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Venice, 18 October 2002
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Restricted
CDL (2002) 139
Or. fr.
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Opinion no. 190/2002
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE
COMMISSION)
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE
IN ELECTORAL MATTERS
GUIDELINES
AND
EXPLANATORY REPORT
Adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections
at its 2nd and 3rd Meetings
(Venice, 3rd July and 16 October 2002)
Contents
Page
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................
4
GUIDELINES ON ELECTIONS adopted by the Venice
Commission at
its 51st Plenary Session (Venise, 5-6 July 2002)...................................................................... 5
EXPLANATORY REPORT................................................................................................... 12
General remarks..................................................................................................................... 12
I. The underlying principles of Europe’s electoral heritage.................................................. 12
Introduction: the principles and their
legal basis................................................................... 12
1. Universal suffrage............................................................................................................... 13
2. Equal suffrage..................................................................................................................... 15
2.1. Equal voting rights............................................................................................................... 16
2.2. Equal voting power............................................................................................................. 16
2.3. Equality of opportunity........................................................................................................ 17
2.4. Equality and national minorities............................................................................................ 18
2.5. Equality and parity of the sexes............................................................................................ 18
3. Free suffrage....................................................................................................................... 18
3.1. Freedom of voters to form an opinion.................................................................................. 19
3.2. Freedom of voters to express their wishes and
combating electoral fraud............................. 19
3.2.1. Voting procedures............................................................................................................ 19
3.2.1.1. Postal voting or proxy voting in certain
circumstances.................................................... 20
3.2.1.2. Military voting............................................................................................................... 21
3.2.1.3. Mechanical and electronic voting methods...................................................................... 21
3.2.1.4. Counting....................................................................................................................... 21
3.2.1.5. Transferring the results................................................................................................... 22
4. Secret suffrage.................................................................................................................... 22
5. Direct suffrage.................................................................................................................... 23
6. Frequency of elections........................................................................................................ 23
II. Conditions for implementing the principles....................................................................... 23
1. Respect for fundamental rights.......................................................................................... 24
2. Regulatory levels and stability of the electoral law.......................................................... 25
3. Procedural safeguards........................................................................................................ 25
3.1. Organisation of elections by an impartial body...................................................................... 25
3.2. Organisation and operation of polling stations....................................................................... 28
3.3. Funding............................................................................................................................... 28
3.4. Security.............................................................................................................................. 29
3.5. Observation of elections...................................................................................................... 30
3.6. An effective system of appeal.............................................................................................. 30
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 32
Introduction
On 8 November 2001 the Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly, acting on behalf of the
Assembly, adopted Resolution 1264 (2001) inviting the Venice
Commission:
i. to set up a working group,
comprising representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly, the CLRAE and
possibly other organisations with experience in the matter, with the aim of
discussing electoral issues on a regular basis;
ii. to devise a code of
practice in electoral matters which might draw, inter alia, on the guidelines
set out in the appendix to the explanatory memorandum of the report on which
this resolution is based (Doc. 9267), on the understanding that this code
should include rules both on the run-up to the election, the elections
themselves and on the period immediately following the vote;
iii. as far as its resources
allow, to compile a list of the underlying principles of European electoral
systems by co-ordinating, standardising and developing current and planned
surveys and activities. In the medium term, the data collected on European
elections should be entered into a database, and analysed and disseminated by a
specialised unit.
The following guidelines are a concrete
response to the three aspects of this resolution. They were adopted by the
Council for Democratic Elections – the joint working group provided for by the
Parliamentary Assembly resolution – at its second meeting (3 July 2002) and
subsequently by the Venice Commission at its 51st Session (5-6 July
2002); they are based on the underlying principles of Europe’s electoral
heritage; lastly and above all, they constitute the core of a code of good
practice in electoral matters.
The explanatory report explains the
principles set forth in the guidelines, defining and clarifying them and, where
necessary, including recommendations on points of detail.
As requested in the Parliamentary Assembly’s
resolution, this document is based on the guidelines appended to the
explanatory memorandum to the report on which the Assembly resolution was based
(Doc. 9267). It is also based on the work of the Venice
Commission in the electoral field, as summarised in Document CDL (2002) 7.
GUIDELINES ON ELECTIONS
adopted by the Venice
Commission
at its 51st
Plenary Session
(Venice,
5-6 July 2002)
I. Principles of Europe's electoral heritage
The five principles underlying Europe's electoral heritage
are universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage. Furthermore,
elections must be held at regular intervals.
1. Universal suffrage
a. Universal suffrage means in principle that all
human beings have the right to vote and to stand for election. This right may,
however, and indeed should, be subject to certain conditions:
i. The right
to vote and to be elected must be subject to a minimum age.
ii. The right
to vote must be acquired, at the latest, at the age of majority.
iii. The
right to stand for election should preferably be acquired at the same age as
the right to vote and in any case not later than the age of 25, except where
there are specific qualifying ages for certain offices (e.g. member of the
upper house of parliament, Head of State).
i. A
nationality requirement may apply.
ii. However,
it would be advisable for foreigners to be allowed to vote in local elections
after a certain period of residence.
i. A
residence requirement may be imposed.
ii. Residence
in this case means habitual residence.
iii. A length
of residence requirement may be imposed on nationals solely for local or
regional elections.
iv. The
requisite period of residence should not exceed six months; a longer period may
be required only to protect national minorities.
v. the right
to vote and to be elected may be accorded to citizens residing abroad.
i. Provision may be made for
depriving individuals of their right to vote and to be elected, but only
subject to the following cumulative conditions:
ii. It must
be provided for by law.
iii. The proportionality
principle must be observed; conditions for depriving individuals of the right
to stand for election may be less strict than for disenfranchising them.
iv. The
deprivation must be based on mental incapacity or a criminal conviction for a
serious offence.
v.
Furthermore, the withdrawal of political rights or finding of mental incapacity
may only be imposed by express decision of a court of law.
b. Electoral registers
Fulfilment of
the following criteria is essential if electoral registers are to be reliable:
i. Electoral
registers must be permanent.
ii.
There must be regular up-dates, at least once a year. Where voters are not
registered automatically, registration must be possible over a relatively long
period.
iii. Electoral registers must be
published.
iv. There should be an
administrative procedure - subject to judicial control - or a judicial
procedure, allowing for the registration of the voter who was not registered;
the registration should not take place at the polling station on election day.
v. A similar procedure should
allow the voter to have incorrect inscriptions amended.
vi. A supplementary
register may be a means of giving the vote to persons who have moved or reached
statutory voting age since final publication of the register.
c. Submission of candidatures
i. The
presentation of individual candidates or lists of candidates may be made
conditional on the collection of a minimum number of signatures.
ii. The
law should not require collection of the signatures of more than 1% of voters
in the constituency concerned.
iii.
Checking of signatures must be governed by clear rules, particularly concerning
deadlines.
iv. The
checking process must in principle cover all signatures; however, once it has
been established beyond doubt that the requisite number of signatures has been
collected, the remaining signatures need not be checked.
v.
Validation of signatures must be completed by the start of the election
campaign.
vi. If a
deposit is required, it must be refundable should the candidate or party exceed
a certain score; the sum and the score requested should not be excessive.
