Belgium / Belgique
Questionnaire sur l’exécution
des arrêts des juridictions
constitutionnelles
Réponse pour la
Belgique
Professeur
ordinaire à l’Université de Liège,
Membre
de la Commission européenne
pour la
Démocratie par le Droit
I. Questions générales sur le contrôle de
constitutionnalité.
Remarques introductives.
La
notion de contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois est assez récente en
Belgique. Elle a été introduite par la révision constitutionnelle du
29 juillet 1980, concrétisée par la loi du 28 juin 1983. Ces textes
ont consacré l’existence d’une « Cour d’arbitrage » ayant pour
mission de régler les conflits de compétence entre le législateur fédéral et
les législateurs des entités fédérées, Communautés et Régions, soit dans la
terminologie belge, les conflits entre la loi (fédérale), le décret (des Communautés
et des Régions wallonne et flamande) et l’ordonnance (de la Région de
Bruxelles-Capitale).
La révision constitutionnelle du
15 juillet 1988, mise en œuvre par la loi spéciale du 6 janvier 1989,
a notablement étendu la compétence de la Cour d’arbitrage, ainsi que les
modalités de sa saisine.
La Cour d’arbitrage est désormais
non seulement compétente en matière de conflits de compétence provoqués par
l’intervention de plusieurs législateurs au niveau fédéral ou des entités
fédérées, mais aussi pour vérifier le respect par chaque législateur du
principe d’égalité et des principes constitutionnels régissant l’enseignement.
Techniquement, le contrôle de la
Cour d’arbitrage reste toujours limité : il ne s’étend pas à l’ensemble de
la Constitution. Mais cette restriction est largement apparente. La
jurisprudence de la Cour conçoit en effet le principe d’égalité de manière si
large qu’elle parvient par ce biais à englober indirectement dans son contrôle
de très nombreuses dispositions constitutionnelles, voire des droits consacrés
par des textes de droit international directement applicables (la Convention
européenne des droits de l’homme, par exemple).
Pour ne prendre qu’un exemple de
ce contrôle « par ricochet », si la Constitution réserve la
réglementation d’une matière donnée à la loi, la Cour d’arbitrage verra une
violation du principe d’égalité en cas de délégation excessive du législateur à
l’exécutif. Partant de l’idée que tous bénéficient en principe de la protection
que la Constitution assure en exigeant l’intervention du législateur, la Cour
considère comme une rupture du principe d’égalité l’abandon par le législateur
du domaine que la Constitution lui réserve en exclusivité.
Les textes de base dont
actuellement l’article 142 de la Constitution belge et la loi spéciale du
6 janvier 1989 sur la Cour d’arbitrage (ci-après citée : L.C.A.).
A.
Le type et l’objet du contrôle de
constitutionnalité.
1) Le contrôle de constitutionnalité des actes
normatifs.
En Belgique, la Cour d’arbitrage n’est compétente qu’en ce qui concerne
ce type de contrôle. Seuls les lois, décrets et ordonnances (c’est-à-dire les
« lois » adoptées par les entités fédérées) peuvent être soumis à la
censure de la juridiction constitutionnelle.
a) Contrôle préventif : inexistant dans l’état
actuel des choses (une partie de la doctrine plaide en faveur de l’instauration
d’un contrôle préventif en matière de traités).
b) Contrôle abstrait ou principal.
Un
recours en annulation d’une loi, d’un décret ou d’une ordonnance peut être introduit
dans un délai de six mois suivant la publication du texte (art. 2,
§ 1er L.C.A.).
En cas de loi
(décret ou ordonnance) portant assentiment à un traité, le délai est réduit à
soixante jours (art. 2, § 2 L.C.A.).
Peuvent
introduire un tel recours :
- le Conseil des ministres fédéral ou
le Gouvernement d’une Communauté ou d’une Région ;
- Les
présidents des différentes assemblées législatives au niveau de l’Etat fédéral
ou au niveau des entités fédérées à la demande de deux tiers de leurs
membres ;
- toute
personne physique ou morale justifiant d’un intérêt (art. 2 L.C.A.).
Ainsi, les personnes physiques,
les associations, sociétés, belges ou étrangères peuvent introduire une action
en annulation d’une loi (au sens large comprenant décret et ordonnance) devant
la Cour. Celle-ci interprète la notion d’intérêt de façon assez extensive.
Le requérant peut, à l’urgence,
demander à la Cour d’arbitrage la suspension de la norme attaquée en
invoquant à son encontre des moyens sérieux et en démontrant que son exécution
immédiate risque de causer un préjudice grave difficilement réparable. La même
possibilité est ouverte lorsqu’un recours en annulation est exercé contre une
norme identique à une norme déjà annulée par la Cour d’arbitrage et qui a été
adoptée par le même législateur (art. 20 L.C.A.). Cette seconde
hypothèse n’a jamais été rencontrée dans la pratique. Quant à la première
(moyens sérieux et risque d’un préjudice grave, difficilement réparable), la
Cour d’arbitrage n’accorde la suspension que dans de très rares cas.
c) Le contrôle concret
ou incident des normes.
Lorsqu’une question qui relève de
la compétence de la Cour d’arbitrage est posée devant une juridiction
quelconque, judiciaire ou administrative, celle-ci doit en principe adresser une
question préjudicielle à la Cour d’arbitrage (compatibilité de la norme
législative –sensu lato– avec les règles de partage de compétence
ou respect du principe d’égalité ou des règles constitutionnelles en matière
d’enseignement).
Une distinction doit toutefois
être opérée selon le niveau de ces juridictions.
En
ce qui concerne l’ensemble des juridictions, à l’exception des
juridictions dont les décisions ne sont pas susceptibles de recours, elles
peuvent s’abstenir de poser à la Cour la question préjudicielle soulevée devant
elles dans trois cas :
1° lorsque la Cour a déjà statué sur
une question préjudicielle ou un recours en annulation ayant le même
objet ;
2° lorsque
la juridiction estime que la réponse à la question préjudicielle n’est pas indispensable
pour rendre sa décision (question non pertinente) ;
3° lorsque
la norme législative querellée ne viole manifestement pas une des règles
constitutionnelles soumises au contrôle de la Cour d’arbitrage ou les règles de
partage de compétence entre l’Etat, les Communautés et les Régions (théorie de
l’acte clair) (art. 26, § 2 L.C.A.).
Ces trois exceptions laissent en
réalité une assez grande marge de manœuvre aux juridictions qui peuvent les
invoquer, quant aux questions préjudicielles à soumettre à la Cour d’arbitrage.
En revanche, les juridictions dont
la décision n’est pas susceptible de recours, en pratique la Cour de
cassation et le Conseil d’Etat, ne peuvent utiliser les trois exceptions
précitées pour se soustraire à l’obligation d’interroger la Cour d’arbitrage.
Elles doivent toujours poser à la Cour d’arbitrage les questions préjudicielles
qui leur sont soumises par les parties (sauf le seul cas d’irrecevabilité de
l’action).
Le système est donc très rigide en
ce qui concerne la Cour de cassation et le Conseil d’Etat. Cette rigidité
s’explique par la crainte éprouvée par le législateur de voir ces deux
juridictions suprêmes, dans l’ordre judiciaire et dans l’ordre administratif,
se soustraire abusivement à leur obligation d’interroger la Cour d’arbitrage.
On constate toutefois en pratique que tant la Cour de cassation que le Conseil
d’Etat ont omis de poser certaines questions à titre préjudiciel à la Cour
d’arbitrage, alors que le texte légal leur en faisait obligation.
Pour être complet, ajoutons qu’à
côté du contrôle de constitutionnalité traité ici, existe un contrôle de
« conventionnalité » par rapport aux dispositions de droit
international directement applicable. Ce dernier contrôle est exercé
directement par l’ensemble des juridictions et s’exerce sur toutes les normes
de droit belge, législatives ou infra-législatives.
d) Les
actes normatifs échappant au contrôle de constitutionnalité.
Dès
que la norme prend la forme d’une loi sensu lato (loi, décret ou
ordonnance), elle est soumise au contrôle de la Cour d’arbitrage.
La Cour n’a fait aucune
distinction : elle a par exemple affirmé sa compétence à l’égard des lois
dites spéciales (qui doivent être adoptées à majorité renforcée), des lois
budgétaires ou des lois portant assentiment à un traité (et ce tant dans le
cadre du contrôle abstrait que du contrôle concret).
La Constitution et ses révisions
échappent à la compétence de la Cour.
De même, les actes inférieurs à la
loi ne relèvent pas de sa compétence. Ces actes ou règlements, tant au niveau
fédéral qu’à celui des Communautés et Régions ou encore au niveau des provinces
et des communes, peuvent être annulés par le Conseil d’Etat ou se voir opposer
l’exception d’illégalité devant toute juridiction généralement quelconque, ce
qui entraîne la non-application de l’acte ou du règlement dans l’espèce jugée
(art. 159 Const.).
2) L’examen des omissions constitutionnelles en
matière législative.
Dans
de rares cas, statuant en matière d’égalité, la Cour d’arbitrage a relevé une
infraction au principe d’égalité, cette violation ne provenant pas, selon la
Cour, de la disposition législative elle-même soumise à sa censure, mais
découlant du défaut de la part du législateur d’avoir prévu une autre
disposition.
3) Recours du type « Verfassungsbeschwerde »
et « amparo ».
Ces
recours n’existent pas en Belgique.
4) Autres compétences de la juridiction
constitutionnelle.
La
Cour d’arbitrage n’exerce pas d’autres compétences que celles décrites plus
haut. Ce n’est qu’en doctrine que ces questions sont discutées (en ce qui
concerne par exemple l’interdiction de partis extrémistes ou la validité des
élections législatives).
Il est bien évident que la Cour
d’arbitrage intervient dans le cadre des conflits entre entités infra-étatiques
ou entre celles-ci et l’Etat fédéral. Telle est même la raison de
l’instauration de cette juridiction, en 1980, et l’unique compétence qu’elle
avait à cette époque. Telle est aussi la raison d’être du nom
(Cour d’arbitrage) que la Cour constitutionnelle a gardé. Cependant, ces
conflits sont appréhendés selon les deux types de recours exposés plus haut
(recours en annulation et question préjudicielle) et ne font l’objet d’aucune
règle particulière.
B.
Les effets des arrêts de la juridiction
constitutionnelle.
1) En ce qui concerne les actes normatifs (points a) à
f)).
Les
effets d’un arrêt de la Cour d’arbitrage sont très différents selon qu’il
s’agit d’un arrêt rendu sur recours en annulation (A) ou d’un arrêt rendu
sur question préjudicielle (B).
A-1. Les arrêts d’annulation
ont l’autorité absolue de la chose jugée à partir de leur publication au
Moniteur belge (art. 9, § 1er L.C.A.).
La norme doit être considérée
comme inexistante et n’ayant jamais existé. Cette annulation s’impose à toute
autorité et toute personne quelconque. Elle a en principe un effet rétroactif
(art. 8, al. 1 L.C.A.). L’annulation peut être partielle ou
totale (ibidem). La Cour ne peut modifier la norme (sous-question B)).
Une annulation partielle peut cependant avoir un effet très semblable dans la
pratique, surtout lorsque la Cour annule une disposition « en tant
que… », « en ce que… », etc.
Si le principe est celui de la
rétroactivité, la Cour peut cependant, notamment pour des raisons de sécurité
juridique ou pour des raisons tenant aux difficultés administratives et
financières, indiquer dans son arrêt « par voie de disposition générale,
ceux des effets des dispositions annulées qui doivent être considérés comme
définitifs ou maintenus provisoirement pour le délai qu’elle détermine »
(art. 8, al. 2 L.C.A.). La Cour fait parfois usage de cette
possibilité de moduler les effets d’un arrêt dans le temps (sous-question d)).
La loi belge prévoit, suite à un
arrêt d’annulation de la Cour d’arbitrage, une procédure particulière de rétractation
à l’encontre des décisions judiciaires passées en force de chose jugée. Cette
rétractation s’applique aux jugements en matière pénale (art. 10 à
14 L.C.A.), en matière civile (art. 16 L.C.A.) ou contre un
arrêt du Conseil d’Etat (art. 17 L.C.A.). La demande de rétractation
doit être introduite dans les six mois à dater de la publication de l’arrêt au
Moniteur belge. En outre, les actes et règlements des diverses autorités
administratives ainsi que les décisions des juridictions administratives peuvent,
nonobstant l’écoulement des délais légaux, faire l’objet d’un recours, suite à
l’annulation de la norme législative qui leur servait de fondement, dans les
six mois à dater de la publication de l’arrêt d’annulation au Moniteur belge
(art. 18 L.C.A.).
A-2. Les arrêts rendus par la
Cour d’arbitrage portant rejet des recours en annulation sont
obligatoires pour les juridictions en ce qui concerne les questions de droit
tranchées par ces arrêts (art. 9, § 2 L.C.A.). La doctrine tend
à considérer que ces arrêts de rejet ont, en ce qui concerne les points de
droit tranchés par la Cour, de facto une autorité absolue de chose
jugée.
A-3. Un arrêt ordonnant la suspension
provisoire de la norme attaquée paralyse toute application à dater de la
publication au Moniteur belge de l’arrêt, publication qui doit avoir lieu dans
les cinq jours de son prononcé (art. 24 L.C.A.). Dans ce cas, la Cour
doit rendre son arrêt sur la demande en annulation dans les trois mois du
prononcé de l’arrêt ordonnant la suspension. A défaut, la suspension cesse
immédiatement ses effets.
