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Strasbourg, 23 March 2001
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CDL-INF (2001) 8
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GUIDELINES AND REPORT
ON
THE FINANCING OF POLITICAL PARTIES
adopted by the Venice Commission
GUIDELINES
adopted by the
Commission
at its 46th
Plenary Meeting,
(Venice, 9-10
March 2001)
The Venice Commission:
Being engaged in the promotion of
fundamental principles of democracy, of the rule of law and the protection of
human rights, and in the context of improving democratic security for all;
Noting with concern problems
relating to the illicit financing of political parties recently uncovered in a
number of Council of Europe member states;
Taking into account the essential
role of political parties within democracy and considering that freedom of association,
including that of political association, is a fundamental freedom protected by
the European Convention on Human Rights and is one of the cornerstones of
genuine democracy, such as that envisaged by the Statute of the Council of
Europe;
Paying particular attention to
state practice in the area of financing of political parties;
Recognising the need to further
promote standards in this area on the basis of the values of European legal
heritage;
Has adopted the following
guidelines:
1
For the purpose of these guidelines, a political party is an
association of persons one of the aims of which is to participate in the
management of public affairs by the presentation of candidates to free and
democratic elections.
2
Such political parties may seek out and receive funds by means
of public or private financing.
A Regular Financing
a.
Public Financing
3
Public financing must be aimed at each party represented in
Parliament.
4
In order, however, to ensure the equality of opportunities for
the different political forces, public financing could also be extended to
political bodies representing a significant section of the electoral body and
presenting candidates for election. The
level of financing could be fixed by legislator on a periodic basis, according
to objective criteria.
Tax
exemptions can be granted for operations strictly connected to the parties’
political activity.
5
The financing of political parties through public funds should
be on condition that the accounts of political parties shall be subject to
control by specific public organs (for example by a Court of Audit). States shall promote a policy of financial
transparency of political parties that benefit from public financing.
b.
Private Financing
6
Political parties may receive private financial
donations. Donations from foreign
States or enterprises must however be prohibited. This prohibition should not prevent financial donations from
nationals living abroad.
Other limitations may also be envisaged. Such may consist notably of:
a. a maximum
level for each contribution;
b. a
prohibition of contributions from enterprises of an industrial, or commercial
nature or from religious organisations;
c. prior control of contributions by members of
parties who wish to stand as candidates in elections by public organs
specialised in electoral matters.
7
The transparency of private financing of each party should be
guaranteed. In achieving this aim, each
party should make public each year the annual accounts of the previous year,
which should incorporate a list of all donations other than membership
fees. All donations exceeding an amount
fixed by the legislator must be recorded and made public.
B Electoral Campaigns
8
In order to ensure equality of opportunities for the different
political forces, electoral campaign expenses shall be limited to a ceiling,
appropriate to the situation in the country and fixed in proportion to the
number of voters concerned.
9
The State should participate in campaign expenses through
funding equal to a certain percentage of the above ceiling or proportional to
the number of votes obtained. This
contribution may however be refused to parties who do not reach a certain
threshold of votes.
10
Private contributions can be made for campaign expenses, but
the total amount of such contributions should not exceed the stated
ceiling. Contributions from foreign
States or enterprises must be prohibited.
This prohibition should not prevent financial contributions from
nationals living abroad.
Other
limitations may also be envisaged. Such may consist notably of a prohibition of
contributions from enterprises of an industrial or commercial nature or
religious organisations.
11
Electoral campaign accounts will be submitted to the organ
charged with supervising election procedures, for example, an election
committee, within a reasonable time limit after the elections.
12
The transparency of electoral expenses should be achieved
through the publication of campaign accounts.
C. Control
and sanctions
13
Any irregularity in the financing of a political party shall
entail sanctions proportionate to the severity of the offence that may consist
of the loss of all or part of public financing for the following year.
