.
Under the Constitution of
Bosnia and Herzegovina the state of BH is vested with own powers, in
particular legislative ones, and must be capable of establishing the
institutions necessary to guarantee the effectiveness of BH legislation. If the lack of a court at state level
undermines that effectiveness, BH must have the authority to create one.
That authority must,
however, be exercised in accordance with the Constitution, which does not make
provision for any ordinary courts at BH level.
To be compatible with the Constitution, the establishment of a judicial
institution at state level must not be a merely useful or desirable measure but
must satisfy a specific need, acknowledged in the Constitution itself or in
the peace agreements.
The Commission has
already held, for instance, that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not bound to establish criminal courts at
state level to apply the criminal law to be passed by the State of BH. Actually,
what is at stake in criminal proceedings is the individual’s criminal
responsibility and not the validity of acts performed by BH authorities.
Therefore, there is indeed nothing to prevent the courts of the entities from applying
the laws passed by the BH legislature, a situation to be found in a number of
European federal states It is true that, given the lack of a supreme judicial
institution at state level, the uniform interpretation of that legislation may
not be fully guaranteed. However, as we
have seen, the BH constitutional system allows for certain discrepancies. In any case, where a difference in legal
interpretation by the judicial institutions of the entities poses serious
problems, the view might be taken that this amounts to a breach of BH's
constitutional system and could therefore be a matter for the BH Constitutional Court. The same applies to offences perpetrated by BH
public officials, who can therefore be tried by the entities' criminal courts
according to the rules of jurisdiction laid down by BH law. This naturally does
not concern several offences provided
for in criminal legislation (e.g. high treason) committed by persons appointed
to high government or political office (members of the presidency, ministers,
members of the Constitutional Court, etc.) in the exercise of their
functions. As in many other European
states, special rules of procedure must be issued concerning such offences law.
It follows from the above
that BH is empowered, or even bound (see below), to establish courts at state
level provided that:
- the courts in question are specific,
in that they have special rather than general jurisdiction; allowing the
establishment of courts with general jurisdiction would lead to the creation of
a system of ordinary courts at BH level, which is clearly not what is intended
by the BH Constitution; and
- they are established in
response to a constitutional need, in the sense that the constitutional
system is weakened until such courts come into existence.
3. Areas
where there is a need to establish a judicial institution at BH level
The Commission has identified a number of fields where
the above conditions are met.
3.1 Electoral
disputes
Elections are one such area.
In its opinion on the competence
of BH in electoral matters (adopted on *), the Commission held that, with
regard to disputes concerning elections to BH institutions, it was necessary
to assign appellate jurisdiction to a court at state level. Indeed, the democratic nature of BH (which is
enshrined in the preamble to its Constitution) and, above all, the requirement
that BH (and the entities) organise "free and fair elections"
(Article I, paragraph 1 of Annex 3 to the Dayton Agreements) make it mandatory
that any electoral dispute be dealt with by an independent judicial
institution. BH is therefore bound both by the peace agreements and by its own
Constitution to refer such disputes to a judicial institution. The choice of institution is left to the
state legislature, which might envisage giving jurisdiction in such matters to
a special division of the Constitutional Court or might establish a separate court (ibid.). Whatever solution is adopted by the
legislature, it will necessarily entail an addendum to the BH
Constitution, which makes no provision either for the constitutional court to
have jurisdiction in electoral matters or for the establishment of a separate
court. This does not mean that the
Constitution will not be observed, since, as we have seen, the existence of such
an institution is a requirement of the Constitution itself.
3.2 Administrative
disputes
Another field where the
establishment of a judicial institution at BH level must be envisaged is that
of disputes over administrative decisions.
The general principle
that administrative authorities must abide by the law as well as the principle
of the Rule of law, on which the BH Constitution is founded (Article I,
paragraph 2), require that administrative decisions be subject to judicial
review.
This general requirement
takes an even more definite form in cases where administrative decisions affect
individual rights. In such cases the
requirement that administrative decisions be subject to judicial review comes
within the ambit of respect for fundamental rights.
Article II of the BH
Constitution provides that "the highest level of internationally
recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms" shall be ensured in BH
and that a Human Rights Commission shall be set up to that end, in accordance
with Annex 6 to the peace agreements.
The first article of Annex 6 itself makes reference to the European
Convention on Human Rights (hereafter the ECHR), Article 6, paragraph 1 of
which provides, inter alia, "In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law".
(Also see Article II, paragraph 3 (e) of the BH Constitution.)
According to the established case-law of the European Court and the European Commission of Human Rights, the
notions of "civil rights and obligations" and "criminal
charges" are autonomous ones, specific to the ECHR, which are not to be
interpreted by reference to the domestic law of the states bound by this
convention. The European Court of Human
Rights has consistently held that it is sufficient that the outcome of a
dispute should be decisive for civil rights, that is to say that the rights in
issue should be personal and economic rights of one of the parties to the
proceedings. Disputes in fields
traditionally governed by administrative law of member states have thus been
regarded, in the context of the convention, as disputes over civil rights. Examples are disputes over the refusal of
certain tax advantages (Editions Périscope v. France judgment of 26 March 1992,
Series A No. 234-B); over entitlement to social security benefits (Deumeland v.
Federal Republic of Germany judgement of 29 May 1986, Series A No. 100); over
entitlement to a civil service pension (Lombardo v. Italy judgements of 26
November 1992, Series A Nos. 249-B and 249-C); and over the right to
compensation for unlawful administrative acts (Tomasi v. France judgement of 27
August 1992, Series A No. 241-A).
Similarly, certain administrative proceedings have been considered to
involve a "criminal charge".
Examples are cases concerning penalties imposed in economic matters
(Deweer v. Belgium judgement of 27 February 1980, Series A No. 35); in tax
matters (Commission report in the Sydow v. Sweden case); and for road traffic offences (Özturk v.
Federal Republic of Germany judgement of 21 February 1984).
There is absolutely no doubt that decisions taken by
the BH administrative authorities pursuant to the powers vested in them by the
Constitution (for instance, in matters of foreign policy, customs policy,
immigration policy, regulation of transportation and air traffic control) may
have a decisive effect on the exercise of individuals' civil rights or obligations
or may be regarded as penalties imposed following a criminal charge, within the
meaning of Article 6, paragraph 1 of the ECHR.
That article, which is binding on BH by virtue of its Constitution and
the peace agreements, requires that such administrative decisions be subject to
judicial review.
The state of BH is therefore bound by its Constitution
to afford its subjects access to a tribunal which will determine any dispute
arising from an act or omission of the administrative authorities, in so far as
that act or omission can be regarded as a criminal penalty or immediately
affects an individual's personal or economic rights. Since the courts of the entities have no
jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of decisions taken by the BH
administrative authorities, or to set aside such decisions, the state of BH
is obliged to set up a judicial institution at state level, which is competent
to deal with all aspects of a case (that is to say has jurisdiction to hear
the case on the merits and is empowered to overturn an administrative act).
4. Conclusions
The
Commission finds that:
- the
lack of a supreme judicial institution at the level of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not inconsistent with BH constitutional system
having regard to the latter’s particularities ;
- under
the Constitution of BH, the State of BH is empowered to establish state-level
courts, which should be specific, in the sense that they should have special
and not general jurisdiction, and be created in response to an established
constitutional need ;
- as
regards electoral disputes and administrative disputes, BH is empowered, and
even obliged, to set up state-level courts.
At its 35th Plenary Meeting (Venice,
12-13 June 1998), the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission), accepted the proposal made by Mr. Paul Gewirtz, Observer for the
United States, to issue an opinion on possible appeals against decisions given
by the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The present opinion was
adopted by the Commission at its 36th Plenary Meeting (Venice, 16-17
October 1998) on the basis of a report by Mr.Malinverni, Rapporteur.
*
* *
1. The
establishment of the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia
and Herzegovina
Annex 6 to the Dayton Peace Agreement provides for a Commission of
Human Rights consisting of two bodies : the Office of the Human Rights
Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber. They are jointly in charge of examining alleged or
apparent violations of human rights as guaranteed in the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols
(hereafter ECHR), but also discrimination as regards the enjoyment of
fundamental rights guaranteed in other specified human rights instruments. The
human rights protection mechanism is scheduled to last for five years after the
entry into force of the Dayton Agreement (14 December 1995). After that period
of time, the responsibility for the continued operation of the Commission of
Human Rights is to be transferred to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina
unless the Parties agree otherwise, in which case the Commission of Human
Rights will continue its operation. The competence of the Human Rights
Commission extends to all acts or decisions occurring after 14 December 1995 (date of the signature of the Dayton Agreement).
The Human Rights Chamber is composed of fourteen members; four are
appointed by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH), two by the
Republika Srpska (RS) and the remaining eight by the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe. The members appointed by the Committee of Ministers must
not be citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any neighbouring State.
The Chamber has jurisdiction to receive, either directly or by referral
from the Ombudsman on behalf of the applicant, applications concerning
violations of human rights. It has to decide which applications to accept and
in what priority to address them according to whether effective remedies exist
and whether the applicant has demonstrated that they have been exhausted. The
decisions of the Chamber are final and binding.
2. Possible
conflicts of jurisdiction between the Constitutional
Court and the Human Rights Chamber
Annex 4, Article VI, of the Dayton Peace Agreement
(the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina) also provides for a Constitutional Court. It is composed of nine members, four members from
the FBH, two from the RS and three non-citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of neighbouring States, selected by the President
of the European Court of Human Rights. The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to decide any dispute that arises
under the Constitution between the Entities and the central Government and
between the Entities themselves or between institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina including the question of compatibility of an
Entity's Constitution with the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Article VI, para. 3
(a)). The Court has jurisdiction over issues referred by any court in the
country, on whether a law on whose validity its decision depends is compatible
with the Constitution, with the European Convention for Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols or with rules of public international
law pertinent to a court's decision (Article VI para 3 (c)). It shall also have
appellate jurisdiction over constitutionality issues arising out of a
judgement of any other court in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article VI para 3 (b). The Constitutional Court gives final and binding judgements.
In its opinion on the
Constitutional situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina with particular regard to
human rights protection instruments, the Venice Commission found that the
fields of respective competences of the Constitutional Court and the Human Rights
Chamber were partially overlapping. The Venice Commission noted :
« Among other
competences, the Constitutional Court is to have jurisdiction over issues
referred by any court in the country, on whether a law on whose validity
its decision depends is compatible with the Constitution, with the European
Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols or with
rules of public international law pertinent to a court's decision (Article VI
para 3 (c)). It shall also have appellate jurisdiction over
constitutionality issues arising out of a judgement of any other court in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article VI para 3 (b). It
follows from the latter provision that the Constitutional Court may receive appeals against
decisions from any court whereby it is alleged that they violate the
Constitution, including the provisions on Human Rights (cf. Article II). In
accordance with Article VI para 4 of the Constitution of BH, the decisions of
the Constitutional Court "are final and
binding". Similarly, the Commission of Human Rights - and in particular
the Human Rights Chamber -has jurisdiction to receive applications
concerning violations of human rights. The decisions of the Chamber are
also "final and binding". Whatever the intention of the drafters of
the Constitution may have been, there is an overlapping between the competences
of the Constitutional Court and those of the Commission
of Human Rights. Both shall deal with human rights issues, mainly under the
European Convention on Human Rights. »
The Venice Commission considered
whether it would be compatible with the Dayton Agreement to allow appeals
from one jurisdiction to the other, considering that one of these two
judicial bodies is in a « hierarchically » superior position to the
other. The Commission ruled out this possibility for the following
reasons : A solution allowing appeals from one institution to the other
would « disregard the fact that the
decisions of both the Constitutional Court and the Human Rights Chamber have to
be regarded as "final and binding" under the Dayton Agreement. In
these circumstances, a decision of the Human Rights Chamber finding a violation
of the European Convention on Human Rights cannot be reviewed by the Constitutional Court and vice-versa». Moreover, allowing appeals from one jurisdiction to
the other, would add a level of jurisdiction to the already long process of
exhaustion of remedies.
Taking into account the need
to ensure legal safety as to respect for human rights within a relatively short
time and to avoid prolongation of human rights litigation, the Venice
Commission suggested that the jurisdiction of either court should not extend to
matters already dealt with by the other. Human rights litigation could be
attributed, as a matter of principle, to the Human Rights Commission as long as
it is in operation.
3. The Constitutional
Court’s decision on the appeal introduced
against a decision by the Human Rights Chamber
When the Venice Commission issued the above
opinion, the Human Rights Chamber had not yet given any judgement and the Constitutional Court had not yet been set up. It
was still possible to include in the Rules of Procedure of either bodies rules
which would exclude overlapping and promote a clear distribution of cases, at
least for the transitional period. This, however, did not occur.
On 31 December 1997, Mr
Haris Siladjić, in his capacity as
co-Chair of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Mr Plamenko
Čustović, as Public Attorney of
Bosnia and Herzegovina lodged appeals with the Constitutional Court against two
decisions of the Human Rights Chamber (Decision of 3 November 1997 on cases N°
96/3,8 and 9 and Decision of 3 November 1997 on case N° 96/22). The applicants
claimed to represent the State of BH. They alleged that the
Human Rights Chamber had violated the Constitution of BH and that the Constitutional Court should review the
challenged decisions pursuant to its « appellate jurisdiction » over
constitutionality issues arising out of judgements « of any other
court » in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. On 5 June 1998 the Constitutional Court decided to reject the appeal.
The relevant part of the Constitutional Court’s decision reads as
follows :
« Article VI, par. 3
(b) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides that the
Constitutional Court has appellate jurisdiction over issues under the
Constitution arising out of a judgement of any other court in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The question therefore arises whether the Human Rights Chamber
should be considered a court in Bosnia and Herzegovina according to this provision
of the Constitution. It is significant to
note in this context that, according to Article XI (3) of the Agreement on
Human Rights which is Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the decisions of the Human Rights Chamber are final and
binding, subject only to review by the Chamber itself in some cases.
The Constitutional Court,
however, does not consider it necessary in this case to resolve the question
whether a decision of the Human Rights Chamber can be appealed to the
Constitutional Court, because, even if the Constitutional Court were considered
to have jurisdiction with respect to such an appeal, the appeals filed in the
present case would have to be rejected for the following reasons.
In both cases one of the
defendants before the Human Rights Chamber was the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Decisions of the
Chamber indicate that the Chamber invited the State, both before and after it
decided on the admissibility of the cases, to participate in the proceedings by
submitting comments in writing. The State did not respond to the requests of
the Chamber in any way. The State did not submit any comments, nor was it
represented at the oral hearings in the two cases.
The Constitutional Court considers that, even if it
should be possible to appeal against a decision of the Human Rights Chamber, it
would not be permissible for the parties to present their comments and
arguments for the first time in the appellate proceedings ».
It follows from the above
decision that the issue as to the admissibility of appeals to the Constitutional Court from the Human Rights
Chamber is still open.
4. Opinion
of the Commission
There are elements in the
Constitution of BH which would support the position to allow appeals from the
Human Rights Chamber to the Constitutional Court. Since the Human Rights
Chamber is somehow integrated in the domestic legal order of Bosnia and Herzegovina it could be regarded as
« any other court in Bosnia and Herzegovina », whose decisions can
be appealed against. It would also be consistent with the role normally
attributed to constitutional courts in some European constitutional systems,
namely the role of ultimate appeal court. The Venice Commission already referred
to these arguments in its above-mentioned opinion.
However, a careful
consideration of the role of the Human Rights Chamber in the context of the
Dayton Peace Agreements clearly supports the opposite view.
Protection of Human Rights
appears as the cornerstone of the Peace Agreement. In Article VII of the
General Framework Agreement the parties to the Agreement expressly recognise
that « the observance of human rights and the protection of refugees and
displaced persons are of vital importance for achieving a lasting peace ».
In this context, the experience of the European Convention on Human Rights
seems determinant. The ECHR, an international instrument conceived as an
effective legal reply to the atrocities of the Second World War, appears as a
tool for achieving « greater unity » between European States by
« the maintenance and further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental
freedoms ». The key element in this
instrument is not the list of rights set out in it but rather the
implementation machinery which it establishes namely the monitoring bodies (the
European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights) and the right of
individuals to address these international bodies when they claim that their
rights have been violated. This machinery is the realisation of the
« collective enforcement » of the rights set out in
the ECHR and is indeed so closely related to these rights that the latter would
not have the same scope if the implementation mechanism did not exist.
Article II of the
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides that « the
rights and freedoms as set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority
over all other law ». This provision would lose most of its meaning if the
list of rights alone, and not the monitoring mechanism, were to apply in BH.
However, the ECHR monitoring
machinery is only open to States which are parties to this convention and BH is
not one of them, since only member States of the Council of Europe can become
parties to the ECHR. It is therefore necessary, pending the accession of BH to
the Council of Europe and the ratification of the ECHR by it, to provide for a
provisional monitoring mechanism reproducing in BH the Strasbourg bodies (the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights).
The idea of a transitional
international human rights protection mechanism was already expressed in
Resolution (93) 6 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, and
Annex 6 to the Dayton Agreements, establishing the Human Rights Chamber,
expressly refers to this Resolution.
The international elements
in the composition of the Human Rights Commission (the Ombudsperson and the
majority of the Human Rights Chamber are not nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina) underline this specific
role of the bodies established under Annex 6. The Human Rights Commission
appears as a quasi-international sui
generis body integrated into the legal order of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a transitional period,
until the effective integration of this State has been achieved and has acceded
to the Council of Europe, ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and
recognised the human rights protection mechanism of the Strasbourg organs. The transitional (provisional) character of the mechanism
is also indicated in Annex 6 , which is scheduled to last for five years
after the entry into force of the Dayton Agreement. After that period of time,
the responsibility for the continued operation of the Commission of Human
Rights is to be transferred to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unless otherwise agreed. This provision has to
be read in conjunction with Article 5 of Resolution (93) 6 which provides that the arrangements for a transitional
human rights control mechanism integrated in the internal legal order of
European States which are not yet members of the Council of Europe, shall cease
once the requesting state has become a member of the Council of Europe, except
as otherwise agreed.
The provisions on
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission further underline this
quasi-international (sui generis)
character of the mechanism established under Annex 6. Article 2 of Annex 6
states that the Commission on Human Rights is established to assist the parties
(namely the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska)
in honouring their obligations to secure to all persons within their
jurisdiction the highest level of internationally recognised human rights
standards. Therefore, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a party to
proceedings before the Human Rights Commission in its capacity as a party to an
international agreement.
The above distribution of
competencies and the exclusion of appeals from one court to the other further
contributes to the effectiveness of human rights protection in the country,
since it avoids adding another degree of jurisdiction to the already long
process of exhaustion of legal remedies.
5. Conclusion
It follows from the above
that the Human Rights Chamber, on account of its quasi -international (sui generis) and provisional character,
cannot be regarded as a court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the meaning of
Article VI, para 3 (b) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least
as long as these characteristics remain.
Consequently, the Venice Commission is of the opinion
that the Constitutional Court has no appellate jurisdiction in
respect of decisions of the Human Rights Chamber.
By letter dated 4 August 1998 the Office of the High Representative
asked the Venice Commission to examine the constitutionality of a number of
Agreements, the list of which appears at Appendix I, concluded by the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina or by Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) and/or the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH) with the Republic of Croatia on the
one hand and by Republika Srpska (RS) with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) on the other.
The present opinion was
adopted by the Commission at its 37th Plenary meeting on 11-12
December 1998 upon the proposal of the Sub-Commission on the Federal and Regional State. It was prepared by a working group of the Sub-Commission composed
of Messrs Matscher (Austria), Scholsem (Belgium), Tuori (Finland) and Bartole (Italy).
The Agreements raise a
number of difficult issues concerning both procedure and substance. As regards
procedure, Agreements concluded after the entry into force of the BH
Constitution appearing at Appendix IV of the General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement) but before the establishment
of the new institutions raise particular problems. As regards substance, all
Agreements have to respect the division of responsibilities between BH on the
one hand and the Entities on the other.
In the opinion, the
Commission has limited itself to examining the constitutionality according to
the Constitution of BH as set out at Appendix IV to the Dayton Agreement. It
has not dealt with the constitutionality according to earlier constitutions of
the Republic of BHor the constitutionality of Agreements concluded by the Entities under the
Entity Constitutions. In addition, the consequences under international law of
a possible unconstitutionality are not addressed in the present opinion. While,
according to the provisions of Articles 27 and 46 of the Vienna Convention,
provisions of internal law may only under very exceptional circumstances be
invoked to contest the validity of an international treaty, the situation
concerning the Agreements dealt with in the present opinion seems very specific
in so far as the two other States concerned, i.e. Croatia and FRY, as
co-Parties to the Dayton Agreement, were not only perfectly aware of the
constitutional situation in BH but even formally endorsed the BH Constitution
and agreed to fully respect the commitments made therein (Article V of the
Dayton Agreement).
The present opinion also
does not claim to deal exhaustively with all relevant constitutional questions.
The Commission has concentrated on those questions which seem decisive for the
validity of the agreements or for the further action to be undertaken by the BH
authorities. In addition, the Commission is conscious that the decision on the
constitutionality of the agreements belongs to the Constitutional Court of BH
and that it may only provide a non-binding legal opinion of outside experts.
While the Office of the High Representative has provided all information
requested by the Commission, such information cannot replace an adversarial
legal procedure. Therefore it does not seem impossible that the Constitutional
Court of BH may in the future, when called upon to take a decision on the
constitutionality of one or the other Agreement, dispose of additional elements
and arrive at different conclusions with respect to certain issues.
II.
Agreements ratified before the entry into force of the
Constitution
Section 5 of the
Transitional Arrangements appearing in Annex II to the Constitution contains
the following rule on treaties:
“Any
treaty ratified by the Republic of BH between January 1, 1992 and the entry
into force of this Constitution shall be disclosed to Members of the Presidency
within 15 days of their assuming office; any such treaty not disclosed shall be
denounced. Within six months after the Parliamentary Assembly is first convened,
at the request of any Member of the Presidency, the Parliamentary Assembly
shall consider whether to denounce any other such treaty.”
The Commission was
informed by the Office of the High Representative that both treaties mentioned
below were disclosed to the Members of the Presidency in accordance with this
provision and that no request to denounce either of the treaties was made.
There are therefore no procedural reasons to doubt the validity of these
Agreements.
Preliminary Agreement on the Establishment of a
Confederation between FBH and the Republic of Croatia
The Commission considers
the establishment of a confederation between an Entity and another State as
clearly inconsistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BH and
therefore as unconstitutional. While the Agreement itself falls short of the
establishment of a confederation, this purpose is not legitimate under the BH
Constitution which provides as an alternative the possibility to conclude
agreements on special parallel relationships. It is clear that, as from the
entry into force of the new Constitution, the Washington Agreement may be used
as a basis for the conclusion of agreements only to the extent it is compatible
with the new Constitution.
This Agreement, which was
concluded before Dayton, has to be regarded as superseded by the new
Constitution.
Agreement
on the Adoption of the Constitution of the FBH and Preliminary Agreement
concerning the Future Economic and Military Co-operation between the FBH and
the Republic of Croatia
The Commission notes that
the commitments resulting from this Agreement were presumably to a large extent
carried out already. The Commission is not aware to which extent the measures
agreed by the Military Interim Team, to which reference is made, are still
relevant and can therefore not provide a final opinion.
III.
Agreements ratified (or signed without reservation
as to ratification) between the entry into force of the Constitution (14 December 1995) and
the elections to the new constitutional institutions (September 1996)
The Agreements in this
category were ratified after the entry into force of the Constitution.
Section 5 of the Transitional Arrangements is therefore not applicable, at
least not directly.
The Commission was
informed that these agreements, as well as all other agreements concluded
between 1 January 1992
and 31 November 1996,
had nevertheless been notified to the Members of the Presidency upon their
taking office. This disclosure was motivated by the desire to ensure
transparency and was not based upon a legal obligation under Section 5 of the
Transitional Agreements.
The Agreements, with the
exception of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Joint Council for Co-operation
which was treated as an Agreement not requiring ratification, were all ratified
in a procedure inconsistent with the provisions of the new Constitution. The
Constitution provides that the Presidency is responsible for “negotiating,
denouncing and, with the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly, ratifying
treaties of BH” (Article V.3.d) and that the Parliamentary Assembly shall have
responsibility for “deciding whether to consent to the ratification of
treaties” (Article IV.4.d). In contradiction with these provisions, the
Agreements were ratified by the government of the Republic of BH,
without the involvement of the Parliamentary Assembly or the Presidency, on the
basis of Article 34 of the 1994 Law on the Government of the Republic of BH
adopted under the previous Constitution.
This disregard for the
Constitution, which had already entered into force on 14 December 1995, seems
due to the fact that the institutions provided for by the new Constitution had
not yet been established and that the elections to them did not take place
until September 1996. For this transitional period a solution therefore had to
be found and this solution was not provided for directly by the text of the
Transitional Arrangements.
The Commission was
already consulted on this problem, not with respect to international treaties
but with respect to ordinary legislation. In its Opinion on legislative powers in BH in the period between the entry
into force of the Constitution set out in Annex IV to the Dayton Agreement (14
December 1995) and the elections of 14 September 1996 (CDL (96) 94) it came
to the following conclusions:
“10. Article
IV of the new Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina contains provisions on a Parliamentary Assembly.
This Parliamentary Assembly is different from the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina existing under the previous Constitution.
11. Following
the rule on immediate entry into force of the new Constitution, contained in
its Article XII.1, at first sight the Assembly of the Republic would lose its
legal basis upon signature of the Dayton Agreement and therefore cease to be
able to validly enact legislation or other decisions. A different conclusion
may however result in particular from the Transitional Arrangements contained
in Annex 2 to the Constitution.
