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Strasbourg, 31 May 2005
Opinion no. 326 / 2004
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Restricted
CDL(2005)016rev
Engl. only
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE COMMISSION)
draft opinion
on A possible solution
to the issue of decertification of
police officers
in bosnia and herzegovina
on the basis of comments by
Mr Pieter van Dijk
(Member, the Netherlands)
Mr Jan Helgesen
(Member, Norway)
Mr Giorgio Malinverni
(Member, Switzerland)
I.
Introduction
1. By a letter of 8 December 2004, Mr Adnan
Terzic, Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, requested the assistance of
the Commission in finding an adequate solution to the issue of a possible
review of some of the decisions taken by UNMBiH until 2002 on decertification
of police officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. A working group, composed of Messrs Pieter
van Dijk, Jan Helgesen and Giorgio Malinverni,
was subsequently set up.
3. A preliminary discussion was held within the
Sub-commission on international law on 10 March 2005.
6. The present opinion, which was prepared on
the basis of the contributions of the members of the working group, was
discussed within the sub-commission on international law on … and subsequently
adopted by the Commission at its .. Plenary Session (Venice…)
II.
Background
7.
In the period 1996-2002, the United Nations International Police Task
Force (IPTF) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established under Annex 11 to the
Dayton Peace Accords (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina – GFAP), proceeded with the reorganisation of the police forces in
both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (pursuant to the Bonn-Petersberg
agreement of 1996)
and in the Republic Srpska
(see in particular the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1088/1996 and the
decisions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in London on 4-5 December
1996).
8.
The vetting process of police officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina was notably conducted
pursuant to IPTF Policies Nos. P10-2002 and P11-2002.
9.
The certification criteria set out in Policy P11 were the following:
Positive criteria (all to be
complied with):
- Demonstrated ability to perform police powers;
- Proof of citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina (original or certified
copy of the certificate would be accepted);
- Valid educational credentials;
- Completed Human Dignity and Transitional Course;
- Proof that no criminal case is pending (Certificate
from the court: original or certified copy would be accepted); and
- Compliance with the property legislation.
Negative criteria (any of which
would prevent certification):
- Failure to have demonstrated ability to uphold
human rights and/or abide by the law (e.g: pattern of abuses, of violations
of law and/or of duty);
- Officer made a deceptive statement in the context
of the registration process and/or certification process;
- Criminal proceedings against the officer have been
commenced by a domestic court, in case of war crimes (in accordance with
the Rules of the Road); and
- Non-compliance with the property legislation, when
an officer has been identified as:
1) an illegal
occupant, or
2) a multiple
occupant, or
3) having an
expired deadline specified in a court or administrative decision (i.e. 15 and
90 day), or
4) occupying
claimed property where there is a) housing authority and/or b) CRPC decision,
and s/he has failed to vacate within 30 days from receipt of the notification
sent by the IPTF Commissioner.
10.
Police Officers were registered by the UN/IPTF and given an ID card and
a registration number. They were then provisionally authorized to work as
police officials until final certification. After a review of their files,
police officers were either certified or denied certification.
11.
Before being certified, police officials who had been registered by the
UN were thus able to provisionally work as police officials. The provisional authorization could be removed.
The criteria and the procedure applicable to removals of provisional
authorization were outlined in Article 2 a) to h) of Policy no.
IPTF-10A/2002.
12.
The certified officers, who by their acts or omissions, would fall
within the scope of application of Policy IPTF-P10/2002 para. 2(a) to 2(h),
i.e. in the following cases:
·
Conviction of a serious breach of law, and the
law enforcement agency in which the officer is employed has failed to take
appropriate actions/sanctions in conformity with domestic law;
·
Conviction by a disciplinary panel of a serious
breach of duty, and the penalty assigned does not correspond to the severity of
the misconduct of the officer;
·
In the context of investigations conducted under
Security Council resolution 1088, UNMIBH/IPTF has obtained independent evidence
that an officer has committed a serious breach of duty that would obligate a
law enforcement agency and the judiciary to take action under domestic law;
·
An officer has committed a pattern of minor offences
that demonstrate disregard for upholding the law;
·
In the context of investigations conducted under
Security Council resolution 1088, UNMIBH/IPTF has obtained independent evidence
that an officer committed a serious breach of duty that would obligate a law enforcement
agency to take action under domestic law and rulebooks on disciplinary
procedure;
·
An officer has been issued two substantive
non-compliance reports as outlined in UNMIBH/IPTF “Performance Assessment
Policy” (IPTF-P05/2001);
·
An officer has made a material misrepresentation
to UNMIBH that fundamentally affects consideration of suitability to exercise
police powers; or
·
An officer, whose acts and/or omissions, and/or
functions from the period of April 1992 to December 1995, demonstrate the
inability or unwillingness to uphold internationally recognised human rights
standards.