14
Any irregularity in the financing of an electoral campaign
shall entail, for the party or candidate at fault, sanctions proportionate to
the severity of the offence that may consist of the loss or the total or
partial reimbursement of the public contribution, the payment of a fine or
another financial sanction or the annulment of the election.
15
The above-mentioned rules including the imposition of
sanctions shall be enforced by the election judge (constitutional or other) in
accordance with the law.
REPORT
by
Mr Jacques ROBERT (Member, France)
adopted
by the Commission
at
its 44th Plenary Meeting,
(Venice,
13-14 October 2000)
This report has
been prepared from the replies to a questionnaire sent to all the countries
represented within the Venice Commission.
Over thirty countries responded.
They are listed here in alphabetical order: Albania, Argentina, Armenia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay.
As in all surveys of this kind,
the replies received by the secretariat differed considerably both in volume
and in their degree of detail. The diversity of political contexts naturally
results in very different situations in different countries.
This report clearly cannot set
out to describe in full all the solutions found to the complex problems posed
by the highly sensitive issue of party funding, which has numerous political
ramifications. It will therefore not be possible to cite all the respondent
countries in the report although, in view of the thoroughness of their replies
to the questionnaire, many would well deserve to be mentioned. We will cite
only a few countries as examples of the points we are seeking to make.
The aim of this synopsis of the
national reports is merely to attempt to explain the major general principles -
if any - adopted by the different countries, to highlight the implications of
applying those principles, and to bring to the fore the similarities, or
conversely the main differences, between solutions, with the aim of possibly
suggesting improvements that might be made, here or there, to ensure that the
functioning of political parties, which are absolutely essential to all
democracies, gives rise to fewer difficulties, and possibly even fewer abuses,
in future.
We shall first draw a number of
general conclusions from the descriptions of the financing arrangements in
force in the countries covered by the survey and then go on to examine the
salient points of their replies to the main questions posed.
I. General observations
A. - Our first comment
concerns the fact that interest in the issue of political party funding is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Although this is understandable in the case of countries
which began their transition to democracy only a short time ago, it is more
surprising in those which have long had democratic systems of government and
already have considerable experience of political pluralism, electoral contests
and parliamentary - and possibly presidential - election campaigns.
It is astonishing that in many
countries the main legislation governing the funding of political parties was
passed only a few years ago. As a result, there is fairly little case-law - in
particular from constitutional authorities - in this field. This situation does
not facilitate an in-depth study of the many problems posed.
To cite three examples, the Austrian
legislation on political parties was enacted only 25 years ago (1975) and
the Austrian Constitutional Court, although the oldest in Europe, has delivered
only a small number of judgments on the funding of political parties. What is
more, those judgments deal solely with more or less technical matters.
Armenia, where the
Constitution requires political parties to guarantee the transparency of their
financial activities, has addressed the issue of party finances only in two
very recent instruments (a law of 1991 and the Electoral Code of 17 February
1999).
In 1998 the Registration of
Political Parties Act introduced for the first time in the United Kingdom
a Register of political parties. A political party is entitled to be entered on
the Register if that party intends to have one or more candidates at
parliamentary elections. However, there is no specific legislative provision on
financing of political parties. In November 1997, the Government extended the
terms of reference of the Committee on Standards in Public Life to include
political party funding. As a result of its work the Committee elaborated a
number of recommendations on the issue. The Political Parties, Elections and
Referendums Bill 2000, when enacted, will give effect to these recommendations.
In Luxembourg, the scope
of laws relating to the financing of political parties dates only from January
1999 and is limited to the sole financing of legislative and European
elections.
This long-lasting indifference on
the part of the public authorities in the majority of countries has had very
harmful consequences. The complete lack of rules meant that anything was
permitted. As political parties clearly could not survive merely with the funds
raised through the collection of membership fees and as no form of public
funding was provided, each party had to find its own expedients. In several
countries, the outcome was widespread reliance on dubious, undercover financing
practices, which – even in many of the major democracies - led to the
prosecution, and even the conviction and sentencing, of party leaders, who, in
an effort to obtain at all costs the financing vital to their parties'
activities, had resorted to unlawful fund-raising practices Spectacular
examples can be found in the scandals which have shaken Italy, Germany,
France and the United States, among other countries, not all of
which have yet come to a final conclusion in the courts.