2. Equal suffrage
This entails:
a. Equal voting rights: each voter has in principle
one vote; where the electoral system provides voters with more than one vote,
each voter has the same number of votes.
b. Equal voting power: seats must be evenly
distributed between the constituencies.
i. This
must at least apply to elections to lower houses of parliament and regional and
local elections:
ii. It
entails a clear and balanced distribution of seats among constituencies on the
basis of one of the following allocation criteria: population, number of
resident nationals (including minors), number of registered voters, and
possibly the number of people actually voting. An appropriate combination of
these criteria may be envisaged.
iii. The
geographical criterion and administrative, or possibly even historical,
boundaries may be taken into consideration.
iv. The
permissible departure from the norm should not be more than 10%, and should
certainly not exceed 15% except in special circumstances (protection of a
concentrated minority, sparsely populated administrative entity).
v. In order to guarantee equal
voting power, the distribution of seats must be reviewed at least every ten
years, preferably outside election periods.
vi. With multi-member
constituencies, seats should preferably be redistributed without redefining
constituency boundaries, which should, where possible, coincide with
administrative boundaries.
vii. When constituency boundaries are redefined –
which they must be in a single-member system – it must be done:
- impartially;
- without
detriment to national minorities;
- taking
account of the opinion of a committee, the majority of whose members are
independent; this committee should preferably include a geographer, a
sociologist and a balanced representation of the parties and, if necessary,
representatives of national minorities.
c. Equality of
opportunity
aa. Equality of opportunity must
be guaranteed for parties and candidates alike. This entails a neutral attitude
by state authorities, in particular with regard to:
i. the election campaign;
ii. coverage by the media, in
particular by the publicly owned media;
iii. public funding of parties
and campaigns.
bb. Depending on the subject
matter, equality may be strict or proportional. If it is strict, political
parties are treated on an equal footing irrespective of their current
parliamentary strength or support among the electorate. If it is proportional, political
parties must be treated according to the results achieved in the elections.
Equality of opportunity applies in particular to radio and television air-time,
public funds and other forms of backing.
cc. In conformity with freedom of
expression, legal provision should be made to ensure that there is a minimum
access to privately owned audiovisual media, with regard to the election
campaign and to advertising, for all participants in elections.
dd. Political party, candidates
and election campaign funding must be transparent.
ee. The principle of equality of
opportunity can, in certain cases, lead to a limitation of political party
spending, especially on advertising.
d. Representation
of national minorities
aa. Parties representing
national minorities must be permitted.
bb. Special rules guaranteeing
national minorities reserved seats or providing for exceptions to the normal
seat allocation criteria for parties representing national minorities (for
instance, exemption from a quorum requirement) do not in principle run counter
to equal suffrage.
cc. Neither candidates nor voters
must find themselves obliged to reveal their membership of a national minority.
e. Equal
representation of the sexes
Legal rules requiring a minimum percentage of persons of
each gender among candidates should not be considered as contrary to the
principle of equal suffrage if they have a constitutional basis.
3. Free suffrage
a. Freedom of
voters to form an opinion
aa. State authorities must
observe their duty of neutrality. In particular, this concerns:
i. media;
ii.
billposting;
iii. the right
to demonstrate;
iv. funding of
parties and candidates.
bb. The public authorities have a
number of positive obligations; inter alia, they must:
i. submit the
candidatures received to the electorate;
ii. enable voters to know the
lists and candidates standing for election, for example through appropriate
posting.
iii. The above information must
also be available in the languages of the national minorities.
cc. Sanctions must be imposed in
the case of breaches of duty of neutrality and voters' freedom to form an
opinion.
b. Freedom of
voters to express their wishes and action to combat electoral fraud
i. Voting
procedures must be simple.
ii. Voters should always have the
possibility of voting in a polling station. Other means of voting are
acceptable under the following conditions:
iii. Postal voting should be
allowed only where the postal service is safe and reliable; the right to vote
using postal votes may be confined to people who are in hospital or imprisoned
or to persons with reduced mobility or to electors residing abroad; fraud and
intimidation must not be possible.
iv. Electronic voting should be
used only if it is safe and reliable; in particular, voters should be able to
obtain a confirmation of their votes and to correct them, if necessary,
respecting secret suffrage; the system must be transparent.
v. Very strict rules must apply
to voting by proxy; the number of proxies a single voter may hold must be
limited.
vi. Mobile ballot boxes should
only be allowed under strict conditions, avoiding all risks of fraud.
vii. Two criteria should be at
least used to assess the accuracy of the outcome of the ballot: the number of
votes cast and the number of voting slips placed in the ballot box.
viii. Voting slips must not be
tampered with or marked in any way by polling station officials.
ix. Unused
voting slips must never leave the polling station.
x. Polling stations must include
representatives of a number of parties, and the presence of observers appointed
by the candidates must be permitted during voting and counting.
xi. Military personnel should
vote at their place of residence whenever possible. Otherwise, it is advisable
that they be registered to vote at the polling station nearest to their duty
station.
xii. Counting
should preferably take place in polling stations.
xiii. Counting must be
transparent. Observers, candidates' representatives and the media must be
allowed to be present. These persons must also have access to the records.
xiv. Results
must be transmitted to the higher level in an open manner.
xv. The state
must punish any kind of electoral fraud.
4. Secret suffrage
a. For the voter, secrecy of voting is not only a right but
also a duty, non-compliance with which must be punishable by disqualification
of any ballot paper whose content is disclosed.
b. Voting must be individual. Family voting and any other
form of control by one voter over the vote of another must be prohibited.
c. The list of persons actually voting should not be
published.
d. The violation of secret suffrage should be sanctioned.
5. Direct suffrage
The following must be elected by direct suffrage:
i. at least
one chamber of the national parliament;
ii.
sub-national legislative bodies;
iii. local
councils.
6. Frequency of
elections
Elections must be held at regular intervals; a legislative
assembly’s term of office must not exceed five years.
7. Electoral system
Within the respect of the above-mentioned principles, any
electoral system may be chosen.
II. Conditions for
implementing these principles
1. Respect for
fundamental rights
a. Democratic elections are not possible without respect for
human rights, in particular freedom of expression and of the press, freedom of
circulation inside the country, freedom of assembly and freedom of association
for political purposes, including the creation of political parties.
b. Restrictions of these freedoms must have a basis in law,
be in the public interest and comply with the principle of proportionality.
2. Regulatory
levels and stability of electoral law
a. Apart from technical and detail rules – which may be
included in regulations of the executive –, rules of electoral law must have at
least the rank of a statute.
b. The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular
the electoral system proper, membership of electoral commissions and the
drawing of constituency boundaries, should not be open to amendment less than
one year before an election, or should be written in the constitution or at a
level higher than ordinary law.
3. Procedural
guarantees
a. Electoral commissions
aa. An impartial body must be in
charge of applying electoral law.
bb. Where there is no
longstanding tradition of administrative authorities' independence from those
holding political power, independent, impartial electoral commissions must be
set up at all levels, from the national level to polling station level.
cc. The central electoral
commission must be permanent in nature.
dd. It should include:
i. at least
one member of the judiciary;
ii. representatives of parties
already in parliament or having scored at least a given percentage of the vote;
these persons must be qualified in electoral matters.