B. Les arrêts rendus sur question
préjudicielle ne lient en droit strict que le juge qui a posé la question
ou tout autre juge (par exemple, en appel) statuant sur la même affaire
(art. 28 L.C.A.). La norme n’est pas susceptible d’annulation dans le
cadre du contentieux préjudiciel. Il s’agit, le cas échéant, d’un simple
constat d’invalidité laissant subsister la norme.
Toutefois, la portée d’un arrêt
rendu sur question préjudicielle dépasse ce strict effet obligatoire à l’égard
du juge qui a posé la question (ou des juges statuant sur la même affaire).
En effet, les juges statuant dans
d’autres affaires et qui rencontrent la question déjà tranchée par la Cour
d’arbitrage, soit sur recours en annulation, soit sur question préjudicielle
(cas qui nous intéresse ici) peuvent s’abstenir de reposer à nouveau la
question, à condition, bien évidemment, de suivre la réponse antérieurement
apportée par la Cour d’arbitrage. Tel est le comportement habituel du juge,
sauf s’il peut espérer provoquer, par une nouvelle question, un revirement de
jurisprudence qui, sauf circonstances nouvelles, paraît très peu probable. La
réponse de la Cour dans une affaire donnée a donc, au-delà de son effet
obligatoire relatif, un effet jurisprudentiel plus généralisé.
Comme il a déjà été dit, les
juridictions suprêmes (la Cour de cassation et le Conseil d’Etat) ne peuvent
faire usage de cette exception, tirée d’une réponse antérieure de la Cour, à
l’obligation de principe de s’adresser à la Cour d’arbitrage. Même lorsque
celle-ci a déjà apporté réponse à la question posée, ces juridictions suprêmes
doivent en principe réinterroger la Cour d’arbitrage. Ainsi que nous l’avons
souligné plus haut, cette règle s’explique par le sentiment de méfiance éprouvé
par le législateur à l’égard de l’esprit de collaboration entre les différentes
Cours suprêmes (Cour d’arbitrage, Cour de cassation et Conseil d’Etat).
En pratique, dès qu’une
disposition législative a été déclarée contraire à la Constitution dans le
cadre d’une question préjudicielle, la règle ne sera plus appliquée par les
juges. Il n’en reste pas moins que la règle subsiste et qu’elle continue en
principe à être mise en œuvre par l’administration.
Cet effet limité des arrêts rendus
sur question préjudicielle est susceptible d’entraîner des difficultés. C’est
en vue de les résoudre que la loi sur la Cour d’arbitrage prévoit qu’après un
arrêt sur question préjudicielle constatant l’inconstitutionnalité d’une norme
législative, le Conseil des ministres fédéral ou les Gouvernements de
Communauté ou de Région peuvent, dans les six mois, demander à la Cour
l’annulation de la règle (art. 4, 2° L.C.A.). Malheureusement, cette
faculté n’est que très peu utilisée en pratique.
Il découle de tout ceci qu’aucun
organe n’intervient dans la mise en œuvre de l’arrêt par voie d’abrogation. La
décision de la Cour s’impose d’elle-même, avec des effets différents selon la
nature de l’arrêt (sous-question c)).
2) En ce qui concerne la
protection des droits constitutionnels.
Sans objet pour la Belgique.
3) Autres questions.
a) On
considère que la Cour d’arbitrage n’est pas liée par ses précédents. Les
changements de jurisprudence, s’ils ne sont pas inexistants, sont toutefois
très rares.
b) L’effet de res judicata,
absolu ou relatif, dépend de la nature de l’arrêt (cf. supra).
c) Le droit belge ne
précise pas expressis verbis le niveau occupé par un arrêt de la
Cour d’arbitrage dans la hiérarchie des normes. Seuls les effets des arrêts sont
envisagés par la loi sur la Cour d’arbitrage.
d) Les arrêts doivent être
publiés au journal officiel, soit le Moniteur belge. Les arrêts rendus sur
recours en annulation sont publiés en entier et ceux rendus sur question
préjudicielle par extrait (art. 114 L.C.A.). Les arrêts sont rédigés,
prononcés et publiés en français, en néerlandais et en allemand s’il s’agit
d’arrêts rendus sur recours en annulation ou si l’affaire a été introduite en
allemand. Dans les autres cas, les arrêts sont rédigés et prononcés en français
et en néerlandais. Ils sont publiés au Moniteur belge avec une traduction en
allemand (art. 65 L.C.A.).
En outre, la Cour doit assurer la
publication de ses arrêts dans un recueil officiel (art. 114,
al. 2 L.C.A.). Ils peuvent aussi être consultés par internet.
e) Dans certains cas, la
Cour a consenti à admettre comme constitutionnelle une législation à condition
qu’elle soit modifiée dans un délai raisonnable. La Cour n’a jamais fixé de
délais précis en vue de préserver la marge de manœuvre du législateur,
spécialement en ce qui concerne les matières dont les implications financières
sont importantes. Dans une affaire récente, il a été demandé à la Cour de fixer
un tel délai. La Cour s’y est refusée. Elle a simplement constaté qu’en l’espèce,
le « délai raisonnable » était expiré sans répondre
explicitement à la question de principe de savoir si elle était compétente pour
fixer un tel délai précis (arrêt du 29 novembre 2000 – n° 121/2000).
II. Quels sont les moyens d’assurer l’exécution des
arrêts de la juridiction constitutionnelle ?
L’article 115 L.C.A.
énonce que les arrêts de la Cour d’arbitrage sont exécutoires de plein droit.
Le texte précise que le Roi en assure l’exécution. Ceci signifie qu’il peut
être recouru à la force publique dans la mesure où celle-ci serait nécessaire à
l’exécution de l’arrêt. A cette fin, le greffier appose sur les expéditions des
arrêts, à la suite du dispositif, la formule ci-après :
« Les Ministres, les membres des
Gouvernements des Régions et des Communautés et les autorités administratives,
pour ce qui les concerne, sont tenus de pourvoir à l’exécution du présent
arrêt. Les huissiers de justice à ce requis ont à y concourir en ce qui
concerne les voies de droit commun ».
III. Cas d’inexécution.
On
ne relève pas de cas d’inexécution d’un arrêt de la Cour d’arbitrage en
Belgique.
IV. Cas d’exécution insatisfaisante.
La
situation quant à l’exécution des arrêts de la Cour d’arbitrage paraît en
général très satisfaisante en Belgique. L’autorité de la Cour est grande et ses
décisions ne sont guère contestées, même lorsqu’elles tranchent des questions
très délicates sur le plan politique, par exemple des controverses portant sur
l’organisation fédérale de l’Etat. On peut même dire que la Cour a contribué au
développement d’une véritable culture constitutionnelle en Belgique. Ainsi, la
section de législation du Conseil d’Etat, saisie de projets ou de propositions
de loi, attire-t-elle souvent l’attention du législateur sur la jurisprudence
de la Cour d’arbitrage.
Ceci ne signifie pas qu’aucun
problème ne se pose.
Dans certains cas, un législateur
dont une norme avait été annulée par la Cour d’arbitrage a reproduit une norme
semblable. Il en a été ainsi de dispositions de décrets budgétaires de la Communauté
française prévoyant, pour des années successives, des subsides à des
associations culturelles situées dans des communes flamandes à facilités
linguistiques. Ces décrets budgétaires ont fait l’objet d’annulations répétées
de la part de la Cour d’arbitrage.
A cet égard, il convient de noter
que la législation elle-même prévoit l’hypothèse où un législateur reprendrait
une disposition identique à celle annulée par la Cour d’arbitrage, puisqu’elle
permet dans ce cas que la Cour puisse suspendre immédiatement cette nouvelle
norme (art. 20, 2° L.C.A.).
Les difficultés de mise en œuvre
des arrêts de la Cour d’arbitrage se situent cependant plus sur le terrain
juridique que politique.
Ainsi, lorsque la Cour dénonce ce
qu’il est convenu d’appeler une « lacune législative », cette
constatation pose de toute évidence problème, puisque l’intervention du
législateur est requise pour rétablir le principe d’égalité. Ces cas sont
toutefois jusqu’à présent très rares. Dans un de ces cas, le législateur est effectivement
intervenu en vue de combler la « lacune » dénoncée par la Cour.
Plus sérieux sont les problèmes
suscités par la portée des arrêts rendus sur question préjudicielle (cf. supra).
Ces arrêts constatent, le cas échéant, une inconstitutionnalité, mais
n’anéantissent pas la norme qui continuera, par exemple, à être appliquée par
l’administration. La possibilité pour les différents gouvernements
d’introduire, suite à un tel arrêt, un recours en annulation de la norme est
certes prévue (art. 4, 2° L.C.A.), mais, comme déjà dit, très
rarement utilisée. De manière plus générale, la doctrine regrette le manque de
réaction des différents législateurs, suite aux arrêts de la Cour d’arbitrage.
Bien souvent, seule l’intervention du législateur est susceptible de rétablir
une réelle cohérence dans une matière dont certains aspects partiels ont été
invalidés par la Cour constitutionnelle.
La portée des arrêts de la Cour
prête aussi parfois à discussion. C’est plus particulièrement le cas lorsque la
Cour annule ou invalide dans certaines limites ou avec des réserves (« en
ce que », « en tant que », etc, formules dont la Cour fait
fréquemment usage) ou invalide dans une interprétation (« interprétée en
ce sens que ») ou, au contraire, n’admet la validité de la norme que dans
une certaine interprétation (« interprétée en ce sens que »).
Bien souvent, la discussion
surgit, dans le cadre des questions préjudicielles, de déterminer la compétence
d’interprétation qui revient au juge du fond et celle qui appartient à la Cour
d’arbitrage. Cette question fait actuellement l’objet d’assez vives discussions
en droit belge. Certaines divergences de jurisprudence, quoique non
dramatiques, ont pu être décelées entre le juge constitutionnel d’une part, le
juge judiciaire ou le juge administratif d’autre part. C’est afin d’éviter ces
divergences que le législateur a imposé aux juridictions suprêmes, Cour de
cassation et Conseil d’Etat, d’interroger sans possibilité de dérogation la
Cour d’arbitrage sur les questions relevant de sa compétence. Cependant, comme
il a déjà été souligné, cette obligation théorique reste sans sanction et
n’est, dans certains cas, pas respectée par les juridictions sur lesquelles
elle pèse.
____________________
Croatia
/ Croatie
AD: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW DECISIONS - C R O A T I A
Sources:
1) The Constitution ("Narodne novine",
56/90, 135/97, (8/98), 113/2000);
abrv. = CON
2) The Constitutional Act on the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of Croatia ("Narodne novine", 99/99);
abrv. = CACC; it should be amended after the recent changes
of the
Constitution.
I. General questions on constitutional
review
A. The type of constitutional review
and its subject:
1. In case of the Constitutional Court of
the Republic of Croatia "1b" covers the answer. The Court
reviews in abstract review constitutionality of laws (enacted) and
constitutionality and legality of other regulations (sub-legislative norms,
mainly rules issued by executive, presidential decrees, acts by local governments
and self-governments); excepted are the Constitution itself and amendments to
the Constitution.
2. There is no review of unconstitutional
omission of legislation in a sense that the Court passes decisions about
the issue, but the Changes of Constitution, passed on November 9th 2000, 113/00, introduced in art. 62. (125. of the original text) that
Constitutional Court observes implementation of constitutionality and legality
and notifies the House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament about
observed phenomena; also if the Constitutional Court ascertains that the
competent body has not passed the regulations necessary for the implementation
of constitutional provisions, laws and other regulations, and it had obligation
to pass such a regulation, the Court notifies the Government about it, and it
notifies about it the House of Representatives if the Government was the body
which was obliged to pass the regulation in question.
3. The Court decides about
constitutional complaints against individual acts of state bodies, bodies of
local and regional self-government and legal persons vested with public
authorities when by these acts are violated fundamental freedoms and rights of
man and citizen and right to local self-government guaranteed by the
Constitution. This is the text of mentioned change of the Constitution,
previously the relevant provision said that the Court protects constitutional
freedoms and human rights and Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court explicitly mentioned "decisions of the
judicial or administrative authority or other bodies of the public
authority".
4. Other
areas of constitutional review are: jurisdictional conflicts between
legislative, executive and judicial branches; impeachment of the President of
the Republic; constitutionality of programs and activities of political
parties, control of constitutionality and legality of elections and national
referenda.
According
to the mentioned changes Constitutional
Court decides that the Speaker of
the Croatian Parliament shall, in case of illness or incapability of the
President of the Republic, have temporary duty of the president of the
Republic; the same happens in the case of death of the President of the
Republic. Also the Court decides about appeals in cases in which judge is
relieved of his office and about appeals on disciplinary responsibility of
judge.
B. The
effects of constitutional review decisions:
1. Concerning normative acts:
a.
The constitutional review decisions are not merely declaratory in a sense that
person whose right has been violated by an individual act grounded upon the
repealed law or another repealed or annulled regulation has the right - within
determined time limits - to request from the competent body the change of this
individual act.
b.
The Constitutional Court cannot modify the disputed norm, it can repeal laws
passed by legislator and repeal or annul other regulations.
c.