B. - It should also be
said that the countries which have felt the need to regulate political party
funding - even if only recently - have not always followed their ideas through
to their logical conclusion.
For instance, in both Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Slovakia national law does not go far enough in
regulating matters relating to the overall financing of political parties,
whereas in Hungary the law entirely disregards the issue of
private-sector funding and in Georgia it makes no provision for
supervisory mechanisms. In Croatia the law is too vague, and in Latvia
it is the entire party system that is in need of in-depth reform.
The major democracies themselves
are also fully aware that the financing arrangements which they have
introduced, albeit with a scarcely justifiable delay, have many shortcomings,
lead to unfairness and leave room for some regrettable abuses. Although the
situation is clearer, it is not yet rosy everywhere.
C. - It must be said that
the diversity of the rules established in this field facilitates neither their
understanding nor their observance.
Where rules exist and where there
is also a will to enforce those rules, should they be ranked as constitutional
law by including them in the Constitution? This offers the advantage of
permitting the review of any subsequent law that might have the effect of
undermining rights or possibilities granted, but entails the disadvantage of
making it far more difficult to reform the entire body of rules.
Where criminal or civil penalties
may have to be imposed on political parties which fail to comply with the
funding rules, should the relevant legal provisions also be included in the
Constitution?
It can be seen that in many
countries a distinction would appear to have been drawn between political
parties, which are normally mentioned in the Constitution, and their funding,
which - where it is regulated - is governed by ordinary law.
D. - But what is a political
party?
It is true that once the decision
has been taken to provide political parties with assistance and funding for the
pursuit of their activities (which often entail significant amounts of
expenditure), it becomes absolutely essential to identify the potential
beneficiaries in very precise terms. Whether funding is public or private - or
both - who should receive it? In other words, should the Constitution give a
precise definition of what constitutes a political party or, at the very least,
stipulate the criteria to be met in order to be entitled to aid, and even ban
its being granted to certain kinds of organisations whose intentions are
unclear - or perhaps only far too clear?
In this sphere the countries have
adopted a very broad range of solutions, depending on their own individual -
more or less democratic - tradition.
Mention can be made of the
following:
In France Article 4 of the
1958 Constitution provides "Political parties and groups shall contribute
to the use of suffrage. They shall be freely established and carry on their
activities freely. They shall comply with the principles of national
sovereignty and democracy." The requirement that political parties must
promote gender equality in access to electoral functions or elective office was
recently added to this article. But there are no provisions on party funding.
It follows from the very wording
of Article 4, which recognises the freedom of activity enjoyed by French
political parties, that their functioning must not be entirely dependent on
state aid. However, it was not until a law of 11 March 1988, which first
seriously broached the issue of party financing, that the principle of public
funding was established. That law's provisions were confirmed and supplemented
by successive laws passed in 1990, 1993 and 1995.
Does this mean that parties are
entitled to the promised state aid only in so far as they comply with the
constitutional requirements (contributing to the use of suffrage, compliance
with the principles of national sovereignty and democracy, promotion of gender
equality)? It cannot be asserted that this is unequivocally the case, although,
during the debate on the constitutional bill on gender equality, some people
argued that parties might incur financial penalties if they failed to promote
equality of access to electoral functions or elective office. Such financial
penalties might in fact take the form of a significant reduction in the state
aid granted to an offending party.
Liechtenstein requires
political parties to assume the legal form of an association and to declare
their commitment to the principles enshrined in the Constitution in order to
qualify for public funding, which they are of course free to use as they see
fit, on condition that they keep documentary evidence of the use made of funds.
In Portugal the
Constitution provides that all parties shall enjoy freedom of association,
apart from armed organisations of a racist nature. The implication is that
since such organisations cannot, by definition, freely carry on their
activities, they do not qualify to receive the slightest state aid.