It may
include:
iii. a
representative of the Ministry of the Interior;
iv.
representatives of national minorities.
ee. Political parties must be
equally represented on electoral commissions or must be able to observe the
work of the impartial body. Equality may be construed strictly or on a
proportional basis (see point I.2.c.bb).
ff. The bodies appointing members
of electoral commissions must not be free to dismiss them at will.
gg. Members of electoral
commissions must receive standard training.
hh. It is desirable that
electoral commissions take decisions by a qualified majority or by consensus.
b. Observation of
elections
aa. Both national and
international observers should be given the widest possible opportunity to
participate in an election observation exercise.
bb. Observation must not be confined
to election day itself, but must include the registration period of candidates
and, if necessary, of electors, as well as the electoral campaign. It must make
it possible to determine whether irregularities occurred before, during or
after the elections. It must always be possible during vote counting.
cc. The places where observers
are not entitled to be present should be clearly specified by law.
dd. Observation should cover the
respect by the authorities of their duty of neutrality.
c. An effective
system of appeal
aa. The appeal body in electoral
matters should be either an electoral commission or a court. For elections to
Parliament, an appeal to Parliament may be provided for in first instance. In
any case, final appeal to a court must be possible.
bb. The procedure must be simple
and devoid of formalism, in particular concerning the admissibility of appeals.
cc. The appeal procedure and, in
particular, the powers and responsibilities of the various bodies should be
clearly regulated by law, so as to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction (whether
positive or negative). Neither the appellants nor the authorities should be
able to choose the appeal body.
dd. The appeal body must have
authority in particular over such matters as the right to vote – including
electoral registers – and eligibility, the validity of candidatures, proper
observance of election campaign rules and the outcome of the elections.
ee. The appeal body must have
authority to annul elections where irregularities may have affected the
outcome. It must be possible to annul the entire election or merely the
results for one constituency or one polling station. In the event of
annulment, a new election must be called in the area concerned.
ff. All candidates and all voters
registered in the constituency concerned must be entitled to appeal. A
reasonable quorum may be imposed for appeals by voters on the results of
elections.
gg. Time-limits for lodging and
deciding appeals must be short (three to five days for each at first instance).
hh. The applicant’s right to a
hearing involving both parties must be protected.
ii. Where the appeal body is a
higher electoral commission, it must be able ex officio to
rectify or set aside decisions
taken by lower electoral commissions.
EXPLANATORY
REPORT
General remarks
Alongside human rights and the rule of law,
democracy is one of the three pillars of the European constitutional heritage,
as well as of the Council of Europe. Democracy is inconceivable without
elections held in accordance with certain principles that lend them their
democratic status.
These principles represent a specific aspect of
the European constitutional heritage that can legitimately be termed the
“European electoral heritage”. This heritage comprises two aspects, the
first, the hard core, being the constitutional principles of electoral law such
as universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage, and the second the
principle that truly democratic elections can only be held if certain basic
conditions of a democratic state based on the rule of law, such as fundamental
rights, stability of electoral law and effective procedural guarantees, are
met. The text which follows – like the foregoing guidelines – is therefore in
two parts, the first covering the definition and practical implications of the
principles of the European electoral heritage and the second the conditions
necessary for their application.
I. The underlying principles of Europe’s
electoral heritage
Introduction: the principles and their legal basis
If elections are to comply with the common
principles of the European constitutional heritage, which form the basis of any
genuinely democratic society, they must observe five fundamental rules: suffrage
must be universal, equal, free, secret and direct. Furthermore,
elections must be held periodically. All these principles together
constitute the European electoral heritage.
Although all these principles are conventional
in nature, their implementation raises a number of questions that call for close
scrutiny. We would do well to identify the “hard core” of these principles,
which must be scrupulously respected by all European states.
The hard core of the European electoral heritage
consists mainly of international rules. The relevant universal rule is
Article 25 (b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which expressly provides for all of these principles except direct suffrage,
although the latter is implied.
The common European rule is Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights, which explicitly provides for the right to
periodical elections by free and secret suffrage;
the other principles have also been recognised in human rights case law.
The right to direct elections has also been admitted by the Strasbourg Court,
at least implicitly.
However, the constitutional principles common to the whole continent do not
figure only in the international texts: on the contrary, they are often
mentioned in more detail in the national constitutions.
Where the legislation and practice of different countries converge, the content
of the principles can be more accurately pinpointed.
1. Universal suffrage
Universal suffrage covers both active (the right
to vote) and passive electoral rights (the right to stand for election). The
right to vote and stand for election may be subject to a number of conditions,
all of which are given below. The most usual are age and nationality.
There must be a minimum age for
the right to vote and the right to stand for election; however, attainment of
the age of majority, entailing not only rights but also obligations of a civil
nature, must at least confer the right to vote. A higher age may be laid down
for the right to stand for election but, save where there are specific
qualifying ages for certain offices (senator, head of state), this should not
be more than 25.
Most countries’ legislations lay
down a nationality requirement. However, a tendency is emerging to
grant local political rights to long-standing foreign residents, in accordance
with the Council of Europe Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in
Public Life at Local Level.
It is accordingly recommended that the right to vote in local elections be
granted after a certain period of residence. Furthermore, under the European
integration process European citizens have been granted the right to vote and
stand for election in municipal and European Parliament elections in their EU
member state of residence.
The nationality criterion can, moreover, sometimes cause problems if a state
withholds citizenship from persons who have been settled in its territory for
several generations, for instance on linguistic grounds. Furthermore, under
the European Convention on Nationality
persons holding dual nationality must have the same electoral rights as other
nationals.
Thirdly, the right to vote and/or the right to
stand for election may be subject to residence requirements,
residence in this case meaning habitual residence. Where local and regional
elections are concerned, the residence requirement is not incompatible a
priori with the principle of universal suffrage, if the residence period
specified does not exceed a few months; any longer period is acceptable only to
protect national minorities.
Conversely, quite a few states grant their nationals living abroad the right to
vote, and even to be elected. This practice can lead to abuse in some special
cases, e.g. where nationality is granted on an ethnic basis. Registration could
take place where a voter has his or her secondary residence, if he or she
resides there regularly and it appears, for example, on local tax payments; the
voter must not then of course be registered where he or she has his or her
principal residence.
The freedom of movement of
citizens within the country, together with their right to return at any time is
one of the fundamental rights necessary for truly democratic elections.
If persons, in exceptional cases, have been displaced against their will, they
should, provisionally, have the possibility of being considered as resident at
their former place of residence.
Lastly, provision may be made for clauses
suspending political rights. Such clauses must, however, comply with
the usual conditions under which fundamental rights may be restricted; in other
words, they must:
-
be provided for by law;
-
observe the principle of proportionality;
-
be based on mental incapacity or a criminal conviction for a serious
offence.
Furthermore, the withdrawal of
political rights may only be imposed by express decision of a court of law.
However, in the event of withdrawal on grounds of mental incapacity, such
express decision may concern the incapacity and entail ipso jure deprivation
of civic rights.
The conditions for depriving
individuals of the right to stand for election may be less strict than for
disenfranchising them, as the holding of a public office is in issue and it may
be legitimate to debar persons whose activities in such an office would violate
a greater public interest.