12. Section
2 of the Transitional Arrangements on the continuation of laws is worded as
follows: "all laws, regulations, and judicial rules of procedure in effect
within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina when the Constitution enters
into force shall remain in effect to the extent not inconsistent with the
Constitution, until otherwise determined by a competent governmental body of
Bosnia and Herzegovina".
This provision does not cover legislation adopted
after the entry into force of the new Constitution, but only previously enacted
legislation. The very absence of a provision on legislation adopted during the
transitional period might however be regarded as an indication that such
legislation was not envisaged.
13. On
the other hand, section 4 of the Transitional Arrangements provides under the
heading "offices" as follows: "until superseded by applicable
agreement or law, governmental offices, institutions, and other bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina will operate in accordance with applicable
law".
Within the terminology of the Dayton Constitution, a
parliamentary body may be covered by the expression "governmental offices,
institutions, and other bodies". This results from Article III.1 where the
word institution is applied to all State organs, including the Parliamentary
Assembly. Moreover, section 2 of Annex 2 cited above calls
"governmental" the competent body, which determines the continued
validity of previous legislation.
By contrast, the application of the words "until
superseded by applicable agreement or law" to a parliamentary body seems
problematic since parliament has its main legal basis in the Constitution and
the new Constitution has already superseded the previous Constitution.
14. The
wording of the Transitional Arrangements therefore seems ambiguous and an
answer has to be found by applying general principles to the interpretation of
the Constitution contained in the Dayton Peace Agreement.
15. According
to Article I.1 of the Constitution, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a new State but it continues its legal
existence under international law as a State. This also results clearly from
Article XII.1 according to which the new Constitution enters into force
"amending and superseding the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". It is therefore clear that the State of
Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to exist throughout the whole period.
As a State it had to exercise the attributes of State power proper to any State
under international law. The organs of the State therefore had to be able to
effectively exercise their powers. Since the new parliamentary organs did not
come into existence before the elections on 14 September 1996, a denial of the continued existence of the
Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would mean that for a period of 10 months no
parliamentary or legislative body would have existed at the level of the State
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is difficult to conceive, and in the
absence of any clear provision in the text itself, the principle of continuity
requires the continued existence of a parliamentary organ of the State of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16. However,
this continued existence would seem to be very limited.
17. First
of all, it is obvious that the Assembly of the Republic, acting as an organ of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, could only act within the sphere of responsibilities
given to the parliamentary organs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (as distinct from
the Entities) by the new Constitution.
18. In addition, the powers of the Assembly were only
justified on the basis of the principle of necessity. The Assembly was not a
competent organ by virtue of the new Constitution, with the full powers given
by the new Constitution to the new institutions. It only continued to exist to
avoid the absence of the existence of any competent body and its actions were
only justified to the extent that such a lack of a competent body had to be
avoided. The Assembly of the Republic could therefore only deal with current
matters and not take any measures going beyond what is necessary to ensure the
continuity of the State. This limitation may be difficult to determine, as is
for example the case for the current matters a government still can expedite
during a governmental crisis. The limits can however be, if necessary, assessed
by the Constitutional Court and,
provisionally, by the High Representative under the conditions of Article 2.1.d
of Annex 10 to the Dayton Agreement.”
The same reasoning seems
appropriate with respect to international treaties. As a general rule, the BH
institutions were therefore justified to act on the basis of their previous
constitutional attributions with respect to such Agreements which were
necessary to ensure the continuity of the State and only within the limits of
the responsibilities of BH as distinct from the responsibilities of the
Entities. With respect to the following Agreements, the Commission will
therefore be guided by the application of the principles of continuity and
necessity.
This Agreement was signed
on 14 December 1995,
the day of entry into force of the new Constitution, by the presidents of the Republic of BH,
Croatia and FBH. According to its Article 5, the
Agreement comes into force on the day of its signing.
The main purpose of this
Agreement is to establish a joint Council for co-operation. The Commission
notes that a more recent Agreement on the
Establishment of an Inter-State Council for Co-operation between BH and the Republic
of Croatia (see below) was already approved by the BH Parliamentary
Assembly. This Agreement will replace the present Agreement. In addition it
should be noted that the new Agreement on special parallel relations between
FBH and Croatia also provides for the establishment of a joint
Council for co-operation, in this case between FBH and Croatia.
Under these
circumstances, the present Agreement is about to be superseded by subsequent
developments and it does not seem necessary to examine it in detail.
Agreement
between the Government of BH, the Government of FBH and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on Mutual Execution of Court Decisions in Criminal
Matters
This Agreement was signed
on 26 February 1996
and subsequently ratified by the government of the Republic of BH
according to the procedure under the law of 1994. The ratification was
published on 4 April 1996. As set out above, the procedural validity of the
Agreement will therefore depend on the question whether it was really necessary
at the time to conclude such an Agreement to ensure the continuity of the State
of BH.
It is certainly true that
the establishment of law and order are a priority in a country just having
experienced a war and that co-operation with a neighbouring State in such
matters may well be decisive. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the
Agreement only refers to the transfer of sentenced persons and to the
supervision of conditionally sentenced persons in the other country. It is hard
to see why the transfer of sentenced persons should have been so urgent and
decisive for the reconstruction of the State and why it should not have been
possible to wait for the establishment of the constitutional institutions. It
was therefore not justified to conclude the agreement without respecting the
procedural rules set out in the new Constitution.
As regards the substance
of the Agreement, it should be noted that both BH and FBH are parties to the
Agreement. The Constitution of BH does not expressly provide for the joint
conclusion of an international agreement by BH and an Entity. While Article
III.2.d of the Constitution expressly grants to the Entities the right to
conclude international agreements with the consent of the Parliamentary
Assembly, it does not mention the conclusion of agreements jointly with BH.
And, in general, the constitutional system of BH seems based on a strict
separation between responsibilities of BH and responsibilities of the Entities.
No express provision is made for joint or mixed responsibilities as are found
in the constitutions of European federal States.
Nevertheless, this and
subsequent Agreements were jointly concluded by BH and FBH and the respective
institutions seem to have considered such a procedure appropriate and perhaps
even necessary. This can be explained by the fact that BH is an unusually weak
Federation. Most responsibilities are assigned to the Entities while the
responsibility for foreign policy naturally remains with BH. Under these
circumstances, it seems plausible that many international Agreements will touch
upon responsibilities both of BH and of one of the Entities. Co-operative
mechanisms therefore have to be found and a reasonable way of ensuring full
harmony between the State and the Entity level seems to be the conclusion of
such joint agreements. The Commission sees no reason to object to them in
principle, provided the respective agreement touches upon the responsibilities
both of BH and the Entity concerned.
In the present case, the
participation of BH is in particular justified by the BH responsibility for
“international and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement” under Article III.1.g
of the Constitution and the participation of FBH by its overall responsibility
for its criminal justice system.
As regards the substance
of the Agreement, there seems therefore no reason to doubt its
constitutionality.
Treaty
on Customs Co-operation between the Government of Republic of BH, the Government of FBH and the Government of the Republic of Croatia
This Agreement was signed
on 24 March 1995
before the entry into force of the Constitution and ratified in February 1996
during the transitional period, again without respecting the constitutional
provisions on the ratification procedure. The substance of the Agreement is
very technical, setting out not so much general rules of customs policy but
regulating co-operation between authorities on the ground. Even taking into
account the high importance of trade with a neighbouring State, the necessity
of rapid ratification seems doubtful. This is confirmed by the fact that the
Agreement was ratified eleven months after its signature. It would therefore
have seemed possible to wait seven more months until the new institutions were
established. In addition, according to its Article 18, the treaty was to be
provisionally applied as from the day of its signing. Under these
circumstances, it would have been perfectly possible to prolong this
provisional application until the establishment of the new institutions and
then submit the text to the newly elected Presidency and Parliamentary
Assembly. The ratification of the Agreement can therefore not be regarded as
valid.
Under these
circumstances, it does not appear necessary to examine the substance of the
Agreement in detail. Since at the time of ratification a customs policy of BH
could not yet have been defined, it is difficult to see how an Entity could
conclude such an agreement without violating the responsibility of BH for
customs policy under art. III.1.c of the BH Constitution. The reference to a
customs region of FBH in art. 2 in particular seems unconstitutional.
Agreement
on the Return of Refugees
This is again an
Agreement signed in March 1995 and ratified in February 1996 by the government
of the Republic of BHaccording to the procedure under the law of 1994. The return of refugees was
and remains obviously of the highest importance for the reconstruction of BH.
The Commission, while it does not have sufficient elements to assess the urgency
of the Agreement in detail, cannot exclude that ratification during this period
was justified having regard to the principles of necessity and continuity as
set out above.
With respect to
substance, the Commission notes that this is a further Agreement having both BH
and FBH as parties. This again seems unobjectionable, taking into account that
the Agreement on Refugees and Displaced
Persons appearing at Annex VII to the Dayton Agreement obliges both BH and
FBH to take all necessary steps for the return of refugees and that Article
III.5.a of the Constitution provides that BH shall assume responsibility for
such other matters as are provided for in Annexes V-VIII to the Dayton
Agreement.
It should be noted that
the Agreement is applicable to refugees coming from the whole territory of BH
while, with respect to the return of refugees, Article 4 refers to the
territory of the Federation only. While such arrangements may have been
justifiable when the Agreement was concluded, it would now seem appropriate for
the BH authorities to examine together with the Entities, and subsequently Croatia, the possibility of extending the application of
this article also to persons wishing to return to RS.
Agreement
on Waiving Visas
Protocol on the Conditions for Entering or
Transiting the Republic
of Croatia by Citizens of the Republic of BH
Protocol
on the Temporary Application of the Agreement on Waiving Visas
The situation with
respect to these three texts seems somewhat confusing. The Agreement on waiving visas was signed on behalf of the
government of the Republic and Federation in March 1995. The Protocol on the Conditions for Entering or
Transiting the Republic of Croatia by Citizens of the Republic of BH was,
on the Bosnian side, signed on the same day by the government of the Republic of BH
only. According to its Article 4, the Protocol
enters into force within fifteen days from the date of its signature and shall
be applied until the Agreement on Waiving
Visas enters into force. Nevertheless, both Agreement and Protocol were
ratified together (publication on 23 February 1996) by BH. In addition, the Protocol on the Temporary Application of the Agreement on Waiving Visas
was concluded between BH and Croatia on 26 February 1996 pending the entry into force of the Agreement on waiving visas. This Protocol, according to its text, entered into force on 4 March 1996 and temporarily limits the application of the
provisions of the Agreement on Waiving
Visas to citizens of BH residing on the territory of FBH. Despite the ratification of the Agreement by BH, it therefore does
not seem to have become applicable and the original Protocol was replaced by
the Protocol on the Temporary Application
of the Agreement on Waiving Visas.
Having regard to the
geographical situation of BH, it seems plausible that rules on transit of BH
citizens through Croatia were of the utmost urgency. It also seems correct
that only BH concluded the Protocols since BH is responsible for “immigration,
refugee, and asylum policy and regulation”.
By contrast, the content
of the Protocol on the Temporary
Application of the Agreement on Waiving Visas as the only text presently in
force meets with objections. The Protocol reserves the benefits of free travel
exclusively to BH citizens residing on the territory of FBH while referring citizens residing on the territory of RS
to a supplementary Protocol which does not seem to have been concluded. Such a
discriminatory treatment of one part of the citizens of the State does not seem
permissible within a federal State and the Protocol therefore has to be
regarded as unconstitutional.
This Agreement was again
signed on behalf of the Republic of BH
and FBH governments on 24 March 1995 and ratified by the government of Republic of BH
under the law of 1994 during the transitional period in March 1996.
Trade with Croatia and economic co-operation with Croatia were obviously very important for BH during this
period and a certain urgency cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the ratification
during a transitional period of such a comprehensive Agreement with a
neighbouring State and major economic partner cannot be justified as necessary.
In addition, the
Agreement meets with objections of substance. It is not even very clear who are
the parties to the Agreement. According to its Preamble, the Agreement was
agreed by the two governments, i.e. Croatia on the one side and the government of the
Republic and Federation on the other. Articles 1 and 15 seem to limit the
applicability of the Agreement to FBH. It seems however inconceivable in a
Federation to regulate major questions of foreign trade policy and customs
policy with effect for one Entity only. Due to the principle of free movement
of goods and services throughout BH enshrined by Article I.4 of the
Constitution, any such agreement has major repercussions on the other Entity.
The reference in the preamble to the Confederation Agreement between Croatia and FBH also shows that this Agreement is
inappropriate following the new situation created by the Dayton Peace
Agreement.
This Agreement therefore
has to be regarded as unconstitutional.
IV.
Agreements concluded or to be concluded by BH
and/or FBH with Croatia after
the setting up of the institutions provided for by the new Constitution
Agreement
on the Establishment of an Inter-State Council for Co-operation between BH and
the Republic of Croatia
With respect to this Agreement, the correct
constitutional procedure seems to have been followed and the Commission sees no
reason to doubt the constitutionality of this Agreement.
Protocol
on the Establishment of Navigation on Internal Navigation Routes of the Sava River and its Tributaries between the Republic of Croatia and BH
Different versions of this Protocol were submitted to
the Commission during the period of its consideration. Its text is difficult to
assess without a more complete knowledge of both the legal and factual
background. The Commission therefore refrains from expressing an opinion on
this agreement.
Draft
Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and BH on the Establishment of a Motorway
Construction Company for the Zagreb-Bihać-Dubrovnik and Ploče-Sarajevo-Osijek Motorways
This draft Agreement is to be signed by the
governments of Croatia, BH and FBH. It involves the setting up of a joint
company for the carrying out of construction work and does not address public
law questions such as the necessary planning permits. It has a mainly private
law nature.
V.
Agreements concluded by the RS with the FRY
Precept
on Temporary Regulations of Commodities and Services with the FRY
The Commission notes that this text is not an
international agreement but an internal regulatory text. It may well also be
already superseded by later texts, in particular the Decree on Regulation of Traffic of Goods and Services with the FRY
(see below).
The Precept regulates trade and customs arrangements with
the FRY. According to Articles III.1.b and III.1.c of the Constitution, foreign
trade policy and customs policy are the responsibility of the BH institutions
and this Precept therefore clearly violates the BH Constitution.
Protocol
on the Trade of Goods and Services between the Republic of Serbia and the RS
This protocol regulates the trade between RS and the Republic of Serbia
as the main component of the FRY. It again violates the BH responsibility for
foreign trade and customs policy. Such agreements can also not be concluded by
one Entity since they have important repercussions on the other Entity due to
the free movement of goods and services within BH (see above).
In addition, the consent of the BH Parliamentary
Assembly, which under Article III.2.d of the Constitution is required for
Entity agreements, has not been sought or obtained (cf. below under Trade Agreement for the question whether
a trade agreement may be an agreement on special parallel relations).
Draft
Agreement on Special Parallel Relations between the FRY and the RS
It should be noted that this Agreement provides that
its entry into force is subject to ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly
of BH. Under the BH Constitution it
seems questionable whether agreements of special parallel relations require the
consent of the Parliamentary Assembly of BH. According to Article III.2.d of
the Constitution this consent is required for international agreements in
general. However, agreements on special
parallel relationships are governed by a different provision of the
Constitution, Article III.2.a, which does not mention the consent of the
Parliamentary Assembly. The word
"also" in Article III.2.d indicates that both procedures have to be
considered separately. This is confirmed
by the fact that Article VI.3.a gives to the Constitutional Court a specific responsibility to control, upon the
request of the institutions mentioned in this article, the constitutionality of
agreements on special parallel relationships.
It is therefore the understanding of the Commission that the agreements
on special parallel relations do not require the consent of the BH
Parliamentary Assembly.
Nevertheless, the Agreement has not entered into force
according to its text. In addition, according to press reports, a new such
Agreement between RS and FRY is being prepared. It seems therefore sufficient
to briefly identify the most problematic parts of the Agreement.
Article 5 of the Agreement provides that the member of
the BH Presidency from RS is Vice-President of the Council for Co-operation.
Since the members of the Presidency of BH act on behalf of BH, it is not
possible for the Entities to adopt rules on the rights and obligations of
members of the BH Presidency.
Article 6 establishes a list of fields for the
activities of the Council for Co-operation. In particular, the following fields
encroach upon BH responsibilities:
-
emigration,
immigration and asylum conflicts with the BH responsibility under Article
III.1.f of the Constitution for Immigration, Refugee, and Asylum Policy and
Regulation;
-
the same
consideration applies to “regulating the crossing of State borders”;
-
harmonising
foreign policy and the approach to third-world countries and international
organisations conflicts with the BH responsibility on foreign policy under
Article III.1.a of the Constitution;
-
the same
consideration applies to “resolving the issue of succession of the Former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.
The aim of creating a unified market and the
commitment to the principle of the freedom of movement of people, goods and
capital (Article 12) encroach in particular upon the BH responsibilities for
foreign trade and customs policy and immigration. Other fields such as
citizenship (under Article I.7 of the BH Constitution Entity citizenship only
exists within the framework of BH citizenship) and the fight against terrorism
and organised crime may also, depending on the scope of co-operation, encroach
upon BH responsibilities. In this context it is to be regretted that there is
no general provision limiting the activities of the Council for Co-operation to
areas within the responsibility of RS under the BH Constitution.
Other parts of the Agreement, such as the
non-aggression clause in Article 9, typical of agreements concluded between
sovereign states, though in principle to be welcomed, may also be regarded as
violating the foreign policy prerogative of BH and the responsibilities of the
Standing Committee on Military Matters provided for by Article V.5.b of the BH
Constitution..
Trade
Agreement
As regards procedure, it is not foreseen to submit the
draft Agreement to the BH Parliamentary Assembly for its consent, as required
by Article III.2.d of the Constitution for international agreements concluded
by the Entities. The only exception foreseen by the Constitution is that,
according to Article III.2.a, special parallel relationship agreements are not
subject to the consent of the BH Parliamentary Assembly (see above). The
present Agreement claims to be based on this Article III.2.a.
It seems questionable, but may remain open here,
whether an agreement limited to a specific field such as trade can be regarded
as a special parallel relationship agreement. In any case, special parallel
relationship agreements may only be concluded for areas for which the Entities
are responsible. Since foreign trade policy is reserved to BH, the Entities
cannot conclude trade agreements. The Agreement is therefore unconstitutional.
Decree
on Regulation of Traffic of Goods and Services with the FRY
See the comments on the Precept on temporary regulations of commodities and services with the
FRY.
Decree on the Amendment to the Decree on
Regulation of the Exchange of Goods and Services with the FRY
This decree amends other unconstitutional texts and
has to be considered invalid together with them.
Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of Montenegro and the Government of RS
This Agreement was not submitted to the BH
Parliamentary Assembly. It is therefore unconstitutional unless it may be
regarded as an agreement on a special parallel relationship. In principle,
Article III.2.a provides for such special parallel relationships only with
neighbouring States. Montenegro is an Entity of a neighbouring State. Having regard
to the increasing tendency under international law to allow Entities to enter
into international commitments, a tendency confirmed by the BH Constitution,
and to the fact that agreements with neighbouring Entities do not seem to raise
more risks for the interests of BH than agreements with neighbouring States,
there seems to be no reason to deny the applicability of Article III.2.a to
agreements with neighbouring Entities. As regards its substance, the Agreement
covers wide areas of mutual co-operation and may be regarded as an agreement
establishing a special parallel relationship. Article III.2.a is therefore
applicable and the consent of the BH Parliamentary Assembly is not required.
However, again, the responsibilities of BH have to be
respected. Since the provisions of the Agreement are very imprecise, it is not
easy to determine whether provisions violate the BH Constitution. It is
therefore to be regretted that no reference to the need to safeguard the
responsibilities of BH is included in the text of the Agreement. Such a
reference should be added. As the Agreement stands, in particular the closer
integration in the field of telecommunications (cf. Article III.1.h of the BH
Constitution) and air traffic (cf. Article III.1.j of the BH Constitution) seem
problematic.
Protocol
on the Procedure of Organised Return
There is no provision to submit this draft Protocol to
the consent of the BH Parliamentary Assembly. The draft Agreement concerns a
very specific area in which BH responsibilities exist and cannot be regarded as
a special parallel relationship agreement which would have to be of a more
general nature. In addition, there is no reference to the main agreement which
would have to be supplemented by this Protocol. In the absence of such a main
agreement, the Protocol seems to go beyond a purely administrative arrangement
and to have to be considered as an international agreement in the meaning of
Article III.2.d of the Constitution.
The consent of the BH Parliamentary Assembly is
therefore required.
A P P E N D I X
·
Preliminary
Agreement on the Establishment of a Confederation between FBH and the Republic of Croatia, signed on 18
March 1994
·
Agreement
on the Adoption of the Constitution of the FBH and Preliminary Agreement
concerning the Future Economic and Military Co-operation between the FBH and
the Republic of Croatia, signed on 18
March 1994
·
Agreement
on the Establishment of the Joint Council for Co-operation, signed on 14
December 1995
·
Agreement
between the Government of BH, the Government of FBH and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on Mutual Execution of Court
Decisions in Criminal Matters, signed on 26 February 1996
·
Treaty
on Customs Co-operation between the Government of BH, the Government of FBH and
the Government of the Republic of Croatia, signed on 24
March 1995
·
Agreement
on the Return of Refugees, signed on 24 March 1995
·
Agreement
on Waiving Visas, signed on 24 March 1995
·
Protocol
on the Conditions for Entering or Transiting the Republic of Croatia by Citizens of the Republic of BH, signed on 24
March 1995
·
Protocol
on the Temporary Application of the Agreement on Waiving Visas, signed on 26
February 1996
·
Agreement
on Economic Co-operation, signed on 24 March 1995
·
Draft
Agreement on the Establishment of an Inter-State Council for Co-operation
between BH and the Republic of Croatia, signed on 30
March 1998
·
Protocol
on the Establishment of Navigation on Internal Navigation Routes of the Sava River and its Tributaries between the Republic of Croatia and BH, signed on 16
October 1998
·
Draft
Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and BH on the Establishment of a
Motorway Construction Company for the Zagreb-Bihač-Dubrovnik and Ploče-Sarajevo-Osijek Motorways
·
Precept
on Temporary Regulations of Commodities and Services with the FRY
·
Protocol
on the Trade of Goods and Services between the Republic of Serbia and the RS, signed on 14
March 1997
·
Draft
Agreement on Special Parallel Relations between the FRY and the RS, signed on 28
February 1997
·
Trade
Agreement, signed in March 1997
·
Decree
on Regulation of Traffic of Goods and Services with the FRY
·
Decree
on the Amendment to the Decree on Regulation of the Exchange of Goods and
Services with the FRY
·
Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of Montenegro and the Government of RS, signed on 25
March 1998
·
Protocol on the Procedure of Organised Return
1. Following the conference "five years of the
Estonian Constitution", held in Tallinn on 26-27 September 1997,
the Estonian Ministry of Justice asked the Commission to give an opinion on the
constitutional issues involved in Estonia's accession to the European
Union.
2. Opinions on this issue were provided by Mr Matti
Niemivuo (CDL (97) 52) and Mr Luis Lopez Guerra (CDL (98) 5). These individual
opinions were discussed at the 33rd and 34th meeting of the Commission in
December 1997 and March 1998 respectively and they were made available to the
Governmental Commission charged in Estonia to prepare proposals for
changes to the Constitution of Estonia. This Governmental Commission made an
Intermediary Report (CDL (98) 39) outlining proposals for changes to the
Constitution of Estonia made necessary by accession to the European Union.
Following this report, Mr Lopez Guerra made some additional comments (CDL (98) 5 Addendum).
3. The present opinion is based on the individual opinions
by Mr Niemivuo and Mr Lopez Guerra and takes into account the Intermediary
Report of the Governmental Commission as well as the discussions at the 33rd,
34th [and 35th] plenary meetings of the Commission.
I. The
need for a general provision on transfers of powers to the European Union
4. Article 1 of the Estonian Constitution provides that
"Estonia is an independent and
sovereign democratic republic wherein the supreme power of the State is held by
the people. Estonian independence and sovereignty is interminable and
inalienable". Article 59 of the Constitution provides that
"legislative power shall rest with the Riigikogu" and Article 86 that
"executive power shall be held by the government of the republic".
Article 121 establishes the treaty-making power of the Riigikogu which includes
Estonia's joining international
organisations. There is no provision on the transfer of powers to international
or supra-national organisations nor on Estonia's participation in
international co-operation in general. Article 123 specifically prohibits the
conclusion of treaties which are in conflict with the Constitution.
5. The need for a general "empowerment" provision
providing for the transfer of powers to the European Union is extensively
discussed in the individual opinions by Mr Niemivuo (CDL (97) 52) and Mr Lopez
Guerra (CDL (98) 5 rev.), taking into account the experience of other European
countries already members of the Union. Since the Estonian Governmental
Commission has also come to the conclusion that a revision of the Constitution
should include a general empowerment clause, it seems not necessary to repeat
these arguments in detail. The present opinion is therefore limited in this
respect to an outline of the main arguments and the Commission refers for the
details and the experience of other European States to the individual opinions
by Mr Niemivuo and Mr Lopez Guerra.
