CDL-INF(1999)005e
Strasbourg, 27 March 1999
OPINION ON THE REFORM OF THE
JUDICIARY IN BULGARIA
adopted by the Commission at
its 38th Plenary Meeting
(Venice, 22-23 March 1999)
on the basis of comments by
Mr. James HAMILTON (Ireland)
Mr.
Luis LOPEZ GUERRA (Spain)
Mr. Joseph SAID PULLICINO
(Malta)
Ms Hanna SUCHOCKA (Poland)
1
Introduction
1.
The Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe decided to request from the Venice Commission a legal opinion on the draft
law amending and supplementing the Bulgarian Law on the Judiciary. The
Commission was informed of this request by letter of 25 September 1998 by Mr
Bruno Haller, Clerk of the Assembly.
2.
At its 37th Plenary Meeting, on 11-12 December 1998 the Commission held
an exchange of Views on the judicial reform in Bulgaria with Messrs Gotsev,
Minister of Justice, and Toshev, Chairman of the Bulgarian Delegation to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CDL (98) PV 37). In particular, the Commission was informed that the draft law had already entered into force and that it had been challenged before the Constitutional Court. 3. The Commission set up a working group on the reform of the judicial system in Bulgaria consisting of Messrs Hamilton, Lopez Guerra and Said Pullicino, Ms Suchocka and Mr Svoboda. In order not to interfere with the case pending before the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, the Commission asked its working group to visit Bulgaria once the Court would have handed down its decision. 4. The Constitutional Court delivered its decision on 14 January 1999 (CDL (99) 12). On 18-21 February 1999, Messrs Hamilton, Lopez Guerra and Said
Pullicino made a visit to Bulgaria in order to assess the impact of the reform
and to hold an exchange of views with the different interested parties,
including the parliamentary opposition (see also memorandaCDL(99)16).
5.
The present opinion is based on the comments of Messrs. Hamilton, Lopez
Guerra and Said Pullicino (CDL (99) 21, 11 and 10) and was adopted by the Commission
at its 38th Plenary Meeting (Venice, 22-23 March 1999).
2
Constitutional and legal situation
2.1
Constitutional basis for the judicial
system
6.
The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria was adopted by the Grand National
Assembly on 12 July 1991. It provides that the judicial branch of Government
shall be independent (Article 117.2 of the Constitution) and that the judicial branch of Government shall have an independent
budget (Article 117.3 of the Constitution). The judicial branch of Government has three parts (a) the courts (b) the
prosecutor’s office and (c) investigating bodies which are responsible for
performing the preliminary investigation in criminal cases.
7.
Justice is administered by the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme
Administrative Court, courts of appeal, courts of assizes, courts martial and
district courts. Specialised courts may be set up by virtue of a law, but
extraordinary courts are prohibited (Article 119 of the Constitution).
8.
Justices, prosecutors and investigating magistrates are elected,
promoted, demoted, reassigned and dismissed by the Supreme Judicial Council
which consists of 25 members. There are 3 ex
officio members, the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the
Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court, and the Chief Prosecutor. Eleven
of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council are elected by the National
Assembly, and 11 are elected by the bodies of the judicial branch. All 22
elected members must be practising lawyers of high professional and moral
integrity with at least 15 years of professional experience. The elected
members of the Supreme Judicial Council serve terms of 5 years. They are not
eligible for immediate re-election. The meetings of the Supreme Judicial
Council are chaired by the Minister for Justice, who shall not be entitled to a
vote (Article
130 of the Constitution).
9.
Justices, prosecutors and investigating magistrates, become
unsubstitutable upon completing a third year in the respective office. They may
be dismissed only upon retirement, resignation, upon the enforcement of a
prison sentence for a deliberate crime, or upon lasting actual disability to
perform their functions over more than one year (Article 129.3 of the
Constitution). They enjoy the same immunity as the members
of the National Assembly (Articles 132.1 and 70 of the Constitution). Therefore, they are immune from detention or criminal prosecution but
can be detained in the course of committing a grave crime.The immunity of a justice, prosecutor or
investigating magistrate may be lifted by the Supreme Judicial Council only in
the circumstances established by the law (Article 132.2 of the
Constitution).
10.