The proper maintenance of electoral
registers is vital in guaranteeing universal suffrage. However, it is
acceptable for voters not to be included automatically on the registers, but
only at their request. In practice, electoral registers are often discovered
to be inaccurate, which leads to disputes. Lack of experience on the part of
the authorities, population shifts and the fact that few citizens bother to
check the electoral registers when they are presented for inspection make it
difficult to compile these registers. A number of conditions must be met if
the registers are to be reliable:
i. There
must be permanent electoral registers.
ii. There
must be regular updates, at least once a year, so that municipal (local)
authorities get into the habit of performing the various tasks involved in
updating at the same time every year. Where registration of voters is not
automatic, a fairly long time-period must be allowed for such registration.
iii. The
electoral registers must be published.
iv. The
final update should be sent to a higher authority under the supervision of the
impartial body responsible for the application of the electoral law.
v. A
supplementary register can enable persons who have changed address or reached
the statutory voting age since the final register was published, to vote.
vi. There
should be an administrative procedure – subject to judicial control – or a
judicial procedure enabling electors not on the register to have their names
included. In some countries, the closing date for entry in the supplementary
register may be, for example, 15 days before the election or election day
itself. The latter case, whilst admirably broad-minded, relies on decisions
made by a court obliged to sit on polling day, and is thus ill-suited to the
organisational needs on which democracies are based. In any event polling
stations should not be permitted to register voters on election day itself.
vii. Furthermore,
inaccuracies in electoral registers stem both from unjustified entries and from
the failure to enter certain electors. A procedure of the kind mentioned in
the previous paragraph should make it possible for electors to have erroneous
entries corrected. The capacity for requesting such corrections may be
restricted to electors registered in the same constituency or at the same
polling station.
The
obligation to collect a specific number of signatures in order to be
able to stand is theoretically compatible with the principle of universal suffrage.
In practice, only the most marginal parties seem to have any difficulty
gathering the requisite number of signatures, provided that the rules on
signatures are not used to bar candidates from standing for office. In order
to prevent such manipulation, it is preferable for the law to set a maximum 1%
signature requirement.
The signature verification procedure must follow clear rules, particularly with
regard to deadlines, and be applied to all the signatures rather than just a
sample;
however, once the verification shows beyond doubt that the requisite number of
signatures has been obtained, the remaining signatures need not be checked.
In all cases candidatures must be validated by the start of the election
campaign, because late validation places some parties and candidates at a
disadvantage in the campaign.
There
is another procedure where candidates or parties must pay a deposit, which is
only refunded if the candidate or party concerned goes on to win more than a
certain percentage of the vote. Such practices appear to be more effective
than collecting signatures. However, the amount of the deposit and the number
of votes needed for it to be reimbursed should not be excessive.
2. Equal suffrage
Equality
in electoral matters comprises a variety of aspects. Some concern equality of
suffrage, a value shared by the whole continent, while others go beyond this
concept and cannot be deemed to reflect any common standard. The principles
to be respected in all cases are numerical vote equality, equality in terms of
electoral strength and equality of chances. On the other hand, equality of
outcome achieved, for instance, by means of proportional representation of the
parties or the sexes, cannot be imposed.
2.1 Equal
voting rights
Equality
in voting rights requires each voter to be normally entitled to one vote,
and to one vote only. Multiple voting, which is still a common irregularity
in the new democracies, is obviously prohibited – both if it means a voter
votes more than once in the same place and if it enables a voter to vote
simultaneously in several different places, such as his or her place of current
residence and place of former residence.
In
some electoral systems, the elector nonetheless has more than one vote. In,
for example, a system that allows split voting (voting for candidates chosen
from more than one list), the elector may have one vote per seat to be filled;
another possibility is when one vote is cast in a small constituency and
another in a larger constituency, as is often the case in systems combining
single-member constituencies and proportional representation at the national or
regional level.
In this case, equal voting rights mean that all electors should have the same
number of votes.
2.2 Equal
voting power
Equality
in voting power, where the elections are not being held in one single
constituency, requires constituency boundaries to be drawn in such a way that
seats in the lower chambers representing the people are distributed
equally among the constituencies, in accordance with a specific apportionment
criterion, e.g. the number of residents in the constituency, the number of
resident nationals (including minors), the number of registered electors, or
possibly the number of people actually voting. An appropriate combination of
these criteria is conceivable. When this principle is not complied with, we
are confronted with what is known as electoral geometry, in the form
either of “active electoral geometry”, namely a distribution of seats causing
inequalities in representation as soon as it is applied, or of “passive
electoral geometry”, arising from protracted retention of an unaltered
territorial distribution of seats and constituencies. Furthermore, under
systems tending towards a non-proportional result, particularly majority (or
plurality) vote systems, gerrymandering may occur, which consists in favouring
one party by means of an artificial delimitation of constituencies.
Constituency
boundaries may also be determined on the basis of geographical criteria and the
administrative or indeed historic boundary lines, which often depend on
geography.
The
maximum admissible departure from the distribution criterion adopted depends on
the individual situation, although it should seldom exceed 10% and never 15%,
except in really exceptional circumstances (a demographically weak
administrative unit of the same importance as others with at least one
lower-chamber representative, or concentration of a specific national
minority).
In
order to avoid passive electoral geometry, seats should be redistributed at
least every ten years, preferably outside election periods, as this will limit
the risks of political manipulation.
In
multi-member constituencies electoral geometry can easily be avoided by
regularly allocating seats to the constituencies in accordance with the
distribution criterion adopted. Constituencies ought then to correspond to
administrative units, and redistribution is undesirable. Where a uninominal
method of voting is used, constituency boundaries need to be redrawn at each
redistribution of seats. The political ramifications of (re)drawing electoral
boundaries are very considerable, and it is therefore essential that the
process should be non-partisan and should not disadvantage national
minorities. The long-standing democracies have widely differing approaches to
this problem, and operate along very different lines. The new democracies
should adopt simple criteria and easy-to-implement procedures. The best solution
would be to submit the problem in the first instance to a commission comprising
a majority of independent members and, preferably, a geographer, a sociologist,
a balanced representation of the parties and, where appropriate,
representatives of national minorities. The parliament would then make a
decision on the basis of the commission’s proposals, with the possibility of
a single appeal.
2.3 Equality
of opportunity
Equality
of opportunity should be ensured between parties and candidates and should
prompt the state to be impartial towards them and to apply the same law
uniformly to all. In particular, the neutrality requirement applies to
the electoral campaign and coverage by the media, especially the
publicly owned media, as well as to public funding of parties and
campaigns. This means that there are two possible interpretations
of equality: either "strict" equality or
"proportional" equality. "Strict" equality means that the
political parties are treated without regard to their present strength in
parliament or among the electorate. It must apply to the use of public
facilities for electioneering purposes (for example bill posting, postal
services and similar, public demonstrations, public meeting rooms).
"Proportional" equality implies that the treatment of political
parties is in proportion to the number of votes. Equality of opportunity
(strict and/or proportional) applies in particular to radio and television
airtime, public funds and other forms of backing. Certain forms of backing may
on the one hand be submitted to strict equality and on the other hand to
proportional equality.
The
basic idea is that the main political forces should be able to voice their
opinions in the main organs of the country’s media and that all the political forces
should be allowed to hold meetings, including on public thoroughfares,
distribute literature and exercise their right to post bills. All of these
rights must be clearly regulated, with due respect for freedom of expression,
and any failure to observe them, either by the authorities or by the campaign
participants, should be subject to appropriate sanctions. Quick rights of
appeal must be available in order to remedy the situation before the
elections. But the fact is that media failure to provide impartial
information about the election campaign and candidates is one of the most
frequent shortcomings arising during elections. The most important thing is
to draw up a list of the media organisations in each country and to make sure
that the candidates or parties are accorded sufficiently balanced amounts of
airtime or advertising space, including on state radio and television
stations.