The Court decisions must be implemented by other organs.
d.
Effects of annulment can be postponed by Court's decision; the legal effects of
Court's decision start on day of publication of the decision unless the Court
determines another day.
e.
In case of abstract constitutional review of normative acts the Court's
decision has erga omnes effects. In similar cases decided after a final
decision in one individual case the Court - unless something fundamentally
different has occurred - decides its cases in the same way and other courts are
expected to respect interpretation of the Constitutional Court; if they do not
the case comes as constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court.
f.
See A. 3.; not "orders", "notifies" that they have a duty
to....
2. Concerning the protection of constitutional rights:
a.
The disputed act is quashed and the case is sent back to the competent
authority for a new ruling; the Constitutional
Court does not decide on the
matter, but the mentioned competent body is bound by decision and
interpretation of the Court.
3 Constitutional review decisions have
a.
binding force, erga omnes force
b.
res iudicata force only when the same persons disputes the same norms and with
the same reasons. The Court may review the constitutionality of the law,
respectively the constitutionality and legality of other regulations even in
the case when the same law or regulations have already been reviewed by the
Court.
c.
It could be said that repealment and annulment have the force of law.
d.
Decisions are published in official journal.
e.
There is no decision with such a declaration about becoming unconstitutional;
there are the effects of the decision which say that certain provisions or laws
are unconstitutional and they may be postponed.
II. What means are available to ensure the execution of
constitutional review decisions?
1. There
is the norm, the art. 30. of CACC:
"(1)
The decisions and the rulings of the Constitutional
Court are obligatory and every
individual or legal person shall obey them. (2) All bodies of the central
government and the local self-government and administration shall, within their
constitutional and legal jurisdiction, execute the decisions and the rulings of
the Constitutional Court. (3) The Government of the Republic of Croatia ensures, through the bodies of central
administration, the execution of the decisions and the rulings of the Constitutional Court. (4) The Constitutional Court may
determine which body is authorized for the execution of its decision,
respectively its ruling. (5) The Constitutional
Court may determine the manner in
which its decision, respectively its ruling shall be executed.
III. What are
the consequences...
Not
researched or known so far. But it should be stressed that submitters from
finalized cases do not apply for protection again.
IV. Cases where decisions are not executed
The
Court has in 1998. (12th of May) passed decision by which a law regulating
pensions was repealed. New law passed in December 2000 ("Narodne
novine", 127/00). My personal opinion is that the reason for delay has had
mainly financial nature. The legislator has been constantly reminded by the
general public (pensioners, the number of them is not small in this country)
and by the press about the need to obey the Court's decision.
There
also were conflicts between Constitutional
Court and Supreme Court which held
that the courts, being autonomous and independent, are not obliged to obey the Constitutional Court's interpretations of Constitution and law.
V. Cases of unsatisfactory execution
No
information has reached the Court that a norm, found unconstitutional by its
decision, continues to be applied, in individual cases; but in the history of
this Court there were several cases in which the norm found unconstitutional by
the Court was, with the same essence, reaffirmed by legislator through another
law or through renewed text of the repealed law.
The
reasons were always connected with financial resources, but also, perhaps, the
reasons of the Court's decisions were not strong or applicable enough.
Cyprus
/ Chypre
Replies by the Supreme Court of Cyprus
I. General
questions on constitutional review
A. The type of constitutional
review and its subject:
1. constitutional
review of normative acts
a. preliminary review
Preliminary review is
expressly envisaged by Article 140(1) of the Constitution whereby “the
President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting jointly may, at any
time prior to the promulgation of any law or decision of the House of
Representatives, refer to the Supreme Constitutional Court (now the Supreme Court)
for its opinion the question as to whether such law or decision or any
specified provision thereof is repugnant to or inconsistent with any provision
of this Constitution”. By virtue of Article 140.3 of the Constitution “in case
the Supreme Court is of the opinion that such law or decision or any provision
thereof is repugnant to or inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution
such law or decision or such provision thereof shall not be promulgated by the
President and the Vice-President of the Republic”.
b. abstract or principal review
(direct claim of unconstitunionality)
Questions of
unconstitutionality are examined as questions of law in the proceedings whether
civil, criminal or public law proceedings, only when relevant to the
determination of any issue in the proceedings.
c. concrete or incidental review
of norms
In addition to preliminary
review (see Point a. above) there can take place incidental review. It is
examined in the proceedings referred to in Point b above. In public law matters
the Supreme Court is vested with “exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate finally
on a recourse made to it on a complaint that a decision, an act or omission of
any organ, authority or person, exercising any executive or administrative
authority is contrary to any of the provisions of this Constitution or of any
law or is made in excess or in abuse of powers vested in such organ or
authority or person”. In dealing with such recourses the Supreme Court examines
incidentally the constitutionality of normative acts, only if the question of
constitutionality is relevant for the determination of any of the issues
arising in the recourse.
d. normative acts that are not
subject to constitutional review
All normative acts are
subject to constitutional review as envisaged by Article 140 of the
Constitution and incidentally as described in Points b. and c. above.
2. Review of unconstitutional omission of
legislation (failure of the legislator to act when it is obliged to do so by
the Constitution)
There
cannot be such a review. The Supreme Constitutional Court held (vide Papaphilippou
v. Republic, 1 R.S.C.C. 9) that the omission to enact legislation is so
closely linked with the exercise of legislative power that it cannot be
regarded as an omission of the nature which is amenable to a recourse under
Article146.1 of the Constitution (see Point c., above).
3.
Decisions
concerning the protection of constitutional rights
(Verfassungsbeschwerde,
amparo, appeal to a judicial body of ultimate appeal)
The Supreme Court has on many
occasions pronounced on questions concernig the protection of constitutional
rights.
Examples of such rights are:
(i) Right to liberty
and security of person which is safeguarded by Article 11 of the Constitution.
(ii) Right to a fair
trial.
(iii) Right to respect
for private and family life and right to respect for and to secrecy of
correspondence and other communication which are safeguarded by Articles 15 and
17 of the Constitution.
(iv) Right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion which is safeguarded by Article 18 of the
Constitution.
(v) Right to property.
Also lower Courts have
jurisdiction to decide matters concerning the protection of constitutional
rights.
4. Other
areas of constitutional review (examples: unconstitutionality of political
parties, referenda, conflicts between infra-state entities, conflicts between
state bodies)
The creation and functioning
of political parties is safeguarded by Article 21(3) of the Constitution. No
direct review of unconstitutionality of political parties is envisaged by the
Constitution. However, under Article 21(3) of the Constitution restrictions may
be placed by law, on the relevant right, as “are absolutely necessary only in
the interests of the security of the Republic or the constitutional
order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the
public morals or for the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by
this Constitution to any person”. In the event of enactment of such a law
there may take place a preliminary review or an incidental review as indicated,
respectively in Points I A a., b. and c. above.
Referenda:
There is no provision in the Constitution for constitutional review of
referenda. In the event of enactment of a law governing referenda its
unconstitutionality may be reviewed preliminarily or incidentally as indicated
above (see Points I A a., b. and c.).
Conflicts between
infra-state, entities and conflicts between state-bodies: Under
Article 139 of the Constitution the Supreme Court has “jurisdiction to
adjudicate finally on a recourse made in connexion with any matter relating to
any conflict or contest of power or competence arising between the House of
Representatives, and the Communal Chambers or any one of them and between any
organs of, or authorities in, the Republic:
Provided that nothing in this
paragraph contained shall apply to any conflict or contest between any courts
or judicial authorities in the Republic, which conflict or contest shall be
decided by the Hight Court.”
The provisions of the above
articles are wide enough to cover conflicts between the above bodies.
B. The effects of
constitutional review decisions:
1. Concerning
normative acts:
a. Are constitutional review decisions
merely declaratory?
They are merely declaratory.
b. Is the norm which is declared
contrary to the Constitution null and void, or annulled immediately? Can the
body exercising constitutional review modify the norm?
It is declared null and void.
The body exercising constitutional review cannot modify the norm. Where,
however, a section of the Law is found to be unconstitutional and such part of
the law is severable from the rest the declaration of unconstitutionality may
be limited to
the particular provision of
the Law.
c. Must the decisions be
implemented (i.e. by repealing the norm) by another organ?
If the unconstitutionality
review is the one envisaged by Article 140 of the Constitution (vide Point I A
a. above) the unconstitutional norm cannot be promulgated. If the review is an
incidental one the unconstitutional norm ceases to be applied but a repealing
act is not inevitable.
d. Can the effects of annulment
be postponed?
No.
e. Do the effects of the
decisions go beyond the individual case, where incidental concrete review of
norms is concerned? What is the position regarding similar cases which have
already been the subject of a final decision?
The effects of the decision
are “binding on all courts and all organs or authorities in the Republic and
shall be given effect to and acted upon by the organ or authority or person
concerned” (vide Article 146(5) of the Constitution) but they do not go beyond
the individual case. They cannot affect similar cases which were not adjudicated
upon by the Court (vide Pavlides v. Republic (1967) 3 C.L.R. 217)
or have been concluded.
f. Can the body exercising
constitutional review order another authority to act? Within a fixed period
of time?
Under Article 146.1 of the
Constitution if any organ, authority or person exercising any executive or
administrative authority is held guilty of an omission to do an act prescribed
by law the Supreme Court may upon a recourse by an interested person declare
“that such omission, either in whole or in part, ought not to have been made
and that whatever has been omitted should have been performed”.
No time is fixed by the
Constitution but the authorities are expected to act within reasonable time.
2. Concerning
the protection of constitutional rights:
If the body exercising
constitutional review quashes a decision by a public authority (administration,
court, etc.) on the grounds that it is unconstitutional:
a. Is it sent back to the
original authority for a new ruling? or
If the decision which is
quashed is an administrative decision it is sent back to the original authority
for a new ruling. If it is a court decision then the body exercising
constitutional review decides on the matter.
b. Does the body exercising
constitutional review decide on the matter?
See a. above.
3. Furthermore,
do constitutional review decisions have:
a. binding force (binding the
body exercising constitutional review itself)?
Yes.
b. res judicata force (inter partes;
erga omnes)?
Constitutional review
decisions which annul acts or decisions taken by administrative bodies have binding
force both inter partes and erga omnes and by virtue of Article 146.5 of the
Constitution such decisions “shall be binding on all courts and all organs or
authorities in the Republic and shall be given effect to end acted upon by the
organ or authority or person concerned”. Constitutional review decisions
regarding decisions taken by lower Courts are binding inter partes.
c. force of law (see for instance
§ 31.2 of the German law on the constitutional court)?
They do not have force of law
but the ratio decidenti of the constitutional review decision is binding on
both the Supreme Court and lower Courts by virtue of the doctrine of judicial
precedent (stare decisis).
d. are
they published in an official journal?
Yes.
They are published in the Cyprus Law Reports which is an official journal.
e. What happens if a decision
declares that a norm will become unconstitutional if it is not modified within
a certain period?
There is no power in the
Courts to make such a declaration.
Do the answers to the previous questions
depend on the type of constitutional review
(for example: concrete/abstract
control)? Do special rules apply in the cases mentioned in Point I.A. 4 above?
Yes. The rules that apply in
the cases mentioned in point 1.A.4 above have already been explained (see Point
I.A. 4 above).
The reply to questions II and III will make a
distinction, if necessary, according to the type/subject of constitutional
review as well as to the effects of decisions (see question I).
II. What means
are availabe to ensure the execution of constitutional review decisions?
The response to this question should take
account of the legislation concerning the execution of constitutional review
decisions, either by other courts or by executive bodies. In particular:
1. Is
there a norm indicating which authority has to execute the constitutional
review decisions?
In the case of preliminary
constitutional review the Law is not promulgated.
In the case of constitutional
review of decisions taken by administrative bodies the review is incidental and
the case is sent back to the administrative body or authority concerned for
re-examination and taking of a new decision in the light of the Court decision.
In the cases of
constitutioned review of decisions of lower Courts, which is incidental, the
decision is quashed.
2. If
not, is there a norm providing that the body exercising constitutional review
or any other authority has the power to designate the body which will execute
the decisions of the court? How does the system work in practice?
________________
III. What are the consequences if
constitutional review decisions are not executed within a reasonable time?
Questions of
non-execution of constitutional review decisions may, perhaps arise only in
relation to constitutional review of decisions of administrative bodies, under
Article 146.1 of the Constitution. If the body responsible for the decision
omits to comply within a reasonable time then the individual concerned may
apply to the Supreme Court for an annulment of the omission by filing a
recourse under Article 146.1 of the Constitution. He may allege breach of res
judicata and abuse of powers.
IV. Cases where
decisions are not executed?
Usually the administration
complies with the decisions.
A. Have
there been any recent cases where a constitutional review decision has not been
executed in your country?
No.
B.
If
so, is it possible to identify the reasons why the decision was not executed
(eg. political or financial reasons, lack of clarity in the decision,
inadequate rules on the execution of decisions)?
__________________
V. Cases of
unstatisfactory execution
In certain cases, even where a
constitutional review decision has been executed, the situation remains
unsatisfactory because an unconstitutional norm continues to be applied.
A. Has such a situation arisen
recently in your coutry?
No.
B.