It should be noted that in Russia
the Constitution safeguards political pluralism, except in the case of parties
whose aim is to overthrow the regime. However, the Constitution says nothing
about party financing. It should be added that state registration of political
parties is a mandatory formality.
In Spain the wording of
the Constitution bears some similarity to that found in France. Article 6 of
the 1978 Constitution similarly provides "political parties shall embody
political pluralism … and shall be the fundamental means of public
participation." Parties may be freely established and enjoy freedom of
activity providing they abide by the Constitution and the law. Their internal
structure and functioning must be democratic.
It was against the background of
these requirements that the law of 19 June 1985 laying down the general rules
governing elections and the law of 2 July 1987 on political party funding were
subsequently passed.
Some countries' law says
absolutely nothing about either political parties or their funding. This
is the case in Switzerland, where no recognition is granted to political
parties in the Federal Constitution, but constitutional case-law in fact
acknowledges their "de facto" existence.
There is no federal law on party
finances, and this would seem to imply that there are no restrictions on
fund-raising, which is left to the parties' sole initiative. Nor are there
regulations governing the use of funds raised by political parties.
In a limited number of cantons
provision is made for full or partial reimbursement by the cantonal authority
of the cost of printing and distributing ballot papers, but this public subsidy
is confined to expenditure incurred in connection with an election.
What are the reasons for this
virtually complete lack of legislation - whether federal or cantonal - on the
specific subject of party financing?
A number of reasons may be
advanced. Firstly, in Switzerland it is taken for granted that a party's main
source of funds should be members' contributions. Similar traditions are to be
found in other countries where the prevailing view is that parties, which
function as private associations, must - like all such associations - be
capable of financing themselves. However, this requires a civic sense among the
general public and a strong public interest in community affairs. Both exist in
Switzerland, but are far less in evidence elsewhere.
It can also be argued that in
Switzerland political parties generally have a fairly lightweight internal
organisation and, as a result, do not incur much expenditure. In larger
democratic states political parties are huge machines necessitating a large
number of permanent staff, vast premises and a high operating budget that
cannot be covered merely from members' contributions, which are often
completely insufficient in terms of the number of contributors and the
relatively small amounts paid in.
One might add that if Switzerland
some day wished to pass legislation on party financing, it would no doubt be
obliged to hold a public referendum, with absolutely no guarantee as to the
outcome given the hostile tradition mentioned above.
Switzerland has perhaps also been
lucky in that, unlike some of its larger neighbours, it has not experienced a
public scandal concerning political party financing, which would have tarnished
the reputation of its governing class and forced it to regulate parties'
sources of funds.
In Luxembourg, where the
Constitution mentions neither the existence nor the function of political
parties, the latter were defined for the first time within legislation on 7
January 1999, which concerned provisions for the partial reimbursement of
electoral campaign expenses.
In Uruguay the
Constitution provides for the existence of political parties, but the country
has no legislation on their financing.
II. Guiding principles
All states wishing to bring some
semblance of order to party funding, with the aim of both allowing the free
expression of pluralist political opinion and guaranteeing equal treatment of
all political parties according to their respective circumstances, are
confronted with a number of major issues.
A. - The first is whether
parties should be aided solely during election periods, to enable them to face
the high costs inherent in any campaign, or whether, on a broader level, some
form of regular, permanent funding of political parties should be introduced.
The decision is an important one as it has obvious political and financial
implications.
Confining funding to the full or
partial coverage of campaign expenses (in particular through the reimbursement
of a percentage of expenditure incurred) merely aims to avoid emptying the
parties' coffers every time an election takes place and to permit the
trouble-free functioning of the democratic process through the holding of
regular, free elections. In this case, political parties are regarded as
private organisations which have a free hand in raising the funds necessary for
their day-to-day functioning but must be aided during the holding of elections,
which are organised by the public authorities on their own responsibility.