In
conformity with freedom of expression, legal provision should be made to ensure
that there is a minimum access to privately owned audiovisual media, with
regard to the election campaign and to advertising, for all participants in
elections.
The
question of funding, and in particular of the need for it to be transparent,
will be considered later.
Spending by political parties, particularly on advertising, may likewise be
limited in order to guarantee equality of opportunity.
2.4 Equality
and national minorities
In
accordance with the principles of international law, the electoral law must
guarantee equality for persons belonging to national minorities, which includes
prohibiting any discrimination against them.
In particular, the national minorities must be allowed to set up political
parties.
Constituency delimitations and quorum regulations must not be such as to form
an obstacle to the presence of persons belonging to minorities in the elected
body.
Certain
measures taken to ensure minimum representation for minorities either by
reserving seats for them
or by providing for exceptions to the normal rules on seat distribution, eg by
waiving the quorum for the national minorities’ parties
do not infringe the principle of equality. It may also be foreseen that people
belonging to national minorities have the right to vote for both general and national
minority lists. However, neither candidates nor electors must be required to
indicate their affiliation with any national minority.,
2.5 Equality and parity of the sexes
If there is a specific constitutional basis,
rules could be adopted guaranteeing some degree of balance between the two
sexes in elected bodies, or even parity. In the absence of such a
constitutional basis, such provisions could be considered contrary to the
principle of equality and freedom of association.
Moreover, the scope of these rules depends on the electoral
system. In a fixed party list system, parity is imposed if the number of men
and women who are eligible is the same. However, if preferential voting or
cross-voting is possible, voters will not necessarily choose candidates from
both sexes, and this may result in an unbalanced composition of the elected
body, chosen by voters.
3. Free
suffrage
Free
suffrage comprises two different aspects: free formation of the elector’s
opinion, and free expression of this opinion, i.e. freedom of voting procedure
and accurate assessment of the result.
3.1 Freedom
of voters to form an opinion
Freedom
of voters to form an opinion partly overlaps with equality of
opportunity. It requires the state – and public authorities generally
– to honour their duty of even-handedness, particularly where the use of the
mass media, billposting, the right to demonstrate on public thoroughfares and
the funding of parties and candidates are concerned.
Public
authorities also have certain positive obligations. They must submit lawfully
presented candidatures to the citizens’ votes. The presentation of specific
candidatures may be prohibited only in exceptional circumstances, where
necessitated by a greater public interest. Public authorities must also give
the electorate access to lists and candidates standing for election by means,
for instance, of appropriate billposting. The information in question must
also be available in the languages of national minorities, at least where they make
up a certain percentage of the population.
Voters’
freedom to form an opinion may also be infringed by individuals, for
example when they attempt to buy votes, a practice which the state is obliged
to prevent or punish effectively.
In
order to ensure that the rules relating to voters’ freedom to form an opinion
are effective, any violation of the foregoing rules must be punished.
3.2 Freedom
of voters to express their wishes and combating electoral fraud
Freedom
of voters to express their wishes primarily requires strict observance of
the voting procedure. In practice, electors should be able to cast
their votes for registered lists or candidates, which means that they must be
supplied with ballot papers bearing their names and that they must be able to
deposit the ballot papers in a ballot box. The state must make available the
necessary premises for electoral operations. Electors must be protected from
threats or constraints liable to prevent them from casting their votes or from
casting them as they wish, whether such threats come from the authorities or
from individuals; the state is obliged to prevent and penalise such practices.
Furthermore,
the voter has the right to an accurate assessment of the result of the ballot;
the state should punish any election fraud.
3.2.1 Voting
procedures
Voting
procedures play a vital role in the overall electoral process because it is
during voting that election fraud is most likely to occur.
In
some countries the implementation of democratic practices requires a radical
change of attitudes, which must be actively promoted by the authorities. In
this respect some measures have to be taken to control the habits and reflexes
which have a negative impact on the elections. Most of these irregularities,
such as “family voting”
occur during the voting procedure.-
All
these observations lead us to the following conclusion: the voting procedure
must be kept simple. Compliance is therefore recommended with the criteria set
out in the ensuing paragraphs.
If
the polling station officials represent a proper balance of political opinion,
fraud will be difficult, and the fairness of the ballot should be judged by two
main criteria alone: the number of electors who have cast votes compared with
the number of ballot papers in the ballot box. The first measure can be
determined by the number of signatures in the electoral register. Human
nature being what it is (and quite apart from any intention to defraud), it is
difficult to achieve total congruity between the two measures, and any further
controls such as numbering the stubs of ballot papers or comparing the total
number of ballot papers found in the ballot box plus those cancelled and unused
with the number of ballot papers issued to the polling station may give some
indication, but one should be under no illusion that the results of these
various measures will coincide perfectly. The risk in multiplying the
measures used is rather that the differences in the totals, and in the end the
real irregularities, will not be taken seriously. It is better to have strict
control over two measures than slack – and hence ineffective – control over a
larger number of variables.
Any
unused ballot papers should remain at the polling station and should not be deposited
or stored in different premises. As soon as the station opens, the ballot
papers awaiting use must be in full view on the table of the senior station
official. There should be no others stored in cupboards or other places.
The
signing and stamping of ballot papers should not take place at the point when
the paper is presented to the voter, because the signatory or the person
affixing the stamp might mark the paper so that the voter could be identified
when it came to counting the votes, which would violate the secrecy of the
ballot.
The
voter should collect his or her ballot paper and no one else should touch it
from that point on.
It
is important that the polling station officials include multi-party
representatives and that observers assigned by the candidates be present.
Voters
should always have the possibility of voting in a polling station; other means
of voting are, however, acceptable on certain conditions, as indicated below.
3.2.1.1 Postal
voting or proxy voting in certain circumstances
Postal
voting and proxy voting are permitted in countries throughout the western
world, but the pattern varies considerably. Postal voting, for instance, may
be widespread in one country and prohibited in another owing to the danger of
fraud. It should be allowed only if the postal service is secure – in other
words, safe from intentional interference – and reliable, in the sense that it
functions properly. Proxy voting is permissible only if subject to very
strict rules, again in order to prevent fraud; the number of proxies held by
any one elector must be limited.
Neither
of these practices should be widely encouraged if problems with the postal
service are added to other difficulties inherent in this kind of voting,
including the heightened risk of “family voting”. Subject to certain
precautions, however, postal voting can be used to enable hospital patients,
persons in custody, persons with restricted mobility and electors resident
abroad to vote, in so far as there is no risk of fraud or intimidation. This
would dispense with the need for a mobile ballot box, which often causes
problems and risks of fraud. Postal voting would take place under a special
procedure a few days before the election.
The
use of mobile ballot boxes is undesirable because of the attendant
serious risk of fraud. Should they nonetheless be used, strict conditions
should be imposed to prevent fraud, including the attendance of several members
of the polling station election commission representing different political
groupings.
3.2.1.2 Military
voting
Where
servicemen cannot return home on polling day, they should preferably be
registered at polling stations near their barracks. Details of the servicemen
concerned are sent by the local command to the municipal authorities who then
enter the names in the electoral list. The one exception to this rule is when
the barracks are too far from the nearest polling station. Within the
military units, special commissions should be set up to supervise the
pre-election period, in order to prevent the risk of superior officers’
imposing or ordering certain political choices.