What
are the causes of such a situation? Do they stem from the effects of the
constitutional review decision (absence of erga omnes effect, declaratory
nature of the decision), or from other causes, such as those mentioned in IV.B
above?
_________________
Concerning points IV and V, did
specific problems arise when decisions of ordinary higher courts were declared
contrary to the Constitution?
No.
Denmark / Danemark
The Danish reply to the
Questionnaire on the Execution of constitutional Review Decisions (CDL (2000) 45rev.)
I. General questions
on constitutional review
A. The type of
constitutional review and its subject
1. Constitutional
review of normative Acts
Before the Government introduces a
bill before the Parliament, the ministry responsible for the drafting is
obliged to send the bill to the Ministry of Justice for an examination of its
constitutionality. In addition, the Speaker of Parliament examines all bills.
If a bill is found to be unconstitutional the Speaker recommends to Parliament
to dismiss the bill.
b) Abstract or principal review
(direct claim of constitutionality)
c) Concrete or incidental
review of norms
There is no separate
constitutional court in Denmark. In Denmark all ordinary courts of law hold the
authority to declare an Act passed by Parliament unconstitutional.
The review of the
constitutionality of an Act can assume the following forms:
-
Review of whether the legislative
procedure has been adhered to.
-
Review of whether the principle of the
separation of powers has been adhered to.
-
Review of whether an Act is materially
constitutional, having regard e.g. to civil and political rights.
As a general rule, only a party
with a particular and individual interest in having a decision on a question
can take action. Thus, the concept of “popular complaint” or “abstract or
principal review” is not generally recognised in the Danish administration of
justice. On one occasion, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a number of
Danish citizens had a sufficient legal interest in having the constitutionality
of the Act of Parliament regarding accession to the Treaty of the European
Union decided on the merits (see Bulletin 1996/2, [DEN-1996-2-002]).
In Denmark all normative Acts are
subject to the above-mentioned review.
2. Review of unconstitutional
omission of legislation (failure of the legislator to Act when it is obliged to
do so by the Constitution)
There is no special procedure –
judicial or other – in which the legislature can be obliged to fulfil its
constitutional responsibilities.
3 Decisions concerning the protection of
constitutional rights (Verfassungbeschwerde, amparo, appeal to a judicial body
of ultimate appeal)
There is no specific procedure
corresponding to that of Verfassungsbeschwerde. The protection of
constitutional rights takes place through the procedure of abstract and
concrete constitutional review described under I.A.c.
4. Other
areas of constitutional review (examples: unconstitutionality of political
parties, referenda, conflicts between infra-state entities, conflicts between
state bodies)
All constitutional questions are subject to the review
described under I.A.c.
1.
Concerning normative Acts:
a)
Are constitutional review decisions
merely declaratory?
b)
Is the norm, which is declared contrary
to the Constitution null and void, or annulled immediately? Can the body
exercising constitutional review modify the norm?
c)
Must the decisions be implemented (i.e.
by repealing the norm) by another organ ?
d)
Can the effects of annulment be
postponed?
e)
Do the effects of the decisions go
beyond the individual case, where incidental concrete review of norms is
concerned? What is the position regarding similar cases which have already been
the subject of a final decision?
Court decisions concerning constitutional review are binding but only
in relation to the particular case at hand.
If, in a concrete case, an Act of Parliament, a statutory instrument or
some other regulation is found to be unconstitutional, it will not be applied
in that particular case. The court, however, is not empowered to annul the Act
concerned. It is up to the authority, which enacted the regulation, to withdraw
or amend it.
The court decision has no retroactive effect. A party, who has been
subjected to a regulation that is later found unconstitutional, may, however,
seek to have his case reopened according to the normal procedural provisions.
Furthermore, he may seek compensation for any damages suffered as a result of
the application of the unconstitutional regulation.
2.
Concerning
the protection of constitutional rights:
If the body exercising constitutional review quashes a decision by a
public authority (administration, court, etc.) on the grounds that it is
unconstitutional:
a)
Is it sent back to
the original authority for a new ruling? or
b)
Does the body
exercising constitutional review decide on the matter?
If a court quashes a decision by a public authority on the grounds that
it is unconstitutional the effect will be that the administrative decision is
invalid. It depends on the legal basis in question whether the court itself
will make a new decision in order to replace the invalid decision or whether
the court will leave it to the public authority to make a new decision.
3. Furthermore, do constitutional review decisions have?
a)
Binding force
(binding the body exercising constitutional review itself)?
b)
Res iudicata force (inter partes; erga omnes)?
c)
Force of law (see
for instance § 31.2 of the German law on the constitutional court)?
Court decisions concerning constitutional review are binding but only
in relation to the particular case at hand (cf. the answer to question I.B)
d)
Are they published
in an official journal?
In modern times, there has only been one instance – apart from
decisions relating to compensation in relation to expropriation – where the
courts have found provisions in a Parliamentary Act unconstitutional (see
Bulletin 1999/2 [DEN-1999-2-005]). On this occasion the decision was published
in the legal gazette, Lovtidende.
Generally speaking, there is no official journal for Danish court
decisions. There is, however, public access to all court decisions and all
important court decisions are published in the (un-official) Danish legal
journal, Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen.
e)
What happens if a
decision declares that a norm will become unconstitutional if it is not modified
within a certain period?
Decisions, which declare a norm unconstitutional if it is not modified
within a certain period, are not known in Danish law.
II. What means are available to ensure the execution of
constitutional review decisions?
1.
Is there a norm
indicating which authority has to execute the constitutional review decisions?
2.
If not, is
there a norm providing that the body exercising constitutional review or any
other authority has the power to designate the body which will execute the
decisions of the court? How does the system work in practice?
In Denmark there are no special procedures or norms regulating which
authority has to execute the constitutional review decisions nor any norms or
procedures concerning the designation of an executing body.
III. What
are the consequences if constitutional review decisions are not executed or are
not executed within a reasonable time?
The parties to a case where the court has performed constitutional
review, have the same remedies against delays in execution of the decision, as
they have in other cases.
IV. Cases where decisions are not executed
A.
Have there
been any recent cases where a constitutional review decision has not
been executed in your country?
If so, is it possible to identify the reasons
why the decision was not executed (eg. political or financial reasons, lack of
clarity in the decision, inadequate rules on the execution of decisions)?
To our knowledge, there have been no cases of non-execution.
V. Cases of unsatisfactory execution
In certain cases, even where a constitutional review decision has been
executed, the situation remains unsatisfactory because an unconstitutional norm
continues to be applied.
A.
Has such a
situation arisen recently in your country?
B. What are the causes of such a
situation? Do they stem from the effects of the constitutional review decision
(absence of erga omnes effect, declaratory nature of the decision), or
from other causes, such as those mentioned in IV.B above?
In modern times, there has only been one instance – apart from
decisions relating to compensation in relation to expropriation – where the
courts have found provisions in a Parliamentary Act unconstitutional (see
Bulletin 1999/2 [DEN-1999-2-005]). On this occasion, the decision was published
in the (official) Danish Law Gazette. The concerned provisions, which were not
applied after the judgment, were subsequently annulled by an Act of Parliament.
Germany / Allemagne
(supplement)
-----Original Message-----
From:
g.nolte@jur.uni-goettingen.de
[mailto:g.nolte@jur.uni-goettingen.de]
Sent: Monday 29 January 2001
18:56
Subject: Re: Report and synoptic
table on the execution of decisions
In response to your suggestion
to supplement my report on the execution of constitutional court judgments I
would like to add the following text.
Yours sincerely, Georg Nolte
V. Cases of unsatisfactory execution
In a few of those cases in which
the Constitutional Court has permitted the temporary continued application of
an unconstitutional law (i.e. when it has declared a law to be merely
unconstitutional rather than void) the legislator has not reenacted a
constitutional law within the timeframe which was indicated by the Court. The
most recent case concerns the decision in which the Constitutional Court had
declared that prisoners have a constitutional right to receive a certain
minimum level of pay for their work within the prison system. In this case the
Court found that the existing rates were too low but it gave the legislator
time until 1 january 2001 to raise the rates. The Bundestag failed to terminate
the legislative procedure by this date. In its decision, however, the Court had
provided for such a contingency by declaring that the regular courts would be empowered
to autonomously set the appropriate rates from 1 january 2001 should the
legislator not have acted until then. As this case suggests, legislative
inactivity is not completely exceptional in Germany. In most cases, however, it
is merely legislative inertia rather than serious political controversies which
are the cause for the delayed implementation of the Constitutional Court's
original decision by the legislator.
Professor Dr. Georg Nolte
Institut fuer Voelkerrecht
der Georg-August-Universitaet
Goettingen
Platz der Goettinger Sieben 5
Fax ++49 (0) 551 394767
Tel ++49 (0) 551 394751
Iceland / Islande
Hjörtur Torfason
Justice of the Supreme
Court
Member of the Venice
Commission
REPLY FROM ICELAND
to the
Questionnaire on the Execution
of Constitutional
Review Decisions
The following is to set forth a reply to the above
Questionnaire as applicable to the Republic of Iceland. The responsibility for
the text rests solely with the rapporteur.
Introductory remarks
The reply relates to constitutional review exercised by the Supreme
Court of Iceland, the national court of ultimate appeal, under the Constitution
of the Republic of Iceland No. 33 of 17 June 1944 as amended to date, the
only amendments relevant to the matter having been adopted by Constitutional
Law No. 97 of 28 June 1995 (and No. 100 of the same date) entering into force
on 5 July 1995.
Iceland does not have a separate constitutional court, and
the right to judicial review of the constitutional validity of ordinary
legislation rests with the common courts of general jurisdiction (now 8
District Courts as a first instance and the Supreme Court as the second and
final instance), which also have jurisdiction in administrative law matters.
The right itself is not directly provided for in the Constitution, but is
generally accepted in theory and practice as resting on tradition developed
through judicial interpretation of the Constitution, notably its principle of
the separation of powers and those concerning human rights.
Under this tradition, having the status of customary
constitutional law, the common courts have the power to invalidate or set aside
provisions of statutory law which are held to be in conflict with the
Constitution, within limits of proper judicial restraint. They also have the
possibility of construing and interpreting statutory provisions so as to bring
them into line with the Constitution, and this recourse is more frequently seen
to be followed.
It is inherent in the tradition that the access to the
courts over constitutional issues is subject to the same limitations as the
access to court in general, so that they have to be brought up for resolution
as part of an actual conflict in an ordinary lawsuit involving a sufficient
legal interest (in Nordic parlance, rettslig or retlig interesse) by the
party bringing the suit.
The boundaries for legal interest in this sense are flexible
to some extent, and the access to court also has been facilitated by some
recent law reforms. These notably include a widening of the right to sue for
declaratory judgments involving the recognition of a right or status, which may
serve to simplify the groundwork of the suit, and also the introduction of
rules for accelerated procedure in lawsuits against governmental authorities.
The latter reform perhaps was adopted primarily with actions over
administrative law issues in mind, but it also affects the constitutional
issues as such.
I. General
questions on constitutional review
A. The type of constitutional review in Iceland
and its subject
1. Constitutional review of normative acts:
a. A
preliminary review of normative acts (proposed legislation in the Althing or
governmental regulations to be issued under enabling legislation) does not occur.
In principle, the courts of Iceland are not empowered to give advisory
opinions, whether on the constitutional or administrative plane or in relation
to private conflicts.
b. An
abstract or principal review (upon a direct claim of unconstitutionality) also
is not exercised. The subject for review has to be brought up as a matter of
actual conflict by an individual or legal entity having a sufficient legal
interest to claim acess to court over the issue.
c. A
concrete or incidental review of norms ex post facto may be carried out
by the courts both of first and second instance (in the latter case, by way of
an appeal from the lower instance) in the course of deciding an ordinary action
at law (civil or criminal), provided that the cause for review is appropriately
pleaded by the parties to the action. Exceptionally, the court concerned might
find it proper to bring in the matter of its own accord (ex officio) and
invite the parties to debate the issue and adduce relevant and available
evidence thereon.
d. No
normative acts are exempted a priori from becoming subject to
constitutional review by the courts of law when properly addressed. On the
other hand (and as another matter), the courts may decide not to replace a norm
embodying an element of doubtful constitutional validity by a norm or
interpretation of their own (emanating from a court judgment) on the ground
that the matter in issue is one that depends on or has to be resolved by a
value assessment which under the Constitution should properly belong with the
legislature (the elected representatives of the people).
2. Review of unconstitutional omission of
legislation:
A case for review of a failure by the legislator to act when
it is obliged to do so by the Constitution generally will not arise in a manner
enabling the courts to provide a direct remedy, as the courts are not empowered
to produce statutory law or to issue directives for legislation to the Althing.
However, if the situation involves a lacuna in statutory law with results
affecting a right or status of specific persons which is nevertheless entitled
to legal protection, the courts may have to produce a concrete solution as
between the parties able to bring the matter into court. Such solution(s) might
conceivably lead to the development of a common law rule.
On the other hand, the results of a failure to legislate
conceivably may be such as to give rise to a right for damages/compensation
from the State to specific parties injured by such failure, and the courts then
will be able to provide an indirect remedy by awarding such damages. By way of
parallel example, the Supreme Court recently has awarded damages to an
Icelandic lady employee who was denied compensation from a State fund for wages
lost in an employer bankrupty, on grounds that the denial resulted from a
failure of the legislator to bring the statutory rules on the said fund in line
with an applicable EU directive, as required under the EEA treaty and the
Icelandic legislation affirming its validity. (Judgment of 16 December 1999 in
case No. 235/1999, Erla María Sveinbjörnsdóttir v. the Icelandic State.)