The second approach, where the
state bears all or part of the costs arising from political parties' very
operation, follows a somewhat different line of reasoning. In this case
political parties are regarded as officially recognised bodies, since they
contribute to the state's ongoing democratic functioning, and it is therefore
reasonable that the state should help to support their existence.
It therefore comes as no surprise
that the countries which have opted for this second approach include those
where parties are regarded as "institutions", whose means of
subsistence cannot but be a matter of state concern.
This is the case in most of the
major European democracies. Germany is a prime example.
The German Federal Constitutional
Court acknowledges the need for public funding not only of campaign expenses,
but also of expenses incurred in connection with political parties' routine
activities, on condition that state aid is in inverse proportion to each
party's self-financing capacity and is calculated solely on the basis of
funding requirements absolutely essential to the proper functioning of the
public authorities.
B. - The second issue is
the nature of the funds that may be granted to parties or that they may
themselves raise.
1. Many
states have, as a matter of principle, introduced a strict, mandatory ban on
the funding of political parties by foreign entities or the acceptance of
financial or material aid from foreign sources, whether another state, a
foreign political party or foreign individuals or corporate bodies. This
applies, inter alia, to Armenia (section 3 paragraph 4 of the law of
1991) and Bulgaria, which prohibits political parties from accepting
financial assistance, donations or legacies from foreign countries or
organisations and even from anonymous sources.
Russia bans donations to
campaign funds by foreign states, companies or organisations, stateless
persons, international organisations and Russian legal entities in which more
than 30% of the capital is foreign owned.
It is perfectly understandable
that a state should be reluctant to allow a foreign country to interfere with
its domestic politics by making funds available on a discretionary basis to
certain of its political parties.
Although it had been common
knowledge for many years that some parties, which had long been in positions of
strength in some of the major democracies, regularly received funds from
foreign states to finance not only their election campaigns but also their
day-to-day existence, once general legislation on party funding was in the
pipeline, this could no longer be officially permitted, or even merely
tolerated.
In this connection, the
spectacular scandal that broke out very recently in Germany shows to
what extent public opinion in certain countries - but not all - heeds any hint
of corrupt electoral practices which might - even indirectly - jeopardise the
functioning of democracy.
2. Public
or private funding? Or both?
Here too the choice raises an
essential substantive issue. As mentioned above, for decades many countries had
no legislation governing the financing of political parties, which implies that
the state took no interest in such matters, leaving each party entirely free to
raise the funds necessary to its functioning here and there, without being too
scrupulous about the methods employed.
This completely anarchical state
of affairs led to the excesses of which we are aware. Each party had to raise
funds at all costs, and the richest were the strongest. Since there were no
rules, and therefore no limits on either income or expenditure, parties
competed with one another in a frantic race to find contributors, and the firms
contacted took advantage of the position of strength in which they then found
themselves in order to provide funds - with strings attached - to those parties
that would get their message across and safeguard their interests.
Hence the - when all's said and
done quite recent - idea of ending this constant quest for financing by
providing a public source of funds, with the aim of placing parties and
their candidates on a more equal footing.
The emergence of this new source
of funds did not, however, mean an end to all private financing. But since the
state was offering financial assistance, it could legitimately exercise some
degree of supervision over parties' private sources of funds, so that the diversity
of their nature and amount did not in fact undermine the equality between
parties which the public financing arrangements were seeking to promote. Some
countries' parliaments or constitutional courts would even go so far as to
encourage parties to engage in profit-making activities as a means of
increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis their backers, whether public or private,
by generating their own funds.
For instance, the Czech
Constitutional Court did away with legislation prohibiting parties from carrying
on commercial activities. Czech political parties can now bring out
publications and hold cultural events for fund-raising purposes.
In Japan, in a decision of
24 June 1970 the Supreme Court ruled that, although private firms could also
continue to finance parties, under no circumstances must this become a means of
exerting pressure on the parties concerned.