The organisation and the activity of the Supreme Judicial Council, of
the courts, the prosecution and the investigation, the status of the justices,
prosecutors and investigating magistrates, the conditions and the procedure for
the appointment and dismissal of justices, court assessors, prosecutors and
investigating magistrates and the materialisation of their liability are to be
established by a law (Article 133 of the Constitution). This law is the Judicial System Act of the Republic of Bulgaria which
was enacted in 1994 and has been amended in 1994, 1996, 1997 and 1998.
2.2
The Act constituting an amendment to
the Judicial System Act of the Republic of Bulgaria
11.
The specific remit of the Commission was to report concerning the law on
amendments of the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria which was promulgated in the
State Gazette no. 133 of 11 November 1998 and entered into force on 15 November
1998 (CDL (98) 87). The text of the Act as finally enacted (seeCDL(98)93
rev.) differs from that which was introduced both because
the President of the Republic of Bulgaria referred the Act to the National
Assembly for further debate, as a result of which a number of provisions were
not proceeded with, and because a number of the provisions of the Act were
successfully challenged before the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria in an
application brought by the Prosecutor General and a number of Deputies of the
National Assembly. While the request from the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary
Assembly was specifically directed to the last amendment to this Act which in
the meantime already had entered into force, the Venice Commission felt obliged
to address some aspects of the Act as a whole.
12.
Arising out of the Constitutional Court’s verdict of 14 January 1999
(CDL (99) 12) a number of provisions of the Act as enacted were struck down as
unconstitutional, including changes in procedures for the budget of the
judicial system, which were held to be an interference with the autonomous
budget of the Constitution; a proposal to impose disciplinary sanctions on
judges and prosecutors for “breach of the Oath of Office,” which was held to be
impermissibly vague; a proposal to extend to the Chairman of the Supreme Court
of Cassation, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Minister for Justice and
European Legal Integration the right to request the Supreme Judicial Council to
divest a judge, prosecutor or investigator of immunity and temporarily remove
him from Office (the Court held that only the prosecutor could make such a
proposal); and the right of the Supreme Judicial Council to appoint a
prosecutor in cases involving disciplinary cases against members of the
Judiciary. The Constitutional Court also rejected a proposal that appeals from
the disciplinary panel of the Supreme Judicial Council should be to a mixed
court staffed from the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme
Administrative Court. As a result such appeals lie only to the Supreme
Administrative Court. It is unnecessary for the Commission to give any further
consideration to these aspects of the amendments to the Judicial System Act
which, having been rejected by the Constitutional Court, are no longer in
force.
13.
The Venice
Commission has absolutely no reason to doubt that the Constitutional Court
reached its decision, after due deliberation, free from any undue influence.
That judgment determines the constitutionality of the amendments according to
the Bulgarian Constitution. Any observations on the judgment itself would not
only be outside the scope of the Commission’s mandate but would also be
improper since the opinion sought of the Venice Commission was limited to an
examination on whether the Judicial System Act, as amended, satisfied the
required standard for an independent Judiciary and adequately guarantees the
basic requirements of a democratic society.
14.
The principal issues dealt with in this opinion are the following:
§
the election of a new Supreme Judicial Council before the five year
mandate of the previous Council had elapsed (point 3.1 below);
§
the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council (point 3.2 below);
§
provisions which strengthen the powers of the Minister for Justice and
European Legal Integration both generally and within the Supreme Judicial
Council, and particularly in relation to the appointment, disciplining and
dismissal of judges and prosecutors (point 3.3 below);
§
warnings to the
courts by the Minister of Justice (point 3.4 below);
§
the disciplinary sanction of transferring a magistrate to another
district (point 3.5 below);
§
the authorisation of leaves by the Minister of Justice (point 3.6 below);
§
changes in the qualifications which are required for judges (point 3.7 below);
§
a rule preventing prosecutors from withdrawing cases without the consent
of the court (point 3.8 below);
§
immunity of magistrates (point 3.9 below).