6. In the opinion of the Commission, the decisive arguments
in favour of introducing a general "empowerment" provision into the
Estonian Constitution are the following:
a) Accession to the European Union involves a substantial
transfer of executive, judicial and in particular legislative power to the
institutions of the European Union. The present provisions of the Estonian
Constitution, such as "legislative power shall rest with the
Riigikogu", would no longer reflect the actual legal situation.
b) Accession would involve a limitation of the sovereignty
of the republic, which is proclaimed in Article 1 of the Constitution, since
several of the powers transferred may be considered as central components of
the State's powers. It should be noted that these Community powers may be
exercised without necessarily always obtaining the consent of all member
States.
c) The introduction of an empowerment clause would
contribute to the legal certainty of the binding force of European law in Estonia. Given the system of the
diffuse control of the constitutionality of laws which exists in Estonia, the
transfer or empowerment clause, by explicitly providing for the
constitutionality of the transfer of competences, would confirm the direct and
preferential binding force of European law (treaties, regulations, directives
and decisions), and would preclude the possibility of European primary and
secondary law not being applied by the Estonian courts on the basis of Article
152 of the Constitution which states that "if any law or other legal act
is in conflict with the Constitution, it shall not be applied by the Court in
trying a case".
d) The empowerment clause could include a provision
guaranteeing the participation of the Riigikogu in the formulation of the
European policies of the Estonian Republic. The Estonian Constitution
establishes that the Executive power shall "implement foreign
policies" (Article 83). In the structure of the European Union, there is a
strong presence of organs whose designation or composition depends on the
proposals or decisions of the executive powers of the member States. Therefore,
a constitutional mandate providing for the participation of the Riigikogu (as
the State organ which represents the Estonian people) in the internal processes
to define Estonia's position on European matters, and the proposals to be
formulated by the Estonian representatives in the European Union institutions,
would partially compensate for that predominance of the executive powers,
sometimes considered to be a "democratic deficit".
7. The Commission therefore notes with satisfaction that
the Governmental Commission in fact proposes the introduction of a general
empowerment clause into the present Constitution of Estonia.
II. The
actual wording of the empowerment clause
8. From a constitutional standpoint, the proposal contained
in the Intermediary Report of the Governmental Commission clears the way for
the integration of the Republic of Estonia into the European Union by
means of the ratification of the corresponding treaty. The proposal entails the
adoption of an empowerment clause, allowing the transfer (or delegation) of
constitutional competences to the institutions of the European Union, as well
as providing for an extended intervention of the legislative power in the
formulation of Estonian European policy (the Government should "give due
regard to the positions adopted by the Riigikogu on all related
questions"). Some considerations may, nevertheless, be formulated:
a) The reference to the 7 February
1992Treaty might be considered as superfluous, and may prove a source of
constitutional difficulties in the future.
It might prove superfluous
because it does not add any new precision to the authorisation to become a
member of the Union. The European Union is what it really and actually is; any empowerment
clause related to the European Union does not need to enumerate the instruments
by which this Union is created. It is understood that accession to the European Union is
authorised to the Union in its present form. If a change of the structure and
functions of the Union were to be introduced in the future, the agreement of
its members would be necessary, by way of a new Treaty, whose compatibility
with the Constitution would once again have to be considered.
But the reference to the
Maastricht Treaty could also prove to be a source of future difficulties, since
it restricts the empowerment clause exclusively to the accession to the Union
as set forth in that Treaty, thus implying the exclusion of any future reform.
In other words, the reference to the Maastricht Treaty could reasonably be
interpreted as meaning that any amendment to the Union set forth by a
subsequent Treaty would require a new constitutional empowerment clause in
order to permit the Republic of Estonia to ratify that treaty, even if the
reform of the Union did not, in any way, contradict the basic principles and
tasks of the Estonian State. (Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty is on its way to
being superseded by the Amsterdam Treaty.)
The empowerment clause,
therefore, should not make reference to the Maastricht Treaty, but rather to
the European Union without any specific reference to either its present or
future form (notwithstanding the "safeguard clause" relating to the
Preamble of the Constitution - see below).
b) The constitutional reserve clause included in the second
item of the proposed reform article ("provided that this does not come
into contradiction with the basic principles and tasks of the Estonian State
the way they have been fixed in the Preamble of the Constitution") may be
understood only as a safeguard clause against future modifications of the
Union, not as a reserve referring to the present content of the Treaty of the
Union. If it were understood otherwise, the Republic of Estonia's acceptance of its duties
as a member of the Union would be a sub
conditione acceptance, ie. conditioned by a permanent review of the
compatibility of the dispositions of the Treaty with the Estonian Constitution
on the part of the Estonian authorities. The elimination of the specific
reference to the Maastricht Treaty would eliminate any interpretation of that
nature. The "safeguard clause" would thus be a constitutional limit pro futuro, forbidding ratifications of
future Treaties contrary to the Preamble of the Constitution.
III. Specific
constitutional issues to be considered in the context of accession to the
European Union
The publication of EU norms
9. Article 3 of the Estonian Constitution contains a
relevant provision: "Laws shall be published in the prescribed manner.
Only laws which have been published shall have obligatory force." At
present, the provision only applies to national legislation. EU norms, on the
other hand, are not published in the same manner. The only official channel of
publication is the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ) and the provisions
enter into force on the date indicated or, failing an indication, on the 20th
day after publication. EU legislation is published in all the official
languages of the member States (excluding Irish Gaelic). Were Estonia to become a member State of the EU, the legislation
would also be published in Estonian. The national provisions on the
implementation of EU directives would be published like national legislation.
It would appear that the publication of EU norms does not call for an amendment
to the Estonian Constitution.
The division of powers
between President and Government in EU matters
10. It is of special importance to determine the division of
powers between the President of the Republic and the government in EU matters.
The crucial provision is Article 78.1 of the Estonian Constitution: "[The
President of the Republic shall] represent the Republic of Estonia in international
relations." Does this mean, for instance, that it is the President who
represents Estonia in the European Council? In
any event, the essential point is to carry out a thorough debate on the issue
and to formulate the pertinent provisions clearly and unambiguously.
The right to vote and be
elected in local elections
11. Article 8B of the Treaty on the European Union gives to
every Union citizen the right to vote in local elections and be elected in the
State where he or she is resident. Article 57 of the Estonian Constitution
limits the right to vote to Estonian citizens. While Article 156 of the
Constitution extends the right to vote in local elections to all permanent
residents, no such provision exists with respect to the right to be elected. An
amendment to the Constitution is therefore necessary. This amendment would also
have to make it possible for EU citizens residing in Estonia to participate as voters or
candidates in the Estonian elections to the European Parliament in the terms
set out in Article 8B.2 of the European Union Treaty.
The right to be a member of
a political party
12. Article 48 of the Estonian Constitution states that
"only Estonian citizens may be members of political parties." It is
very doubtful that, given the inter-relation among all political rights, such a
clause could be considered compatible with the free and equal exercise of
voting rights (to vote and be candidate) in local elections, as well as in
elections to the European Parliament. Article 8B of the EC Treaty provides that
EU citizens shall have the right to vote "under the same conditions as
nationals of that State," which would exclude discrimination based on
factors as relevant as party membership. This interpretation is also reinforced
in Article 6 of the Treaty which forbids discrimination for reasons of
nationality when applying Treaty mandates. As a consequence, the Estonian Constitution
should also be amended to allow EU citizens resident in Estonia to be members of political
parties.
The right to issue currency
13. Another contradiction to be considered is the one existing
between Article 111 of the Estonian Constitution ("the sole right to issue
currency in Estonia shall rest with the Bank of Estonia") and Article 105A
of the EC Treaty providing for the emission of currency by the European Central
Bank. Given the present rate of development of the European Monetary Union and
the forecast for the future in monetary matters, (which will result in the
unification of currencies in the European Union by the year 2002), the
contradiction between the aforementioned clauses will soon be more real than
hypothetical. Certainly, it might be assumed that the empowerment clause,
providing for the transfer of constitutional competences to the EU, could also
address this issue. But the categorical terms of Article 111 ("The sole
right", in the English version) makes it advisable to amend the text.
There would seem to be no more need for a currency clause once Estonia has joined the Monetary
Union. An international comparison indicates that currency provisions seldom
belong to the core of the national constitutions.
Conclusion
14. The Commission notes with satisfaction that the
intermediary report of the governmental commission recommends the introduction
of a general empowerment provision into the Constitution of Estonia. This
provision, subject to some amendments as indicated above, provides a
satisfactory solution for the main constitutional issues raised by Estonia's accession to the European
Union. Further reflection seems advisable on the division of powers between
President and Government in EU matters. In addition, some other provisions of
the Estonian Constitution should be amended, in particular with respect to:
- the right of EU citizens to be
elected at local elections;
- the right of EU citizens to be
members of political parties;
- the right to issue currency.
The Estonian Minister of
Justice, in a letter dated 15 October 1997, asked the Commission to give an
opinion on the revision of the Estonian Constitution with a view to the
possibility of instituting a separate Constitutional Court, as opposed to the
existing system of a Supreme Court with a Constitutional Review Chamber, in the
context of proposals to allow individual complaints to be heard by the body of
constitutional review.
Wtih the primary goal of
preparing for accession to the European Union, the Estonian Government set up a
Commission to review the Constitution and to propose necessay amendments.
According to information provided by the Estonian Ministry of Justice, in its
report this Commission proposed the establishment of a Constitutional Court with competence to examine
individual complaints. The government report is to serve as a basis for further
discussion in Parliament on amending the Constitution.
In parallel, the Estonian
Supreme Court also informed the Commission that it was preparing a draft bill
to replace the current Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act. This draft
bill is available from the Venice Commission as documentCDL(98)48.
At its 32nd plenary meeting
the Commission appointed Mssrs Bartole and Steinberger as rapporteurs to
examine the question of the reform of constitutional justice in Estonia. During the 33rd meeting a
written opinion by Mr Bartole (CDL (97) 53) was discussed also in the light of
oral comments made by Mr Steinberger. The present text consolidates the written
opinion, the oral comments and the discussion that ensued.
I. FORMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN ESTONIA
According to the Estonian
Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act, the Supreme Court is the court of
constitutional review. Constitutional review is undertaken by a chamber
consisting of five members of the Supreme Court (Article 2.1). The
Constitutional Review Chamber examines petitions directly in accordance with
Article 6.1 of the Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act.
Under this article, abstract
review of laws which have not yet come into force may be undertaken in two
cases:
(a) When the Riigikogu (Parliament) approves for a second time, without
amendments, a law which the President has returned to it, the President may
directly petition the Supreme Court requesting that it declare the law to be in
conflict with the Constitution. If, however, the Court declares the law to be
in accordance with the Constitution, the President must then proclaim the law
(Article 107 of the Constitution).
(b) According to Article 142 of the
Constitution, the Legal Chancellor shall apply to the Constitutional Court requesting a declaration
that a legal act is invalid if the State legislative or executive power or
local government which issued the act fail to comply with the Chancellor's
request that the legislation be brought into line with the Constitution within
20 days.
A third form of
constitutional review – resulting from the concrete application of a law – is
possible on the basis of Article 5.2 of the Constitutional Review Court
Procedure Act. In this case, a court which "has declared a law or other
legal act to be in contradiction with the Constitution and has refused to apply
it [...] shall so inform the Supreme Court and the Legal Chancellor, by which
constitutional review proceedings in the Supreme Court shall be
initiated".
It is not entirely clear
from this article whether the Legal Chancellor must initiate proceedings or
whether they are initiated ex officio,
although the jurisprudence of the Court leans toward this second construction:
see judgments III-4/A-12/94 and III-4/A-1/95 (reported in the Venice Commission's
Bulletin on Constitutional Case-Law
and CODICES database, with the identification EST-1995-1-001 and EST-1995-1-002
respectively). In any case it is this third form of constitutional review which
gives rise to most commentary and which is discussed in more detail in section
III below.
Currently, no provision is
made in Estonian law for individual complaints to the Constitutional Review
Chamber of the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court's draft bill (§7)
proposes widening the Chamber's competence to include this possibility as well
as that of hearing petitions, in certain specified cases, from the majority of
a local government, the Board or the Chairman of the Riigikogu or at least 21 members of the parliamentary minority. The
draft also proposes widening the Court's jurisdiction to include ex post facto review of the
constitutionality not only of legislation but also of electoral questions and
referenda (§3).
II. COMPARISON WITH
OTHER PROCEDURES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
In so far as any court of
justice is entrusted with the power of refusing to apply a law which it
declares to be "in contradiction with the Constitution", the system
of judicial review of legislation is reminiscent of the system adopted in the United States of America. Under the Estonian system,
however, such a decision by a court automatically initiates constitutional
review proceedings, and decisions of the Supreme Court have binding force for
all State and government bodies, local governments, courts, officials, legal
persons and natural persons (Article 23 of the Constitutional Review Court
Procedure Act). The American Supreme Court, in contrast, is an appellate
jurisdiction, and constitutional review proceedings can only be instigated on
the initiative of one of the parties to the case. Furthermore, its decisions
are binding only on the parties to the case, while their general effects flow
from the principle of stare decisis.
Constitutional review may
also be instigated in Italy when the courts consider a
norm to be in conflict with the Constitution. Italian courts do not rule on the
matter themselves (as is the case in Estonia and the United States of America)
but rather may implement a stay in proceedings and refer the matter to the
Constitutional Court to be decided before making any ruling in the case before
them. Nevertheless, in both the Estonian and the Italian systems, the starting
point for constitutional review proceedings is a decision by a judge or a court
in the context of the concrete application of a law: refusal to apply a law
declared to be in contradiction with the Constitution (Estonia), or referral of
the question to the Constitutional Court before making a ruling in the case
(Italy). In both countries, there is no provision for individual applications
to the body of constitutional review.
A further comparison may be
made with the Portuguese system of constitutional review. Here, the President
of the Republic and Ministers may request the Constitutional Court to undertake
preliminary review of the constitutionality of a legislative provision (Article
278 of the Portuguese Constitution) but the Court also has jursidiction to hear
appeals against decisions of lower courts which have refused to apply a legal
rule on the grounds of its unconstitutionality or have applied a legal rule
whose constitutionality was challenged during proceedings (Article 280 of the
Portuguese Constitution). In the latter situation, the Portuguese
Constitutional Court acts as an appellate jurisdiction in which, as is the case
in the United States of America, proceedings may begin only at the initiative
of one of the parties to the case before the lower court, whereas in Estonia,
constitutional review commences automatically in such cases. A further
distinction may be made between the two systems in that the Portuguese system
is rounded out by the possibility of a general review of constitutionality in
accordance with Article 281 of the Constitution.
Finally, in other countries
where a separate Constitutional Court/Council exists, for example France and
Germany, these bodies are competent to examine such questions as the conformity
with the Constitution of procedures followed in elections and referenda (in
France), the relations between and functioning of the constitutional bodies of
the State, the distribution of powers between State organs and guaranteeing
more directly the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms within
the State (in Germany). Constitutional criminal trials and questions of
impeachment are further examples of matters that may fall within the
jurisdiction of the body of constitutional review.
III. THE
POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING THE COMPETENCE OF THE ESTONIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
CHAMBER
The Estonian system, as the
above comparison shows, contains certain distinctive features, and it has
already been noted (section II) that the competence of the Constitutional
Review Chamber of the Supreme Court is limited to the judicial review (whether
abstract preliminary review or concrete review of the application of laws) of
the conformity of legislation with the Constitution.
Estonia is not alone, however, in
providing for judicial review of legislation without establishing a separate Constitutional Court: this is a feature common
to many Commonwealth and Nordic countries, and it has its own rationale. First,
the preliminary review of constitutionality is aimed at avoiding the entry into
force of legal acts which are not in conformity with the Constitution. In
addition, constitutional review proceedings initiated under Article 5.2 of the
Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act allow for the review of judgments by
lower courts, as well as for the possible extension erga omnes of the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality
of a law which the lower court refused to apply on the grounds of its being in
contradiction with the constitution.
In the context of reforming
the system of constitutional justice, the possibility of allowing lower courts
to address preliminary questions to the court undertaking constitutional review
might also be considered. This would eliminate the need to annul decisions by
lower courts, as their proceedings would be stayed pending the decision of the
consitutional review body to which the question is referred.
As mentioned above (section
II), there is currently no possibility of lodging an individual complaint with
the Supreme Court for review of the constitutionality of a law. However, there
appears to be a general consensus within the country that this possibility
should be introduced, and it is true that individual complaints are possible in
a large number of European countries. In the majority of countries where this
is the case, there is a separate Constitutional Court (Albania, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Malta, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain and "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"). In some
countries, however, individual constitutional complaints are possible even
though there is no separate Constitutional Court (Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Switzerland).
Thus, clearly, the creation
of a separate Constitutional Court is not a legal requirement
for the introduction of the individual constitutional complaint. There is no
technical or legal reason why individual complaints could not be made possible
under the existing system: the chamber of the Supreme Court which is competent
to deal with constitutional review proceedings could also be entrusted with
jurisdiction over individual complaints, although this would be an unusual
solution in the European context. In order to streamline such an arrangement
the Legal Chancellor might be allowed to act as a filter for individual
complaints. From a strictly logical and technical point of view, then, allowing
the lodging of individual constitutional complaints would not of itself require
the establishment of a separate Constitutional Court.
Granting wider powers to the
Constitutional Review Chamber would lead to an increased workload for that
body. The existing Chamber may have difficulty dealing with such an increase in
its caseload, especially if its powers were to be extended to include not only
individual complaints but also some of the powers of review exercised by other
constitutional review bodies (see section II) and proposed in the Supreme
Court's draft bill (see section I). Again, there are no legal or technical
reasons which would prevent its having competence to examine all these matters;
the question is more one of the logistical difficulties involved for an
appellate court to resolve questions of constitutionality within a reasonable
time, even if a separate chamber deals with these matters. From this point of
view, the establishment of a separate Constitutional Court may be desirable.
A final matter to be borne
in mind is the extra cost involved in running a separate court. The advantages
which may be gained by the creation of a separate body of constitutional
review, in particular the greater efficiency which could thus be achieved, need
to be weighed against the extra cost to the State which such a body may create.
IV. COMPOSITION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BODY
In the context of reforming
the system of constitutional review, the composition of the body exercising
this function must also be considered. The methods of appointment and criteria
for selection of constitutional judges are of considerable importance in
guaranteeing the independence of the body.
It should be borne in mind
that in countries which have experienced a revolution, the appointment as
constitutional judges and guarantors of the constitution of judges connected
with the previous régime "would seem contradictory". Therefore the criteria for
selection of members of a body charged with the constitutional review of
legislation should be determined with great care. This is consistent with the
comments of H. Kelsen about the links between constitutional justice and the
politics of a State. The necessary professional
requirements of constitutional judges should be combined with political
considerations.
According to the Estonian
Constitution, the requirements for members of the Constitutional Review Chamber
do not differ from those of the other members of the Supreme Court. All are
elected by the Parliament upon nomination by the Chairman of the Supreme Court
(Article 150). The general assembly of the Supreme Court elects the members of
the Chamber in such a way that it includes one member from each of the civil,
criminal and administrative panels of the Court; in addition, one member is
elected from amongst the jurists in the Republic of Estonia (Article 26.3 of the Courts
Act). The President of the Supreme Court is the fifth, ex officio member of the Constitutional Review Chamber.
This system does not provide
for the direct influence of political parties for which Kelsen argued: it is
true that constitutional review is conducted by judges elected by the
Parliament, but the parliamentary choice is conditioned and restricted by the
nominations submitted by the President of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the law does not
stipulate a need for any professional competencies other than those required
for the election of all Supreme Court judges (Article 24.2 of the Courts Act). It is a generally accepted
idea that constitutional judges, faced as they are with special
responsibilities and cases unlike those dealt with by other judges, need
particular professional experience and capabilities. Thus in most countries
there are selection criteria for constitutional judges including a minimum (and
sometimes maximum) age and also legal experience requirements.
These
issues, relevant in any case, would merit closer attention if it were decided
to reform the Estonian system so as to create a separate Constitutional
Court in the context of widening the
possibilities of constitutional review to include (amongst other possibilities)
the competence to examine individual complaints.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In comparison with the full
range of activities available to constitutional courts, the current
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court of
Estonia can be seen to be quite limited, in that it is confined to the judicial
review of legislation (although this includes both abstract preliminary review
and concrete review of the application of legislation in specific cases).
Indeed, its jurisdiction could be increased to include any or all of the
competencies discussed above (section II).
It must be borne in mind
that any widening of the scope of review of the Constitutional Review Chamber
will be likely to create an increased workload for this body. In view of this
expansion, and the need for cases to be dealt with in a reasonable time, the
establishment of a separate Constitutional Court dealing exclusively with
proceedings of a constitutional nature may be the preferable solution. This
Court could also be charged with the power to decide individual constitutional
complaints.
Granting the body of
constitutional review the power to review individual complaints would not
prevent lower courts from undertaking judicial review of legislation as
provided for by Article 5.2 of the current Constitutional Review Court
Procedure Act, as the Portuguese experience suggests. Decisions adopted by
lower courts could be submitted to the appellate jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court under a system similar to
the existing one, thus preserving what could be seen as a characteristic
feature of the Estonian system of law.
In 1997 the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) was asked by the authorities of the
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” to examine the draft law on referendum and
citizen initiative of "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
Following this request,
the Venice Commission appointed Ms Anna Milenkova
(Bulgaria) and Mr Sergio Bartole (Italy) to draw up an opinion on the draft law.
Having examined the draft
law submitted by the Macedonian authorities, the rapporteurs formulated a
number of observations. The most
important of these are set out below.
2. The
text
The status of a
referendum varies. Under the
constitution, a referendum may be either mandatory
or optional, in so far as it is the
Assembly of Representatives that decides whether or not a referendum must be
called. The impact of this procedure
also varies, depending on how easy it is to set in motion.
According to the Constitution of Macedonia, responsibility for
organising a referendum rests with the Assembly of the Republic (cf “Assembly”
below). A clear distinction is made in
the constitution between referenda the Assembly is legally obliged to call and
those which it has discretion to call.
For example, the Assembly is obliged to issue notice of a referendum if
one is proposed by at least 150 000 voters and in the case of decisions
concerning any change in the borders of the republic (Articles 73 and 74 of the
constitution).
Article 3 of the law on
referendum also provides that “the referendum shall be obligatory in cases when
the Assembly is to adopt a decision for changing the borders of the Republic or
for uniting into or disuniting from a federation or confederation with other
states.” The obligation on the Assembly
to call a referendum if one is proposed by 150 000 voters is laid
down in Article 21 of the law.
The law also provides for
three kinds of referendum:
a. a ratification
referendum, referred to in Article 14 of the law as a “legislative
referendum”, on issues that are to be defined in a law. If the electorate votes in favour of the law,
the Assembly is obliged to adopt it. If,
on the other hand, the electorate votes against the law or “against the
solution offered for defining a certain issue”, the Assembly is obliged to
reject it (Article 25);
b. an additional
referendum is called to confirm a law that has already been enacted
(Article 14). A favourable response from
the electorate results in promulgation of the law (Article 75 of the
constitution), an unfavourable response in non-promulgation (Article 30);
c. an advisory
referendum is called on “general issues concerning the citizens of the
Republic” (Article 6). As the draft law
lays down no organisational rules regarding advisory referenda, they are
organised at the discretion of the Assembly according to rules decided by it on
an ad hoc basis.
Articles 32 and 33 of the
law provide that ratification of certain international treaties and certain
other issues may be subject to a ratification referendum.
Article 8 of the draft
law (together with Article 2 of the law on the procedure for collecting
signatures for the purpose of organising a referendum) provides that referenda
may be initiated by “citizens, registered political parties or citizen
associations”. The question arises
whether it is really necessary to include political parties on this list, given
that (a) there are many other ways in which political parties can take part in
the political life of the country, particularly through parliamentary debate.
At the same time, in some Council of Europe member states’ political parties
can themselves initiate a referendum.
3. Problems
of interpretation of the law
1. According to the authors of the draft law, the
constitution incorporates referenda in the country’s legal system and provides
that responsibility for all decisions concerning the organisation of referenda
rests with the legislative power. This
interpretation is confirmed by the draft provisions of Article 15 banning the
holding of referenda on:
- emergency bills that have been
passed in states of emergency and war or on issues pertaining to national
defence and security;
- laws relating to the budget of
the republic;
- fiscal laws.
The question arises
whether this interpretation is compatible with the Constitution.
On the one hand, the
authors’ interpretation of the conditions governing the organisation of
referenda limits not only the Assembly’s ability to call a referendum, but also
the right of citizens in this regard.
According to the draft law, it will no longer be possible for
150 000 voters to propose a referendum on the issues listed in
Article 15. There appears to be no
such limitation under the constitution.
On the other hand, exclusion
of the issues listed in Article 15 from the list of those that can be
decided by referendum is fully in line with the approach adopted by many modern
constitutions. It would be inconceivable
to hold a referendum on either “fiscal” or “emergency” laws. Exclusion of referenda on budgetary and
monetary issues is equally justified.
When considering the draft, it is also necessary to bear in mind the
political and economic problems currently facing the country, which might
explain why the issues listed in Article 15 have been expressly excluded from
those that can be decided by popular referendum.
At the same time, the
provisions of the constitution regarding referenda leave a number of gaps. It is the existence of these gaps which seems
to explain the wish, and the authority, of the legislature to introduce
limitations into the draft law.
The fact remains,
however, that there is a problem of compatibility here which will have to be
solved at some point, either by the Constitutional Court or by an amendment to the constitution.
2. Furthermore, even if it is accepted that Article 15
of the draft law does not contradict the constitution, the absence of any rules
establishing a judicial procedure for checking whether or not referendum
proposals submitted to the Assembly are compatible with Article 15 poses a
number of problems. As a political body,
parliament should not be competent in this area. Admittedly, Article 19 of the law
confers such powers on the Assembly, but there is no justification for doing
so. As it stands, the Assembly has the
power to change or reject a proposal by the electorate if it does not like
it, whereas the whole point of a
referendum is to impose the will of the electorate on the Assembly.
In Italy, for example, it is the Constitutional Court which is empowered to check whether or not
referendum proposals are compatible with the rules. This solution would also be perfectly
feasible in the case of "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, where the Constitutional Court already has jurisdiction in the protection of
citizens’ rights and freedoms, and the authority to verify that measures taken
by the public authorities are compatible with the constitution. Furthermore, since it is clear from the final
paragraph of Article 19 that the organisation of referenda is governed by
constitutional law, there is justification for involving the Constitutional Court in this matter.