Public and private sources of
funds therefore co-exist. But is it necessary to limit their respective
amounts? And have such limits been imposed in practice?
C. - Limits on financing
1. Where
the state finances political parties it is naturally free to decide the nature
and extent of the aid granted. A great variety of arrangements exist.
Some states offer extensive coverage of the cost of election campaigns,
parties' routine functioning and certain specific activities.
For instance, Austria
makes an annual grant to political parties holding at least five seats in the
National Council or those which, without having won any seats, polled more than
1% of the vote in the most recent elections.
Parties represented in the
Council also receive financial assistance for the running of election campaigns
(whether national or European).
Under a law of 1985,
parliamentary groups consisting of at least five MPs also receive an annual
grant to cover the cost of their work in the two chambers of parliament.
Apart from funding parties'
political activities in the true sense, under a law of 1984 on the promotion of
political training the state makes annual grants to fund political training
activities pursued by the parties through the mounting of exhibitions or
through foundations. Publication of periodicals for the purpose of dispensing
political training may also be subsidised by the state.
In Spain the same
principles govern the award of public subsidies. Firstly, there are "electoral"
subsidies. The law defines a state contribution to campaign expenses payable
not only to political parties but also to federations of parties and groups of
electors, in so far as they have won at least one seat. This contribution is
proportional to the number of votes polled.
Part of the subsidy may be paid
in advance, on the basis of the amount received by each individual party for
the previous election.
"Annual" subsidies,
intended to cover a party's day-to-day functioning, are payable according to
criteria based on the number of seats and votes obtained. One-third of the
total amount is distributed in proportion to the number of seats, and the
remaining two-thirds in proportion to the number of votes. Political parties
which did not win any seat are not entitled to this subsidy.
In France, the law of 1988
(section 9, as amended) provides parties with a source of public financing,
which is stable for the duration of parliament and represents a substantial
amount. As in Spain, a law of 15 January 1990 established the principle of
proportional distribution of the sum concerned, but on a half-and-half basis.
Half of the grant is based on performance in the general elections to the
National Assembly. It is payable to parties which field candidates in a minimum
number of constituencies and is proportional to the number of votes obtained in
the first round of voting by candidates standing for the party concerned. The
other half of the grant is calculated according to the number of members of
parliament who have stated that they belong to the party and is payable on
condition that the party already qualifies to receive the first half of the
grant.
2. The problem facing states which, alongside
other public or private institutions, decide to finance political parties is
striking a fair balance among all parties - in terms of the funds distributed -
and avoiding distribution based on arbitrary criteria, which would favour the
most powerful parties to the detriment of those which either did not score well
in the most recent elections or are newly formed and have not yet stood the
test of elections.
It is therefore important that
state financing should be calculated on the most objective, fairest basis
possible.
Constitutional courts whose
jurisdiction extends to electoral disputes and the regulation of election
campaigns must seek to ensure that such aid is equally balanced.
In Croatia, for example,
the Constitutional Court has upheld the right of a political party representing
a national minority to apply for reimbursement of its campaign expenses by the
state. In even more precise terms, the Constitutional Court of Slovenia
has held, conversely, that grants made to political parties by the state,
calculated on the basis of the score obtained in local elections, do not breach
the constitutional principles of the right to local self-government and the
right to vote.
In Hungary the
Constitutional Court has ruled that the legislation providing for state aid to
be granted solely to parties which obtained more than 1% of the votes cast in
the preceding election is not unconstitutional.
More often than not, national law
- of which we have seen a number of examples above - makes public aid for
political parties conditional on both the number of seats obtained and the
overall percentage score.
3. The
issue of private funding is more complex. It is therefore not surprising
that different countries have adopted different solutions in this field.
Some countries
permit private funding of political parties without imposing any restrictions
on its amount or origin. Others prohibit it and regard as lawful sources of
funds only grants made by the state and individual membership fees. Some
confine themselves to imposing maximum limits on private financing.
Examples of legislation or
case-law are cited below.