were decertified.
13.
Non-certification and de-certification precluded the local police
officer from holding any position within a law enforcement agency in BiH.
14. A review of the decisions on both
removal of provisional authorization (carried out pursuant to Policy IPTF-
P10A/2002) and denial of certification (carried out pursuant to Policy
IPTF-P11/2002) could be sought before the Commissioner.
15.
The procedure was as follows: within eight days of the Commissioner’s
decision on non-certification or decertification, an appeal could be lodged
before a panel composed of UNMBiH staff members. The application was to be made
on the basis of the reasons for the refusal, but without access to the file and
the evidence. Neither the applicant nor a representative were allowed to appear
before the panel. The panel would make its recommendation to the Commissioner
who would then make the final and binding decision.
16.
According to the information provided by the UNMBiH, 16,762 officers
were certified, and 598 decertified, of which 150 have challenged the decisions
decertifying them before national courts.
17.
UNMBiH terminated its mission on 31 December 2002.
The continuation was ensured by the European Union with the European Union
Police Mission
as of 1 January 2003.
III.
Analysis
18.
A decision whereby an individual is prevented from continuing to
exercise his or her profession for life directly affects him or her in the
exercise of his or her profession. It must therefore be open for the individual
in question to challenge this decision before an independent and impartial
court in conformity with Article 6 ECHR,
or at least before a body competent to effectively review the merits of the
decision in accordance with Article 13 ECHR.
19.
Police officers are, however, public servants. The Commission thus considers
that it is appropriate, at the outset, to address the matter of applicability
of Article 6 ECHR to the decertification proceedings.
20.
The United Nations have recalled that, in its judgment Pellegrin v.
France, the European Court of Human Rights has stated that “the only disputes
excluded from the scope of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention are those which are
raised by public servants whose duties typify the specific activities of the
public service in so far as the latter is acting as the depositary of public
authority responsible for protecting the general interests of the State or
other public authorities. A manifest example of such activities is provided by
the armed forces and the police.”
Accordingly, in the opinion of the United Nations, the decertification
proceedings did not have to satisfy the requirements of Article 6 ECHR.
21.
The Commission is cognizant of the Pellegrin case-law. It recalls
however that Article 53 ECHR on safeguard for existing human rights provides
that: “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating
from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured
under the laws of any High Contracting Party. (…).” This provision means that
the European Convention, as interpreted by the European Court, represents a minimum common standard of
human rights protection in Council of Europe member states. National
legislation, as interpreted by the national courts, may well extend this
protection beyond the scope determined by the European Court. The latter’s position on a specific matter
must not be used to reduce the national scope of protection of that same
right.
22.
In the case under examination, the Human Rights Commission of the
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the highest human rights
authority in BiH, has extended Article 6 ECHR to cover disputes raised by
police officers.
23.
In the Commission’s opinion, this decision should not be questioned and
should serve as the starting point for the reflection on the situation
concerning the decertification of Bosnian police officers. The latter may
therefore legitimately invoke the protection of Article 6 ECHR.
24.
In addition, the Commission recalls that the decertification procedure
which was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovinaby the UN/IPTF was motivated by a very specific situation. As the United Nations
underline, after the war the Bosnian police forces counted 44,000 officers,
many of whom were demobilized soldiers and paramilitary personnel. A great
number of these personnel has inadequate qualifications and little or not
training in the core values of the rule of law and human rights. Some of them,
in addition, were known or suspected to have been involved in the continuing
commission of acts of ethnic violence or in organised crime.