3. Decisions
concerning the protection of constitutional rights (Verfassungs-beschwerde,
amparo):
A procedure for special
submission to a judicial body of ultimate appeal to deal with a complaint of
interference with constitutional rights is not available under Icelandic law. -
However, the Icelandic act or code of general civil procedure No. 91/1991 does
contain provisions enabling the courts concerned (the competent District Court
and the Supreme Court in its turn) to allow accelerated proceedings in a legal
action against the State or governmental authorities, which facilitates the
access to court over constitutional issues.
4. Other areas of constitutional review:
Procedures for constitutional review in specific relations,
such as those involving the unconstitutionality of political parties, the
holding of referenda, conflicts between infra-state entitites or conflicts
between state bodies, are not available in Iceland. Challenges or solutions in
respect of these matters can only be sought by the means afforded in an
ordinary and properly brought lawsuit before the common courts by parties
having sufficient legal interest. The jurisdiction of the courts may extend to
conflicts between state entities or bodies on this basis.
B. The effects of constitutional review
decisions
1. Concerning normative acts:
a. In
Iceland, constitutional review decisions will not be declaratory in content, as
they will be expressed in terms of a court judgment having binding force
between the parties to the case concerned (and eventually as judicial
precedent), and as the courts cannnot be called upon for an advisory opinion
(see I. A. 1. a above).
However, they probably will be
declaratory in the sense that the judgment concerned usually will not be
concluded by a statement or sentence that a specific statute or a specific
provision thereof is held invalid, but rather a sentence to the effect that a
sum of money in issue is owed to (or not owed by) the claimant, that a
governmental decree affecting the claimant is invalid or that a specific status
or right of the claimant is recognised, etc. The constitutional ground for such
result, i.e. the unconstutionality and consequent invalidity of a statute (or,
more frequently, an individual provision thereof), will instead be described
and declared in the judicial premises leading to the concluding statement or
sentence.
b. The
norm which is declared contrary to the Constitution is to be regarded as invalid
(as null and void or without effect) in the context or relation in which it was
considered by the court, which may or may not extend to its entire content and
applicability. The declaration will have immediate effect upon the binding
delivery of the judgment.
The court exercising
constitutional review cannot modify the norm in the sense of producing a
different norm of its own within the statute itself. However, a modification
tantamount to replacement may occur if the court is able to resolve the matter
in issue by declaring an interpretation of the norm which may differ from that
indicated by the letter of the law or seen by the government or other party
relying on the statute, but has the effect of removing the problem of
unconstitutionality and bringing the norm into line with the Constitution.
c. The
decision of the court need not be implemented by the legislator by a repeal of
the normative act under review, as the norm is in fact to be regarded as a dead
letter (or set aside) in all respects in which the effect of the decision
applies. – The practical consequences of the decision as regards the text of
the statute concerned may be none, i.e. if the setting aside of a specific
provision thereof does not render the statute unworkable or unacceptable by the
legislature as then composed. In the opposite event, the consequence presumably
will be a parliamentary/governmental initiative for a formal amendment or
repeal of the statute.
A recent example is a Supreme
Court decision of 3 December 1998 in case no. 145/1998, Valdimar Jóhannesson
v. the Icelandic State (H.1998.4076), where a specific provision of the law
on management of fisheries in Icelandic waters was found to be
unconstitutional, and a government decision refusing a fishing license to the
complainant was annulled. The provision mainly restricted the number of vessels
to be used in the fisheries, and by an amending law adopted by the Althing in
January 1999, the restriction was repealed. - The converse occurred with a
Supreme Court decision of 3 December 1992 in case No. 129/1991, Bjarnheidur
Gudmundsdóttir v. the Minister of Finance et al. (H.1992.1962), where a
provision of a law setting aside the wage clauses of a union agreement for
civil servants and replacing them with wage terms set out in the law itself was
found unconstitutional. The provision had annulled a 4,5% wage increase as of a
certain date, and the court awarded a corresponding sum to the complainant.
Following the decision, the same increase was granted and paid out to all other
civil servants covered by the agreement, without an amendment being made in the
law.
d. The
effects of the annulment or setting aside of the statute or provision cannot be
formally postponed. - If parliamentary reaction in relation to the norm set
aside is delayed, or if executive implementation of the norm is continued
without appropriate regard to the result of the decision, this would entail the
risk of new recourse to the courts by those injured by the norm. - Conceivably,
however, the nature of a norm might be such that a period of adjustment to the
result of its review might be reasonable and constitutionally viable, and the
legislature then might be justified in determining a certain postponement.
e. The
constitutional review by the Icelandic courts will be incidental and concrete,
and the effects of their decisions are formally limited to the concrete case
before the court. However, the review conclusion expressed in the resulting
judgment will have immediate effect as a judicial precedent grounded in
customary constitutional law, so that de facto the norm in issue or the
unconstitutional aspect thereof is thereafter to be regarded as inoperable.
If similar cases already have
been the subject of a final judicial decision, such decisions will not be
affected except in the sense that the new precedent may become a cause for
reopening of the earlier cases under the ordinary procedural rules therefor
(see 3.a. below). If an injured party does obtain appropriate redress out of
court (e.g. where the decision has not related to status which cannot be
properly vindicated without a new court decision), this may suffice to settle
the issue.
As regards prior final decisions
within the administrative sector, it would follow that these should be reconsidered
by the competent public authority to the extent that they or their consequences
can be effectively altered after the fact. Failing that, the persons injured by
the decisions presumably would be able to take the authorities to court in
order to obtain restitution or redress, subject to generally applicable
limitations of time and circumstance.
f. The
court exercising constitutional review cannot order another body to act in
respect of the norm reviewed, except by way of such orders as can be embodied in
an ordinary court sentence in the concrete case. Thus the court can e.g. order
the government to suffer the quashing of an executive decision based on the
norm, to recognize a certain status of a party to the case, or to allow him
specific restitution (where this can properly be accomplished) or redress by
way of damages. But the court cannot order the government to issue a new
general regulation or the parliament to pass a new law.
2. Concerning the
protection of constitutional rights:
a. Where the court exercising constitutional review quashes a
decision by a public authority (an administrative body or official, etc.) on
grounds that it is unconstitutional, the effect will be to remove the validity
of the decision and any acts taken on its basis. The court cannot order the
authority to take a new decision, except where such order may properly be
embodied within a sentence providing for the restitution or recognition of a
status of the party to the concrete case. The decision thus will not be sent
back to the original authority for a new ruling, so that if such ruling is
necessary to complement the judgment delivered by the court, the injured party
to the case or a third party with similar interest may need to request it from
the authority.
As regards
decisions of a District Court failing to observe an unconstutionality
recognized by the Supreme Court, the cassation system is not followed in
Iceland, so that the Supreme Court will pronounce a new judgment replacing that
of the District Court. The case will not be remitted to the lower court unless
this is necessary for other procedural purposes.
b. As
implied under a. above, the court exercising constitutional review in respect
of a claim for protection of constitutional rights (against a decision or ruling
by a public authority or otherwise) will itself decide upon the rights of the
claimant, in so far as such decision can be embodied or stated in the
sentencing conclusion of an ordinary judgment (declaratory and/or executory).
3. Furthermore, the
following applies to constitutional review decisions of the Icelandic courts:
a. The
decisions have binding force for the court concerned in relation to the
concrete case at hand. The resulting judgment cannot be altered except by way
of a reopening procedure, which is only allowed within very strict limits for
causes such as the unforeseen appearance of new material evidence (where the
parties cannot reasonably be blamed for its late discovery) or otherwise to
permit repairment of gross injustice.
b. The
decisions will have res judicata effect as between the parties to the
concrete case. They will also have res judicata effect erga ommes
as a judicial precedent, the scope of the effect depending on the scope of the
reasoning by which the court established the unconstitutionality of the norm
reviewed or the need for protection of the constitutional right in issue (i.e.
whether the reasons of the court were highly specific or of general
application).
c. The
decisions will not have ordinary force of law. Although judicial precedent is
recognised in Iceland as one of the sources of law, it does not have the
binding force of statutory legislation. Its direct force primarily lies in the
fact that the courts may be expected to follow the precedent in all similar cases.
It is thus regarded as a principle of customary law that the lower courts
should follow the precedents of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also may
be expected to follow its own precedents as a matter of course, although the
Court formally has the power to change them in a later case.
The occasions on which the
Supreme Court has departed from its own decisions so as to create new precedent
are extremely rare. Furthermore, the departure in most cases may be
characterised as not representing a break with consistency, but rather as
involving a reaction to legal and social developments in the surrounding world.
In other words, mostly the departures may be seen as a reflection of the truth
that judicial precedent is not a static, but a dynamic source of law.
It may be of interest to note
that the most recent examples of departure by the Supreme Court from an
established view reflected in prior decisions are related to the work of the
Commission and Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and other developments in
the field of human rights. An outstanding one is the landmark decision of 9
January 1990 in case no. 120/1989, the State Prosecution v. Gudmundur
Breidfjörð Ægisson (H.1990.2), where the Court decided in effect that the
requirements for judicial impartiality set out in the code of criminal
procedure now had to be interpreted with a stronger and stricter view to
judicial independence than that previously applied. The result was that the
judge handling the case in the District Court had to be disqualified due to
formal association with the investigating power in the district, despite the
absence of any indication of partiality in the specific circumstances and
despite the fact that the reference of the case to the judge fully accorded
with the procedural system then existing under the code. The situation was
similar to the one examined by the Commission of Human Rights in March 1989 in
the case of Jón Kristinsson v. Iceland, and among other considerations,
the Court took note of the stand there taken by the commission. A further
change in the same field was made by the judgment of 18 May 1995 in case No.
103/1994, the State Prosecution v. Sveinn Eiríkur Sigfússon
(H.1995.1444), where the Supreme Court disqualified a deputy district judge
from handling a case on the ground that the existing conditions of tenure of
judicial deputies were not compatible with the principle of judicial
independence. – Among decisions of the Court of Human Rights which have
influenced the expressed views of the Supreme Court towards the
constitutionality of particular norms, the ones involving matters from Iceland
include Thorgeir Thorgeirsson v. Iceland (25 June 1992 (No. 239), 14
E.H. R.R. 843, relating to the freedom of expression) and Sigurdur A.
Sigurjónsson v. Iceland (30 June 1993 (No. 264), 16 E.H.R.R. 462, relating
to the freedom of association).
d. The
constitutional review decisions of the Icelandic courts are not published in an
official journal devoted to laws or regulations or to constitutional matters in
particular. In the case of the Supreme Court, they are regularly published
among its other decisions in the Supreme Court Reports (appearing in 2-5
volumes annually), together with the respective District Court judgments. The
decisions also are made public immediately upon their pronouncement, by the
issue of copies and on the Internet. This latter procedure is similarly
followed in the District Courts.
e. Under
the Icelandic system of concrete and incidental control, the situation of a
court decision declaring that a norm will become unconstitutional if it is not
modified within a certain period is not likely to arise. On the other hand, the
Icelandic courts may incidentally come to face situations where a normative act
has been expressly adopted for a specific period or otherwise for temporary
purposes, and may be considered constitutionally viable precisely because of
its temporary nature.
This last may be said to have
been experienced with the legislation on the management of fisheries in
Icelandic waters which has been developing since about 1980. The initial laws
and regulations imposing major restrictions on the number and capacity of
fishing vessels and on the quantity of catch (quotas of specific fish stocks)
were adopted for successive fixed terms of one, two and three years, whereas in
1990, they were framed in a law which had an indefinite term in the ordinary
manner, but did include provisions for a future review of the system
prescribed. The constitutionality of this important legislation was not seriously
challenged in the Supreme Court until the law of 1990 had been in force for
some time, the main challenges to date having been handled in the judgment of 3
December 1998 above cited (see I.A.1.c.) and a judgment of 6 April 2000 in case
No. 12/2000, the State Prosecution v. Björn Kristjánsson et al. Although
the prior temporary legislation was not directly in issue, both judgments
contain statements which may be said to indicate that the laws concerned would
have been deemed constitutional in their time, at least partly due to their
short-term validity.
If an existing norm is challenged
in court and held to be constitutional primarily in view of its temporary
nature, and the norm subsequently is maintained in force without change, the
court decision on hand will not have any direct effect on the resulting
position, so that a further challenge in a new court action will have to be
made if the norm is to be set aside.
It may perhaps be noted that this
problem was posed in an opinion delivered by the present rapporteur in the
above Supreme Court case of 6 April 2000, where four justices held the existing
quota system under the 1990 law to be constitutionally viable, considering all
its aspects (being based on a value assessment of the legislator and within his
appropriate scope of action), while two justices found the system so
discriminatory as to be unconstitutional. In my separate opinion as the seventh
judge, it was held that the system must be considered to have been valid in
February 1999, when the infractions in issue were committed, on account of the
law of 1990 being temporary in nature despite the absence of a fixed term of
validity. It was further stated, however, that the law could not remain
constitutional for any length of time unless its existing discriminatory
features were to be offset by major counterbalancing features in the favour of
national and private interests other than those favoured by the existing
system.