3.2.1.3 Mechanical
and electronic voting methods
Several
countries are already using, or are preparing to introduce mechanical and electronic
voting methods. The advantage of these methods becomes apparent when a number
of elections are taking place at the same time, even though certain precautions
are needed to minimise the risk of fraud, for example by enabling the voter to
check his or her vote immediately after casting it. Clearly, with this kind of
voting, it is important to ensure that ballot papers are designed in such a way
as to avoid confusion. In order to facilitate verification and a recount of
votes in the event of an appeal, it may also be provided that a machine could
print votes onto ballot papers; these would be placed in a sealed container
where they cannot be viewed. Whatever means used should ensure the
confidentiality of voting.
Electronic
voting methods must be secure and reliable. They are secure if the system can
withstand deliberate attack; they are reliable if they can function on their
own, irrespective of any shortcomings in the hardware or software.
Furthermore, the elector must be able to obtain confirmation of his or her vote
and, if necessary, correct it without the secrecy of the ballot being in any
way violated.
Furthermore, the system’s
transparency must be guaranteed in the sense that it must be possible to check
that it is functioning properly.
3.2.1.4 Counting
The
votes should preferably be counted at the polling stations themselves, rather
than in special centres. The polling station staff are perfectly capable of
performing this task, and this arrangement obviates the need to transport the
ballot boxes and accompanying documents, thus reducing the risk of
substitution.
The
vote counting should be conducted in a transparent manner. It is admissible
that voters registered in the polling station may attend; the presence of
national or international observers should be authorised. These persons must
be allowed to be present in all circumstances. There must be enough copies of
the record of the proceedings to distribute to ensure that all the
aforementioned persons receive one; one copy must be immediately posted on the
notice-board, another kept at the polling station and a third sent to the
commission or competent higher authority.
The
relevant regulations should stipulate certain practical precautions as regards
equipment. For example, the record of the proceedings should be completed in
ballpoint pen rather than pencil, as text written in pencil can be erased.
In
practice, it appears that the time needed to count the votes depends on the
efficiency of the presiding officer of the polling station. These times can
vary markedly, which is why a simple tried and tested procedure should be set
out in the legislation or permanent regulations which appear in the training
manual for polling station officials.
It
is best to avoid treating too many ballot papers as invalid or spoiled. In
case of doubt, an attempt should be made to ascertain the voter’s intention.
3.2.1.5 Transferring the results
There
are two kinds of results: provisional results and final results (before all opportunities
for appeal have been exhausted). The media, and indeed the entire nation, are
always impatient to hear the initial provisional results. The speed with
which these results are relayed will depend on the country’s communications
system. The polling station’s results can be conveyed to the electoral
district (for instance) by the presiding officer of the polling station,
accompanied by two other members of the polling station staff representing
opposing parties, in some cases under the supervision of the security forces,
who will carry the records of the proceedings, the ballot box, etc.
However
much care has been taken at the voting and vote-counting stages, transmitting
the results is a vital operation whose importance is often overlooked; it must
therefore be effected in an open manner. Transmission from the electoral
district to the regional authorities and the Central Electoral Commission – or
other competent higher authorities – can be done by fax. In that case, the
records will be scanned and the results can be displayed as and when they come
in. Television can be used to broadcast these results but once again, too
much transparency can be a dangerous thing if the public is not ready for this
kind of piecemeal reporting. The fact is that the initial results usually
come in from the towns and cities, which do not normally or necessarily vote in
the same way as rural areas. It is important therefore to make it clear to
the public that the final result may be quite different from, or even
completely opposite to, the provisional one, without there having been any
question of foul play.
4. Secret
suffrage
Secrecy
of the ballot is one aspect of voter freedom, its purpose being to shield
voters from pressures they might face if others learned how they had voted.
Secrecy must apply to the entire procedure – and particularly the casting and
counting of votes. Voters are entitled to it, but must also respect it
themselves, and non-compliance must be punished by disqualifying any ballot
paper whose content has been disclosed.
Voting
must be individual. Family voting, whereby one member of a given family can
supervise the votes cast by the other members, infringes the secrecy of the
ballot; it is a common violation of the electoral law. All other forms of
control by one voter over the vote of another must also be prohibited. Proxy
voting, which is subject to strict conditions, is a separate issue.
Moreover,
since abstention may indicate a political choice, lists of persons voting
should not be published.
Violation
of the secrecy of the ballot must be punished, just like violations of other
aspects of voter freedom.
5. Direct
suffrage
Direct
election of one of the chambers of the national parliament by the people is one
aspect of Europe’s shared constitutional heritage. Subject to such special
rules as are applicable to the second chamber, where there is one, other
legislative bodies, like the Parliaments of Federate States,
should be directly elected, in accordance with Article 3 of the Additional
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. Nor can local
self-government, which is a vital component of democracy, be conceived of
without local elected bodies.
Here, local assemblies include all infra-national deliberative bodies.
On the other hand, even though the President of the Republic is often directly
elected, this is a matter for the Constitution of the individual state.
6. Frequency
of elections
Both
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights
provide that elections must be held periodically. General elections are
usually held at four- or five-yearly intervals, while longer periods are
possible for presidential elections, although the maximum should be seven
years.
II. Conditions
for implementing the principles
The
underlying principles of European electoral systems can only be guaranteed if
certain general conditions are fulfilled.
·
The first, general, condition is respect for fundamental human
rights, and particularly freedom of expression, assembly and association,
without which there can be no true democracy;
·
Second, electoral law must enjoy a certain stability, protecting
it against party political manipulation;
·
Last and above all, a number of procedural guarantees must be
provided, especially as regards the organisation of polling.
Furthermore,
elections are held not in a vacuum but within the context of a specific
electoral system and a given party system. This second section will conclude
with a number of comments on this aspect, particularly on the relationship
between electoral and party systems.
1. Respect
for fundamental rights
The
holding of democratic elections and hence the very existence of democracy are
impossible without respect for human rights, particularly the freedom of
expression and of the press and the freedom of assembly and association for
political purposes, including the creation of political parties. Respect for
these freedoms is vital particularly during election campaigns. Restrictions
on these fundamental rights must comply with the European Convention on
Human Rights and, more generally, with the requirement that they have a basis
in law, are in the general interest and respect the principle of
proportionality.
The
fact is that many countries have legal limitations on free speech,
which, if restrictively interpreted, may just be acceptable – but may generate
abuses in countries with no liberal, democratic tradition. In theory, they
are intended to prevent “abuses” of free speech by ensuring, for example, that
candidates and public authorities are not vilified, and even protecting the
constitutional system. In practice, however, they may lead to the censoring
of any statements which are critical of government or call for constitutional
change, although this is the very essence of democratic debate. For example,
European standards are violated by an electoral law which prohibits insulting
or defamatory references to officials or other candidates in campaign
documents, makes it an offence to circulate libellous information on
candidates, and makes candidates themselves liable for certain offences
committed by their supporters. The insistence that materials intended for use
in election campaigns must be submitted to electoral commissions, indicating
the organisation which ordered and produced them, the number of copies and the
date of publication, constitutes an unacceptable form of censorship,
particularly if electoral commissions are required to take action against
illegal or inaccurate publications. This is even more true if the rules
prohibiting improper use of the media during electoral campaigns are rather
vague.
Another
very important fundamental right in a democracy is freedom of movement within
the country, together with the right for nationals to return to their country
at any time.