2.3
The justifications advanced for the
introduction of the amending Act
15. The rapporteurs discussed the
amending Act with a wide range of interests in Bulgaria. These included the
Minister for Justice and European Legal Integration, the newly appointed
Prosecutor General, the juge rapporteur
of the Constitutional Court who dealt with the constitutional case in which the
Act was impugned, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, the
President of the Bulgarian Bar Association, the President of the Bulgarian
Judges Association, the Chief Prosecutor, the Chairman of the Legal Affairs
Committee of Parliament, representatives of political parties, including the
principal governing party, the Union of Democratic Forces, and the two
principal opposition parties, the Democratic Left (Bulgarian Socialist Party)
and the Euro left party, and a group of judges, prosecutors and investigators
based in Plovdiv, the second city of Bulgaria.
16.
Supporters of the amending Act justified its enactment by reference to
serious problems concerning the judicial system in Bulgaria in dealing with
crime. In many cases, criminals were released shortly after their arrest and
their cases never came to trial. The rapporteurs were informed that corruption amongst prosecutors is
believed to be widespread. There have, however, been no cases where such
corruption has been proved.
17.
There were serious delays in cases coming to court. The large majority
of the judges had been appointed under the former communist regime prior to
democratisation, and whilst these judges had been de-politicised and guaranteed
security of tenure inefficiencies within the judicial system remained. It was
necessary, therefore, to take steps to ensure that disciplinary procedures
functioned effectively in cases where improper behaviour on the part of
prosecutors could be shown or where judges were incompetent.
18.
In addition to this, a number of important new courts intended to be
established under the Constitution adopted in 1991 had been brought into being
only within the recent past, although under the Constitution they should have
been established within one year of its enactment. These included the new
courts of appeal which had been established only in 1998. In the view of
supporters of the amending Act, the need to properly represent the judges on
the Supreme Judicial Council justified interrupting the five year term of
office of the Supreme Judicial Council, which is guaranteed under the
Constitution, notwithstanding that less than two years of its term of office
had run. This reasoning had been accepted by the Constitutional Court in its
decision.
2.4
The Objections to the Act
19.
The most serious objections which the rapporteurs heard to the amendments to the Judicial System Act were
made by the two opposition political parties (see alsoCDL(99)16). Their spokesmen
expressed fears that the amendments would in effect result in the total control
of the Judiciary by the Executive. Very often therefore, the representations of
Opposition parties were directed not at the text of the law itself but at the
way in which it was being or was expected to be implemented. They voiced the fear that the changes in disciplinary procedure for judges and
prosecutors would lead to widespread dismissal of existing judges and would
threaten and undermine judicial independence.
20.
Some of the opposition spokespersons, though not all, argued that the
new Supreme Judicial Council was a highly politicised body. It was pointed out
that the parliamentary component of the Council had been elected only with the
votes of the current majority in Parliament. (The Government side’s contention
was that this was because the opposition deputies had declined to participate).
Opposition Deputies did not accept the bona
fides of the decision to replace the old Supreme Judicial Council.
21.
Objections were also raised to the strengthening of the Minister for Justice
and European Legal Integration’s powers on the grounds that they infringed on
the independence of the Judiciary. While opposition representatives did not
dispute that a serious problem in relation to the prosecution of crime existed,
they doubted that the proposals in the amendment to the Judicial System Act
were the correct way to tackle the problems.
22.
The rapporteurs also heard a
number of other objections from different sources. These included the
relaxation in qualifications for appointment as a judge or prosecutor and the
idea that Parliament should elect part of the Supreme Judicial Council at all.
3
Opinion of the Venice Commission
23.
This opinion of the Venice Commission takes into account all views
submitted to it, giving due weight to the submissions of opposition parties. It
should not be construed as being critical of the Bulgarian legislator or of the
judicial authorities in a negative sense. This opinion is being offered in a
spirit of co-operation and is meant as an objective independent assessment of a
legal document that could contribute to a better understanding of those areas
which have provoked controversy and that need to be addressed to ensure a
proper functioning of the Act.
24.
In considering the various objections made to
the Act, it is important to note at the outset it is not part of the
Commission’s functions to express any view in relation to the compliance of the
amendments to the Judiciary System Act with the Constitution of Bulgaria. That
question is one solely for the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria. The
Commission’s function is confined to an examination of the Bulgarian law in the
light of international standards in the field of democracy, human rights and
the rule of law. The criteria for the evaluation of these amendments are taken from the
requirements concerning the independence of the Judiciary included in the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, and other related international documents (including Article 6.1
ECHR, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 14.1
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). The comments will
refer not only to the amendments’ strict conformity with the international
requirements concerning the independence of the Judiciary, but also to
considerations on the suitability of these amendments from the standpoint of
improving the conditions for guaranteeing that independence. Consequently, this
opinion does not confine itself to suggest amendments to the Judiciary System
Act but equally points out provisions of the Constitution itself which might be
reexamined.