As already indicated, the answers to the previous questions
have depended on the fact that the Icelandic constitutional review is based on
concrete control. There are no special rules for the cases mentioned in point
I.A.4 above.
II. What means are available to
ensure the execution of constitutional review decisions?
1. There is not any norm specifically indicating
which authority has to execute the constitutional review decisions in Iceland.
This results from the fact that the review is carried out by the courts in
their ordinary course of business.
2. (In fine) The way the system works in practice is
that the execution of the review decisions falls within the ordinary system for
execution of court judgments. If the concrete case results in an executory
judgment (for payment of damages, repayment of taxes, return of property, etc.),
the order implied in the judgment will be executable by the body in charge of
the execution of civil claims affirmed by court judgment. If the judgment
concludes in a declaratory sentence (for the quashing of a government decision,
the recognition of a right, etc.) the result exceptionally may be such as to
enable the excecutory body to effect proper performance. Beyond this, where the
correction or redress of the consequences of an unconstitutional norm or the
breach of a constitutional right is outside the competence of the executory
body, the reviewing judgment simply must be expected to be obeyed by the public
authorities or other parties concerned, who otherwise run the risk of challenge
by further court action. - The competence of the executory body does, of
course, only extend to the consequences of a normative act and not to its norms
themselves.
The task of executing court judgments used to be regarded as
a judicial function and was vested in special regional courts (Courts of
Executions, Courts of Auctions), from which appeals could be made to the
Supreme Court. By procedural reform legislation entering into force in 1992,
the function was separated from the judicial system and is now wholly vested in
the Sheriffs or County Commissioners for each administrative district, who
respresent the local arm of the national government and are supervised by the
Ministry of Justice. Their decisions or decrees in the course of executing
judgments may be referred to the competent District Courts, who will handle the
matter in summary or short-form proceedings, generally subject to summary or
complaint-form appeal to the Supreme Court.
III. What are the consequences if
constitutional review decisions are not executed or are not executed within a
reasonable time?
It follows from the description in II. above that it should
always be possible to secure compliance with a constitutional review decision
to the extent that the power to fulfill the requirements set out in the court
judgment is within the scope of competence of the County Commissioners as
executory bodies.
Outside this scope, if a public authority or other party
fails to obey the immediate requirements of the judgment in relation to the
complainant who has obtained a recognition of unconstitutionality in the
concrete case, and/or if it continues to follow the norm set aside or the
unconstitutional line of action condemmed in the judgment, the authority or
other disobeying party will run the risk of challenge by further court action
by the complainant and/or other persons in a similar position. There also will
be a risk of action against the authority by way of such means as may be
afforded by provisions of the laws on public administration and the criminal
code against abuse of power and other breaches committed by public authorities.
As regards the problem of continued formal existence of a
legal norm deemed to be unconstitutional by a court decision, this can only be
remedied by the action of a parliamentary majority in the Althing towards
repeal or amendment of the norm. If this is not forthcoming, a parliamentary
member or group possibly could attempt to make the matter a cause for
impeachment of the government Minister responsible in the field of the norm,
but the instigation of impeachment proceedings, or a vote of non-confidence
against the Minister (which also might be proposed), would require the approval
of a parliamentary majority.
IV. Cases where decisions are not executed
There are no recent cases where a constitutitonal
review decision has not been executed in Iceland.
It may be noted, however, that as the constitutional control
in Iceland is concrete and ex post facto and dependent on the party
complaining of unconstitutionality having sufficient legal interest in the
matter, the claims arising out of the unconstitutionality will normally be
considered subject to the ordinary general conditions or limitations for such
claims. Thus a money claim for compensation or repayment may be barred by the
statute of limitation (the limitation period mostly being 4 years for
commercial and most contract claims and 10 years for ordinary tort claims), or
because of prolonged and excessive passivity on the part of the complainant. If
the barring by these general rules is in evidence when the issue of unconstitutionality
is first brought before the court, the action usually will fail.
As an example of the effect of the statute of limitation, it
may be of interest to note the recent case of an import firm which complained
of a special tax or duty on certain foodstuff imports levied over a period of
some years. In a resulting judgment of 19 December 1996 is case No.427/1995, Þrotabú
S. Óskarssonar & Co. hf. v. the Icelandic State (H.1996.4260), the
Supreme Court found that the levying of this tax as from the effective date of
a Ministry regulation of February 1998 was in conflict with the taxation
provisions of the Constitution, the authorisation from the legislator to the
government Minister for determining the incidence and rate of the tax having
involved an excessive delegation of power. The Court thus delivered a
declaratory (recognition) judgment quashing a decree of the State Customs
Commission which had established a claim in arrears against the firm by way of
redetermining the proper tax on its imports in 1988-1992 (after discovering
that the firm had reacted to the tax by asking its foreign suppliers to
disguise the true price of the foodstuffs in their invoices so as to lower the
tax amount).
The estate in bankruptcy of the firm subsequently brought
suit for repayment of the tax actually paid in the said period according to the
import price then declared. In a Supreme Court judgment of 10 December 1998 in
case No. 146/1998 (H. 1998.4180), it was found that the firm and estate had
allowed the relevant 4-year period of limitation to pass without making a money
claim, even though there had been ample reason to protest against the tax at
the time of import. The prior suit for recognition of unconstitutionality was
held not to have been so framed as to break the period. The money claim thus
failed completely, and a similar result was experienced by a few other firms
which brought suit on the basis of the 1996 decision, although some of them
received partial repayment. – The cases are perhaps interesting because the
Supreme Court did not distinguish the claims over an unconstitutional tax from
an ordinary claim for overpaid taxes as regards the period of limitation, but
it is to be noted that the claims were framed in terms of repayment (of the
gross amount of the tax or such part thereof as the firm might not have been
able to pass along to its customers), but not in terms of damages in tort for
net loss.
V. Cases of unsatisfactory execution
A situation where an unconstitutional norm continues to be
appplied has not recently arisen in Iceland.
It may be noted that we perhaps came somewhat close to a
problem of this nature in connection with the judgment of 3 December 1998 cited
in I.B.1.c. and I.B.3.e. above on the management of fishing rights. The case arose
over a restriction on the number and capacity of fishing vessels provided for
in Article 5 of the relevant Act No. 38/1990, but many people felt that the
reasoning employed by the Supreme Court equally involved a condemnation of the
restrictions by way of fish stock quotas regulated by Article 7 and related
provisions of the Act. The Government, however, took the view that only Article
5 was affected, and the subsequent amendment of the Act was carried out
accordingly, despite minority protests in the Althing. This view of the
Government was borne out in the later decision of 6 April 2000, where all the
justices agreed that the prior judgment could not be directly cited against the
validity of the quota rules under Article 7. The opponents of the quota thus
only had the limited consolation that the minority justices also found these
latter rules to be in actual or potential conflict with the Constitution.
As a final reply concerning points IV and V, the question of
decisions of ordinary higher courts being declared contrary to the Constitution
does not properly arise as a problem in Iceland, since we do not have the a
separate Constitutional Court.
_______________
The constitutional provisions and general laws pertinent
to the subject of the Questionnaire may bee listed as follows:
Constitution of the Republic of Iceland No. 33 of 17 June
1944, as amended, in particular its Article 2 (on the separation of powers),
Chapter V, Articles 59-61 (on the judiciary, where Article 60 affirms the power
of the courts to review actions of the executive power, while review of
legislation is not directly mentioned) and Chapter VII, Articles
65-77 (on human rights, including an Article 70 on access to court and fair
hearing).
- Act
No. 62 of 19 May 1994 on the European Human Rights Convention, where in Article
1, the Convention of 4 November 1950 on the Protection of Human Rights and
Freedoms with its Protocols No. 1, 4, 6 and 7 as amended by Protocol 11 is
given the force of law in Iceland.
- Act No.
15 of 25 March 1998 on the Judiciary, including its Chapter II on the Supreme
Court of Iceland.
- Act
No. 91 of 31 December 1991 on Civil Procedure, as amended, including its
Chapter I on jurisdiction, Chapter IV on causes of action (esp. Articles 24-25),
Chapter XIX on accelerated procedure, Chapter XXIV on complaint-form appeal,
Chapter XXV on ordinary appeal, and Chapters XXVI-XXVII on the reopening of
decided cases.
- Act
No. 19 of 26 March 1991 on Criminal Procedure, as amended, including its Chapter
I on jurisdiction, Chapter XVI on complaint-form appeal, Chapter XVIII on
ordinary appeal, and Chapter XXII on the reopening of decided cases.
- Act
No 90 of 1 June 1989 on Executions.
- Act
No. 31 of 23 April 1990 on Attachment of Assets, Injunctions et al.
- Act
No. 90 of 23 December 1991 on Forced Sales.
- Act
No. 21 of 21 February 1994 on the Seeking of an Opinion of the EFTA-Court on
Interpretation of the Agreement on the European Economic Area.
While the legislation above listed provides the framework
for action of the common courts empowered to carry out constitutional review,
and for the execution of their decisions, none of its provisions specifically
deal with such review.
Reykjavík, 21 November
2000
Kazakhstan
Liechtenstein
Gerard
Batliner / Herbert Wille
Liechtenstein-Institut
Bendern / Liechtenstein
QUESTIONNAIRE
SUR L’EXECUTION
DES ARRETS DES
JURIDICTIONS CONSTITUTIONNELLES
(CDL [2000] 45)
I. Questions générales sur le contrôle de constitutionnalité
A. Le type et l’objet du contrôle de constitutionnalité:
Les compétences de la Cour d’Etat
(Staatsgerichtshof) sont énumérées dans la Constitution liechtensteinoise
(ci-après «Cst.») du 5 octobre 1921, LGBl. 1921/15 (art. 104 [art. 62 lit.f,
80] et 112) et dans la Loi sur la Cour d’Etat (ci-après «Loi») du 5 novembre
1925, LGBl. 1925/8. Cette Cour d’Etat de 1921/1925 est une «Cour
constitutionnelle». Elle réunit les caractéristiques d’une juridiction
constitutionnelle de type moderne, concentrée sur une seule Cour et
institutionnellement séparée de la juridiction ordinaire.
1. Le contrôle de constitutionnalité des actes
normatifs
Un contrôle préventif des actes normatifs dans
le sens technique du mot n’existe pas.
Cependant, la Cour d’Etat est compétente de
rendre des avis d’expertise sur des questions générales du droit
constitutionnel et administratif, sur des questions de la législation et des
projets de lois et sur l’interprétation de lois ou d’ordonnances, sur demande
du gouvernement ou du parlement (art. 16 Loi). Les avis rendus ne sont pas
contraignants, mais dans la pratique tels avis se sont révélés comme une sorte
de contrôle préventif efficace.
b. Le contrôle abstrait of principal
(grief direct d’inconstitutionnalité)
Le contrôle abstrait des lois est assuré sur
demande du gouvernement ou d’une commune (art. 104 par. 2 Cst. et art. 11 et 24
Loi). Dans le cas d’une ordonnance (de l’exécutif), également 100 citoyens sont
habilités à s’adresser directement à la Cour constitutionnelle en vue d’un
contrôle abstrait, dans un délai d’un mois depuis la publication de cette
ordonnance (art. 26 Loi).
Le contrôle concret ou incident des normes
(lois et ordonnances) est prévu en cas de recours individuel constitutionnel
(Verfassungsbeschwerde: art. 23 combiné avec art. 24, 25 Loi) ou sur demande
d’un tribunal ordinaire dans une affaire pendante devant celui-ci (art. 25 et
28 Loi); ainsi que (concernant seulement les ordonnances en cas d’application)
sur demande d’une commune (art. 25 par. 2 Loi).
Il n’y a point d’actes normatifs échappant au
contrôle de constitutionnalité.
2. L’examen des omissions inconstitutionnelles en
matière législative (inaction du législateur lorsque la Constitution l’oblige à
agir)
Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour
constitutionnelle l’absence de législation simple ne peut pas faire objet d’un
contrôle (abstrait) des normes. Par contre, si telle omission législative a
pour effet une violation des droits individuels constitutionnels garantis,
l’individu peut recourir à la Cour constitutionnelle (Verfassungsbeschwerde)
qui constate et réprime la violation résultant de l’omission législative.
3. Les décisions concernant la protection des
droits constitutionnels (Verfassungsbeschwerde, amparo, recours devant les
tribunaux de dernière instance)
Le recours individuel (Verfassungsbeschwerde)
est prévu contre toute décision d’un tribunal ou d’une autorité administrative,
après épuisement des voies de recours ordinaires, pour violation des droits
garantis par la Constitution ou pour violation des droits fondamentaux de la
Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme ou du Pacte international relatif
au Droits civils et politiques. Exception: Nul recours existe en cas de
violation directe, commise par le Prince.
4. Les autres compétences des juridictions
constitutionnelles (exemples: inconstitutionnalité des partis politiques, référendums,
conflits entre infra-étatiques, conflit entre organes de l’Etat)
-
Interprétation contraignante de la Constitution à effet erga omnes en
matière de litige d’interprétation entre le gouvernement (Prince) et le
parlement sur une disposition constitutionnelle spécifique (art. 112 Cst., art.
39 par. 1 Loi);
- Décision
en matière de conflits de compétence entre tribunaux et autorités
administratives (art. 104 par. 1 Cst.);
- Décision
en matière de mise en accusation d’un ministre (Ministeranklage) par le
parlement (art. 104 par. 1 Cst.);
- Décision
sur demande en nullité en matière d’élections ou de référendums (art. 104 par.