2. Regulatory
levels and stability of the electoral law
In practice, however, it is
not so much stability of the basic principles which needs protecting (they are
not likely to be seriously challenged) as stability of some of the more
specific rules of electoral law, especially those covering the electoral system
per se, the composition of electoral commissions and the drawing of
constituency boundaries. These three elements are often, rightly or wrongly,
regarded as decisive factors in the election results, and care must be taken to
avoid not only manipulation to the advantage of the party in power, but even
the mere semblance of manipulation.
It
is not so much changing voting systems which is a bad thing – they can always
be changed for the better – as changing them frequently or just before (within
one year of) elections. Even when no manipulation is intended, changes will
seem to be dictated by immediate party political interests.
One
way of avoiding manipulation is to define in the Constitution or in a text
higher in status than ordinary law the elements that are most exposed (the
electoral system itself, the membership of electoral commissions,
constituencies or rules on drawing constituency boundaries). Another, more
flexible, solution would be to stipulate in the Constitution that, if the
electoral law is amended, the old system will apply to the next election – at
least if it takes place within the coming year – and the new one will take
effect after that.
For
the rest, the electoral law should normally have the rank of statute law.
Rules on implementation, in particular those on technical questions and matters
of detail, can nevertheless be in the form of regulations.
3. Procedural
safeguards
3.1 Organisation
of elections by an impartial body
Only
transparency, impartiality and independence from politically motivated
manipulation will ensure proper administration of the election process, from
the pre-election period to the end of the processing of results.
In
states, where the administrative authorities have a long-standing tradition of
independence from the political authorities, the civil service applies
electoral law without being subjected to political pressures. It is therefore
both normal and acceptable for elections to be organised by administrative
authorities, and supervised by the Ministry of the Interior.
However,
in states with little experience of organising pluralist elections, there is
too great a risk of government’s pushing the administrative authorities to do
what it wants. This applies both to central and local government - even when
the latter is controlled by the national opposition.
This
is why independent, impartial electoral commissions must be set up from
the national level to polling station level to ensure that elections are
properly conducted, or at least remove serious suspicions of irregularity.
According
to the reports of the Bureau of the Assembly on election observations, the
following shortcomings concerning the electoral commissions have been noted in
a number of member States: lack of transparency in the activity of the central
electoral commission; variations in the interpretation of counting procedure;
politically polarised election administration; controversies in appointing
members of the Central Electoral Commission; commission members nominated by a
state institution; the dominant position of the ruling party in the election
administration.
Any
central electoral commission must be permanent, as an
administrative institution responsible for liaising with local authorities and
the other lower-level commissions, e.g. as regards compiling and updating the
electoral lists.
The
composition of a central electoral commission can give rise to debate and
become the key political issue in the drafting of an electoral law.
Compliance with the following guidelines should facilitate maximum impartiality
and competence on the part of the commission.
As
a general rule, the commission should consist of:
- a
judge or law officer: where a judicial body is responsible for administering
the elections, its independence must be ensured through transparent
proceedings. Judicial appointees should not come under the authority of those
standing for office;
-
representatives of parties already represented in parliament or which
have won more than a certain percentage of the vote. Political parties should
be represented equally in the central electoral commission; “equally” may be
interpreted strictly or proportionally, that is to say, taking or not taking
account of the parties’ relative electoral strengths.
Moreover, party delegates should be qualified in electoral matters and should
be prohibited from campaigning.
In
addition, the electoral commission may include:
- representatives
of national minorities; their presence is desirable if the national minority is
of a certain importance in the territory concerned;
- a
representative of the Ministry of the Interior. However, for reasons
connected with the history of the country concerned, it may not always be
appropriate to have a representative of the Ministry of the Interior in the
commission. During its election observation missions the Assembly has
expressed concern on several occasions about transfers of responsibilities from
a fully-fledged multi-party electoral commission to an institution subordinate
to the executive. Nevertheless, co-operation between the central electoral
commission and the Ministry of the Interior is possible if only for practical
reasons, e.g. transporting and storing ballot papers and other equipment. For
the rest, the executive power should not be able to influence the membership of
the electoral commissions.
Broadly
speaking, bodies that appoint members to electoral commissions should not be
free to recall them, as it casts doubt on their independence. Discretionary
recall is unacceptable, but recall for disciplinary reasons is permissible -
provided that the grounds for this are clearly and restrictively specified in
law (vague references to “acts discrediting the commission”, for example, are
not sufficient).
In
the long-standing democracies where there are no electoral commissions but
where another impartial body is competent in electoral matters, political
parties must be able to observe the work of that body.
The
composition of the central electoral commission is certainly important, but no
more so than its mode of operation. The commission’s rules of
procedure must be clear, because commission chairpersons have a tendency to let
members ramble on, which the latter are quick to exploit. The rules of
procedure should provide for an agenda and a limited amount of speaking time
for each member – e.g. a quarter of an hour; otherwise endless discussions are
liable to obscure the main business of the day.
There
are many ways of making decisions. It would make sense for decisions to be
taken by a qualified (e.g. 2/3) majority, so as to encourage debate between
the majority and at least one minority party. Reaching decisions by consensus
is preferable.
The
meetings of the central electoral commission should be open to everyone,
including the media (this is another reason why speaking time should be
limited). Any computer rooms, telephone links, faxes, scanners, etc. should
be open to inspection.
Other
electoral commissions operating at regional or constituency level should have a
similar composition to that of the central electoral commission. Constituency
commissions play an important role in uninominal voting systems because they
determine the winner in general elections. Regional commissions also play a
major role in relaying the results to the central electoral commission.
Appropriate
staff with specialised skills
are required to organise elections. Members of central electoral commissions
should be legal experts, political scientists, mathematicians or other people
with a good understanding of electoral issues. There have been several cases
of commissions lacking qualified and trained election staff.
Members
of electoral commissions have to receive standardised training at all levels of
the election administration. Such training should also be made available to
the members of commissions appointed by political parties.
The electoral law should
contain an article requiring the authorities (at every level) to meet the
demands and needs of the electoral commission. Various ministries and other
public administrative bodies, mayors and town hall staff may be directed to
support the election administration by carrying out the administrative and
logistical operations of preparing for and conducting the elections. They may
have responsibility for preparing and distributing the electoral registers,
ballot papers, ballot boxes, official stamps and other required material, as
well as determining the arrangements for storage, distribution and security.
3.2 Organisation
and operation of polling stations
The
quality of the voting and vote-counting systems and proper compliance with the
electoral procedures depend on the mode of organisation and operation of the
polling stations. The reports of the Bureau of the Assembly on the
observation of elections in different countries have revealed a series of
logistical irregularities. For example, significant differences between
polling stations across different regions of the same State were noted.
Assembly
observation missions have also noticed several cases of technical
irregularities such as wrongly printed or stamped ballot boxes, overly complex
ballot papers, unsealed ballot boxes, inadequate ballot papers or boxes, misuse
of ballot boxes, insufficient means of identification of voters and absence of
local observers.
All
these irregularities and shortcomings, in addition to political party electioneering
inside the polling station and police harassment, can seriously vitiate the
voting process, or indeed undermine its integrity and validity.
3.3 Funding
Regulating
the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns is a further important
factor in the regularity of the electoral process.
First
of all, funding must be transparent; such transparency is essential
whatever the level of political and economic development of the country
concerned.