Article 110 of the
Constitution includes a provision intended to allow for a broadening of the
powers of the Constitutional Court. This article also defines the power of the
court to protect the “rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen
relating to ... political associations and activities ”, thereby
establishing a sufficient basis for guaranteeing citizens access to the
Constitutional Court should the Assembly impose unlawful restrictions on
referenda. If, however, this solution to
the problem is unacceptable, the power to investigate complaints against Assembly
decisions in this regard, as well as against voting irregularities, could be
given to the Supreme Court (Article 65 of the draft law).
3. Articles 25 para. 2 and 31 of the draft law provide that
if the Assembly calls a referendum on a question and its proposal is rejected
by the electorate, a year must elapse before another referendum may be held on
the same question. This period does not
seem long enough. In this connection it
would be better if the ban on holding another referendum on the same question
lasted until the end of the Assembly’s term of office.
4. According to Article 52 of the draft law, “the
ballot paper shall include the question that has to be decided on the
referendum and voting instructions”. It
is not clear what is meant by “instructions”.
If they are instructions on how to vote, their inclusion on the ballot
paper could mislead voters.
On the other hand, if
this reference to instructions links up with the final paragraph of
Article 52, which states that “the text of the question on the ballot
paper shall be clearly and unambiguously formulated”, it is very
important. It is indeed essential that
the question be absolutely clear to the electorate . As
it is so important, the clarity of the referendum question could be established
in law as a condition for a referendum’s admissibility, and it could be made
obligatory to have the question checked by an independent authority, such as
the Constitutional Court. Without such a check, the authority
organising the referendum (ie the Assembly) is the sole judge of whether or not
the referendum question is clear, and experience has shown that the absence of
“checks and balances” in this regard may entail risks. There would therefore seem to be a need for
an impartial and neutral body to ensure that the rights of the electorate to
cast their votes in an informal manner are upheld.
At all events, the
criteria and conditions for drafting referendum questions should be
incorporated in the law and the applicable rules should be made more specific.
5. Other
observations
The
constitution establishes no rule to the effect that voters must be “capable of
working”, as stated in Article 39 of the draft law. This requirement is contrary to the
constitutional guarantees in Section II
of the constitution, particularly Article 22 which states that the “[…]
right to vote is equal, universal and direct”.
According to Article 42
of the draft law, the Polling Committee shall help illiterate citizens exercise
their right to vote. This provision is
open to misunderstanding because it can be interpreted as meaning that only the
polling station is authorised to help illiterate citizens whereas, in
principle, citizens who are either illiterate or incapable of voting are free
to choose who accompanies them and helps them to cast their vote. The risk of the same person helping more than
one or two illiterate voters must also be avoided.
The draft law contains a
contradiction as to which body is responsible for fixing the date of the
referendum. Article 35 confers this
power on the Assembly, whereas from Article 44 it would seem that it is
the governmental Polling Committee that determines the date of the referendum.
The third paragraph of
Article 64, which concerns the possibility of appealing against a decision by
the Polling Committee, is ambiguous: it is not clear which body is meant, the
Polling Committee at the polling station, or the governmental Polling
Committee.
6. Conclusions
On the whole, the draft
law provides a good basis on which to establish the conditions for organising a
referendum. The authorities have made a
considerable effort to improve the initial draft law on referendum.
Nevertheless, there are a
number of provisions in the new draft that could still be improved.
The Assembly’s
decision-making powers sometimes seem too broad. The Assembly decides not only whether or not
a referendum should be held, but also the rules governing the way the in which
it is organised. A more equal distribution
of powers in respect of referenda would have been better. In particular, certain supervisory powers
could be entrusted to the Constitutional Court.
In addition, the draft
law should define the criteria and conditions for drafting the referendum
question, and the rules applicable during a referendum should be clarified.
Many passages in the law,
at least in the English translation, are unclear and consequently open to a
rather broad interpretation.
- Co-operation with the Committee of Ministers
At its 34th Plenary Meeting the Commission
held an exchange of views with Ambassador Dohmes, Permanent Representative of Germany and Chairman of the Committee of Ministers' Deputies.
Ambassador Dohmes, informed the
Commission about recent developments in the Council of Europe. A major issue within the Council was the
question of monitoring activities which was undertaken in parallel by the
Parliamentary Assembly, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe and the
Committee of Ministers. Ambassador Dohmes considered that there was scope for
improving the monitoring of the Committee of Ministers. New working methods
were being discussed. The monitoring was conducted in a consensual,
non-confrontational and non-discriminatory way.
Further major tasks of the Committee of Ministers were the establishment
of a Commissioner of Human Rights and the fight against organised crime. In the
latter field a fruitful co-operation with the EU and OSCE had been
established.
The 34th Plenary Meeting was also attended by
Ambassador Hack, Permanent Representative of Austria who presented the achievements of the Council of
Europe in the field of the protection of minorities. He underlined the
importance of the role of the Venice
Commission which had elaborated a draft convention on the protection of
minorities that had served the First Summit of Heads of State and Governments
in Vienna in 1993 as a basis for the elaboration of the Framework
Convention. Following the recent entry into force of this Convention, its
control mechanism needed to be established.
At the 35th
Plenary Meeting Ambassador Carter, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom informed the Commission that the United Kingdom authorities are giving active consideration to the
possibility of joining the Commission.
At the
same meeting Ambassador Gorea Costin, Permanent Representative of Moldova to
the Council of Europe, participated in discussions regarding the Commission's
opinion on the Statute of Gagaouzia. Mr
de Matos Sequeira, Deputy Permanent Representative of Portugal took part in the discussions regarding co-operation
with Mozambique.
At the 36th Plenary Meeting Ambassador Warin,
Permanent Representative of France further informed the Commission about the priorities of
the follow-up to the second Summit of Heads of State and Government of the
Council and on the Council's Action Plan. The four main fields of this
follow-up were (a) democracy, (b) human rights, (c) social cohesion, and (d)
cultural values. Major activities in these areas were, inter alia, the establishment of the single Human Rights Court, the institution of a Human Rights Commissioner and a
system of monitoring of commitments made by member States by the Committee of
Ministers.
Moreover, at the
37th Plenary Meeting, Ambassador Perényi, Permanent Representative
of Hungary and
Chairman of the Ministers’ Deputies informed the Commission that the Committee
of Ministers had set up a Working Party on follow-up action on the final report
of the Committee of Wise Persons. This group would deal, inter alia, with future co-operation between the statutory bodies
of the Council of Europe and the Commission. The question would also be dealt
with by the Follow-up Committee on the Second Summit of Heads of State and
Government.
In addition, at the same Meeting Mr Andrei Vdovine,
Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation informed the Commission
of the Russian authorities' wish to become a member of the Venice
Commission. It would be unfortunate if the fruitful co-operation between Russia and
the Commission, which had begun before Russia had
become a member of the Council of Europe, were to be discontinued. Russia needed
the Commission's co-operation in its continuing legislative reforms. The Commission decided to continue
co-operating with Russia on an ad hoc basis pending official
membership.
- Co-operation
with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
The Commission continued and
intensified its close co-operation with the Parliamentary Assembly during
1998. Representatives from the Assembly
were present at all the Commission’s Plenary Meetings.
Once again the number of
requests from the Assembly for the
Commission’s opinion increased. In
particular, the Commission has co-operated with the Assembly on the following
questions :
- Albanian
Constitutional Law on the High Council of Justice
- Co-operation
with Croatia - revision of the Constitutional law on rights of
national minorities
- Bulgarian law on the judiciary
- Bulgarian law on the civil service
- Draft Statute of Gagauzia
In addition the Commission
also adopted reports on the following subjects during 1998 which were drawn up
at the request of the Assembly.
- Control
of internal security services in Europe
adopted at the 34th Plenary Meeting (6-7 March 1998) ;
- Opinion
on the legal problems arising from the coexistence of the Convention of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States and
the European Convention of Human Rights
adopted at the 34th Plenary Meeting (6-7 March 1998) ;
The text of these two reports appears in Part B.
- Report of the Committee of Wise Persons
The Commission was kept
informed throughout the year of the work of the Committee of Wise Persons by
the presence of certain Ambassadors at its Plenary Meetings (see co-operation
with the Committee of Ministers above).
In its
final report to the Committee of Ministers the Committee of Wise Persons, of
which both President La Pergola and Ms Suchocka had had the honour to be a
member, proposed that the Commission’s activities should be developed in the
following directions - giving
opinions on matters of constitutional importance or fundamental legal interest
for the Council of Europe, at the request of the Committee of Ministers, the
Parliamentary Assembly or the Secretary General; the interpretation of
conventions and other legal instruments of the Council of Europe devoid of
specific interpretation mechanisms, at the request of the Committee of
Ministers; the promotion of the
awareness of the importance of the rule of law, as understood in Europe, and
its relevance to the development of democracy, as well as to pursue, in the
furtherance of this objective, its co-operation with non-European countries and
similar expert bodies from outside our continent.
- Exchange
of Views with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Mr Daniel Tarschys, Secretary
General of the Council of Europe attended the Commission’s 36th
Plenary Meeting. He underlined that both
the Committee of Wise Persons of the Council and the member States had expressed their high esteem for the Commission’s
work as an authoritative source of expertise in the field of constitutional
law. The Commission had a particular
role to play in institution building and consolidation of democracy in
societies in conflict. A seminar on this
theme could be organised during 1999.
- Co-operation with the Congress of Local and Regional
authorities of Europe
The Commission
continued its close co-operation with the CLRAE in particular concerning Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova and the situation in Kosovo.
- Co-operation
with the European Union
The European Commission took an
active part in the work of the Venice Commission and supported its activities. In particular, the European Commission made a
financial contribution to the organisation of several Commission events
concerning the development and consolidation of democracy and human rights in
central and eastern Europe.
At
its 37th Plenary Meeting (11-12 December 1998) the Commission
adopted the report on “Constitutional Law and European Integration” drawn up on
the basis of the replies from European Union member States to a questionnaire
on this subject.
Mr
Scholsem, Chairman of the Venice’sCommission’s Working group on the situation in Kosovo also took part in two
sessions of the contact group at expert level on the Kosovo issue as part of
the delegation of the EU presidency.
- Co-operation
with other international organisations
Co-operation with ODIHR continued
during 1998.
Close co-operation has also taken
place with the OSCE on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.
- Co-operation with the Conference of European Constitutional
Courts
Mr Safjan, President of the
Constitutional Court of Poland which will host the next Conference of European
Constitutional Courts in Warsaw in May 1999, attended the Commission’s 36th
Plenary Meeting. The Commission will
assist in the preparation of this Conference.
Introduction
The Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
has decided to consult the Venice Commission on the question of constitutional
relations between internal security services and other organs of the State.
The work of the Assembly
Committee was initiated by two motions concerning internal security services:
one by Mr Stoffelen and others (Doc. 7104), and the other by Mr Solonari (Doc.
7424). The Committee circulated a questionnaire among member States, and on the
basis of the replies to the questionnaire and other materials, a Working Paper
[AS/Jur (1996) 23] was prepared by Ms Monica Macovei. The replies to the
questionnaire - from 30 States -and Ms Macovei's paper as well as Barbara
Forbes's paper Under surveillance;
Critical citizenship and the internal security services in Western Europe, prepared for the Quaker Council for European Affairs in
1994, were placed at the disposal of the Rapporteurs of the Venice Commission.
In her working paper, Ms
Macovei makes a comparative evaluation of the legal framework governing
internal security services in Europe and of their effect on individual rights. She also
identifies significant differences between the systems in different member
States which may give rise to recommendations for the consolidation of
institutional elements consonant with the integration of the new European
democracies.
The Office of the Clerk of
the Assembly has subsequently, via the Secretariat of the Venice Commission,
completed the Committee's request by specifying that the study should be based
on constitutions and on general principles which are common to them and that
the identification of common European standards might be the main objective of
the opinion. The opinion being sought from the Venice Commission should
therefore concentrate on questions of a constitutional nature concerning
internal security services.
These matters should be
addressed not only from the viewpoint of the State that has an interest and a
right to protect its territorial integrity and internal security and stability
but also from the viewpoint of the individual, who has an interest and a right
to continue to enjoy his fundamental rights and freedoms that should only be
limited in the interests of the common good of the society of which he forms
part and for a valid and just reason. The Constitutional order should therefore
find the appropriate legal framework within which the overriding interest of
the internal and external security of the State can be reconciled with the
fundamental rights of the individual. The studies already carried out to which
reference has been made have adequately illustrated how national legislation
and regulations in Europe differ greatly on the institutional aspects of the
problem.
To address the issue of
harmonising the organisational structure of internal security services existing
in various European countries would be a mammoth task with obvious political
overtones involving delicate issues of national independence and identity. It
would go beyond the scope of the present report. As the request must be
understood in the context of the definition of a common constitutional heritage
of the whole European continent, the scope of the study will be to identify
common European standards applicable to the internal security services in order
to ensure the conformity of their activity to the three fundamental principles
of the Council of Europe: democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
More precisely, in a first
part, the opinion of the Venice Commission will focus on the general framework
of the internal security services in a State governed by the rule of law, such
as the legal (constitutional) basis of the existence of internal security
services, budgetary questions or the powers of such services.
A second part will study the
relations between the internal security services and other constitutional
organs. First, it will focus on the judicial control of the respect of superior
rules by these services as well as on the non-judicial control, which may
concentrate on the practical or political feasibility of the acts (past or
planned) of the services. Then, the emphasis shall shift to the cases in which
the internal security services use the services of another organ, or vice
versa, and to surveillance activities concerning members or officials of another
State organ.
The third part, dedicated to
the individual vis-à-vis internal security services, will examine the limited
extent to which such services might be allowed to interfere with the
fundamental rights of the individual, and in particular with the right of
privacy, as defined e.g. by the European Convention on Human Rights.
Before addressing the
various aspects of the question in greater detail, it may be useful to mention
some peculiarities of the subject of internal security services.
Undoubtedly a variety of
internal and external situations may arise in which the executive organ of the
State must act quickly and decisively to protect the fundamental interests of
the State and society. There must be a consensus that only this need may possibly
justify the derogation from normal human rights standards which may sometimes
be necessary to ensure the proper and effective functioning of National
Security Services. It is this derogation that provokes the need for particular
attention to be given to the manner in which these services must be set up, the
regulation and control of their activities and their proper place within the
constitutional framework of the country. Fewer problems might arise if these
services did not sometimes require a peculiar framework within which to operate
which might allow them more freedom than that which is accorded to a normal
police force within the accepted definition of democratic societies. This
freedom allows them to conduct their activities - at least initially and to a
limited extent - free from the control of the constituted organs of the State,
whose purpose is to ensure full protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.
This report does not address
the issue of whether internal security services should exist at all. When carried out correctly, internal security
services perform an important function within the constitutional order. Nor is
it in dispute that internal security services have inbred in them a potential
for the abuse of State power: there have been innumerable incidences of the
most serious violations of human rights being committed in the name of internal
security. Hence the need for the constitutional order to identify what should
be the role of internal security services within a democratic society, what
should be their place within the constitutional framework, their functions and
limitations and what method of control should be exercised over their
activities.
It is still necessary to
mention that not all the materials are quite up to date. As this analysis is
not intended to be a complete comparative study but rather a survey of problems
and possible solutions, no updating of the materials has been attempted. Some
of the examples presented may thus no longer be accurate.
The present consolidated
opinion is based on the opinions of Messrs. Lundum, Said Pullicino and
Suviranta (CDL (97) 30, 34 and 37), which were presented before the Venice
Commission's 32nd plenary meeting in October 1997, on the discussion
of the first draft consolidated opinion (CDL (97) 58) at the 33rd plenary
meeting in December 1997, and, in particular, the comments made by Mrs Err, who
represented the Parliamentary Assembly's Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights at this meeting.
I. General
issues
A. Institutional
framework of the internal security services
There seem to be two schools
of thought on the question of how security services should be organised. In
some European countries, the security services are independent organisations
which are not part of the ordinary police force, whereas in other European
States the security services are one of many specialised branches of the
general police force. From a constitutional point of view, there do not seem
to be convincing arguments to give preference to one of these systems over the
other. In many cases, the way a country organises its security services is
probably as much due to convention as anything else. The main thing is for the
organisation of the security services to give the service a clear and precise structure
and for the head of the security service to bear the responsibility for all the
actions of the service of which he or she is in charge: one could contemplate
whether a recommendation should be made to this effect.
The head of the internal
security organisation is usually appointed by the head of the State or of the
Government. Some other high officials of the system may also be appointed by an
executive authority, while other vacancies are filled internally. The
appointing authority normally has discretion to dismiss the head of the
organisation and other high officials.
This power to hire and fire keeps the organisation under the tight
control of the Executive.
B. Legal
basis of the existence of internal security services
The existence of internal
security organs can be based on:
(a) the Constitution;
(b) ordinary legislation;
(c) governmental decrees;
(d) no legislation at all.
(a) the Constitution
Constitutional norms bearing
specifically on the internal security services are rare, and the existence of
such specific constitutional norms does not seem necessary in general. What is
essential is that legislation or regulations pertaining to internal security
organs be in harmony with the Constitution.
In theory, of course, if the
existence of internal security services is entrenched in constitutional
provisions, built-in constitutional guarantees would increase the protection
afforded to interests which are potentially threatened by the actions of
internal security services. On the other hand, however, provision in the
Constitution might lend undue constitutional legitimacy or status to such an
institution.
(b) ordinary legislation
Most of the objectives of a
constitutional provision on the internal security services can be attained even
if the internal security services are set up through a legislative process that
recognises the guiding principles mentioned above. What is essential is that
the organic laws and other pieces of legislation pertaining to internal
security organs are in conformity with the Constitution. Legislative control
over the acts and actions of the internal security services in the exercise of
these functions remains an essential means of ensuring that these services
operate exclusively in the national interest for the realisation of democracy
and the rule of law. This control can, however, only be exercised a priori by providing legal instruments
ensuring adequate checks and balances that allow these services to operate
efficiently, without overstepping their role, particularly where fundamental
rights are concerned.
As a matter of fact, in most
countries, the existence of internal security organs is based on parliamentary
legislation. The same applies to the organisation and functions of these
organs, or at least as far as the basic elements are concerned. In some
instances (e.g. Spain), "organic laws"
are used, i.e. legislation which is hierarchically at a lower level than the
Constitution but at a higher level than ordinary legislation.
In several countries (e.g., Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) the security services are
part of the general police. In these countries the legislation concerning
police in general is also applicable to the security services. In Switzerland, however, a Federal Government
Bill for specific legislation on internal security services was presented to
the Federal Parliament in 1994. In Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, an Internal Affairs Act is in force, covering
all activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including internal security
services. In most countries the internal security services and the regular
police are two (or more) distinct organisations. In Germany it seems even to be a
constitutional requirement that the internal security services (the Verfassungsschutz) and the police be
kept apart. Nevertheless, the German ordinary police has a branch (the Staatsschutz) which is said to work in
close contact with the Verfassungsschutz.
(c) governmental decrees
In France, for example, there is no
parliamentary legislation on the internal security services (comprising mainly
the Renseignements généraux and the Surveillance du territoire). The system
is regulated in decrees issued by the Executive. This is in line with the
constitutional prerogative of the Executive to organise public administration
without recourse to parliamentary legislation. Parliamentary legislation on the
internal security services is lacking also in Belgium, where the system is based
on a Royal Decree (of 1929). The obvious drawback of the French and Belgian
systems is that the Parliament has no direct influence over the internal
security services. Nevertheless, one can hardly claim the regulation of
internal security services by parliamentary legislation to be established as a
common European standard, though it is undoubtedly the preferable option. A
standard requirement could, however, be that the executive decrees be
sufficiently clear and comprehensive.
Naturally, parliamentary
legislation – or decrees issued directly under the executive prerogative –
cannot be expected to regulate the internal security system in every detail.
Subordinate regulations may thus be needed, normally issued by the Executive or
by the Head of the security service in question. They must evidently be given
within delegated powers, and also be sufficiently clear and comprehensive. In
some countries, part of the regulations are secret. This cannot always be
avoided. Such secrecy should, however, be kept within a minimum, be within
publicly conferred powers, and not violate published norms.
(d) no legislation at all
The United Kingdom used to be farther still
from any regulation of the internal security system by parliamentary
legislation. Until 1989, the existence of any internal security service was
officially denied. The obvious consequence was that the Parliament had no
influence over the internal security system, nor were any details of the system
publicly known or able to be discussed publicly. In 1989, however, the Security
Service Act was passed. Britain is thus now within the
mainstream of countries regulating the internal security system by
parliamentary legislation.
(e) conclusion
It is true that regulating
security services by laws of Parliament will ensure that Parliament has direct
influence over them, but there does not seem to be a common basis in the States
of the Council of Europe for such a requirement.
It is essential, however,
that the regulations concerning the internal security services be as clear and
concise as possible so that the tasks they can lawfully engage in are clearly
defined and that the regulations should only be allowed to be kept secret to
the extent that is absolutely necessary.
C. Budget
One aspect of the question
of the regulation of internal security services is the budget of these
services. In many countries it is an aspect of the division of powers that
Parliament must approve the budget and that no expense can be paid by the
Executive without this approval. The specificity of the budget varies, however,
from country to country. The budget may not have particular headings for
internal security organs. The functioning of these organs is then financed
under more general headings, e.g. for the police or the Executive in general.
Such general budgetary items are then divided between different recipients and
used by the appropriate executive or administrative authority. This system, of
course, diminishes the power of Parliament to direct the internal security
system by budgetary means.
For reasons connected with
the very nature of the security services, their budgets are often not very
specific or might even be totally hidden within the budgets of the branch of
the Executive in charge of the security service. Again, the role of Parliament
is diminished if the budget of the security services are kept away from them.
There does not, however, seem to be a common basis for a recommendation to
change this. It might be worth considering whether a recommendation should be
made to the effect that at least the member of Government responsible for the
internal security services should be responsible for the budget allocated to
the security services.
D. Internal
Security Services in a State governed by the Rule of Law
As previously stated, what
is essential is that the organic and other laws regulating internal security
organs are in harmony with the Constitution. This assertion inevitably provokes
the question whether there is the need for internal security services to be
considered as a separate organ of the State and to be recognised and set up as
such.
It is clear that if the
internal security services of a country are a part and parcel of the police
force entrusted with internal security, that specialised service would be
subject to the constitutional controls over the activities of the entire police
force. In that event, rather than examining whether and to what extent the
relations between internal security services and other organs of the State are
regulated in the Constitution, one would have to examine the validity and
constitutionality of the exercise of specific powers within the special
competence of the internal security service. In such an eventuality (and, as a
matter of fact, a great majority of countries have opted for this solution) the
internal security service would have no autonomous existence as a
constitutional organ.
On the other hand, a few
countries have opted to have internal security services with a separate
existence independent from other police organisations entrusted with ensuring
law and order. It is also true that in these cases the internal security
services are rarely, if ever, recognised in the Constitution of a country as a
separate constitutional organ. More often than not, they are set up and
organised by legislation or regulations. In these cases again the issue would
be whether the relevant legislation or regulations could be considered to be in
conformity with the accepted democratic Constitution of the country. That would
be a matter for that country's Constitutional Court to determine, naturally in
the light of widely recognised principles that should govern a democratic
society. The actions of the internal security services would be subject to the
scrutiny of the Courts or other method of judicial or quasi-judicial control,
e.g. the Ombudsman to establish whether or not they were carried out within the
proper exercise of their functions and within the provisions of the Law and the
Constitution.
In this respect the
complexity of the issues involved and the diversity of the solutions proposed
by the legislators of different countries, as evidenced by the Macovei report,
suggest the need to establish guiding principles to which basic laws setting up
internal security services should conform. These principles should be set out
in an international instrument - a Convention or a protocol - which would allow
each individual country to provide efficiently for its own internal security
requirements while ensuring proper avenues of control in conformity with a
uniform democratic standard: a standard that would ensure that the internal
security service would act only in the national interest and not in favour of
the party in Government, or for that matter any other party or institution,
that it would not be used as a means of oppression or undue pressure and that
it would operate in full respect of fundamental freedoms.
If such a solution were to
be pursued - and one considers this to be a more possible and plausible
alternative to expecting States to amend their Constitution to conform to expected declared standards - then the
constitutional relations of the internal security service with other
constitutional organs would also be governed by this international instrument,
thereby ensuring national and/or international judicial control.
This issue of control
deserves emphasis here because it should be clear that the protection of the
State by the internal security services, apart from ensuring public order and
the proper functioning of authorities and institutions, and apart from ensuring
territorial integrity against outside aggression, should also aim at ensuring
the constitutional order of the country, the proper functioning of democratic
institutions of the State, the rule of law and the protection of fundamental
rights. Any control exercised by appropriate constitutional organs of the State
on the activities of the internal security services must necessarily be aimed
at ensuring that these services properly and correctly carry out these duties.
The
following conclusion of the Parliamentary Commission of the Swiss Federal
Parliament graphically underlines this principle: "Le Conseil fédéral a confirmé 'la nécessité de déployer une
activité préventive ayant pour but de protéger le citoyen et les institutions
contre le terrorisme, l'extrémisme violent et le crime organisé'. Cette
remarque est également valable pour le service de renseignements prohibé. La
protection de l'Etat doit s'effectuer dans le plein respect des droits
fondamentaux: les atteintes à ces droits ne sont tolérées que dans le cadre des
dispositions légales et pour un intérêt général majeur (principe de
proportionnalité)”.
E. Powers
and restrictions
On this point, there appear
to be two different schools of thought. In some countries (e.g., Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain), the role of internal
security services is limited to the gathering of intelligence and to the
subsequent analysis and interpretation of the material. Any preventive or
enforcement functions lie then with the ordinary police or other organs. In
other countries internal security organs may have preventive and enforcement
functions as well, especially with regard to actions directed against the
security of the State. Particularly in the countries where the security
services are part of the ordinary police, the security service police officers
are allowed to perform the same acts as other police officers, inter alia performing arrests, tapping
telephones etc. Again there seems to be no consensus in European countries on
which to base a recommendation. Furthermore, there do not seem to be convincing
constitutional arguments in favour of one of these systems over the other.