2 Cst.);
- Décision
comme Cour administrative dans des domaines très restreints et spécifiques
(art. 104 par. 2 Cst.).
B. Les effets des arrêts des juridictions
constitutionnelles:
1. En ce qui concerne les actes normatifs:
a. Les
arrêts des juridictions constitutionnelles ont-ils uniquement un effet
déclaratoire?
Non. Voir les effets exposés ci-après.
b. La
norme déclarée contraire à la Constitution est-elle déclarée nulle ou annulée
avec effet immédiat? Est-ce que la juridiction constitutionnelle peut modifier
la norme?
La norme déclarée contraire à la Constitution
par la Cour constitutionnelle (contrôle abstrait ou incident) est annulée par
celle-ci avec effet ex nunc erga omnes (art. 38 par. 2-5, aussi art. 24
par.1 Loi). La norme en question ne peut pas être modifiée par la Cour
constitutionnelle.
Une innovation jurisprudentielle récente
(controversée) est l’»Appellentscheidung»: Si, d’une part, il n’y a pas de
contradiction strictu sensu d’une norme avec la Constitution et si,
d’autre part, la norme n’est pas en pleine concordance avec la Constitution, la
Cour rend une décision d’appel («Appellentscheidung») vis-à-vis du législateur,
en vue d’amender la norme en question (voir Herbert Wille, Die Normenkontrolle
im liechtensteinischen Recht auf der Grundlage der Rechtsprechung des
Staatsgerichtshofes, Liechtenstein Politische Schriften, vol. 27 [1999], p.
315s.).
c. Est-ce
que l’arrêt doit être mis en œuvre (par l’abrogation de la norme) par un autre
organe?
Non. Voir exception (Appellentscheidung) supra
lit. b par. 2.
d. Est-ce que les effets de l’annulation peuvent
être reportés?
L’annulation d’une norme prend effet avec la
promulgation du dispositif de l’arrêt dans la gazette officielle des lois
(Landesgesetzblatt), sous réserve d’un report des effets de l’annulation à une
date ultérieure qui n’excède pas les six mois (art. 43 par. 2 Loi).
e. La
portée de l’arrêt va-t-elle au-delà du cas particulier, en cas de contrôle par
voie incidente? Qu’en est-il notamment des situtions analogues au cas d’espèce,
mais qui ont déjà fait l’objet d’une décision définitive?
Dans tous les cas, l’arrêt de la Cour
constitutionnelle est d’effet erga omnes, dans la mesure où une norme
est annulée. Telle annulation a force de loi («législation négative»). L’effet
de l’annulation saisit le cas concret décidé par la Cour constitutionnelle dans
le cadre d’une Verfassungsbeschwerde, et s’étend (où il y a lieu) sur toutes
les affaires pendantes devant d’autres instances, mais ne met pas en question
les affaires passées en force de chose jugée.
f. La
juridiction constitutionnelle peut-elle ordonner à une autre autorité d’agir?
Peut-elle fixer un délai pour agir?
En cas de l’annulation d’une norme, le
gouvernement est légalement tenu de publier aussitôt le dispositif de l’arrêt
dans la gazette officielle des lois (art. 43 par. 2 Loi). Egalement le
gouvernement doit rendre public les arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle
intégralement ou en partie (sauf exceptions). Les arrêts sont reproduits dans
le recueil officiel («LES») des décisions des tribunaux ou autorités
administratives (art. 43 par. 3 Loi).
En cas d’une «Appellentscheidung», celle-ci
s’adresse au législateur, en vue d’une action législative (voir supra
lit. b par. 2).
2. Concernant la protection des droits
constitutionnels:
Si la juridiction
constitutionnelle annule une décision d’une autre autorité (administration,
tribunal, etc.) pour inconstitutionnalité:
a. L’affaire est-elle renvoyée à l’autorité
inférieure pour nouvelle décision?
Le tribunal ou l’autorité administrative, dont
la décision est attaquée, participe directement (comme «belangte Behörde») à la
procédure devant la Cour constitutionnelle. En cas de cassation d’une décision,
l’affaire est réouverte devant l’instance inférieure.
b. Est-ce que la juridiction constitutionnelle
statue elle-même sur la question?
Non.
3. En outre, est-ce que
les arrêts des juridictions constitutionnelles (en cas
d’un recours individuel constitutionnel [Verfassungsbeschwerde]):
a. lient celles-ci?
La décision de la Cour constitutionnelle lie
cette Cour seulement dans la mesure où la décision est une res iudicata.
La Cour peut changer sa jurisprudence dans une affaire ultérieure.
Evidemment, si dans le cadre d’un recours
individuel (Verfassungsbeschwerde) une norme est déclarée inconstitutionnelle,
l’annulation de la norme a un effet erga omnes (comme c’est le cas dans
un contrôle abstrait).
b. ont un effet de res iudicata
(entre les parties; erga omnes)?
Il y a effet entre les parties. En cas de
cassation d’une décision d’un tribunal ou d’une autorité administrative, cette
instance est liée en l’espèce à l’opinion exprimée par la Cour
constitutionnelle (art. 42 par. 2 Loi). Par contre, le principe anglosaxon de
la «stare decisis» n’existe pas.
En revanche, si dans le cadre d’un recours
individuel (Verfassungsbeschwerde) une norme est déclarée inconstitutionnelle,
l’annulation de la norme a un effet erga omnes (comme c’est le cas dans
un contrôle abstrait).
c. ont force de loi (voir par exemple le § 31.2 de la loi
allemande sur la Cour constitutionnelle)?
Non.
Par contre, l’annulation d’une norme
anticonstitutionnelle (contrôle incident ou abstrait) a force de loi
(«législation négative»). En outre, en cas d’une interprétation contraignante
de la Constitution, telle interprétation de la Cour a force de disposition
constitutionnelle (voir aussi réponse en bas, premier tiret).
d. sont publiées dans un journal officiel?
En principe, les arrêts sont publiés
intégralement ou en partie dans le recueil officiel («LES») des décisions des
tribunaux ou autorités administratives (art. 43 par 3 Loi). En cas d’une
annulation d’une norme, il y a aussi publication de la teneur de l’annulation
dans la gazette des lois. Voir supra I B 1 f par. 1.
e. Qu’en est-il en particulier lorsqu’un arrêt déclare qu’une
norme deviendra incostitutionnelle si elle n’est pas modifiée dans un certain
délai?
Lorsque le délai (de six mois maximum) expire
sans que le législateur ait agi, la norme inconstitutionnelle devient nulle ipso
iure.
La réponse aux questions précédentes varie-t-elle selon le
type de contrôle de constitutionnalité (par exemple: contrôle concret/contrôle
abstrait)?
Ces questions sont traitées supra (I B 1 a-f, 2
a-b, 3 a-e)
Des règles spéciales s’appliquent-elles dans les domaines
mentionnés au point I.A.4 ci-dessus?
En ce qui concerne les autres compétences de
la Cour constitutionnelle:
-
En matière d’interprétation contraignante de normes constitutionnelles,
l’interprétation par la Cour constitutionnelle a force de disposition
constitutionnelle à effet erga omnes (voir art. 39 par. 1 Loi). Les
règles de publication en cas de contrôle de normes s’appliqueraient per
analogiam (voir supra I B 1 f par. 1).
-
Quand il y a recours en nullité concernant une élection ou une votation
(référendum), la Cour constitutionnelle déclare, s’il y a lieu, nulle et non
avenue l’élection ou la votation.
-
En matière de conflits de compétence, la Cour constitutionnelle ne tranche que
la question (préalable) à quelle instance revient la compétence d’agir en
l’espèce (art. 39 par. 2 Loi). L’arrêt passe en force de chose jugée dans les
deux semaines après notification, et les instances concernées sont liées à
l’opinion exprimée par la Cour (art. 42 par. 1 et 2 Loi).
-
En cas de mise en accusation de ministres ou lorsque la Cour est saisie en
qualité de Cour administrative spéciale, la Cour constitutionnelle statue, en
analogie avec les juridictions ordinaires, en la matière (art. 39 par. 3, art.
50 Loi).
II. Quels sont les moyens d’assurer l’exécution des arrêts des
juridictions constitutionnelles?
La réponse à cette question tiendra compte de la législation
relative à l’exécution des arrêts des juridictions constitutionnelles, soit par
d’autres tribunaux, soit par des organes exécutifs. En particulier:
1. La législation prévoit-elle l’autorité chargée d’exécuter
les arrêts de la juridiction constitutionnelle?
2. Sinon, existe-t-il une norme prévoyant que la juridiction
constitutionnelle ou une autre autorité détermine l’organe compétent pour
exécuter les décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle? Comment le système
fonctionne-t-il en pratique?
En cas d’annulation d’une norme
infraconstitutionnelle (contrôle abstrait ou concret) ou d’ interprétation
contraignate d’une disposition constitutionnelle, la teneur de l’arrêt passe en
force à effet erga omnes avec la promulgation dans la gazette officielle
des lois (art. 43 par 2 Loi).
Si, en cas de violation d’un droit
constitutionnel garanti, une décision d’un tribunal ou d’une autorité
administrative est cassée, l’arrêt passe en force de chose jugée dans les deux
semaines après la remise de l’arrêt (aux parties et) au tribunal ou à
l’autorité administrative concernée (art. 42 par. 1 Loi). Par ce moyen, la
procédure initiale (Ausgangsverfahren) est réouverte devant cette instance
inférieure en question.
Si la Cour constitutionnelle annule une
élection in globo ou partiellement, le gouvernement est obligé de faire
le nécessaire pour renouveler l’élection (art. 66 par. 3 Volksrechtegesetz,
LGBl. 1973/50). Il en est de même, mutatis mutandis, en cas d’une
annulation d’une votation (art. 74 Volksrechtegesetz).
En cas d’une décision de la Cour
constitutionnelle dans un conflit de compétence, la loi laisse (en principe)
aux organes ou parties concernées le soin d’introduire ou de poursuivre leur
cause.
Quant aux matières de mise en accusation de
ministres ou de juridiction administrative spéciale, les auteurs de ces
réponses s’abstiennent d’exposer les différentes règles sur l’exécution d’un
arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle.
III. Quelles sont les conséquences de l’inexécution – ou de l’absence
d’exécution dans un délai raisonnable – des arrêts des juridictions
constitutionnelles?
Tels cas ne se sont pas présentés.
IV. Cas d’inexécution
A. Pouvez-vous
citer des cas récents d’inexécution d’un arrêt de la juridiction
constitutionnelle de votre pays?
Non.
B. Si
oui, est-il possible d’identifier les causes de cette inexécution (telles que:
motifs politiques/raison financières/manque de clarté de l’arrêt/caractère
inadéquat des normes en matière d’exécution des arrêts)?
___
V. Cas d’exécution insatisfaisante
Dans certains cas, même si un arrêt de la juridiction
constitutionnelle a été exécuté, la situation reste insatisfaisant, car une
norme inconstitutionnelle continue d’être appliquée.
A. Une
telle situation s’est-elle présentée récemment dans votre pays?
Non.
B. Quelles
sont les causes? Découle-t-elle du pouvoir de décision de la juridiction
constitutionnelle (absence d’effet erga omnes, caractère déclaratoire de
l’arrêt), ou d’autres causes, telles que celles mentionnées sous IV.B supra?
En ce qui concerne les points IV et V, des
problèmes particuliers se sont-ils présentés lorsque des arrêts des
juridictions ordinaires supérieur ont été déclarés contraire à la Constitution?
Non.
Bendern/Liechtenstein,
17 janvier 2001
Luxembourg
Complément de réponse au questionnaire sur
« L’exécution des arrêts des juridictions constitutionnelles »
(Questions II à V)
II. Quels
sont les moyens d’assurer l’exécution des arrêts des juridictions
constitutionnelles ?
Au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg il n’existe pas de dispositions
législatives relatives à l’exécution des arrêts de la Cour Constitutionnelle.
Il est rappelé que le Luxembourg a opté pour un système de
contrôle concret par le biais du renvoi préjudiciel. La juridiction qui a posé
la question préjudicielle, ainsi que toutes les autres juridictions appelées à
statuer dans la même affaire, sont tenues, pour la solution du litige, dont
elles sont saisies, de se conformer à l’arrêt rendu par la Cour.
Les arrêts n’ont donc qu’un effet inter partes et
déclaratoire, malgré l’absence d’obligation légale, il appartient par la suite
au pouvoir politique et en l’occurrence au gouvernement et au législateur
d’intervenir suite à un arrêt déclarant une norme contraire à la Constitution.
Les moyens d’exécution légaux faisant défaut, seule la volonté politique des
responsables est déterminante.
III. Quelles
sont les conséquences de l’inexécution – ou de l’absence d’exécution dans un
délai raisonnable – des arrêts des juridictions constitutionnelles ?
En droit le problème de l’inexécution des arrêts ne se pose
pas vraiment étant donné que les arrêts ont uniquement un effet inter partes.
En fait, dans l’hypothèse où une norme est déclarée
inconstitutionnelle et que la norme en question ou la Constitution n’est pas
modifiée par la suite, pose un vrai problème. La loi est muette sur ce point,
la pratique luxembourgeoise trop courte pour juger des façons possibles pour
parer à cette insuffisance.