25.
It follows that a decertification decision carried with it, in the
Commission’s opinion, certain negative inferences as to the relevant police
officer’s qualifications or, even, criminal involvement.
26.
A decision on decertification, therefore, was likely to have a negative
impact on the one hand on the officer’s reputation,
and on the other hand on the possibility for him or her to find another job in
the public administration and possibly in the private sphere. Accordingly, in the Commission’s opinion, the
relevant public officers’ right to respect for their private life, guaranteed
by Article 8 of the Convention, was at stake.
27.
Decisions whereby police officers are prevented from continuing to
exercise their profession would normally fall under domestic law, and domestic
courts would be competent to review them. However, in the circumstances under
consideration, they were taken by an international organisation rather
than by the competent national bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is due to the particular
constitutional arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The national authorities of Bosnia
and Herzegovina did not have any margin ofappreciation in respect of decertification recommendations issued by UN/IPTF,
and were therefore bound to implement them in order to comply with their
international obligations.
28.
As a result of this, the Bosnian courts, even if formally competent to
review the decisions of domestic authorities implementing UN/IPTF decisions on
denial of certification, have no competence to annul such decisions and order that
new ones should be taken, as they have no power to ignore or reverse the IPTF
recommendations on decertification.
29.
The Venice Commission considers thatthis situation of lack of effective domestic remedies is due to the immunity of
jurisdiction of the UN/IPTF : as a consequence, it should be analysed in a
similar manner as if the policemen had been employed by the United Nations and
consequently not subjected to the jurisdiction of domestic courts.
30.
In the opinion of the Human Rights Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina,the limitation on the relevant police officers’ right of access to a domestic court
which resulted from the impossibility for them to bring their case before a
court competent to examine the merits of their case is compatible with Article
6 ECHR.
31.
The Venice Commission recalls that theimmunity of international organisations from legal proceedings in courts of member states and other international
institutions is generally compatible with public
international law. The purpose
of this rule is to ensure that international organizations can perform their
tasks without undue and uncoordinated interference by courts from individual
states and other international institutions with their respective different
legal systems. Therefore, it is with good reason that international organizations
and their organs, such as the UN and UNMBiH (and their personnel) are not
subjected to legal proceedings in member states and before other international
institutions.
32.
It is particularly important in the present circumstances that the
authority of the United Nations Mission in Bosniashould not be undermined or diminished by allowing IPTF’s decisions to be
reopened by the national authorities of BiH after the end of the mandate of
the same mission.
33.
The Commission nevertheless refers to the case-law of the European Court
of Human Rights in the field of the immunity of jurisdiction of international
organisations.
The compatibility of the limitation on the right of access to a court depends
on certain factors such as the existence of adequate alternative means for
determining the claims. Compatibility in
that case rests on the assumption that the latter comply with the ECHR. “Adequate”
means providing sufficient guarantees in terms of independence and impartiality
and offering adequate procedural guarantees that could be said to fulfil the general
requirements of Article 6 ECHR or Article 13 ECHR, as the case may be.
34.
If that is not the case, that is to say if the alternative procedure
carried out within the international organisation in question is not capable of
ensuring compliance with internationally recognised human rights standards, the
State in question may not be exempted from its responsibilities under the ECHR.
35.
It is so, because compliance with human rights standards is so important
that no international mechanism or procedure may be allowed to circumvent it. Consequently,
a State may neither engage in international obligations, nor rely on these as a
justification for any action or omission, if these obligations result in such circumvention.
36.
The Venice Commission underlines thatthe Human Rights Commission has found
that the decertification proceedings before IPTF and the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (in that particular case, but the pattern was repeated in
several other cases) did not satisfy the requirements of Article 6 ECHR, on
account of the lack of public, adversarial, impartial and independent
examination of the applicants’ rights. In this respect, the Venice Commission
stresses that the Human Rights Commission has found that no breach of Article 6
ECHR had been committed by the national authorities. In the Venice
Commission’s opinion, instead, the Human Rights Commission suggested that such
breach, which had taken place, had indeed been committed by the UN/IPTF.