Transparency
operates at two levels. The first concerns campaign funds, the details of
which must be set out in a special set of carefully maintained accounts. In
the event of significant deviations from the norm or if the statutory
expenditure ceilings are exceeded, the election must be annulled. The second
level involves monitoring the financial status of elected representatives
before and after their term in office. A commission in charge of financial
transparency takes formal note of the elected representatives’ statements as to
their finances. The latter are confidential, but the records can, if
necessary, be forwarded to the public prosecutor’s office.
In
unitary states, any expenses incurred by local authorities in connection with
the running of a national election, the payment of election commission members,
the printing of ballot papers, etc, should normally be borne by the central
state.
It
should be remembered that in the field of public funding of parties or
campaigns the principle of equality of opportunity applies (“strict” or “proportional”
equality).
All parties represented in parliament must in all cases qualify for public
funding. However, in order to ensure equality of opportunity for all the
different political forces, public funding might also be extended to political
formations that represent a large section of the electorate and put up
candidates for election. The funding of political parties from public funds
must be accompanied by supervision of the parties’ accounts by specific public
bodies (e.g. the Auditor General’s Department). The states should encourage
a policy of financial openness on the part of political parties receiving
public funding.
3.4 Security
Every
electoral law must provide for intervention by the security forces in the event
of trouble. In such an event, the presiding officer of the polling station
(or his or her representative) must have sole authority to call in the
police. It is important to avoid extending this right to all members of the
polling station commission, as what is needed in such circumstances is an
on-the-spot decision that is not open to discussion.
In
some states, having a police presence at polling stations is a national
tradition, which, according to observers, does not necessarily trigger unrest
or have an intimidating effect on voters. One should note that a police
presence at polling stations is still provided for in the electoral laws of
certain western states, even though this practice has changed over time.
3.5 Observation
of elections
Observation
of elections plays an important role as it provides evidence of whether the
electoral process has been regular or not.
There
are three different types of observer: partisan national observers,
non-partisan national observers and international (non-partisan) observers.
In practice the distinction between the first two categories is not always
obvious. This is why it is best to make the observation procedure as broad as
possible at both the national and the international level.
Observation
is not confined to the actual polling day but includes ascertaining whether any
irregularities have occurred in advance of the elections (e.g. by improper
maintenance of electoral lists, obstacles to the registration of candidates,
restrictions on freedom of expression, and violations of rules on access to the
media or on public funding of electoral campaigns), during the elections (e.g.
through pressure exerted on electors, multiple voting, violation of voting
secrecy etc.) or after polling (especially during the vote counting and
announcement of the results). Observation should focus particularly on the
authorities’ regard for their duty of neutrality.
International
observers play a primordial role, in states which have no established tradition
of impartial verification of the lawfulness of elections.
Generally,
international as well as national observers must be in a position to
interview anyone present, take notes and report to their organisation, but they
should refrain from making comments.
The
law must be very clear as to what sites observers are not entitled to visit, so
that their activities are not excessively hampered. For example, an act
authorising observers to visit only sites where the election (or voting) takes
place could be construed by certain polling stations in an unduly narrow
manner.
3.6 An
effective system of appeal
If
the electoral law provisions are to be more than just words on a page, failure
to comply with the electoral law must be open to challenge before an appeal
body. This applies in particular to the election results: individual citizens
may challenge them on the grounds of irregularities in the voting procedures.
It also applies to decisions taken before the elections, especially in
connection with the right to vote, electoral registers and standing for
election, the validity of candidatures, compliance with the rules governing the
electoral campaign and access to the media or to party funding.
There
are two possible solutions:
- appeals
may be heard by the ordinary courts, a special court or the constitutional
court;
-
appeals may be heard by an electoral commission. There is much to be
said for this latter system in that the commissions are highly specialised
whereas the courts tend to be less au fait with electoral issues. As a
precautionary measure, however, it is desirable that there should be some form
of judicial supervision in place, making the higher commission the first appeal
level and the competent court the second.
Appeal to parliament, as
the judge of its own election, is sometimes provided for but could result in
political decisions. It is acceptable as a first instance in places where it
is long established, but a judicial appeal should then be possible.
Appeal proceedings should
be as brief as possible, in any case concerning decisions to be taken before
the election. On this point, two pitfalls must be avoided: first, that appeal
proceedings retard the electoral process, and second, that, due to their lack
of suspensive effect, decisions on appeals which could have been taken before,
are taken after the elections. In addition, decisions on the results of
elections must also not take too long, especially where the political climate
is tense. This means both that the time limits for appeals must be very short
and that the appeal body must make its ruling as quickly as possible. Time
limits must, however, be long enough to make an appeal possible, to guarantee
the exercise of rights of defence and a reflected decision. A time limit of
three to five days at first instance (both for lodging appeals and making
rulings) seems reasonable for decisions to be taken before the elections. It
is, however, permissible to grant a little more time to Supreme and
Constitutional Courts for their rulings.
The procedure must also be simple, and providing
voters with special appeal forms helps to make it so.
It is necessary to eliminate formalism, and so avoid decisions of
inadmissibility, especially in politically sensitive cases.
It is also vital that the
appeal procedure, and especially the powers and responsibilities of the various
bodies involved in it, should be clearly regulated by law, so as to avoid any
positive or negative conflicts of jurisdiction. Neither the appellants nor
the authorities should be able to choose the appeal body. The risk that
successive bodies will refuse to give a decision is seriously increased where
it is theoretically possible to appeal to either the courts or an electoral
commission, or where the powers of different courts – e.g. the ordinary courts
and the constitutional court – are not clearly differentiated.
Example:
Central
Election Commission → Supreme Court
↑
Regional
commission → Appeal Court
↑
Constituency
Election commission
↑
Polling
station (on election day)
Disputes
relating to the electoral registers, which are the responsibility, for example,
of the local administration operating under the supervision of or in
co-operation with the electoral commissions, can be dealt with by courts of
first instance.
Standing
in such appeals must be granted as widely as possible. It must be open to every
elector in the constituency and to every candidate standing for election there
to lodge an appeal. A reasonable quorum may, however, be imposed for appeals
by voters on the results of elections.
The
appeal procedure should be of a judicial nature, in the sense that the right of
the appellants to proceedings in which both parties are heard should be
safeguarded.
The
powers of appeal bodies are important too. They should have authority
to annul elections, if irregularities may have influenced the outcome, i.e.
affected the distribution of seats. This is the general principle, but it
should be open to adjustment, i.e. annulment should not necessarily affect the
whole country or constituency – indeed, it should be possible to annul the
results of just one polling station. This makes it possible to avoid the two
extremes – annulling an entire election, although irregularities affect a small
area only, and refusing to annul, because the area affected is too small. In
zones where the results have been annulled, the elections must be repeated.
Where higher-level commissions
are appeal bodies, they should be able to rectify or annul ex officio
the decisions of lower electoral commissions.
Conclusion
Compliance
with the five underlying principles of the European electoral heritage
(universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage) is essential for
democracy. It enables democracy to be expressed in different ways but within
certain limits. These limits stem primarily from the interpretation of the
said principles; the present text lays out the minimum rules to be followed in
order to ensure compliance. Second, it is insufficient for the electoral law
(in the narrow sense) to comprise rules that are in keeping with the European
electoral principles: the latter must be placed in their context, and the
credibility of the electoral process must be guaranteed. First, fundamental
rights must be respected; and second, the stability of the rules must be such
as to exclude any suspicion of manipulation. Lastly, the procedural framework
must allow the rules laid down to be implemented effectively.