25.
The Bulgarian authorities faced a choice between replacing the existing
Supreme Judicial Council with a new one, even though less than two years of its
five year term of office provided for under the Constitution had elapsed, or
leaving important elements of the Bulgarian Judiciary unrepresented on the
Council because courts of which they are members had not been established at
the time of the election of the previous Council notwithstanding the
requirement that those Courts should be established within one year of coming
into force of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court of Bulgaria has held
that the procedures which were adopted are in conformity with the Constitution
of Bulgaria and this finding must be respected by the Venice Commission. The
Commission does not consider that any
question of fundamental rights arises from the choice made as to which of two
conflicting provisions in the Constitution of Bulgaria should have prevailed in
these circumstances.
26.
Obviously,
transitional clause number 4 of the Constitution cannot be interpreted as
allowing the dismissal of the Supreme Judicial Council and the election of a
new Council every time in future when new structural and procedural laws which
implement constitutional mandates are enacted. Such an interpretation would
allow any new parliamentary majority to introduce new procedural laws to
implement the Constitution and thus alter the composition of the Council to
adapt it to the new organization of the Judiciary. Consequently, this
transitional clause must not be invoked again.
27.
The transitory nature
of the choice made and the fact that this decision was based on the
interpretation of conflicting provisions in the Constitution would not justify
any further comment by the Venice Commission except the general consideration
that lack of consensus between the major political forces before such a
decision was taken, inevitably contributed to the aura of suspicion and
mistrust surrounding the Supreme Judicial Council since its inception.
28.
There is no standard model that a democratic country is bound to follow
in setting up its Supreme Judicial Council so long as the function of such a
Council fall within the aim to ensure the proper functioning of an independent
Judiciary within a democratic State. Though models exist where the involvement
of other branches of power (the legislative and the executive) is outwardly
excluded or minimised, such involvement is in varying degrees recognised by
most statutes and is justified by the social content of the functions of the
Supreme Judicial Council and the need to have the administrative activities of
the Judiciary monitored by the other branches of power of the State. It is
obvious that the Judiciary has to be answerable for its actions according to
law provided that proper and fair procedures are provided
for and that a removal from office can take place only for reasons that are
substantiated. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that the main purpose of the very
existence of a Supreme Council of the Judiciary is the protection of the
independence of judges by insulating them from undue pressures from other
powers of the State in matters such as the selection and appointment of judges
and the exercise of disciplinary functions.
29.
Given that the
Bulgarian legislator has opted for a Supreme Judicial Council that includes
direct participation of the legislative branch through the election of a number
of its members by Parliament and of the Executive through the chairmanship of
the Minister of Justice and European Legal Integration, the composition of the
Council becomes an important and determining element that has to be examined. The provision that eleven of the twenty five members of the Supreme
Judicial Council are elected by Parliament is contained in the Constitution itself.
Under the Constitution, all the elected members of the Council, including this
parliamentary component, must consist of practising lawyers of high
professional and moral integrity with at least fifteen years of professional
experience. Nine of the eleven members of the recently elected parliamentary
component of the council are judges. The Venice Commission does not consider
that there can be, in itself, any objection to the election of a substantial
component of the Supreme Judicial Council by the Parliament.
30.
The composition
of the Council as set out in the Act is not in itself objectionable. It could
work perfectly well in an established democracy where the administration of
justice is by and large above the conflict of party politics and where the
independence of the Judiciary is very pronounced and well established. In such
a situation, one would not expect the representatives of Parliament on the
Council to be elected strictly on party lines and in any event, even if that
were to happen, those elected would not feel in any way committed to act under
instructions or directives from the party that elected them.
31.
The Venice
Commission considers that even though the Supreme Judicial Council may not in
fact have been politicised it is undesirable that there should even be the
appearance of politicisation in the procedures for its election. In each of the
two most recent elections for the parliamentary component of the Supreme
Judicial Council, under two different Governments the respective opposition parties
did not participate with the result that on each occasion the parliamentary
component was elected exclusively by representatives of the governing parties.