In either case, it is of the
utmost importance that the regulations on the powers of the security services
are clear and precise and that they are in conformity with the rights of the
individual as protected under the Constitution of the State in question and/or
with the international obligations to which the State in question has
undertaken to adhere, such as the European Convention on Human Rights.
The mere reading of
newspapers, periodicals and books, listening to public broadcasting and the
observation of television programmes would probably be free from any regulation
by other organs, as is the case for ordinary individuals. The filing and
processing of the information so gathered may, however, already be subject to
such regulations aimed at the protection of the privacy of individuals.
Publications, radio and
television are evidently not the only source of information employed by
security organs. Clandestine, forcible or intrusive methods may be used, such
as the interception of telephone calls, house searches, surveillance from a
distance with optic or auditory devices (concealed microphones, etc.), and infiltration
into groups and organisations. The use of such methods is to some extent
regulated in constitutions, international agreements and legislation. These
regulations make the use of certain methods, e.g. interception and searches,
subject to permission being granted, upon certain conditions only, by a court
of law or another authority, e.g. a Government Minister in Croatia and the United Kingdom, three or four Ministers in
the Netherlands, or a special prosecutor in
Romania. These restrictions
normally apply to internal security organs in the same manner as to the police
in general. On the other hand, it seems almost inevitable that the use of some
clandestine methods can neither be regulated nor denied to the security organs.
Preventive and enforcement
functions often involve forcible means, especially the detention of people.
Such means are in many cases unavailable to internal security organs. In any
case, their use is most often strictly regulated in constitutions,
international agreements (especially in the European Convention on Human
Rights) and legislation. The regulations generally include the requirement of
permits from other State organs, e.g. from a court of law, for police detention
for more than two or three days. As a rule, there should be no discrepancy
between the internal security service and the ordinary law enforcement
practice, with respect to the form and duration of initial detention before a
suspect is brought before a judge. Exceptions may be made in the strict
interests of national security in accordance with prescribed norms. However,
once a judge issues a remand order pending trial, the person charged must be
detained in a normal remand centre, free of the control of the internal
security services. There is no legitimate justification for a separate remand
centre for internal security services, as any necessary precautions, such as
solitary confinement, could effectively be taken in an ordinary remand centre.
It is not necessarily enough
for the keeping and processing of information that legislation and regulations
are abided by. Permits from, reports to, and supervision by, outside
administrative agencies – data protection authorities – are often involved as
well. Internal security organisations, or the police in general, are, however,
in many cases free from such outside administrative interference. Compliance
with legislation and regulations is then the responsibility of the organisation
itself. Freedom from outside administrative supervision may also keep the
activities in question rather effectively free from surveillance by the media,
the general public, or interested – or affected – individuals. Secrecy may,
indeed, to a certain extent be necessary for the success of security
operations. It may, however, also harm important general or individual
interests, which makes the regulation of these questions a delicate matter.
Internal security services
may have a duty to perform tasks given to them by superior authorities (within
the Executive power), e.g. to procure information concerning a certain person,
or to follow his movements (in Finland, the internal security
services used to be called "the President's police"). Such
assignments should not in principle increase the powers of the security organs.
This principle may, however, be difficult to apply, e.g. to the use of
information from the files of security organs. The information is there for the
protection of vital national interests, and superior authorities may indeed
require such information for this very purpose. The leaders of the party in
power should, on the other hand, not have access for party political ends to
information which is denied to their political opponents. Detailed regulation
is required for this delicate issue.
The problem should be
simpler in regard to assignments which go beyond the use of existing
information (or such information which security organs can procure by ordinary
means). The assignment should not give any additional right to, e.g., telephone
interception or house searches. Complications may ensue if the authority which
assigns a task is also empowered to grant permits which are needed for the
fulfilment of the task: e.g. a Government Minister may require information for
which telephone interception is needed, and the same Minister may be competent
to grant interception permits.
The question of the
conformity of internal security service activities with human rights
guarantees, and especially with the right of privacy, shall be developed later
(section III).
II. Relations
with other State organs
A. Control
of the internal security services
It appears to be common
ground in European States that the control of the security services cannot be
merely internal, i.e. carried out by the leaders of the service in question or
by the ministries or agencies to which they belong. On the contrary it seems
that an external control exists in all Member States from the Executive, from
Parliament and/or from the judiciary in some form.
How the control of the
security services is best carried out, differs from one area of their work to
another. It is important, however, that the control is not limited to more
general aspects - human resources, areas of interest, priorities etc - as a
closer control of the working of the security services is necessary. It might
be feasible to recommend that the task of controlling the security services be
divided between the Executive, Parliament and the judiciary. The Executive
could, for instance, be responsible for the legality of the work of the
security services and for their efficiency. Parliament (or an independent body
appointed by and accountable to Parliament) could be responsible for
monitoring whether the internal security services confine themselves to
operations that fall within their mandate and confine themselves to using the
methods they are allowed to use. The judiciary could be given the role of
deciding whether actions on the part of the security services that involve
intrusions into the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals should be
allowed.
1. Judicial
control
The Rule of Law requires
that government be able to show legal justification for its actions. The
ordinary courts, the traditional redressors of grievances, are seen to stand
between the citizen and the State, concerned to protect individual rights and
freedoms when scrutinising administrative activity, keen to ensure that legal
powers are not exceeded in terms of substance and procedure, and to apply
principles of natural justice.
An independent judiciary is
an indispensable requisite of a free society under the Rule of Law. This
implies freedom from interference by the Executive or the Legislature in the
exercise of the judicial function. It does not mean that the judge is entitled
to act in an arbitrary fashion. In the concept of independence, provision
should be made for the adequate remuneration of the judiciary, so that, e.g. a
judge's salary should not, during his or her term of office, be altered to the
disadvantage of the judge. Furthermore, rules as to the appointment and dismissal
of judges, and their transfer to other judicial duties are of the essence.
As previously noted the role
of the courts in respect to secret surveillance is the inherent, supervisory
one of ensuring that all officials act within their powers and according to the
law.
Persons who feel that their
rights have been violated by acts (or omissions) of security organs may in
general seek redress before courts of law or other judicial bodies. The right
to a judicial remedy may be secured in the Constitution (e.g. in Sec. 16, as
amended in 1995, of the Finnish Constitution: "Everyone shall have... the
right to have a decision concerning his rights and obligations reviewed by a
court of justice or other independent judicial organ."). To a considerable
extent, guarantees can also be found in international agreements, notably in
Art. 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("Everyone whose
rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.").
In addition to
constitutional and international guarantees, judicial remedies are usually
regulated in ordinary legislation, which may well go beyond the constitutional
and international requirements.
Legislation can provide that
the internal security organs be open to scrutiny by established specialised
organs (appeal authorities for complaints against internal security organs,
e.g. in Ireland, and in the United Kingdom as provided for in the Interception
of Communications Act, 1985 and the Security Service Act, 1989). Such
specialised organs should be guaranteed the right to deliver enforceable
decisions and not merely furnish recommendations to the Executive. They should
be kept separate and autonomous from the Executive acting on their individual
judgment and not subject to the direction or control of any other person or
authority, thereby ensuring effective redress to the aggrieved party. Thus, an
office headed by a judge/magistrate enjoying the above-mentioned guarantees
would certainly serve to provide adequate redress to the aggrieved party.
In the absence of such
specialised organs, the general rules for challenging administrative actions
(and omissions) should apply. Grievances must be referred to the courts of law
since the protection of human rights is unanimously considered as essential to
the very existence and survival of a democratic State. In many countries a
citizen's fundamental rights and freedoms are nowadays enshrined in a bill of
rights, which is enforceable by national courts; where the country is a State
Party to the European Convention on Human Rights and has recognised the
compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court, the citizen also has the added
ultimate protection of the control organs of the Convention, the Commission and
the Court of Human Rights.
One must accept that there
may be limitations regarding the extent of judicial control over the activities
of internal security services. However, it is noted that these controls are
twofold. On the one hand, there are those controls that are proper to judicial
review of the acts or actions of these services that have already been
completed and which therefore invite an investigation into their legitimacy or
constitutionality. In this respect a proper balance must be struck between the
interests of the individual and the interests of society at large. The
principle of proportionality must be applied to assess whether a particular act
that could impinge on the right of the individual citizen could be justified as
acceptable in a democratic society as a necessary measure to ensure the rule of
law. The overriding principle should also be that the Courts should have
jurisdiction to determine whether the actions complained of were within the
powers and functions of the internal security services as established by law.
Within the limitations laid down by law, the Court should have the right to
determine whether there was undue harassment of the individual or abuse of
administrative discretion in his or her regard. Judicial review of the
executive acts, even with proper safeguards essential in the circumstances to
ensure the integrity of the State, should not be unduly withheld.
Another form of control
refers to the requirement imposed on internal security services to seek
authorisation from a Court or other specialised organ before proceeding with
actions which might be construed as infringements or a threat to the
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. The term 'individual' is meant
to include private individuals and legal persons such as political parties and
commercial companies. In this case the same principles of proportionality
apply.
A special aspect of the work
of the security services is, however, that many of the actions that they
undertake are carried out clandestinely so that the person who is the target of
their operation will often not be aware of their actions. This makes it
impractical to rely on judicial control at the initiative of the person who has
been the target of an operation of the security services. As such a judicial
control could be seen as a vital safeguard of the rights of the individual, it
might be advisable to make a recommendation that operations of the security
services that involve intrusions into rights and freedoms protected by the
Constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights can only be carried out
under judicial control.
It should be clarified that
what is being discussed is not a situation of existing, imminent or potential
public emergency. In such a situation other considerations might apply [see,
eg. the European Commission for Democracy through Law's publications in this
area in its series Science and Technique
of Democracy Nos. 12 and 17]. What is being considered here are the
operations of internal security services in a normal situation in which the
circumstances might indeed be very serious and constitute a threat to the Rule
of Law and democratic institutions, but fall short of a public emergency.
Officials of the security
services who violate their official duties are, as a rule, liable to a
punishment (or to a disciplinary sanction). The State may also be ordered to
pay compensation to persons whose rights have been infringed.
2. Control
by non-judiciary organs
The internal security organs
are normally supervised by their hierarchical superiors, at the top level by
the appropriate Government Minister or even by the Prime Minister or the Head
of State. The supervision often includes regular reports from the security
services. It may even include the need for a supervising person or body to
authorise the commencement of investigations in individual cases.
This hierarchical control is
often supplemented by parliamentary supervision. In many countries
parliamentary committees have been created specifically for the supervision of
internal security organs. Regular reports shall be made to the committee, which
is also entitled to be provided with any additional information it requires and
to issue its opinions on the activities of the security organs (in Italy the
Committee may not, however, be furnished with any information on pending
operations; but in Germany, the Parliamentary Control Committee shall be
informed about any interception of postal and telephone communications and
other instances of covert gathering of information). The committee is not,
however, a hierarchical superior to the security organs. Hence, it cannot give
them any orders.
In the absence of such a
specialised committee, the Parliament or its appropriate committees may discuss
internal security matters on the basis of the Government's regular reports or
of questions presented by Members of Parliament as well as in the context of
the annual budget debate. In Sweden, the Board of Directors of
the National Police Board, heading the whole civilian police organisation,
including security services, is partly composed of lay members, who are usually
Members of Parliament and its Committee on Justice. A corresponding system
exists for military intelligence, with the qualification that the lay members
are usually elected among the members of the Parliament's Committee on Defence.
Various other more or less
independent organs may also have a right or even a duty to keep an eye on the
security organs. This applies especially to the now common Parliamentary
Ombudsmen with a general competence to supervise legality in administration.
The Ombudsperson may act on his or her own initiative or on the basis of
complaints of individuals (or of legal persons, etc.). The Ombudsperson may
make inspections, demand explanations, admonish or prosecute officials, make
reports to the Parliament, etc.; but he or she can neither give orders to
official organs nor rectify their actions.
In addition to Parliamentary
Ombudsmen with general competence, a specialised ombudsperson may have
competence with regard to internal security organs, e.g. privacy ombudsmen or
data protection ombudsmen. In addition to the Ombudsperson elected by the Parliament,
in some countries (Sweden, Finland) there is a high Government
official (the Chancellor of Justice) whose competence more or less overlaps
with that of the Ombudsperson. A Government official or body with similar tasks
may also exist in countries without Parliamentary Ombudsmen (the Office of the
Republic's Prosecutor in Belarus, the Chancellor of Justice in Estonia, the
General Prosecutor of the Swiss Confederation).
The main rules on the
organisation, functioning, competence and tasks of the highest State organs are
normally included in the Constitution. This applies, as a rule, also to the
Parliamentary Ombudsperson (and to the Chancellor of Justice). The supervision
of internal security organs by the highest State organs is accordingly covered
by these main constitutional rules, even though the internal security organs
are not specifically mentioned in those rules. More detailed rules as well as
provisions on specialised ombudsmen (on privacy, etc.) are principally a matter
for ordinary legislation (despite the fact that in Belgium there is no
parliamentary legislation on the internal security services themselves, there
is an "organic law" containing provisions on the Permanent
Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence Services).
B. Other
relations
1. Services
to other State organs
Internal security organs may
provide other State organs with services which are similar to the services the
security organs perform for private firms or individuals. In such a case,
services performed for State organs do not appear to involve special problems.
State organs may, however,
also have access to such services which are not performed for private
individuals or entities. Here we encounter problems which are similar to those
related to services performed pursuant to superior orders (see section I.E, supra). However, the responsibility for
discriminating between services rendered for the protection of vital national
interests and services for which State organs should not receive any privilege
could be more easily attributed to the internal security organs themselves.
2. Services
from other State organs
Here, too, the problems that
arise concern services which may not be performed for private individuals or
entities. As already mentioned above, in some countries the internal security
organs do not have any preventive or enforcement functions. Furthermore, where
the security organs themselves may act, they may have the alternative
possibility of requesting the ordinary police to, e.g., arrest and detain a suspect
or search a dwelling. The request from the security organ should neither
enlarge nor restrict the powers or the responsibility of the ordinary police.
In Germany, the security services may
not request cooperation from the ordinary police in taking measures to which
they are themselves not authorised. Upon information provided by the German
security services, the police may only take action if they consider that the
information provided justifies it. In countries without such express provisions
it might, however, be unreasonable to require, especially in urgent cases, that
the well-foundedness of the request be verified in detail by the ordinary
police.
The security organs may
require information not only from the ordinary police but from many other public
organs as well. Information may be requested by a security organ, but the other
organ may also provide information on its own initiative. In principle, the
restrictions which are included in the data protection or privacy legislation
are also applicable to the transfer of information to internal security organs.
In order to fulfil their duties in the protection of vital national interests,
security organs may require privileged access to protected information. Such
privileges must obviously have a legal basis and, as far as the restrictions of
access are included in the Constitution or an international agreement, they
must also have a basis in the Constitution or agreement ("necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of, e.g., State security," in the
words of the European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data). In drafting the privileges, the
possibility of misusing information for party political or other non-privileged
ends must be kept in mind.
3. Other
State organs as targets
Internal security organs, or
their individual officials, may consider it their duty or right to procure,
keep and process information on the opinions, activities and whereabouts of
other State organs and their members and officials. An extreme example is
mentioned in Barbara Forbes's study: a Swedish ambassador (and former
Government Minister), who was chairing a Government commission investigating
the activities of the Swedish security police, found reason to believe that he
was himself at the same time under the covert surveillance of the security
police. Surveillance of persons belonging to State organs is a more sensitive
matter than the surveillance of individuals in general. Security organs, or
persons or instances acting through them, may try – or seem to try – to
influence the actions of other State organs either by a direct use of the
information gathered or by using the surveillance operations to intimidate or
harass the persons in question.
However, even high
Government officials can act as spies for foreign powers, and Members of
Parliament or official boards can plan and carry out violent and even
revolutionary acts. Security organs should be able to discover and combat such
tendencies without, however, taking steps which hamper – or even seem to hamper
– the interplay between different democratic political forces or the normal
functioning of State organs. Detailed legal rules may be needed for a proper
balance to be achieved. It is probably more important that the security organs
themselves respect democratic society and serve it impartially as a whole; but
appropriate legal rules may help in creating and preserving this democratic
spirit within the internal security service.
III. The
individual vis-à-vis Internal Security Services
A. Introduction
It is pertinent to
investigate from the outset what limitations should in principle be made on the
activities of internal security services - irrespective of their particular
organisational setup in different countries - to ensure the minimum of respect
for fundamental human rights. It is accepted that by definition an internal
security service is expected, in the course of its legitimate activities, to
exercise a measure of control within the territorial limits of the country
('internal' interest) with the aim of ensuring the safety of its citizens in
various aspects e.g. political and economic stability, and rule of law
('security' interest). It is also recognised that these activities, even when
legitimate, may sometimes have to be carried out outside the accepted controls
of other constitutional organs (legislative or judicial) and that, therefore,
the individual might not have an absolutely guaranteed opportunity to object to
or oppose such activities and ask for protection. There should be absolutely no
question of allowing a person or authority to be above the law or of giving a
person or authority any licence to violate fundamental rights and freedoms.
Exceptions and limitations in the interest of the common good of society can
only be tolerated within the limitations accepted in democratic societies as
expressed in international conventions and subject to close scrutiny and
control by the appropriate organs.
It goes without saying that
all countries that are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights
and who recognise the jurisdiction of the European Court are bound to be guided
by the principles of the Convention and the decisions of its organs. It is also
clear that these countries' legislations and regulations governing internal
security services are subject to the scrutiny of the Court, which has full
jurisdiction to determine whether, in particular cases brought before it, the
state of the law was such as to ensure that the minimum degree of legal
protection to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law in a democratic
society was present and not found to be lacking. This in itself can be
considered to be an available judicial safeguard against inadequate national
legislation or arbitrary interference.
The matter of the conformity
of legislation setting up internal security services in individual countries
with the European Convention on Human Rights has on occasion been investigated
by the European Court and Commission. Reference
is made to the case Klass and others vs
FRG, in which it was held that the Government's "interference"
was in accordance with the law in
that the Act not only defined precisely
the purposes for which the State could impose any restrictive measures but required
that any individual measure of surveillance had to comply with the strict
conditions and procedures laid down in the Act itself. Other decisions dwelt on
the principle that State action through its internal security services should
be proportionate to the legitimate aim, to the right of the State to undertake
the secret surveillance of subversive elements, to the need for adequate and
effective guarantees against abuse, to the duty to give citizens an adequate
indication as to the circumstances in which, and the conditions on which,
public authorities are authorised and empowered to resort to secret and
potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect for life and
correspondence and to the need to give the individual adequate protection against
arbitrary interference.
B. The
Right to Privacy
An area that is obviously
exposed to the particular activities of internal security services is the
"privacy" of the individual. "Privacy" is intended here in
the widest meaning of the word, extending to the full enjoyment of life in its
various aspects. It is useful to consider this aspect in some detail since this
would help us in the identification of recommendations that could be made
concerning the relations between internal security services and other organs
within the constitutional order.
More precisely, many types
of police work, such as home searches and wire-tapping, involve fundamental
rules on the protection of privacy included even in the Constitution or in
international agreements, e.g. in the European Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 1981. Such
constitutional and international rules shall evidently be respected when
legislative or other rules of lower degree are issued; and the constitutional,
international or inferior rules shall normally also be applied to the
operations of internal security organs. The rules may also include derogations
in favour of internal security operations. It is, however, rare for such
derogations which are included in constitutional or international rules to give
privileges directly to internal security organs. Instead, exceptions may, as
granted in constitutional or international norms, be included in ordinary
legislation (or executive decrees, etc., as the case may be), to be then
applied by internal security organs. Furthermore, such authorisations may be
narrowly circumscribed. The European Convention just mentioned above thus
requires not only that any derogation must be provided for by law but also that
the derogation is a necessary measure in a democratic society in the interests
of, inter alia, protecting State
security, public safety, the monetary interests of the State or the suppression
of criminal offences.
The principle of a right to
privacy emerged from a famous article published by Warren and Brandeis (The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. Law Rev.
192) in 1890. Drawing primarily on the law of intellectual property the authors
argued that:
"in
very early times the law gave a remedy only for physical interference with life
and property, for trespass vi et armis. Thus the 'right to live' served only to
protect the subject from battery in its various forms; liberty meant freedom
from actual restraint; and the right to property secured to the individual his
lands and his cattle. Later there came a recognition of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and his intellect. Gradually the scope of these legal rights
broadened; now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life - the
right to be let alone, the right to liberty securing the exercise of extensive
civil privileges; and the term 'property' has grown to comprise every form of
possession - intangible, as well as tangible."
According to Article 8(1) of
the European Convention:
"Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."
This Article evolved from
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on 10th
December, 1948) which reads as follows:
"No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
This same right is
reiterated in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966) of the United Nations, though here the unlawfulness of the interference also comes into play:
Article 17
1. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Throughout the years various
attempts have been made in order to find an all-encompassing legal definition
of this right. Thus, for example, the Nordic Conference of Jurists on the Right
to Privacy (May, 1967) defined the 'right to privacy' as "the right to be let alone to live one's own life with the minimum
degree of interference". It elaborated this definition and held that
the right to privacy means:
"The right of the
individual to lead his own life protected against:
(a) interference with his
private, family and home life;
(b) interference with his
physical or mental integrity or his moral or intellectual freedom;
(c) attacks on his honour
and reputation;
(d) being placed in a false
light;
(e) the disclosure of
irrelevant embarrassing facts relating to his private life;
(f) the use of his name,
identity or likeness;
(g) spying, prying, watching
and besetting;
(h) interference with his
correspondence;
(i) misuse of his private
communications, written or oral;
(j) disclosure of
information given or received by him in circumstances of professional
confidence.”
A more recent definition was
given in the Declaration concerning the Mass Media and Human Rights (Resolution
428 [1970] of the Consultative (Parliamentary) Assembly of the Council of
Europe), in which the right to privacy was defined as consisting:
"essentially in the right to live one's own Life with a minimum of
interference. It concerns private, family and home life, physical and moral
integrity, honour and reputation, avoidance of being placed in a false light,
non-revelation of irrelevant and embarrassing facts, unauthorised publication
of private photographs, protection from disclosure of information given or
received by the individual confidentially".
Notwithstanding the above,
the State, as a result of the extensive field of regulation entrusted to it, is
constantly in need of acquiring, monitoring and evaluating information. In
fact, the work of internal security services is a guarantee for the continued
existence of the State itself and for the democratically regulated life of
society. Such services also have the task of safeguarding the economic
well-being of the country against threats posed by the actions and intentions
of individuals.
The aim of such services
should also be to provide protection from possible espionage, terrorism and
sabotage from foreign powers, to investigate actions which aim at undermining
democracy and to undertake the secret surveillance of subversive elements
operating within a country's jurisdiction.
However, the above-mentioned
freedoms can never be properly guaranteed if domestic security surveillances
may be conducted within the absolute discretion of the Executive. It is an
established fact that where there is unreviewed executive discretion this may
very well lead to imposing pressure in order to obtain incriminating evidence
and thereby overlook potential invasions of privacy. Thus, the services cannot
operate uncontrolled. There have been various instances where security services
have attempted to influence the political scene in the countries in which they
operate.
It must be emphasised that
the fundamental freedoms and rights of individuals cannot be adequately
protected if the acts of such institutions are not made susceptible to judicial
review. Furthermore, the regulation of internal security services can only be
made effective by having specific legislation. If the position is regulated by
administrative practice, however well adhered to, it will never provide the
guarantees required by law. Being an administrative practice, it can be changed
at any time and thereby clarity as to the scope or the manner in which the
discretion of the authorities is exercised would undoubtedly be lacking.
The enactment of legislation
would give citizens an adequate indication of the instances and conditions in
which such surveillance is admissible. It should also provide for an indication
of the scope of any executive discretion and the manner of its exercise so as
to afford protection against arbitrary interference. In the United Kingdom, prior to the Security
Service Act, 1989, which legitimised for the first time the activities of the
Security Services, the position was regulated by common law. During this period
it was firmly believed that the most effective remedy was an application under
the European Convention on Human Rights.
The appointment of judges or
magistrates, whose independence and impartiality would be guaranteed by the
Constitution, to investigate and monitor the activities of security services
could ensure that such services do not abuse the powers with which they are
entrusted (having a judiciary independent of the Executive is a vital component
of the rule of law). Thus, for example, in the United States vs United States District Court [1972], the Supreme Court held certain
wiretapping to be improper which had been approved only by the
Attorney-General. The view was expressed that the freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be properly guaranteed if domestic security surveillances
are conducted merely on the discretion of the Executive. Furthermore, the
official is to draw up an annual report of the activities undertaken by the
service, a copy of which is to be presented to Parliament.
However, when investigations
to be carried out concern foreign relations, different considerations of the
Executive come into play.
In cases concerning
telephone tapping, listening and visual surveillance including e.g. the
planting of electronic devices and the use of video cameras to observe the
activities of persons in private places, the introduction of specific
legislation would ensure that, whilst the security services are provided with
the necessary tools they do not exceed their powers. Although the State
requires powers of interception in order to gather information about serious
crime and terrorism, these powers should not be unlimited. By establishing such
an institution which is distinct and separate from the executive branch it
would be ensured that:
a) An individual who believes his communications have been
intercepted can apply to such office for redress and request an investigation
on unauthorised interceptions;
b) The judge/magistrate who carries out the investigation
should be guaranteed full access to information and thereby be in a position to
assess whether the order for interception was justified or vexatious.
c) The judge/magistrate could give orders on how the
intercepted material is handled such that he could make arrangements as to the
extent to which the material is disclosed, the number of people to whom it is
disclosed, the extent to which it is copied and the number of copies made.
d) Copies of the material are destroyed as soon as the
storing of the material is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was
issued.
e) The service is kept under review and a provision could
be introduced stipulating that an annual report is to be drawn up and presented
in Parliament.