In Japan, in a decision of
24 June 1970 the Supreme Court held that private firms could contribute funds
to political parties, on condition that such financing did not constitute or
become a means of exerting pressure on the parties concerned.
In France, a law passed in
1990 made it lawful for firms to make contributions to political parties, where
such contributions were deemed to be in keeping with the firm's corporate
purpose, and specified that the amounts concerned would be deductible for
corporate income tax purposes. Contributions had to be paid to political
parties' financing associations or financial agents. However, the law did place
a limit on contributions by corporate bodies, which could not exceed a sum
specified on an annual basis. Since these financing arrangements gave rise to
many misunderstandings, a very strict law was passed on 19 January 1995,
banning corporate contributions to political parties.
Contributions by private
individuals may take only one of two forms. They may be
"identified", in which case a limit per donor is imposed, or may be
contributions from unidentified individuals collected at meetings, rallies or
fund-raising events.
D. - Supervision of financing
1. Supervision
may, firstly, take the form of a reporting requirement, making it
compulsory for each political party to explain the origin of the funds at its
disposal.
In Bulgaria, for example,
supervision of this kind is exercised by a standing committee of the National
Assembly (committee members may include civil society representatives), to
which political parties are required to submit an annual report indicating the
amount and the origin of their funds and expenditure incurred over the past
year.
Parties must file a similar
report two weeks after the holding of elections. Similarly, the many members of
parliament and newly appointed municipal councillors and mayors are required to
report their sources of funds and their campaign expenditure to the respective
body to which they belong within one month of the holding of elections.
Canada also requires the
submission of an annual report.
2. Supervision
may also be performed by Constitutional Courts. However, given that the
legislation governing such supervision is recent there is not yet enough
constitutional case-law to permit an assessment of the scope and effectiveness
of this form of supervision.
3. State
financial bodies (in particular an Auditor General's department) may also
be vested with some degree of supervisory authority (particularly Courts of
Auditors).
4. Lastly,
those who break the rules on party financing may be liable to criminal
penalties.
5. These
various techniques may moreover be applied concurrently. In Russia, for
instance, supervision of political party financing is exercised by both the
public prosecution service at the level of the Federation, which also monitors
social associations' compliance with the law, the Federation Ministry of
Justice, as the body which registers social associations and ensures that their
activities are in keeping with their statutory purposes, and financial bodies
(divisions of the Federation Auditor General's department, the tax
inspectorate), which monitor social associations' sources of income, the
amounts of the contributions that they receive and the payment of tax.
6. Some states rely on their political parties'
good sense and probity, trusting them to carry out their own internal supervision
by means of a number of non-contentious techniques such as audits, accounting
systems and their own statutory financing bodies.
7. Mention
can also be made of other more stringent means of supervision.
Where the law
has been broken, some states have no hesitation in even going so far as to
permit their constitutional court to disband or ban the offending political
party. Others empower, and even make it binding on, their electoral
commissions to refer to the courts any breaches of the electoral code that come
to their knowledge. A number of states merely confine themselves to imposing
financial penalties, for instance a reduction in the amount of state aid
granted the subsequent year.
Conclusion
It can be seen from an
examination of the various systems established by individual states to organise
political party financing in the best possible way that, although the chosen
techniques often differ considerably, the underlying concerns are the same
everywhere and the objectives fairly similar.
The constant aim is to meet the
requirements inherent in the inevitable cost of democracy. If the democratic
process is to function well, it is necessary both to limit, as far as possible,
and reduce expenditure by political parties and at the same time to safeguard
the principle of equality between parties, which often appears to be
jeopardised in favour of mainstream parties, which - because they obtain the
highest scores and the largest number of seats - are allocated considerable
public subsidies.
It is also necessary to ensure
greater transparency in the reporting requirements imposed on parties and more
thorough supervision of the uses made of the funds that they receive.
In the case of funds from private
sources there is doubtless also a need for stricter regulation in terms of the
fixing of limits and more severe penalties for those who break the law.