IV. Cas d’inexécution
Il est rappelé que l’on ne peut pas parler d’exécution ou
d’inexécution strictu sensu, alors que les arrêts ont uniquement un effet
déclaratoire et que la Cour Constitutionnelle n’a pas la compétence d’ordonner
l’exécution de ses propres arrêts, faute de dispositions législatives.
Si la question se posait l’on serait plutôt tenté de parler
de problèmes de suivi des arrêts ; or de tels problèmes ne se sont pas
posés au Luxembourg.
Ainsi, il y a lieu de préciser que jusqu’à ce jour la Cour
Constitutionnelle a rendu 10 arrêts, le premier datant du 6 mars 1998.
Parmi les arrêts (au nombre de 5) qui ont déclaré des normes
contraires à la Constitution, l’on peut relever les points suivants :
- Dans une première série d’arrêts (arrêt du 6 mars 1998 et
trois arrêts du 18 décembre 1998), la Cour Constitutionnelle a déclaré
certaines dispositions de plusieurs règlements ministériels non conformes à
l’article 36 (qui traite de l’organisation du pouvoir réglementaire) de la
Constitution, alors que les mesures d’exécution des lois (règlements et arrêtés)
doivent être prises par le Grand-Duc seul et non par les ministres.
Concernant ce point particulier la Commission des
institutions et de la révision constitutionnelle vient de déposer le 6 février
2001 une proposition de révision de l’article 36 de la Constitution, afin de se
conformer aux prédits arrêts. Cette procédure fait suite aux 4 arrêts
prémentionnés et constitue en quelque sorte l’exécution de ces arrêts.
- Ensuite, reste à citer un arrêt du 26 mars 1999 qui a
déclaré une norme inconstitutionnelle, en l’occurrence l’article 380 du Code
Civil luxembourgeois (article relatif à l’autorité parentale). Sur ce point, il
y a lieu de remarquer que le législateur n’est pas encore intervenu en vue de
mettre la disposition en question en conformité avec la Constitution, mais que
le groupe parlementaire socialiste a l’intention de prendre une initiative en
ce sens.
V. Cas d’inexécution insatisfaisante
Pour l’instant il est trop tôt pour en juger.
13.02.2001 Lydie
ERR
Membre
suppléant
LUXEMBOURG
Norway / Norvège
Replies to the questionnaire on the
execution of constitutional review decisions
Introduction:
The Norwegian Constitution of 17th May 1814 is – after the
United States Constitution – the oldest written constitution in effect today.
The Constitution has no provision concerning judicial review. Judicial review
has however been practised by the Supreme Court since the last half of the 19th
century, and the Supreme Court’s competence to exercise judicial review is
therefore considered well-established customary law.
All cases involving judicial review are handled by the
ordinary courts; the case will start in the District or City Court and
eventually be handled by the High Court before it reaches the Supreme Court.
I. General questions on constitutional review
A. The type of constitutional
review and its subject:
1. b/c/d
Constitutional review of normative acts
The court can only interfere in relation to an act that has
already come into force. There is no preliminary review.
However, according to the Constitution, the Parliament may
obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court on points of law. Such opinions will
only be advisory to the parliament, and the possibility is seldom used.
The constitutional review is limited to cases where an
actual conflict is brought before the court for decision.
A court case must be brought by someone – normally an
individual – having sufficient legal interest in the matter. No normative acts
are exempted from becoming subject to constitutional review. The right to
review also includes the right to review the legality of regulations prescribed
by ministries or other bodies pursuant to the provisions of statute.
2. Review of unconstitutional
omissions of legislation (failure of the legislator to act when it is obliged
to do so by the Constitution).
This does not occur, but the courts may note omissions.
3. Decisions concerning the
protection of constitutional rights
Yes.
4. Other areas of constitutional review
The right to review includes the control of the legality of
administrative (Government) decisions.
B. The effects of constitutional
review decisions:
1. a/b/c/d/f
If an act is deemed unconstitutional it becomes inapplicable
in the specific case.
It is for the Parliament (the Storting) to amend the laws.
1 e and 3 a/b
A decision will formally have effect only with respect to
the parties. The precedential effect of the decision will depend upon how
general or how specific the reason given for the setting aside of the law in
the particular controversy.
2. The court may decide the case
itself or send it back to the lower instance for a new ruling.
3. a/b/d/e
See also 1/e
A decision has binding effect between the parties. The court
is not strictly bound by its earlier decisions.
The decisions are published in the Norwegian Law Gazette
(Norsk Retstidende) and the Lovdata information system. New decisions can also
be found on the Internet.
II.
The execution of the review decisions falls within the ordinary
system for execution of court judgments. For instance, for payment of damages,
the order implied in the judgment will be executable by the body in charge of
the execution of civil claims affirmed by court judgments.
See also 1 e and 3 a/b.
IV and V
No.
Oslo, 5 February 2001
Romania / Roumanie
Replies to the questionnaire on the
execution of constitutional review decisions
The Romanian Constitution of 1991 has
adopted a combined system of constitutional review of normative acts in which
both the a priori and a posteriori review are cumulated at the
same body – the Constitutional Court.
(art.144 from the Romanian Constitution).
I. General questions on constitutional review
A)
The type of Constitutional review and its
subjects:
1. Constitutional review of
normative acts
According to art.144 a) of the Romanian Constitution the
Constitutional Court decides on the constitutionality of normative acts before
their entering into force at the request of the President of Romania, of one of
the two Presidents of the Chambers of Parliament, of the Government, of the
Supreme Court of Justice, of at least 50 members of the Chamber of Deputies or
25 members of the Senate.
In case the Constitutional Court declares a
normative act unconstitutional before its coming into force, the Decision acts
as a suspension veto, because the effect is to send the normative act
for re-examination in the Parliament. If the normative act is adopted in the
same form with a majority of at least two-thirds of the members of each Chamber
of Parliament, the claim of unconstitutionality is waved and its promulgation by
the Romanian President is compulsory. On the contrary, if the said majority is
not met the normative act will not be promulgated.
b.
Abstract or principal review
There is no such form of constitutional
review specified in the Romanian Constitution. The authority of the of the
Constitutional Court is limited to the provisions of art.144 and these
provisions are of strict interpretation.
c.
Concrete or incidental review of norms
A posteriori review relates to legal norms that are
already in force. The Constitution al Court may be seized only by a Court of
justice which has a pending case in which one party or the Court itself
considers that a legal norm on which depends the judgment of the Court is
unconstitutional. In such case the Court suspends the hearings and sends the
file to the Constitutional Court to decide upon the claim of
unconstitutionality of the said legal norm. If the Constitutional Court
declares the legal norm unconstitutional this leads to a re-judgment of the
case. In civil cases the decision of the Constitutional Court profits only to
the parties who raised the exception of unconstitutionality. In criminal cases
the decision leads to the re-judgment of all cases in which the conviction was
based on the legal norm declared unconstitutional.
d.
Normative acts that are not subject to
constitutional review
Subject to Constitutional review are only
the following normative acts:
-
laws voted by the Parliament but not yet
promulgated;
-
internal regulations of the Parliament;
-
laws in force and Ordnances of the Government
assimilated to laws.
-
All other normative acts (i.e. decisions or
regulations of Ministries or other central or local authorities) are excluded
from the constitutional review, their accordance with the law being decided by
the Court of justice. Also, normative act that are no longer in force, being
abrogated either explicitly or tacitly, can not be subject to constitutional
review. Also, laws that were adopted and promulgated in spite of a
Constitutional Court decision declaring unconstitutional the said normative act
before its promulgation (see pct.A.1.a above), are also excluded from
constitutional review.
2.
Review of unconstitutional omission of
legislation
The Romanian Constitution does not provide
that the Constitutional Court may rule on such omissions.
3.
Decisions concerning the protection of
constitutional rights
The protection of constitutional rights is
achieved through the Courts of justice, the Constitutional Court having no role
in this.
4.
Other areas of constitutional review
The Constitutional Court can decide on the
constitutionality of regulation of the Parliament if the claim is raised by one
of the Presidents of the two Chambers, or at least 50 deputies or 25
senators(art.144-b).
Also according to art.144 - d,e,f,g,h and I
of the Constitution the Constitutional Court has competences in the election of
the President of Romania (by scrutinizing the procedures for the election and
confirming the results of the elections), establishes the facts that may lead
to the ad-interim exercise of the Presidency, acts as counseling body for the
request of suspending the President, scrutinizes the procedure for the national
referendum and confirms its results, verifies the compliance with the
regulations in case of legislative initiative by the citizens, decides upon
claims regarding the constitutionality of a political party.
B)
The effects of constitutional review
decisions:
1.
Concerning normative acts:
The two types of constitutional review of normative acts
by the Constitutional Court are carried out at different moments in time – the
first during the process of law-making and the second during its application –
so the effects of constitutional review can not be the same. Despite this, the
Romanian Constitution uses a unified regulation regarding their effects stating
that “… the decisions of the Constitutional Court are mandatory and rule
only for the future. The decisions are to be published in the Romanian Official
Gazette.”
As described at pct. A1a) above in case the
Constitutional Court declares a normative act unconstitutional before its
coming into force the effect is to send the normative act for re-examination
in the Parliament. If the normative act is adopted in the same form with a
majority of at least two-thirds of the members of each Chamber of Parliament,
the claim of unconstitutionality is waved and its promulgation by the Romanian
President is compulsory. On the contrary, if the said majority is not met the
normative act will not be promulgated. Nor during the preliminary review,
neither during the concrete review, the Constitutional Court can modify the
norm. This is the prerogative of the Parliament, as the sole body invested with
the power of law-making. Furthermore the Constitutional Court can not decide on
the interpretation or application of a legal norm but only in respect to its
accordance with the Constitution. (art.2 Law no.47/1992 modified by Law
no.138/1997, regarding the organization and functioning of the Constitutional
Court).
In case of regulations of Parliament, if
the Constitutional Court decides the unconstitutionality of the regulations the
decision is sent to the concerned Chamber of Parliament to re-examine the
regulation and to amend it in accordance with the Constitution.
In case a legal norm is declared
unconstitutional while in force the decision is mandatory and with immediate
effects for the Court of Justice where the claim of unconstitutionality was
raised, and as said above the decision profits only to the party involved in
the pending civil case. In criminal cases the decision is also mandatory and
with immediate effects and leads to the re-judgment of all cases in which the
conviction was based on the legal norm declared unconstitutional.
2.
Concerning the protection of
constitutional rights:
See A.3.above.
3.
According to the Constitution, the
Constitutional Court has
prerogatives not only for the
constitutional review of normative acts but also in other matters as
confirmation of elections, establishing states of facts, performing as first
and last forum of justice in litigation brought directly before the
Constitutional Court (i.e. unconstitutionality of political parties). The
general interpretation is that even if all the Constitutional Court Decisions
are mandatory, their effects are different according to the “case of
unconstitutionality” involved. All Constitutional review decisions are
published in the Official Gazette. In case of preliminary review the only
obligation is to send back to the two chambers of Parliament the normative act
declared unconstitutional to be re-examined. The Parliament can disregard the
decision of the Constitutional Court and if adopted with a number of at least
two-thirds of the members of each Chamber the normative act is promulgated and
the claim of unconstitutionality is waved. This situation was interpreted as
being the process of law-making is the full prerogative of the Parliament and
no other authority can intervene to limit this prerogative.
In case of incidental review the decision
through which a normative act is declared unconstitutional have effects from
the it was published and become mandatory for the Court of justice where the
claim of unconstitutionality was raised. The decision is sent to each of the
two Cambers of the Parliament and to the Government. The effects are only for
the future. The decision has res iudicata force, but the decision is not
considered as amending the unconstitutional normative act. There is neither a
time limit nor an obligation for the legislative body to remedy the situation.
In case of a decision where a political
party is declared unconstitutional the decision is sent to Bucharest Tribunal
which erases the said party from the repertoire of political parties.
II. What means are available to ensure the execution of constitutional
review decisions?
In case of a decision of the Constitutional Court
reviewing and declaring unconstitutional a normative act before its
promulgation the decision has only to be published in the Official Gazette and
to be sent for re-examination to the Parliament. There is no obligation for the
members of the Parliament to amend the normative act according to the decision
of the Constitutional Court.
In case of a decision reviewing a normative act in force,
by means of incidental review, the decision is mandatory for the Court who
deferred the claim of unconstitutionality. If the Court disregards the decision
of the Constitutional Court this situation can be corrected by appealing
against the decision of the Court of justice on the ground that the Court did
not act according to the decision of the Constitutional Court which is, as said
above, mandatory for the Court of justice. So the appeal to the higher Court of
justice is the way to ensure the execution of the constitutional review decision.
In case of a decision regarding the unconstitutionality of
a political party the failure of executing the decision of the Constitutional
Court (erasing the party from the repertoire) gives grounds for administrative
penalty. The remedy is also administrative.
III. What are the consequences if constitutional review decisions are
not executed or are not executed within a reasonable time?
See above.
IV. Cases where decisions are not executed
There were no cases of un-executed Constitutional Court
decisions.
V. Cases of unsatisfactory execution
There were no cases of unsatisfactory execution of
Constitutional Court decisions.
Alexandru
Farcas
Romania