An interesting proposal made
in the United Kingdom was that of the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure, which recommended in 1981 that no warrant for
telephone tapping should be issued until an Official Solicitor who acts on
behalf of the unsuspecting suspect, has had an opportunity to consider and
question in court the grounds for a request to intercept communications.
An advantage in having
interception warrants issued by courts would also serve to dismiss any
objection to introducing the transcripts as admissible evidence in a
prosecution case. In countries such as the United States, experience has suggested
that this type of evidence can be crucial to the conviction of so called "inside dealers".
Another recommendation is
that a phone tap be installed where the judge/magistrate is satisfied that
there is imminent danger of serious crime
and that more routine methods of investigation would be unlikely to succeed.
Provision should also be made for the transcripts to be handed first to the
judge/magistrate, who then releases to the Services such portions as he or she
deems relevant to the investigations being carried out. When investigations are
concluded the destruction of the transcripts could be ordered.
Certainly, it would not be
sufficient to satisfy the above-mentioned principles merely by writing
unlimited administrative powers into formal law. Thus, for example, the British
response to the judgment in Malone vs United Kingdom (1984) was the enactment of the Interception of
Communications Act 1985, which provides a statutory basis for
telephone-tapping, with the warrant of the Home Secretary. Furthermore, it sets
mechanisms for control over this power but unfortunately excludes the courts
from this process. An individual may complain to an independent tribunal from
which there is no appeal, and a Commissioner, a senior judge, is charged with
overall supervision of telephone-tapping. It is interesting to note that in the
case of Christie vs United Kingdom [No. 21482/93] the European Commission of Human Rights
confirmed that the scheme of the Interception of Communications Act satisfied
the substantive as well as the formal requirements of law.
As was stated in the Malone case:
"it would be contrary to
the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the executive to be
expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate
the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the
manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate
aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection
against arbitrary interference."
It must be emphasised that
any enactment should provide guarantees against the arbitrary use of the power
it confers. Adequate protection is to be afforded as such cases involve an
intrusion into private life. The relevant legislation must provide answers to such
questions as: Whose telephones might be tapped? For what offences? For how
long? How are the results to be used? What are the rights of the defence of
access to such recordings? What happens to the tapes and records on conclusion
of the proceedings?
Furthermore, such
legislation could provide for certain offences which would act as a deterrent
and aim at protecting the citizen's right to privacy. This would include a
provision that it is an offence for a person to:
I. intentionally intercept or interfere with a
communication in the course of its transmission;
II. disclose the contents of any
communication which has been intercepted in the course of transmission, where
the perpetrator knows that such contents have been unlawfully obtained;
The law should also provide
for the prosecution of security services officials in the case of abuse of
their powers.
Another area which requires
regulation refers to the collection and dissemination of secret information
concerning individuals and effected by secret services. The invasion of an
individual's privacy by the secret collection of information about him or her
by organisations which have no legal powers or for that matter legal existence,
and against whose behaviour there may be no remedy, is a problem that
necessarily must be dealt with. There have been recorded cases where such
information has been collected with the aim of damaging careers. A case in
point is the Spycatcher case, in
which Peter Wright confessed to "burgling
and bugging his way around London" in the service of MI5. It was shown that Wright had
collected private information about a large number of left-wing politicians,
trade-union leaders and friends of Harold Wilson with this scope (vide, Freedom, the Individual and the Law by
Geoffrey Robertson pg. 109).
The gathering of such
information should be effectively monitored by an independent institution and
thereby ensure that effective investigations are carried out where members of
the public are believed to have been black-listed. The decision whether an
individual requires investigation should certainly not be made exclusively
within the service.
The law should further
provide for the prohibition of any security service from taking any action to
further the interests of a political party.
Certainly, security measures
should be taken against unauthorised access or alteration, disclosure or
destruction of such personal data. Other proposals include:
I. Where information concerning an
individual has been collected and stored without his knowledge, he should be
informed, where practicable, that information is held about him as soon as the
activities of the security services are no longer likely to be prejudiced.
II. The collection of information on
individuals solely on the basis of their particular racial origin, religious
convictions, sexual behaviour or political opinions or association with
particular movements or organisations should be prohibited, unless their
behaviour is proscribed by law.
III. Communication of data to private
parties should only be permissible where a legal obligation requires it or with
the authorisation of a supervisory authority.
IV. A supervisory authority or other
independent body should ensure that only specifically authorised personnel have
access to terminals containing information and that the communication of data
is duly authorised.
V. Periodic reviews of all files should
be undertaken to ensure that they are kept up to date and free of superfluous
and inaccurate data.
VI. The transfer of data to other bodies should be regulated
by specific provisions, for example where the communication is necessary so as
to prevent a serious and imminent danger.
The above examples of
restrictions on the activities of internal security services obviously
necessitate a measure of control through other constitutional organs. It is
therefore advisable to set up a committee which would perform supervisory
control with ultimate judicial review where an individual complaint arises over
the data retained by the security services.
Legislation should ensure,
with certain reservations, public access to such information. This:
I. Avoids a direct attack on the good faith of the
administration;
II. Serves as a redress to the imbalance
between the State and the private organisation;
III. Is of the essence of democratic
government: the public should have the right to be aware of the holding of such
data.
Where, due to such access,
it is shown that data collected is inaccurate, irrelevant or excessive, then it
should be ensured (even via the supervisory authority) that the relevant file
is put in order. This can be done by erasing inaccurate data, or rectifying the
information so as to make it correspond to the correct situation.
Another proposal is that
such data should not be accessible to the public in general but the person
requesting to have access must prove a specific interest in the said
information.
Conclusion
The opinion of the Venice
Commission was requested on the constitutional
relationship between internal security services and other organs of the State.
There are very few constitutional rules specifically regulating the relations
between internal security services and other organs of the State. These
relations are, however, affected by constitutional rules on the organisation
and functioning of the highest State organs, determining how and by whom the
organisation, functioning and powers of Government organs, including security
organs, are set, and on fundamental and human rights, limiting the competence
of the highest State organs to grant powers to other Government organs, again
including security organs. Especially in the latter respect, constitutional
rules are to a large extent supplemented and reinforced by international
agreements and by the international organs monitoring the application of these
agreements.
Despite the influence of the
(mainly general) constitutional and international rules, the more detailed
rules of ordinary (and "organic") legislation and executive and
administrative regulations on the organisation, functioning and powers of
internal security services are of fundamental importance in enabling the
services to perform their tasks effectively but at the same time under the rule
of law and respecting the democratic integrity of all people.
The following more detailed
conclusions can be drawn from the above considerations:
(a) It is recognised that an internal
security service exists for the protection of a State, and that this service,
by its very nature and scope, sometimes has to act outside the accepted
standards of an ordinary police force.
(b) Such a service can be conceived as an
autonomous body and a separate organ or as part of the Executive directly
responsible to a Minister or appropriate committee. In any case, however, the
internal security services must be made accountable for their actions within
the provisions of the law that regulates them.
(c) While the Internal Security Service
must be given the right space within which to operate effectively and the
necessary means to obtain results, there should be consensus that these
services should be legitimated in so far as their role, functions, powers and
duties should be clearly defined and delimited by the legislation that sets
them up or by the Constitution.
(d) It would be preferable that the rules
concerning security services be enshrined in the laws of Parliament or possibly
even in the Constitution. It is absolutely essential, however,
- that norms concerning the internal security services
be as clear and concise as possible so that the tasks they can lawfully engage
in are clearly defined;
- and that the legislation pertaining to internal
security services be in harmony with the Constitution and the international
obligations of the State, and in particular with the rules protecting human
rights.
(e) Norms applicable to internal security
services should only be allowed to be kept secret to the extent that is
absolutely necessary.
(f) There must be an appropriate control
of the budget of the internal security services. As their budget, as approved
by the Parliament, is often not very specific or might even be totally hidden
within the budget of the branch of the Executive in charge of the security
service, it would be suitable, at least for the member of Government
responsible for the internal security services to be responsible for the budget
allocated to the security services.
(g) Internal security services must act
only in the national interest and not in favour of the party in Government, or
any other party or institution. They must not be used as a means of oppression
or undue pressure.
(h) There is common ground in Europe that the control of the
security services cannot be merely internal; on the contrary, it seems that an
external control exists from the Executive, from Parliament and/or from the
judiciary in some form in all member States. A close, and not only a general,
control of the activity of the security services is necessary.
(i) It is imperative that these services
operate within an administrative/legal structure that provides for adequate
control of their activities. Whereas it would be unrealistic to require their
activities - if they are to be effective - to be fully transparent at all
times, it is, however, expected that internal security services be accountable
for their acts and activities within the legal framework in which they operate.
To that extent they must be transparent in the sense that their actions should
be verifiable and subject to control to establish whether they had correctly
exercised their functions and powers intra vires. This control must be a
judicial one either by an ad hoc
judicial authority, or by the ordinary courts. This is especially so where
fundamental rights are involved.
(j) In the exercise of this judicial
control, great care should be taken to protect the overriding interest of the
State and therefore appropriate legislative provision must be made to ensure
confidentiality, secrecy, lack of publicity, protection of preserved
information and data, protection of witnesses, etc.
(k) In order to avoid any abuse, detailed
regulation is needed on the power of other authorities to ask the internal
security services for information or other services not available to private
firms or individuals.
(l) Internal security services must not
interfere with the activity of other State organs. However, the surveillance of
persons belonging to such organs may be necessary (e.g. if they are suspected
of espionage). Detailed legal rules may then be required for a proper balance
to be achieved.
(m) It is recognised that internal
security services should be accorded the opportunity to operate swiftly,
effectively and preventively with the least possible interference as to the
method and the means at their disposal, but their actions must be such as to
ensure that derogations of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals
subjected to their activities and investigations be kept at a minimum. It is to
be expected that the actions of internal security services may sometimes have
to be unconventional. However, they must always be accountable for their
actions when these unduly infringe on fundamental human rights or when they
wrongfully and unwarrantedly have a destabilizing effect on democratic
institutions and the rule of law.
(n) Having
established that the unorthodox means by which internal security services must
be allowed to operate can have this negative effect, it is imperative that
these extraordinary measures and restrictions of fundamental rights and
liberties should be proportionate to the danger involved. The same principle
applies when the internal security services intervene out of necessity in the
defence of the State in the political/democratic process. These services are
only authorised to intervene in this manner as long as the danger their action
is meant to prevent persists and with the minimum involvement for a definite
and determinate purpose.
No one can deny that certain
restrictions of fundamental rights can take place, especially in relation to
information concerning international relations and national security where the
very well-being of the nation is at issue. Without doubt such measures must be
proportionate to the prevailing situation in the country concerned. This
concept of proportionality is to be found in the constitutional law of
countries such as Germany, the USA and Canada as well as in French
administrative law. A restriction on a fundamental right cannot be regarded as
necessary in a democratic society unless, amongst other things, it is
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Thus, if for example there is a
need for action to limit freedom of expression, the interference with such a
fundamental right must be necessary and proportionate to the damage which such
a restriction is designed to prevent.
INTRODUCTION
On 4 July 1997, the
President of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Mr B. Hagård, submitted a
request to the Venice Commission for an opinion on the legal problems arising
from the coexistence of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the European Convention on Human
Rights.
The Venice Commission
invited Mr Malinverni, Rapporteur, to prepare a preliminary opinion on this
question. At its 33rd plenary session (Venice, 12-13 December 1997) the
Commission held an initial exchange of views on the basis of this opinion.
Following this discussion, the Rapporteur and the sub-Commission on
International Law were charged with presenting a draft consolidated opinion on
the question at the next plenary session.
The Sub-Commission on
International Law met in Venice on 5 March 1998. It decided to submit to the Commission the revised
opinion of the Rapporteur.
At its 34th plenary session
(Venice, 6-7 March 1998), the Commission adopted the present opinion and decided to forward it to the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of Parliamentary Assembly.
I. THE CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF INDEPENDENT STATES
On 26 May 1995, in Minsk, seven of the twelve member
states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signed a new Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the
CIS Convention").
According to the information
available to the Venice Commission, the CIS Convention, of which the
Regulations on the Human Rights Commission of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (hereinafter referred to as "the CIS Regulations") are an integral
part, has not yet come into force. It
will do so as soon as the Contracting Parties have deposited the third
instrument of ratification (Article 38 of the CIS Convention).
Three CIS member states are
also members of the Council of Europe: Ukraine, not a party to the CIS
Convention, has been a member since 9 November 1995; Moldova, which has signed
the CIS Convention, since 13 July 1995; and the Russian Federation, which has
ratified the CIS Convention (in November 1995), since 28 February 1996.
Ukraine and Moldova have now
ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter: ECHR) and some of
the protocols thereto and made declarations under Articles 25 and 46 accepting
individual complaints and the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of
Human Rights. The Russian Federation has signed the ECHR and
stated its intention to ratify the convention in the future.
In a 1995 report on the
conformity of the Russian Federation's legal system with Council
of Europe standards a group of experts expressed doubts about the relevance of
the CIS Convention, then in draft form, and its compatibility with the ECHR.
The Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe shared the experts' concerns and raised the question
of the legal consequences and implications if these states were to ratify both
the ECHR and the CIS Convention. It
asked two eminent human rights experts to prepare a legal opinion on the
subject.
Subsequently, in its
Opinions on Moldova, Ukraine and the Russian Federation's accession to the
Council of Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly insisted on a commitment by
Moldova that it would not ratify the CIS Convention until the problems of the
convention's co-existence with the ECHR had been clarified and that it would
not do so without the agreement of the Council of Europe
(Opinion No. 188 (1995), para. 11 (e)). Likewise, the
Parliamentary Assembly called on Ukraine to refrain from signing the
CIS Convention in the present circumstances (Opinion No. 190 (1995), para. 12
i), and asked the Russian Federation to ensure that the CIS
Convention did not in any way interfere with the guarantees and procedure of
the ECHR (Opinion No. 193 (1996), para. 10 xvi).
The essential question is
whether the coexistence of these parallel instruments of human rights
protection will improve the protection of victims of possible human rights
violations. The credibility and utility of any new effort in the human rights
domain must meet the test of whether the procedures created are
victim-oriented, whether the framework of the universality of human rights is
enhanced and whether other norms, treaties or regimes in the area are
reinforced rather than undermined. It is in this context that the viability and
utility of the CIS Convention must be judged.
II. COMPARISON
OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE CIS CONVENTION AND THE ECHR
The civil and political
rights guaranteed by the CIS Convention, which clearly draws on the
corresponding provisions of the ECHR, the United Nations Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, scarcely diverge
from the rights guaranteed by the ECHR.
Roughly speaking, the main
substantive differences are as follows:
- The right to life (Article 2 of the CIS Convention;
Article 2 of the ECHR; Protocol 6 to the ECHR)
Whereas Article 2, para. 2
of the ECHR sets out in full the cases of necessity in which deprivation of
life shall not be regarded as a violation of this right, Article 2, para. 4 of
the CIS Convention merely refers to cases of extreme necessity and necessary
defence provided for in the national legislation of the member states. It is
thus left entirely to the discretion of the respective legislatures to fix
these cases. Protection of the right to life may therefore be more extensively
curtailed under such national legislation than pursuant to the ECHR.
As regards capital
punishment, it should be noted that the CIS Convention provides that women
shall not as a rule be sentenced to the death penalty, and it absolutely
forbids the imposition or execution of the death penalty in the case of
pregnant women as well as its imposition for crimes committed before the
perpetrator reached the age of 18 (Article 2, paras. 2 and 3). Protocol 6 to
the ECHR abolishes the death penalty entirely. This Protocol has not yet been
ratified by all the states parties to the ECHR. However, although protection of
the right to life afforded under the ECHR may thus seem lower, at first glance,
than that afforded by the CIS Convention, it must not be forgotten that the
intention to ratify Protocol 6 has become one of the conditions of a state's
accession to the Council of Europe.
- Deprivation of liberty (Article 5 of the CIS
Convention; Article 5 of the ECHR)
Whereas Article 5, paras. 1
(a) to (f) of the ECHR restrictively lists the cases where detention is lawful,
Article 5, para. 1 (b) of the CIS Convention merely requires that a person's
arrest or detention be lawful, a concept referring to the legislation of the
member states, which are apparently free to determine an unlimited number of
cases where detention or arrest is possible. Personal freedom is therefore
afforded far less protection by the CIS Convention than by the ECHR.
Furthermore, the case-law of
the European Court of Human Rights has firmly established that the provisions
of Article 5 para.1 of the ECHR must be interpreted narrowly, and account must
also be taken of the fact that any deprivation of liberty must, as well as
conforming with domestic laws, be in keeping with the purpose of Article 5 of
the ECHR, which is to protect individuals against arbitrary deprivations of
liberty.
As to an examination of the
lawfulness of pre-trial detention, under Article 5, para. 3 of the CIS
Convention such an examination depends on its being requested by the detained
person, whereas under Article 5, para. 3 of the ECHR it is automatic, immediate
and mandatory.
- Fair trial (Article 6 of the CIS Convention; Article 6
of the ECHR)
Whereas Article 6, para. 1
of the ECHR includes the interests of "national security in a democratic
society" among the grounds for excluding the press and the public from all
or part of a trial, Article 6, para. 1 of the CIS Convention uses the vaguer
and doubtless far broader term "state secrecy" and leaves its interpretation
to the member states' discretion. The
rules governing proceedings in camera are therefore less strictly defined under
the CIS Convention.
Article 6, para. 3 (d) of
the ECHR confers on persons charged with a criminal offence the basic right to
call and question prosecution and defence witnesses. On the other hand, Article 6, para. 3 (d) of
the CIS Convention merely allows a person charged with an offence to make an
application to the court to that end. Here, too, the guarantees afforded by the
CIS Convention are less extensive than those of the ECHR.
- State of emergency (Article 35 of the CIS Convention;
Article 15 of the ECHR)
Whereas under the ECHR
exceptional measures can be taken only "in time of war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation", the CIS Convention permits
them "in time of war or other emergency situation threatening the higher
interests of any Contracting Party", which is obviously a vaguer, far
broader concept. The CIS Convention therefore allows measures derogating from its
guarantees to be taken at what is clearly an earlier stage than is possible
under the ECHR.
In more positive terms, it
should be noted that the CIS Convention enshrines certain economic and social
rights (the right to work, health protection, the right to social security,
protection of disabled persons) or collective rights (protection of persons
belonging to national minorities), which are not to be found in the ECHR.
In general, a comparison of
the substantive provisions of the two conventions shows that the human rights
guaranteed by the CIS Convention are less extensive and more open to
restrictions than under the ECHR.
However, where the victim of
an alleged human rights violation chooses to lodge an application with the
European Commission of Human Rights, the most favourable treatment rule set out
in Article 60 of the ECHR will make it possible to prevent the scope of the
rights conferred by the ECHR from being diminished by the generally lower
standards of protection afforded by the CIS Convention. Moreover, this most
favourable treatment clause also appears in Article 33 of the CIS Convention,
the wording of which is almost identical to that of Article 60 of the ECHR.
Nevertheless, the impact of
such clauses is mainly negative: their effect is not to incorporate the most
favourable provisions of one convention into another, but to preclude the scope
of one instrument from being limited by the provisions of another.
Accordingly, if the alleged
victim applies to the CIS Commission, there is a risk that the latter will
examine the case solely in the light of the lower protection standards of the
CIS Convention.
III. CONTROL
MECHANISMS OF THE CIS CONVENTION
According to the CIS
Regulations, which are an integral part of the CIS Convention (Article 34), the
CIS Commission is composed of representatives of the Parties. These representatives are not elected but
appointed by the parties (Section I, para. 2 of the CIS Regulations).
Moreover, no judicial form
of procedure is provided for in the case of applications from individuals. Section III, para. 3 of the CIS Regulations
merely states that the Commission may, if it so wishes, hear applicants whose
cases it is considering.
Inter-state applications
concerning matters not resolved to the Parties' satisfaction may be referred to
a special conciliatory sub-commission composed of representatives of the
Contracting States. The sub-commission is required to submit its conclusions to
the Commission for transmission to the interested Parties (Section II, para. 5
of the CIS Regulations).
Finally, the Commission's
powers are reduced to a bare minimum. Its decisions "shall take the form
of understandings, conclusions and recommendations". It is not specified
whether such decisions are binding on the Parties; they are of a public nature
"unless decided otherwise by the Parties" (Section I, para. 10 of the
CIS Regulations).
In view of its membership
and limited powers, there seem to be serious grounds for fearing that the CIS
Commission will be unable to fulfil its role as an international supervisory
body in the field of protection of human rights in a completely effective
manner.
In conclusion, the
intergovernmental and political nature of the CIS Commission raises serious
doubts about its quasi-judicial status. In this respect it is very different
from the European Commission of Human Rights. The two systems' dissimilarity
becomes fully apparent when one considers that the CIS Convention does not
provide for the setting up of a Court of Human Rights.
The Strasbourg system has
greatly helped to "realise the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe,
as expressed in its Statute, and to establish a common public order of the free
democracies of Europe", and the European Court of
Human Rights has become as it were, the constitutional court of Western Europe. It seems that such will never be true of the
CIS Convention system in view of the substantially inferior control mechanisms
it provides in respect of the republics of the former Soviet Union.
The contrast between the two
systems will only become greater with the entry into force on 1 November 1998 of Protocol 11 to the ECHR. As from this date all the
supervisory functions of the European Court and Commission of Human
Rights will be assumed by the European Court of Human Rights. The examination
of alleged violations of human rights will thus be conducted entirely under a
judicial form of procedure.
IV. EXHAUSTION OF
DOMESTIC REMEDIES (ARTICLE 26 OF THE ECHR)
The question has been raised
as to whether the control mechanisms established by the CIS Convention should
be regarded as affording a domestic remedy within the meaning of Article 26 of
the ECHR.
In the context of its
examination of the conformity of the Russian Federation's legal system with
Council of Europe standards, the above-mentioned group of legal experts was
told during a meeting at the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy
of Science that an individual complaint concerning a human rights violation
should be dealt with under the CIS Convention system before being brought
before the European Commission of Human Rights.
The group of experts then
expressed concern about the draft CIS Convention in so far as its
implementation mechanism might jeopardise the operation of the Strasbourg mechanism, especially if an
approach to the CIS Commission were to be regarded as a prerequisite for the
lodging of an application with the European Commission of Human Rights. Such a requirement would
in effect cause an unacceptable increase in the time taken to resolve cases of
alleged violations of human rights.
However, the experts' fears
scarcely seem founded. The requirement
in Article 26 of the ECHR regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies, which
is a customary rule of international law, means that a state should not be held
accountable for its actions at international level unless persons considering
themselves prejudiced by one of its actions have unsuccessfully sought redress
by all the means available to them under that state's domestic law. Such
persons must therefore submit their cases to a domestic court, lodge an appeal
if necessary, and then apply to the highest court in the country concerned.
The view has never been
taken either in international practice or by legal writers that recourse to an
international supervisory body is subject to exhaustion of another
international remedy, even in the relationship between a regional system (such
as that of the ECHR) and a universal system (such as that of the Covenants).
This follows, in particular,
from the lack of any hierarchy between the different human rights protection
systems, from their complementary nature and from applicants' freedom to choose
whichever system they consider to provide the most effective protection. Furthermore, the very existence of provisions
such as Article 27, para. 1 (b) of the ECHR and Article 5, para. 2 (a) of the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
shows that there is no hierarchy between the different human rights protection
systems.
The rule regarding
exhaustion of remedies has therefore always applied solely to a state's domestic
remedies, not regional remedies. The wording of Article 26 of the ECHR is
perfectly clear in this respect, as it provides that the European Commission of
Human Rights can only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been
exhausted.
It is therefore wrong to
contend that an application from an individual must in all cases be lodged with
the CIS Commission before it can be examined by the European Commission of
Human Rights.
V. LIS
ALIBI PENDENS AND THE NON BIS IN IDEM PRINCIPLE (Article 27, para.
1 (b) of the ECHR)
The protection and control
mechanisms established by the CIS Convention, which seem likely to be fairly
ineffective and are already unsatisfactory in themselves, raise yet another
problem: the risk that a complaint concerning an alleged violation of human
rights may be found inadmissible by the European Commission of Human Rights if
it has already been brought before the CIS Commission.
This is because under
Article 27, para. 1 (b) of the ECHR the Commission may not accept an
application that is "substantially the same as a matter which ¼ has already been submitted
to another procedure of international investigation or settlement¼".
The purpose of this
provision is to rule out duplication of international proceedings. It is not confined to the "non bis in
idem" principle but also covers cases of "lis alibi pendens"
since, for the Commission to declare an application inadmissible, it suffices
that the same application, relating to the same facts constituting an
infringement of the same rights, should previously or simultaneously have been
lodged with another international institution by the same person.
The following have so far
been regarded as institutions affording procedures of international
investigation or settlement within the meaning of Article 27, para. 1 (b):
- the International Court of Justice, in The Hague,
- the Human Rights Committee
established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
- the Committee set up under the
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,
- the Committee set up under the
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,
- the institutions established within the International
Labour Organisation,
- and, last, at regional level, the
Court of Justice of the European Communities, in Luxembourg.
The concept of
"procedure of international investigation or settlement" therefore
encompasses a variety of procedures functioning in widely differing ways and
providing the parties with very unequal guarantees.
In particular, although the
crucial factor is not whether or not the procedure concerned is judicial in
nature, the institution in question should at least have the means to conduct a
thorough, objective investigation without hindrance, or even to apply a
regulated conciliation procedure without being restricted by political
considerations or hamstrung by irrefutable objections based on respect for
sovereignty.
To this extent, given the
non-independence of the members of the CIS Commission, who are mere appointees
of the states parties to the CIS Convention and representatives of those states
(Section I, para. 2 of the CIS Regulations), and the fact that the Commission's
decisions are not binding (Section I, para. 10 of the CIS Regulations), added
to the non-judicial nature of the Commission's procedure, it might be argued
that the CIS Commission does not qualify as an institution operating a
procedure of international investigation or settlement within the meaning of
Article 27, para. 1 (b) of the ECHR.