32.
A high degree of
consensus in relation to the election of this component should be sought. The Bulgarian
Parliament discusses nominations in advance of the vote in the plenary in a
parliamentary committee. Such a mechanism should be capable of being used to
ensure appropriate opposition involvement in elections to the Supreme Judicial
Council.
33.
The presence of the Minister of Justice in the Council, in the capacity
of Council President as provided for in Article 130.5 of the Constitution, does
not seem, in itself, to impair the independence of the Council. Moreover, in
those countries that have adopted similar institutions, the presence of members
of the Executive Power in the Councils of the Judiciary is not infrequent.
Thus, the Italian Constitution establishes that the President of the Republic
shall preside the Council of the Judiciary and the French Constitution makes
the President of the Republic President of the Council. Furthermore, in France
the Minister of Justice is the ex officio
Vice President of the Council as well as its President, in the absence of the
President of the Republic.
34.
The Minister for Justice has been given a new power to address proposals
to the Supreme Judicial Council for the purposes of appointing and dismissing
the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Chairman of the Supreme
Administrative Court and the Chief Prosecutor, for determining the number of
judges, prosecutors and investigators and for appointing, promoting, demoting,
moving and dismissing all judges, prosecutors and investigators. Formerly, such
proposals could only be made by the heads of the different branches of the
Judiciary, the prosecution service and the investigation service. The
Commission does not consider the conferring of a power to make such a proposal
on a Minister of the Government is in itself objectionable as an interference
with the independence of the Judiciary. Again, the doctrine of separation of
powers does not require that there can be no involvement by either of the other
two branches of power in a decision to appoint or dismiss a judge. The European
Court of Human Rights has held that the fact that a power to appoint members of
a tribunal is conferred on a Government does not, of itself, suffice to give
cause to doubt its members independence and impartiality (Sramek v Austria, 22.10.1984, no. 84 of
Series A of the Publications of the Court).
In the Bulgarian system, notwithstanding the Minister’s power to make
proposals, the actual decision to appoint or to dismiss is made by the Supreme
Judicial Council, on which the judicial branch has a majority representation.
This decision follows a hearing before a disciplinary panel composed of five
members drawn by lot. Furthermore, decisions of the Supreme Judicial Council,
being administrative decisions, are subject to review by the Supreme
Administrative Court in relation to procedural, though not substantive reasons.
Under the Constitution, the Supreme Judicial Council is chaired by the Minister
for Justice and European Legal Integration. He does not chair the disciplinary
panel.
35.
There is, however, a case to be made that when the Council is discussing
proposals made by the Minister it would be preferable that some person other
than the Minister ought to chair it. It might have been desirable that the
increase in the Minister’s powers to put proposals to the Supreme Judicial
Council would have been balanced by a provision that in such cases some other
person of standing (perhaps the President of the Constitutional Court) would
preside over the meeting. It is appreciated, however, that any such change
could not formally be made without an amendment to the Constitution of
Bulgaria.
36.
Given that that
Parliament appoints eleven of its members by a simple majority vote it might be
preferable to grant the power to advise the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings to the Inspectorate in order to suppress any direct interference of
the Government in disciplinary proceedings. Although appointed by the Minister
of Justice and European Legal Integration, inspectors must have the approval of
the Council to be appointed (Article 36.a of the Judicial System Act), and
therefore, they offer a greater guarantee of impartiality.
3.4
Warnings to the courts by the
Minister of Justice (Article 172 of the Judicial System Act)
37.
Article 172 of
the Judicial System Act (amended) grants the Minister of Justice and European
Legal Integration the power to “bring to the attention of regional, district
and appellate judges (...) what appear to the Minister to be irregularities in
their work of initiating and processing certain cases...”. In order to avoid undue influences on the courts in taking their
decisions on the cases subject to their jurisdiction, this provision has to be
strictly interpreted to refer only to administrative irregularities. If there
are, or seem to be, irregularities in the Court’s substantive handling of a
case, it is the task of the parties to the proceedings, including the
prosecutor, to denounce these irregularities to the competent higher court,
using the appropriate legal remedies.
38.