This possible interpretation
of Article 27, para. 1 (b) of the ECHR would be a means of preventing the CIS
Convention system from constituting an obstacle to applicants wishing to have
their human rights complaints examined by the European Commission of Human
Rights.
However, the argument based
on the non-judicial nature of the control procedure set up by the CIS
Convention does not appear decisive if the procedures currently deemed to be
covered by the expression "another procedure" are taken into account.
It is therefore highly
probable that the European Commission of Human Rights (as from 1 November 1998,
the Court) will indeed consider that, despite its inadequacies, the CIS
Commission should be regarded as "another procedure of international
investigation or settlement" and will refuse to deal with applications
that have already been or are currently being examined by it.
It should be noted that
Section III, para. 2 (a) of the CIS Regulations contains a provision similar to
that of Article 27, para. 1 (a) of the
ECHR. An application lodged simultaneously with the CIS Commission and
the European Commission of Human Rights will therefore be declared inadmissible
by both these institutions.
VI. THE
NEED FOR CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE CONTROL MECHANISMS OF THE CIS CONVENTION AND
THE ECHR
Difficulties due to the
coexistence of different international human rights protection systems arose
even in the 1970s, with the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the United
Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The solutions recommended by
the Council of Europe in that connection, imbued with a concern to avoid
duplication of proceedings, may indicate an answer to the problem of the
coexistence of the CIS Convention and the ECHR.
1. With regard to inter-state applications, Article
62 of the ECHR may be said to mean that, failing a special agreement, the
Contracting Parties are under an obligation to submit disputes arising from the
interpretation or application of the ECHR solely to the supervisory bodies
established under that convention. This interpretation has,
however, been criticised and sometimes deemed incompatible with the universal
nature of human rights.
These uncertainties led the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to stipulate that any states
parties to the ECHR that have also recognised the right of interstate
applications under Article 41 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights should normally utilise only the procedure established by the
European Convention in order to complain of another state's violation of a right
guaranteed by both the Covenant and the Convention.
It is therefore clear that
the Council of Europe wished to give precedence to the regional system of the
ECHR and emphasise its independence in relation to other international
institutions, thus making the European Court a sovereign tribunal whose
judgments are final. This solution is designed to prevent an
applicant state from choosing between the two procedures and obviate the risk
of duplication of proceedings.
The CIS Regulations, for
their part, provide that they shall not "¼ prevent the Parties from
resorting to other procedures for settling disputes on the basis of
international agreements applying to them" (Final Section, para. 1 of the
CIS Regulations). In the case of inter-state applications, therefore, it does
not seem that the control mechanism of the CIS Convention should interfere
with the European Convention's system.
However, given the absence
of a hierarchy as between the two conventions, it would be desirable if any
states parties to the ECHR that consider they should nevertheless ratify the
CIS Convention were to make an interpretative declaration when doing so, giving
absolute priority to the ECHR's tried and tested control mechanisms so as to
avoid weakening them and, above all, prevent duplication of proceedings.
2. As for applications from individuals, the
Committee of Ministers, referring to the co-existence of the ECHR and the
Optional Protocol to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
took the view that victims of a violation of a right covered by both
instruments should be fully free to submit the matter to whichever
international procedure they chose.
At the same time, the
"lis alibi pendens" and "non bis in idem" principles set
forth in Article 27, para. 1 (b) of the ECHR expressly preclude the duplication
of proceedings. It follows that an application lodged by the
complainant with the CIS Commission either earlier or simultaneously will be
declared inadmissible by the European Commission.
It would be desirable to
prevent the far from perfect CIS Convention system from standing in the way of
an examination by the ECHR institutions violation of a right covered by both
conventions. In a word, the main problem arising from the coexistence of the
two conventions lies in this risk of the ECHR control mechanism being blocked -
and hence weakened - by the lodging of an application with the CIS
Commission. In view of the terms of
Article 27, para. 1 (b) of the ECHR, it is difficult to eradicate this possibility
of the Strasbourg system being excluded.
From a theoretical point of
view, it is doubtless reassuring to assume that the freedom of choice of a
procedure enjoyed by the applicant, who will have to bear the consequences of
that choice, combined with the most favourable treatment principle (Article 60
of the ECHR; Article 33 of the CIS Convention) will enable the scope for
conflicts of rules between the two systems to be reduced.
However, this thought will
seem somewhat less soothing if one remembers the CIS member states' legal
culture and institutions, their lack of judges and lawyers with experience in
this domain, their lack of a tradition of judicial protection of human rights
and freedoms and, in general, the fact that the very concept of the rule of law
has not yet gained full acceptance. There is thus a genuine
risk that parallel institutional mechanisms affording fewer guarantees than
those provided by the ECHR will confuse victims in the post-Soviet states who
do not yet have sufficient knowledge of the rights they have acquired, and will
act as a further obstacle to redressing alleged abuses.
In such circumstances it
seems illusory to assume that alleged victims will be sufficiently well
informed and advised to be able to choose to submit their complaints to the
international body offering the best level of protection and effectiveness, ie
the European Commission of Human Rights (as from 1 November 1998, the
Court). As to the most favourable
treatment principle, because of its mainly negative effect it will not help to
raise standards of protection under the CIS Convention.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions
can be drawn from the above analysis:
- The fundamental rights set forth
in the CIS Convention are generally more limited in scope than the
corresponding rights under the ECHR, which affords higher standards of
protection.
- The control mechanisms
established by the CIS Convention do not appear adequate for guaranteeing
effective compliance with the human rights obligations entered into by states
parties and are very different from the judicial machinery of the ECHR.
- An application lodged with the
CIS Commission should not be regarded as a domestic remedy to be exhausted
under Article 26 of the ECHR before an application is made under the Strasbourg system.
- The CIS Commission should
undoubtedly be deemed another procedure of international investigation or
settlement within the meaning of Article 27, para. 1 (b) of the ECHR; the
European Commission (as from 1 November 1998, the Court) will therefore
declare inadmissible an individual application lodged earlier or simultaneously
with the CIS Commission pursuant to that article.
- It would be desirable if CIS
member states were, if they choose to ratify the CIS Convention, to make an
interpretative declaration or reservation giving the ECHR system clear
precedence over that of the CIS Convention in the case of inter-state
applications.
Regional cooperation – a
pursuit generally to be encouraged – has little or no worth unless the result
of the cooperation is to lead to improvements in the domain which is the
subject of actions taken. As a general rule, in the field of human rights, a
regional convention is meaningful only if it adds something new to the
universal human rights protection system, whether from the point of view of the
law (new substance) or from that of implementation (new procedure). The above analysis shows
that this is not the case with the CIS Convention which indeed has rather the
effect of lowering the existing standards.
For those States which are
members of the Council of Europe or candidates to become members, ratification
of the ECHR is mandatory and the ECHR should have priority over other European
systems for protection of human rights.
For CIS countries which are
not and will not become candidates for Council of Europe membership, the CIS
Convention provides some international protection of human rights at the
regional level.
In the light of these
comments, it is desirable that CIS member states which have acceded to the
Council of Europe, which ratify the ECHR and also ratify the CIS Convention,
fully inform the people within their jurisdiction, particularly those people
working in relevant professional milieus (lawyers, non-governmental organisations
etc.) that the guarantees provided by the ECHR system are more complete than
those provided by the CIS Convention.
At the request of the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, the European Commission for Democracy through Law conducted a survey
on the prohibition of political parties and analogous measures.
It was urgent to take a closer look at this issue
because of the importance of political parties in cementing the foundations of
democracy, particularly in states governed until recently by authoritarian
regimes. Elections, which are the very foundation stone of democracy, are
inconceivable without the active participation of freely constituted political
parties. And freedom of political association is the political form of a
general fundamental rights : freedom of association.
This comparative survey
of the legislation and practice in the states participating in the Venice
Commission's work identifies common values in the European constitutional
heritage in this field, with a view to improving information on the subject
and, where appropriate, learning from solutions implemented abroad. It is based
on replies to a questionnaire (documentCDL-PP(98)1) on the prohibition
of political parties, covering both the existence of rules prohibiting
political parties or providing for similar measures and the extent to which
they are applied.
Responses were received from the following countries:
Albania, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Kyrghyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay (see documentCDL-PP(98)2).
At its 35th Plenary Meeting, 11-12 June 1998
the Commission adopted the report on the prohibition of political parties and
analogous measures and decided to forward it to the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe.
The report is split into three parts : dealing respectively with the applicable legal
rules, the cases of application and the competent authorities.
The first part concerns the
restrictions on political parties in national law to which there are a wide
variety of national solutions. Certain countries provide even for no
restrictions on the activity of political parties at all. The first chapter
deals with formal restrictions, in particular in the field of registration of
political parties. Although such restrictions vary greatly, they are not the
most serious ones, since they are rarely irremediable. The second - and most important - chapter
deals with the material restrictions on the activity of political parties.
There, too, a large variety of national solutions can be observed. Some
legislators have not adopted any rule on the question, whereas others prohibit
for example parties which endanger freedoms or are extremist, subversive or
incite hatred. Several laws provide that political parties must be organised in
a democratic way. A common feature of the national solutions which can be
considered as a part of the European cultural heritage is however that they
focus on respect of the freedom of association.
The second part of the report,
relating to the practical application of the norms restricting the activities
of political parties, shows that the most serious restrictions of the freedom
of association, that is those of a material character, are quite rare; the
prohibition or the dissolution of a political party is exceptional and should
only happen in accordance with full respect for the principle of
proportionality.
In the third part, the report
underlines that prohibition of political parties and analogous measures can be
decided only with the consent of an independent and impartial judicial
authority or a tribunal.
The following conclusions were reached :
The diversity of the legal provisions governing party
activities in the countries which answered the questionnaire makes it difficult
to define a European standard. A number of common features do stand out,
however:
a. Party
activities everywhere are guaranteed by the principle of freedom of
association.
b. The fact
that certain measures are lacking in many, if not most, of the states concerned
leads to the conclusion that they are not essential to the smooth functioning
of democracy. Examples include:
- registration
of political parties: no registration is required, even as a formality; this
does not mean, however, that candidates for elective office do not have to meet
certain formal requirements;
- sanctions,
including prohibition and dissolution, against political parties which fail to
abide by certain rules. This does not, of course, preclude the punishment of
criminal behaviour by individuals in the context of political activities.
c. Even in
those states which do provide for sanctions against political parties, there is
still considerable diversity. The same situations are not sanctioned in the
same way or with the same severity in the different states.
d. The fact
that it is so difficult - perhaps even impossible - to define behaviours which
would generally warrant such serious sanctions as the prohibition or
dissolution of a political party highlights the need to apply the principle of proportionality when enforcing
legislation restricting freedom of association.
The way in which the often vast legal arsenal governing
the activities of political parties is actually applied in practice reflects a
genuine determination to respect this principle. There are very few democratic
states in which the sanctions covered by the questionnaire have actually been imposed
on political parties in the recent past other than for formal reasons.
With the exception of restrictions of form, particularly
those designed to avoid confusion between party names, measures designed to
prevent the activities of political parties - which do not exist at all in
certain states and are reserved in others to wartime situations - should be
permitted only in exceptional circumstances. The extreme restraint shown by the
vast majority of national authorities confirms this.
e. Finally,
a recurrent feature in the national legislations studied was the guarantee of
being heard by an independent and impartial judicial authority or tribunal.
This is a clear sign of concern to keep something as politically important as
the fate of political parties out of the control of the executive or
administrative authorities, whose impartiality is often open to doubt.
At the Commission’s 36th Plenary Meeting, Mr
Daniel Tarschys, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, invited the
Commission to continue its work concerning the Prohibition of Political Parties
and Analogous Measures with a view to drawing up guidelines or recommendations.
The Commission is also carrying out a study on the
financing of political parties.
A preliminary report on this question had been adopted
during 1997. The Commission continued
its work during 1998 in particular concerning the set of recommendations. At its 35th Plenary Meeting the
Commission adopted the report on the legal foundations of Foreign Policy and
decided to publish it. The report is
part of Publication N°. 24, entitled « Law and Foreign Policy », in
the series Science and Technique of Democracy.
The
purpose of the report is to present the legal foundations of foreign policy in
a large number of States with different legal cultures, in order to show their
diversity and identify the main trends in this sphere. It primarily consists of
replies to the Sub-Commission’s questionnaires, received from the following
countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova,
Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and United States of
America.
Foreign
policy unquestionably serves the national interest in the broadest sense.
However, nowadays it is no longer left entirely to the discretion of
governments. It has ceased to be uncontrollable. On the contrary, it obeys
certain legal rules which are, in a sense, its foundations and which act as
curbs on States' freedom of action, in the interests of the international community
and of all the countries belonging thereto. The legal foundations of foreign
policy are therefore made up of both rules of international law and rules of
domestic law.
Although
the report was above all intended to be a study of the aspects of domestic law
that affect foreign policy, it very quickly became apparent that a comparative
study confined to domestic law alone would be incomplete, so closely do
national legal systems mesh with the international one, in particular in the
context of European integration. It therefore proved necessary to take into
consideration the cardinal principles of international law and certain facets
of the European Union's common foreign policy. The Sub-Commission consequently
devoted part of the round-table on the legal foundations of foreign policy,
held on Santorini on 26 and 27 September 1997, to those matters.
It is
only natural that foreign policy concerning relations between States should,
first and foremost, be governed by international law, the very purpose of which
is to regulate inter-State relations. As members of the international
community, States enter into an obligation to conduct their foreign policy with
due regard for and in full compliance with international law, that is to say
treaties binding them, international custom, the general principles of law, the
binding decisions of international organisations and even, under certain
conditions, unilateral decisions by States, which may also give rise to
international obligations. To be more precise, States must observe the three
cardinal principles of the present international system instituted by the
Charter of the United Nations: the principle of settlement of international
disputes solely by peaceful means (Article 2, paragraph 4), the principle of
refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations (Article
2, paragraph 4), and the obligation to comply with resolutions passed by the
Security Council in matters of international security under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations. In their mutual relations States are likewise
required to observe the principles and rules of good-neighbourliness. These
obligations, incumbent on all States, serve a higher legal interest of the
international community, that of restoring global peace and security. At a time
when the spectre of war has again begun to haunt Europe, posing a threat to
democratic societies and to the process of European integration, the Commission
cannot overstate the need for scrupulous observance of these fundamental obligations
arising from the present international system, which should moreover constitute
the main thrust of States' foreign policy.
The
primary focus of the foreign policy of Council of Europe member States, and of
other States sharing the same values, should be to defend the democratic ideal
and all that it entails: the rule of law and protection of human rights and
individual freedoms. These objectives are not just pursued and developed within
States' national legal systems under the supervision of the judiciary, in
particular the constitutional courts, but also increasingly at an international
level, above all in the context of European integration. It is the very same
principles, which make up the common constitutional heritage on which the
European integration process is founded. In its 1993 study on the relationship
between international and domestic law, the Venice Commission recommended that
"more encouragement should be given ¼ to the incorporation of the
principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the international
legal system" (recommendation 7.5.e). It can but reiterate that
recommendation, while stipulating that these values must also be reflected in
States' foreign policy.
As to national law,
the main focus of the study, the report sets out the rules applicable, country
by country. The aim is to make it easier to compare different countries' legal
systems and to allow an assessment of present trends in this sphere. It was
decided to present the legal foundations of foreign policy in each of the
different States according to a standard layout, corresponding to the main
themes addressed. Therefore, for each country, a first section describes the
principles observed when defining foreign policy (A. Principles). The aim is,
firstly to identify those principles (1. Identification), their sources, their
scope and their substance, and, secondly, to consider their effectiveness, in
particular by examining the control mechanisms guaranteeing their observance
(2. Control mechanisms). Since this facilitates comparisons between the
different countries' legal systems, conclusions might be drawn as to the
existence of higher legal principles binding on the public authorities, which
lead them to define foreign policy not only with regard to political
considerations but also in the light of legal constraints. A second section
describes the legal standards governing the implementation of foreign policy
(B. Implementation). It deals with the respective responsibilities of the
legislature (1.), the executive (2.), the people (3.) and decentralised
authorities (4.).
By
analysing the replies it is possible to make an inventory of the legal
foundations of foreign policy and, hence, to bring to light a dual trend.
Firstly, there are a growing number of increasingly tangible
rules governing who is responsible for foreign policy, how it is implemented
and the options taken. At the same time, a certain tendency to enforce
compliance with the rules in question is becoming perceptible. The judiciary
was long reluctant to review decisions taken by the public authorities in the
foreign policy sphere. In a number of countries the "Actes de
Gouvernement" theory has meant that action taken by the public authorities
in foreign policy matters lies outside the courts' supervision. Under that
theory, where the government takes action at an international level which is
recognised as coming within its prerogative it is not fulfilling administrative
functions, and the exercise of governmental authority therefore does not fall
under the supervision of the courts, but under the political supervision of
parliament. This applies in France, Greece, Croatia and Slovenia, for instance. In yet other countries judicial review
of action taken by certain organs is banned. This is the case in Finland with regard to presidential decisions and Acts of
Parliament. In the Netherlands, the constitution forbids the courts to rule on the
constitutionality of international treaties. In Switzerland, they are prohibited from performing any constitutional
review of federal laws and international treaties.
However,
the ban on judicial review is becoming less absolute in nature. Firstly, it is
open to review whether in taking a foreign policy decision a given organ of the
State exceeded the powers conferred on it by the constitution. The case-law of
the United States Supreme Court is of significance here (see the US contribution in section 38 of the report). Secondly,
certain constitutional courts have established precedents for reviewing not
only whether decision-makers acted within the bounds of their authority, but
also the very substance of the decision itself. This is true of preventive
review of treaties' conformity with the constitution but also - and above all –
of the concept whereby the executive is deprived of its traditional freedom of
action whenever fundamental human rights are in issue. An example of this
unobtrusive but important development is to be found in the constitutional
case-law relating to transfers of sovereignty to the institutions of the
European Union and in particular to ratification of the treaty of Maastricht by
certain EU member States (such as Germany and France). The unprecedented boom
which constitutional law is undergoing at the end of the 20th
century can but strengthen this trend.
Secondly, as a corollary to the emergence of legal rules
governing foreign policy and its supervision, there is a move towards a degree
of democratisation and decentralisation of the conduct of foreign affairs. As
globalisation progresses, the number of legal standards laid down within
international organisations or as a result of multilateral negotiations is on
the increase. Nowadays, conduct of foreign policy sometimes has direct,
immediate repercussions on the lives of ordinary citizens and can hence no
longer be left to the executive's sole discretion. This tendency is apparent
from the arrival of new players on the foreign policy stage. The executive
naturally continues to have chief responsibility in this sphere but it is being
joined by other actors, such as parliament and sometimes the people themselves.
Long excluded from the conduct of political affairs, in strict compliance with
the principle of representative democracy, the grass roots have gradually
succeeded in obtaining a direct say in such matters. Their arrival on the
political scene is, inter alia, reflected in the forms of semi-direct democracy
introduced by many States, including with regard to determination of foreign
policy. Moreover, in response to demand that power be exercised at a level
closer to the citizen, greater responsibilities have been assigned to
decentralised authorities and, sometimes, to socio-professional groups or
non-governmental organisations, including in the foreign policy sphere. The
emergence of these new players on the international scene is a sign of the
present tendency to overstep the traditional limits within which foreign policy
was conducted.
On the strength of the
information which it has gathered, the Venice Commission considers that it is in
a position to draw a number of conclusions in the form of guidelines for member
States of the Council of Europe and other States sharing the same values
concerning the implementation of their foreign policy. These have their basis
in both international law and the fundamental values of the democratic
societies making up the Council of Europe and also reflect the trends of
national law in the field of foreign policy.
Those conclusions are
as follows:
States
are under an obligation to respect and to implement international law in good
faith, including jus cogens rules, treaties binding them, customary law,
general principles of law and binding decisions of international organisations.
In particular:
- In the conduct of their foreign policy
States shall respect the three fundamental principles of the international
legal system, namely resolution of international disputes solely by peaceful
means, refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations
and compliance with resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council
in matters of collective security.
- In
their mutual relations States shall act in accordance with the principles and
rules of friendly, neighbourly relations, which must guide their action at the
international level, particularly in the local and regional context.
In
determining their foreign policy member States of the Council of Europe and all
States sharing the same ideals shall take due account of the essential values
on which they are founded, namely democracy, the rule of law and protection of
human rights.
In their
activities relating to foreign policy States shall enforce compliance with the
constitutional system and the law, and facilitate supervision of government
action by the relevant constitutional institutions, namely the legislature and,
if need be the judiciary.
Parliaments'
interest in their countries' foreign policy is, at first glance, a positive
phenomenon, which should be given approval and encouragement. In particular,
parliaments shall be fully informed of such policy and examine it periodically
in order to participate in setting its principal directions.
The
judiciary, especially the higher courts, shall enforce compliance with the
above-mentioned essential principles of foreign policy, in particular as
regards the application of international law in the domestic legal system.
States
shall inform individuals, as widely as possible, of the main lines of their
foreign policy and shall not impede free circulation of information about
foreign affairs and international relations. They shall inform them of any
action they can take to defend their rights before the international courts.
It is
desirable that States take steps to ensure that the people and the relevant
decentralised authorities or non-governmental organisations are consulted about
and, when necessary, even directly involved in the determination and
implementation of foreign policy.
At
its 37th Plenary Meeting (11-12 December 1998) the Venice Commission
adopted the report on “Constitutional Law and European Integration” drawn up on
the basis of the replies from European Union member States to a questionnaire
on this subject.
In the report the main
thrusts of the replies to the questionnaire had been identified and placed in
the context of the European Community, ie by bringing together the main ideas
underlying European construction. One of
the implicit conditions for membership of the European Union was accession to
the European Convention on Human Rights.
The
requirements for membership of the European Union have changed over the years,
reflecting the development of a European identity, achievement of the aims of
the founding treaties and the contribution of the new treaties, as well as a
greater awareness of the need to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms
and, with it, greater insistence on democratic values.
The questionnaire on “Constitutional Law and European
Integration” - which set out to identify changes made in the legal systems of
European Union member states in order to bring them into line with the new
realities of membership - attracted replies from 13 countries.
The exercise is undoubtedly useful both to the member
states and to countries that have applied for membership or hope to do so. The
former can make instructive and worthwhile comparisons, while the latter gain a
valuable source of information for the process of constitutional review in
which they must engage in order to establish a firm and problem-free basis for
building a relationship between their various national legal systems and that
of the Community.
The questionnaire brings to an end the first phase of
the Venice Commission’s work, during which it has provided advice and guidance
to central and eastern European countries in the process of marking their
new-found freedom by adopting constitutions more imbued with democratic
principles. It also signals the start of
a new phase in which the Commission, at the request of some of those countries,
will assist them as they move towards membership of the major modern
international organisations.
Non-member States of the
European Union have been invited to reply to a revised questionnaire.
The Commission continued its
work on the participation of persons belonging to minorities in public life
during 1998.
During its 34th
Plenary Meeting the Commission took note of a report on the subject drawn up by
the Secretariat.
Co-operation with constitutional
courts and courts of equivalent jurisdiction further deepened during the year
1998. In addition to the regular publication of the Bulletin on Constitutional Case-Law and the database CODICES, the
series of seminars in co-operation with constitutional courts (CoCoSem) have
become a well established programme of the Venice Commission.
In 1998, the newly established
Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan joined the endeavour of publishing the Bulletin on Constitutional Case-Law three
times a year. 45 courts now contribute to this publication. A publicity
campaign was undertaken to increase the number of subscriptions to the Bulletin and the database CODICES.
Another issue of the series of Special Bulletins on Basic
Texts (extracts of constitutions and laws on the courts) has been published,
bringing the number of countries covered to 42.
A new series of special Bulletins on leading cases of
participating courts prior to their participation in the Bulletin has been
undertaken. A first issue in this series on the case-law of the European Court
of Human Rights was published towards the end of 1998.
CODICES
In 1998 two up-dated versions of
the database CODICES were published on CD-ROM and via Internet (http://www.coe.fr/codices). CODICES contains all previous regular issues of the Bulletin, together with over 1500
decisions in full text and many constitutions. All the special Bulletins have been integrated into
CODICES as well. In addition to the indexing of summaries of decisions
according to the Systematic Thesaurus of the Commission, a project was undertaken
to index constitutions article by article according to the Thesaurus to make
them searchable.
Documentation Centre
Due to generous
contributions from participating courts, the stock of documentation in paper
form of the Documentation Centre has continued to increase in 1998. A project
was set up to give access to the resources of the Centre to the public via the
database of the Central Library of the Council of Europe.
Seminars in
co-operation with constitutional courts)
Partly in co-operation
with other bodies (OSCE, PHARE, ABA, COLPI, USAID) seminars were organised on
the budget of constitutional courts (Kyiv, January 1998), two round-tables of
constitutional courts of the State and the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Sarajevo, April and Banja Luka, October 1998), seminars on judicial
independence (Bishkek; May 1998), on techniques of constitutional
interpretation (Kyiv, June 1998) and on
the implementation of international treaties by the constitutional court (Lviv,
October 1998).
Constitutional Court
seminars are primarily intended to assist recently created constitutional
courts in the fulfilment of the important tasks which the democratic
constitutions have confined to them. The fact that these seminars build upon a
mutual exchange of experience of judges from 'older' and more recently
established constitutional courts has very much contributed to the esteem in
which these seminars are held with the courts.
The Commission organised
four seminars within the framework of this programme during 1998 :
The Commission organised, in co-operation with the
University of Sarajevo and the Central European Initiative, on 16-17 April in Sarajevo a Seminar on “New trends in electoral law in a
pan-European context”.
The seminar was opened by Mr Westendorp, High
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mr Barry, Head of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It
brought together electoral law specialists from four continents, who discussed
general aspects of electoral law as well as specific situations in particular
States.
The participants showed that electoral law is not
the exclusive preserve of political machinations and bizarre mathematical
formulae but rather one of the pillars of democracy.
The reports presented during the seminar included
: the constitutional principles for a democratic election - universal suffrage,
equal, free, secret and direct voting; the organisational means of guaranteeing
the legality of elections; the recent evolution, between change and continuity,
of electoral systems in Europe; the effects of different electoral systems in
new democracies. In addition, national
reports (Russia, Italy, South Africa) were presented covering States in which there is
currently debate over reforms to be made to the electoral system.
The final part of the seminar was devoted to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
introductory report concerned electoral systems in post-conflict societies and
was followed by reports on the electoral debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the principles applicable to elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the importance of electoral processes.
The proceedings of the seminar will be published
in the series “Science and Technique of Democracy.
Following a proposal by the
Greek Presidency of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the
Commission organised, in co-operation with the Institute of International
Relations of the Panteion University and with the assistance of the Greek
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Strasbourg on 5-6 May a Conference on
”Democratic Institutions and Civil Society in South Eastern Europe”. More than a hundred persons participated in
the Conference, among them prominent figures of politics, diplomacy, art,
religion and science.
The Conference was opened by
Mr Rexhep Meidani, President of Albania and Mr George Papandreou, Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Chairman in office of the Committee of Ministers. Ms Leni Fischer, President of the
Parliamentary Assembly, Mr Daniel Tarschys, Secretary General and Mr Dimitris
Constas, Permanent Representative of Greece to the Council of Europe and Director of the
Institute of international relations of the Panteion University welcomed the participants.
In his opening speech
President Meidani stressed the importance of civil society as an element of
public participation in the decision-making process and observed that this
element will be decisive in the context of global governance.
Reports were heard on
subjects including, the new European constitutional environment; trade Unions
in the Transition to Democracy; the individual and the State Institutions;
artistic creation in a changing world; political parties and political
organisations in the New Era; the new role of the Parliament; democratic
citizenship; the citizen as a new economic actor; mass media and State
authority; aspects of protection of human rights and minorities in
South-Eastern Europe; democratic institutions and civil society: the viewpoint
of minorities; the contribution of religion; cultural heritage and identity;
interethnic relations and artistic creation.
Democracy has come a long
way since the breakdown of totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe only a few years ago. Within the framework of the enormous task of
constitutional reforms, the establishment of democratic institutions and the
protection of human rights is well advanced.
The Council of Europe’s growth is one witness, amongst others, of this
historical evolution and of the construction of democratic stability in Europe. How do citizens identify with
this evolution, what is their role and responsibility in the creation of the Europe of tomorrow, what can they expect from those citizens, as the principal
players in a society in constant evolution? These are just some of the
questions which were raised throughout the Conference.
Concluding the Conference,
Ambassador Constas observed that in a region where State power has been so
strongly present for decades, citizens may be reluctant to take up their role
as political, social and economic actors.
In parallel, identity crises after the fall of the iron curtain may have
led to the development of nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Increased co-operation, with the help of
international organisations such as the Council of Europe, is necessary to find
a common approach and solution to this problem.
The Commission organised, in co-operation with the
University of Montpellier, on 2-6 July in Montpellier a Seminar on “The principle of respect for human
dignity in European case-law”.
The
seminar was opened by Mr Dugrip, Dean of the Law Faculty, University of Montpellier and Mr Pujol, President of the Pole European University of Montpellier and of the region Languedoc-Roussillon. It brought together high level specialists,
in particular judges or former judges of constitutional courts who debated the
seminar’s theme in a comparative perspective.
The
seminar was divided into two distinct parts.
In the first part the participants worked on the basis of a
questionnaire on the definition and the legal value of the principle of human
dignity. National reports were
presented.
The
second part was devoted to the study of a fictitious case : “Law aimed at
protecting minors under seven years of age from paedophile offences and at
limiting re-offending”.
The
seminar examined the analogies of constitutional protection of human dignity in
the States represented and found common values on the European continent and
beyond. The fictitious case added a
concrete aspect to the seminar’s academic dimension. The work done in this seminar could serve as
a basis for national jurisprudences taking into account rules which are common
in European constitutional heritage.
The
proceedings of the seminar will be published in the series Science and
Technique of Democracy.
The Commission organised, in co-operation with the
Constitutional courts of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and with the
financial support of the Japan Foundation, on 7-11 September in Baku and
Tblissi and on 13-14 October in Yerevan, a Seminar on “Constitutional
developments in the Transcaucasian States : the Division of powers”.
This itinerant seminar focused on the specific situation
in each of the visited countries : experts from Western European States
participated and discussed with local specialists and practitioners the
questions that arise in the field of division of powers and the way to solve
them.
A number of experts from the
Venice Commission presented papers based on the distribution and separation of
powers and the independence of the judiciary in relation to the situation in
each of the States visited.
These seminars gave an opportunity to become acquainted
with the specificities of the constitutional regime of each State, for meetings
and discussions not only between constitutional law specialists but also,
beyond the academic sphere, between practitioners, and in particular between
representatives of each branch of power, so as to become familiar with and
study more closely all the questions which may arise in the area of the
separation of powers.
There was fruitful discussions amongst the participants,
all of whom showed a keen interest in the many issues raised by this
theme. In each country the seminar was
widely covered by the media.
It is envisaged to hold the following UniDem seminars
during 1999 :
- Seminar on « Federal and Regional States in the perspective of European
Integration » in co-operation with the University Johns Hopkins and the University of Bologna (Bologna, 18-19 March 1999)
- Seminar
on « the right to a fair trial » in co-operation with the Czech Constitutional Court (Brno, 23-25 September 1999)
- Seminar
on « Democracy in a society in transition » (Stockholm, date
to be fixed)
Mr Antonio LA PERGOLA (Italy), President, Advocate General at the Court of
Justice of the European Communities
(Substitute: Mr Sergio BARTOLE,
Professor, University of Trieste)
*
* *
Mr Ergun ÖZBUDUN (Turkey), Vice-President, Professor, University of
Bilkent, Vice President of the Turkish Foundation for Democracy
Mr Jean-Claude SCHOLSEM (Belgium), Vice-President, Professor, Law Faculty, University of Liège
Mr Cyril SVOBODA (Czech Republic), Vice-President, Member of Parliament
*
* *
Mr Constantin ECONOMIDES (Greece), Professor, Pantios University, Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
(Substitute: Ms Fani
DASKALOPOULOU-LIVADA, Assistant Legal Adviser, Legal Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs)
Mr Giovanni GUALANDI (San Marino), Vice-President of the Council of Presidency of the
Legal Institute of San Marino
Mr Giorgio MALINVERNI (Switzerland), Professor, University of Geneva
Mr Franz MATSCHER (Austria), Professor, University of Salzburg, Judge at the European Court of Human Rights
(Substitute: Mr Klaus BERCHTOLD,
Head of Division, Federal Chancellery)
Mr Gérard REUTER (Luxembourg), President of the Board of Auditors
Mr Michael TRIANTAFYLLIDES
(Cyprus), Chairman of the Council of the University of Cyprus, Former President
of the Supreme Court and former Attorney-General of the Republic
Mr Helmut STEINBERGER (Germany),Director of the Max-Planck Institute, Professor, University
of Heidelberg
Mr Jacques ROBERT (France),
Honorary President of the Paris University of Law, Economics and Social
Science, Former Member of the Constitutional Council
Mr Jan HELGESEN (Norway), Professor, University of Oslo
Mr Gerard BATLINER (Liechtenstein), Member, Academic Council of the Liechtenstein
Institute
Mr Godert W. MAAS
GEESTERANUS (The Netherlands), Former Legal Adviser to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Mr Joseph SAID PULLICINO (Malta), Chief Justice
Mr Ján KLUCKA (Slovakia), Judge, Constitutional Court
Mr Peter JAMBREK (Slovenia), Former President of the Constitutional Court, Judge at the European Court of Human Rights
(Substitute: Mr Anton PERENIC,
Professor of Law, former Judge of the Constitutional court)
Mr Kestutis LAPINSKAS (Lithuania), Judge, Constitutional Court
Mr Asbjørn JENSEN (Denmark), Judge, Supreme Court
(Substitute: Mr John LUNDUM, High
Court Judge)
Mr Armando MARQUES GUEDES (Portugal), Former President of the Constitutional Tribunal
Mrs Maria de Jesus SERRA LOPES (Portugal), State Counsellor, Former Chairman of the Bar
Association
Mr Aivars ENDZINS (Latvia), Acting Chairman, Constitutional Court
Mrs Hanna SUCHOCKA (Poland), Minister of Justice
Mrs Ana MILENKOVA (Bulgaria), Advocate, Former Member of the National Assembly
(Substitute: Mr Alexandre DJEROV,
Advocate, Member of the National Assembly)
Ms Carmen IGLESIAS CANO (Spain), Director of the Centre for Constitutional Studies
Mr Rune LAVIN (Sweden), Parliamentary Ombudsman
(Substitute : Mr Hans
Heinrich VOGEL, Professor in Public Law, University of Lund)
Mr Stanko NICK (Croatia), Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Substitute: Mrs Marija SALECIC, Legal Adviser, Constitutional Court)
Mr Serhiy HOLOVATY, (Ukraine), Member of Parliament, President of the
Ukrainian Legal Foundation
(Substitute: Mr Volodymyr SHAPOVAL,
Judge, Constitutional
Court)
Mr Heiki LOOT (Estonia), Rector, Public Service Academy
Mr Vladimir SOLONARI (Moldova), Chairman of the Committee on Human Rights and
National Minorities, Parliament of Moldova
Mr Tito BELICANEC, ("The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"),
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Skopje
(Substitute: Mr Igor SPIRKOVSKI, Counsellor, Constitutional Court)
Mr Kaarlo TUORI (Finland), Professor of Administrative law, University of Helsinki
(Substitute: Mr Matti NIEMIVUO,
Director at the Department of Legislation, Ministry of Justice)
Mr James HAMILTON (Ireland), Director General, Office of the Attorney
General of Ireland
Mr Valeriu STOICA, (Romania) Minister of State, Minister of Justice
Mr Alexandru FARCAS (Romania), Counsellor, Embassy of Romania in Geneva
Mr Luan OMARI (Albania), Vice President, Sciences Academy of Albania
Mr Hjörtur TORFASON (Iceland), Judge, Supreme Court of Iceland
Mr László SÓLYOM (Hungary), President, Constitutional Court
ASSOCIATE
MEMBERS
Mr Avtandil DEMETRASHVILI (Georgia), Chairman of the Constitutional Court
Mr Anton MATOUCEWITCH (Belarus), Deputy President, Belarussian Trade Union
Federation
Mr Vladimir TOUMANOV (Russia), Former President of the Constitutional Court
Mr Khatchig SOUKIASSIAN (Armenia), Chairman, Armenian Law Centre
Mr Khanlar I. HAJIYEV (Azerbaijan), Chairman, Constitutional Court
Mr Cazim SADIKOVIC (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Sarejevo
OBSERVERS
Mr Gérald BEAUDOIN (Canada), Professor, University of Ottawa, Senator
(Substitute : Ms Ruth
BARR, Acting/General Counsel, International Law and Activities Section,
Ministry of Justice)
Mr Vincenzo BUONOMO (Holy See),
Professor of International Law at the Latran University
Mr Oljas SOULEIMENOV (Kazakhstan), Ambassador of Kazakhstan in Rome
Mr Serikul KOSAKOV (Kyrgyzstan), Director General, Committee on Science and New
Technologies
Mr Akira ANDO (Japan), Consul, Consulate General of Japan, Strasbourg
Mr Hector MASNATTA (Argentina), Ambassador, Executive Vice-Chairman, Centre for
constitutional and social studies
Mr Miguel SEMINO (Uruguay), Ambassador of Uruguay in Paris
Mr Paul GEWIRTZ (United States of America), Yale Law School
SECRETARIAT
Mr Gianni BUQUICCHIO, Secretary of
the European Commission for Democracy through Law
Mr Christos GIAKOUMOPOULOS, Deputy
Secretary of the European Commission for Democracy through Law
Mr Thomas MARKERT
Mr Pierre GARRONE
Mr Rudolf DÜRR
Mr Sergueï KOUZNETSOV
Ms Helen MOORE
Ms Caroline MARTIN
Ms Michelle REMORDS
Ms Helen MONKS
Ms Brigitte AUBRY
Ms Agnès READING
Ms
Marian JORDAN
Ms Emmy KEFALLONITOU
- President
: Mr La Pergola
- Vice-Presidents
: Mr Özbudun, Mr Scholsem, Mr Svoboda
- Bureau
: Mr Batliner, Mr Helgesen, Mr Holovaty, Mr Nick
- Chairmen
of Sub-Commissions : Mr Economides, Mr Maas Geesteranus,
Mr
Malinverni, Mr Matscher, Mr Reuter, Mr Robert, Mr Steinberger, Mr
Triantafyllides
- Constitutional
Justice : Chairman: Mr Steinberger - members: Mr Bartole, Mr Batliner, Mr
Demetrashvili, Mr Djerov, Mr Endzins, Mr Hamilton, Mr Jambrek, Mr Jensen, Mr La
Pergola, Mr Lapinskas, Mr Lavin, Mr Loot, Mr Marques Guedes, Ms Milenkova, Mr
Özbudun, Mr Reuter, Mr Robert, Mr Said Pullicino, Mr Sólyom, Mr Soukiassian, Ms
Suchocka, Mr Torfason, Mr Triantafyllides, Mr Tuori
- Federal
State and Regional State : Chairman: Mr Malinverni - members: Mr Bartole,
Mr Economides, Ms Iglesias, Mr La Pergola, Mr Matscher, Mr Nick, Mr Sadikovic
Mr Scholsem, Ms Serra Lopes, Mr Steinberger, Mr Triantafyllides; Mr Tuori Obs.
: Canada, USA
- International
Law : Chairman: Mr Economides - members: Mr Djerov, Mr Farcas, Mr Helgesen,
Mr Holovaty, Mr Jambrek, Mr Klucka, Mr La Pergola, Mr Malinverni, Mr Marques
Guedes, Mr Matscher, Ms Milenkova, Mr Nick, Mr Soukiassian, Mr Steinberger, Mr
Triantafyllides
- Protection
of Minorities : Chairman: Mr
Matscher - members: Mr Bartole, Mr Economides, Mr Farcas, Mr Gualandi, Mr
Helgesen, Mr Maas Geesteranus, Mr Malinverni, Mr Nick, Mr Özbudun, Mr Scholsem,
Mr Sólyom
- Constitutional
Reform : Chairman: Mr
Triantafyllides, Vice-Chairman: Mr Batliner -members: Mr Bartole, Mr Djerov, Mr
Economides, Mr Endzins, Mr Farcas, Ms Iglesias, Mr La Pergola, Mr Lapinskas, Mr
Omari; Mr Maas Geesteranus, Mr Malinverni, Mr Marques Guedes, Ms Milenkova, Mr
Özbudun, Mr Reuter, Mr Robert, Mr Scholsem, Ms Serra Lopes, Mr Soukiassian, Ms
Suchocka
- Democratic
Institutions : Chairman: Mr
Steinberger - members:
Mr Djerov, Mr Economides, Mr
Farcas, Mr Hamilton, Ms Iglesias, Mr Jambrek, Mr Klucka, Mr Lapinskas, Mr
Lavin, Mr Marques Guedes, Ms Milenkova, Mr Omari, Mr Özbudun, Mr Reuter, Mr
Robert, Ms Serra Lopes, Mr Svoboda, Mr Triantafyllides, Mr Tuori
- UniDem Governing Board :
Chairman: Mr Maas Geesteranus, - members: Mr Batliner, Mr Djerov, Mr Gualandi,
Mr Helgesen, Ms Iglesias, Mr La Pergola, Mr Lavin, Mr Malinverni, Mr Marques
Guedes, Ms Milenkova, Mr Özbudun, Mr Reuter, Mr Robert, Mr Scholsem, Mr
Steinberger, Mr Svoboda; Mr Tuori Obs.
: Holy See, ODIHR : Co-opted members
: Prof. Evans (Johns Hopkins University,
Bologna), Prof. von der Gablentz (College of Europe, Bruges), Prof. Masterson
(European University Institute, Florence), Mr Koller (Federal Office of Justice,
Berne)
- South
Africa : Chairman: Mr La Pergola - members:
Mr Hamilton, Mr Helgesen, Mr Lavin, Mr Maas Geesteranus, Mr Malinverni,
Mr Scholsem, Mr Torfason, Mr Triantafyllides; Mr Tuori, Obs. : Canada,
USA
- Mediterranean
Basin : Chairman: Mr Robert - members: Mr Batliner, Mr Economides, Ms
Iglesias, Mr La Pergola, Mr Malinverni, Mr Nick, Mr Özbudun, Mr Said Pullicino,
Mr Triantafyllides
- Administrative
and Budgetary Questions : Chairman: Mr Reuter
APPENDIX
III - MEETINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW IN 1998
Plenary Meetings
34th
meeting 6-7 March
35th
meeting 12-13 June
36th
meeting 16-17 October
37th
meeting 11-12 December
Bureau
16th
meeting - Meeting enlarged to include the Chairmen of Sub-Commissions
- 5 March
17th
meeting - Meeting enlarged to include the Chairmen of Sub-Commissions
- 11
June
18th
meeting - Meeting enlarged to include the Chairmen of Sub-Commissions
- 15
October
SUB-COMMISSIONS
Constitutional Justice
14th
meeting - 15 June (Ljubljana)
(Meeting
with Liaison officers from Constitutional Courts)
15th
meeting - 15 October
International Law
16th
meeting - 5 March
17th
meeting - 11 June
UniDem Governing Board
19th
meeting - 4 March
20th
meeting - 15 October
21st
meeting - 10 December
Federal and Regional State
7th
meeting - 19 June
8th
meeting 15 October
9th
meeting 10 December
Democratic Institutions
5th
Meeting 4 March
6th
Meeting 10 December
Constitutional Reform
2nd
Meeting 5 March
3rd
Meeting 11 June
4th
Meeting 17-18 July (Rome)
5th
Meeting 15 October
Administrtive and Budgetary questions
2nd
Meeting 4 March
Constitutional Court of Croatia - Meeting of the
International Advisers
15 June (Zagreb)
7 July (Zagreb)
15-16
December (Strasbourg)
Working Group on the Ombudsman Institutions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina
4 February (Paris)
19-29 March
(Strasbourg)
4 May (Strasbourg)
27 May (Paris)
14-15 September (Lisbon)
23 October (Sarajevo)
3-4 December
(Sarajevo)
Meetings on opinions concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina :
Working
Group on Competence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in penal matters
23
January (Brussels)
Working Group on electoral law Bosnia and Herzegovina
25-26 May (Strasbourg)
Working Group on the competence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in electoral matters
7 July (Heidelberg)
Working Group on Restitution of Property in Bosnia and
Herzegovina
10-11
November (Strasbourg)
Working Group on the Constitutionality of
international agreements concluded by Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the entities
14 November (Paris)
Working Group on the Albanian Law on the organisation
of justice
19 February
(Paris)
26-27
February (Tirana)
Working Group on the draft Constitution of Albania
8-10 January (Tirana)
(Meeting with the Albanian
authorities responsible for the constitutional process)
15 April (Paris)
20-21 May (Lezhe, Albania)
7-8
September (Tirana)
Working Group on constitutional control in Armenia
22-26 May (Yerevan)
Exchange of views on
constitutional reform and in particular the introduction of individual
complaint to the constitutional court
Working Group on the situation in Kosovo
21 April (Brussels)
(Meeting with the Presidency
of the European Union)
16
July (Rome)
21 August (Vienna)
10-11
November (London)
8 December (Brussels)
Working Group on the Draft Statute for Gagaouzia
17 March
(Chisinau)
1 July
(Chisinau)
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE SEMINARS
Seminar
on the budget of the Constitutional Court : control and management with
the financial support of the joint programme European Commission/Council of Europe for Ukraine
19-20
January (Kiev)
Round
Table on the functioning of the system of constitutional control in
co-operation with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Office of the High Representative, the American Bar Association and the Phare
programme of the European Union
4-5 April (Sarajevo)
Workshop
on Judicial independence and incompatibilities of the function of judge with
other activities in co-operation with COLPI
20-21 April
(Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)
Workshop
on the principles of constitutional control : techniques of constitutional and
statutory interpretation in co-operation with USAID and with the financial
support of the joint programme European Commission/Council of Europe for Ukraine
5-6 June (Kiev)
Seminar
on the role of the Constitutional court in the implementation of constitutional
law in co-operation with USAID, the OSCE and with the financial support of the
joint programme European Commission/Council of Europe for Ukraine
7-8 October
(Lviv, Ukraine)
Seminar
on electoral disputes before the Constitutional Court
15-16
October (Yerevan)
Round
Table on Constitutional Justice in co-operation with the American Bar
Association and the Phare programme of the European Union
23-24
October (Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina)
UNIDEM SEMINARS
UniDem
Seminar on New Trends in electoral law in a pan-European context
16-17
April (Sarajevo)
Conference on Democratic
Institutions and Civil Society in South-Eastern Europe in co-operaton with the
Greek Presidency of the Committee of Ministers
5-6 May (Strasbourg)
UniDem Seminar on The
principle of respect for human dignity in European case-law
2-6
July (Montpellier)
UniDem Seminar on the
Constitutional developments in the Transcaucasian States : Distribution of
powers with the financial support of the Japan Foundation
7-11
September (Baku, Tblissi)
13-14 October (Yerevan)
PROGRAMME DEMOCRACY FROM THE
LAW BOOK TO REAL LIFE
Workshop on local government
training
19-20 January (Pretoria)
Workshop on local government
elections
23 January (Pretoria)
Seminar on Equality
Jurisprudence
1-2 February (Cape Town)
Seminar on National and
International Human Rights Law with particular reference to Customary Law and
the Freedom of Expression
1-3 October (Johannesburg)
Workshop on rationalisation
of laws
13-14 October (Johannesburg)
OTHER SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES
Participation in a Colloquy on Le médiateur, quel avenir?
5 February (Paris)
Participation
in a Seminar on Constitutional Courts
22-23 May (Istanbul)
Participation in the seminar
on Teaching constitutional law in comparative law
19-20 June (Lausanne)
Participation in a meeting on
the Revision of the Constitution of Georgia
14-15 July (Tblissi)
Participation in the UNESCO
Seminar on Democratic governance in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society
7-11 September (Bishkek)
Participation
in a meeting with the Association of Constitutional Courts using the French
language (ACCPUF)
10-12
September (Beirut)
Participation in the 6th
Annual Judicial Conference organised by the Center for Democracy (USA)
1-3 October (Warsaw)
Participation in a meeting of
the Scientific Council of the Foundation Venice for Peace
3 October
Participation in a meeting of
the Friends of Albania Group
23 October (Rome)
Participation in a briefing
of parliamentarians responsible for observing the elections in Albania
20-21 November (Tirana)
Participation in the
Conference on Self-determination in international law : applications to the
Kosovo case organised by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
21-22 November (Belgrade)
Participation in the Seminar
on Federalism and Transnational fruition of fundamental rights organised by the
University of Padova
12 December (Padova)
Collection - Science
and technique of democracy
No. 1 : Meeting
with the presidents of constitutional courts and other equivalent bodies
Piazzola sul Brenta, 8 October 1990
No. 2 : Models
of constitutional jurisdiction
by
Helmut Steinberger
No. 3 : Constitution
making as an instrument of democratic transition
Istanbul, 8-10 October 1992
No. 4 : Transition
to a new model of economy and its constitutional reflections
Moscow, 18-19 February 1993
No. 5 : The
relationship between international and domestic law
Warsaw, 19-21 May 1993
No. 6 : The
relationship between international and domestic law
by
Constantin Economides3
No. 7 : Rule
of law and transition to a market economy
Sofia, 14-16 October 1993
No. 8 : Constitutional
aspects of the transition to a market economy
Collected
texts of the European Commission for Democracy through Law
No. 9 : The
Protection of Minorities
Collected
texts of the European Commission for Democracy through Law
No. 10 : The
role of the constitutional court in the consolidation of the rule of law
Bucharest, 8-10 June 1994
No. 11 : The
modern concept of confederation
Santorini,
22-25 September 1994
No. 12 : Emergency powers
by
Ergun Özbudun and Mehmet Turhan
No. 13 : Implementation
of constitutional provisions regarding mass media in a pluralist democracy
Nicosia, 16-18 December 1994
No. 14: Constitutional
justice and democracy by referendum
Strasbourg, 23-24 June 1995
No. 15 : The
protection of fundamental rights by the Constitutional Court
Brioni, Croatia, 23-25 September 1995
No. 16: Local
self-government, territorial integrity and protection of minorities
Lausanne, 25-27 April 1996
No. 17: Human
Rights and the functioning of the democratic institutions in emergency
situations
Wroclaw, 3-5 October 1996
No. 18: The
constitutional heritage of Europe
Montpellier, 22-23 November 1996
No. 19 : Federal
and Regional States
No. 20 : The
composition of Constitutional Courts
No. 21 Citizenship and state succession
Vilnius, 16-17
May 1997
No. 22 The transformation of the Nation-State in Europe at the
dawn of the 21st century
Nancy, 6-8
November 1998
No. 23 Consequences of state succession for nationality
No. 24 Law and foreign policy
* * * * *
Bulletin on Constitutional Case-Law - 93-1,2,3
94-1,2,3
95-1,2,3
96-1,2,3
97-1,2,3
98/1
Special Bulletins - Volume
1 (1994 - Descriptions of the Courts)
Volumes
2,3,4,5 (Basic texts - exracts from constitutions and laws on Constitutional
Courts)
Leading
cases - European Court of Human Rights
* * * * *
Annual Reports - 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997
Annex 6 to
the Dayton Agreement, Chapter Two, Part A and Part C
Articles VII to XIII. See also, Article II,
para 1 of the Dayton Constitution.
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