Article 169.5 of the Judicial System Act will now permit, as a
disciplinary sanction, relocation of a judge, prosecutor or investigator to
another court region for up to three years. The use of relocation as a
disciplinary sanction is open to objection, not least from the point of view of
the citizens in the region to which a disciplined judge, prosecutor or
investigator is to be transferred.
3.6
Authorization of leaves (Article
190.2 of the Judicial System Act)
39.
Article 190.2 of the Act regulates the authorization of judges',
prosecutors' and investigators' leaves. Its subparagraph 4 establishes that the
Minister of Justice shall have the power to authorize leaves of absence of the
presidents of district and appellate courts. This provision may be considered
to confer on the Executive Power an administrative competence over certain
judges that contravenes the principle of independence of the Judiciary. It
seems that it would be more coherent with this principle to confer that
competence to the Council of the Judiciary.
40.
The amended Judicial System Act provides for a relaxation in the
qualifications required for appointment to judicial office (Article 127). In particular, the occupations recognised as constituting a “record of
service” at all levels in the Judiciary have been extended to include
“government agent, subagent and judicial candidate”. While the Venice
Commission is conscious of the practical difficulties facing any country in
transition from a communist system to democracy in finding suitable candidates
for judicial office, care needs to be taken to ensure that any relaxation of
necessary qualifications does not lead to a reduction in the professional
calibre of the Judiciary.
41.
The Venice Commission considers that a rule requiring a prosecutor to
have the consent of the court before withdrawing a case is a proportionate
response to a perception of fraud among elements of the prosecution service
since it makes it difficult for the prosecutor to make such a decision which is
without objective justification.
42.
As already noted, under the Constitution judges, prosecutors and
investigators have the same immunity from detention or criminal prosecution as
legislators (Article 132.1 of the Constitution). This immunity can be set aside
only by the Supreme Judicial Council. The Constitution confers no immunity from
criminal investigation. While no doubt immunity could be justified if it were
necessary to prevent judges or prosecutors from interference from vexatious
proceedings it ought not to operate to place judges and prosecutors above the
law. Were it to do so it would infringe the basic principle that no person is
above the law. Despite the widespread belief that there is corruption within
the prosecution service, the Venice Commission notes that no cases of
corruption have been proved. This could be due to lack of evidence; if there
were evidence in an appropriate case the Supreme Judicial Council should not
hesitate to withdraw immunity to enable court proceedings to take place. It
would be important that the requirement to waive immunity before a prosecution
could take place could not operate so as to prevent investigations in cases
where there was a reasonable ground to suspect a crime had been committed by
judges or prosecutors.
4
Conclusion
43.
Taken individually it seems possible to justify most of the measures in
the amended Judicial System Act which have been impugned, nevertheless the
measure taken as a whole represents a significant increase in the power of the parliamentary
majority and of the executive. While the justification for this development is
the serious problem relating to crime and the criminal justice system in
Bulgaria, and while in a democracy the democratically elected Government and
the responsible Minister must in the last analysis be accountable for the
proper functioning of the judicial system, it would be desirable if in the
longer term Bulgaria were to be able to move towards a system where the judges
themselves, and the prosecutors, would be able to assume a greater
responsibility for the proper functioning of the judicial and prosecutorial
system and the executive would be able to step back from it. Although the new
powers assumed by the Executive by virtue of the reform of the Judicial System
Act are not incompatible with European standards concerning judicial
independence, a judicious and restrained use of these new powers would be
highly recommended.
44.
If the judicial system is to function properly, it is essential that
the political culture develop in such a way that the judicial system is not the
subject of party political controversy and that respect for judicial
independence becomes imbued in this culture. Wide political consensus is
essential if the Supreme Judicial Council is to be effective. That consensus
seems unfortunately to be lacking. It is not up to the Venice Commission to
find fault or identify responsibilities. While in the last analysis it may be
necessary to ensure that a parliamentary minority cannot block the election of
the members of the Supreme Judicial Council to be chosen by
the Parliament, it would nonetheless be desirable to seek the highest degree of
consensus possible in the election
process.
45.
The Venice
Commission wishes to thank all Bulgarian interlocutors who met their rapporteurs for the frank and very
informative discussions which enabled them to assess the situation of the
Judiciary in Bulgaria in a spirit of genuine co-operation.