The Human Rights Commission, however, does not have any jurisdiction over the
UNMBiH, hence could not declare such breach.
37.
The Venice Commission recalls that Bosnia and Herzegovina did not decide to transfer
its powers in the field of police reorganisation to the United Nations: the UN
powers derived directly from the GFAP. Bosniais not free to choose to take back these powers: it follows that it cannot be
held accountable for shortcomings in the proceedings carried out by the United
Nations.
38.
It is therefore of the utmost importance that compliance with
international human rights standards be ensured by the United Nations itself.
39.
In the vetting process, IPTF has failed to provide the relevant police
officers with a public, adversarial, impartial and independent examination of
their rights,
while the review mechanism (see §§ 8 and following) appeared to be abortive for
the larger part.
40.
The VeniceCommission notes that no convincing justification has been adduced for this
failure. The United Nations underline that the certification of the Bosnian
police officers, as organized and administered by the IPTF, formed a core
component of the international community’s response to the situation then
prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina,which constituted “a threat to international peace and security”. The police apparatus
was inadequate to ensure the maintenance of law and order and the security of
the Bosnian citizens, and even represented a potential threat to the stability,
and integrity, of the State.
41.
The Venice Commission is aware of the situation as described by the
United Nations, and fully agrees that it was imperative to proceed with the
vetting process. Indeed, the VeniceCommission recognises the excellent work the United Nations has done in Bosnia;
the tasks performed by the IPTF, particularly in the area of restructuring of
the police forces, are part thereof and the difficulties faced in this respect
must certainly not be forgotten or underestimated.
42.
The Venice Commission, however, is of the opinion that the crucial
nature of this process in ensuring peace in Bosnia does not explain why, for
example, the police officers were not heard in person or allowed to make
submissions or challenge allegations against them, or why they were not provided
with access to their files and the evidence adduced against them. The need to
complete the process speedily, while at the same time preparing to wind down
the mission, may explain some of the shortcomings in question. It may not,
however, justify them.
43.
It must be underlined that in this respect, the UN-IPTF has carried out
tasks which are certainly more similar to those of a State administration than
those of an international organisation proper. It is inconceivable and incompatible
with the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights
that it could act or have acted as a State authority and be exempted from any
independent legal review.
In the Venice Commission’s opinion, transparency and accountability of
transitional territorial administration by international organisations are an
extremely important element of their credibility and authority Peace and security cannot but be fostered by
transparent and fair proceedings.
44. The United Nations should be ready
to fulfil IPTF’s mission “in accordance with internationally recognised
standards and with respect for internationally recognised human rights and
fundamental freedoms”.
45. The VeniceCommission considers therefore that it is appropriate that the United Nations
carry out a review process of the decertification decisions that have been
challenged before the Bosnian authorities after the end of 2002.
46.
It deems this to be even more so on account of the far-reaching
consequences of the decertifications: the policemen who were decertified are
prevented from continuing to exercise this profession for life.
47. It is obviously up to the Security
Council to decide on the body that most appropriately should review the
decertification proceedings that have been subject to legal challenge before
the domestic courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
48.
The Venice Commission, for its part, would recommend that the Security
Council set up a review body of (three) independent experts, entrusted with
reviewing the approximately 150 decertification cases which have been
challenged before the domestic courts.
49.
In this respect, the Commission notes with appreciation that, in a
letter addressed on 14 October 2004 to the High Representative of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr
Jean-Marie Guéhenno, indicated the readiness of the United Nations Secretariat
to assist “whatever competent agency may be authorised [by the Security
Council] to carry out a review of certification cases, by providing such agency
with the relevant files on a case-by-case basis”. The Commission welcomes this
readiness which would indeed be essential in order for the review body to carry
out its tasks.
50.
In the proposed SC Resolution, the task and relevant powers should be
given to the appropriate national authority (notably the Ministry of the
Interior of the FBiH) - in case the review body, in the light of any
potential new information provided to it by the applicants in the course of
adversarial proceedings, should come to the conclusion that the original recommendation
should be reversed - to implement a new recommendation by annulling its own
previous decision on decertification.
51.
The (three) members of the review body could be appointed by the Secretary General, in consultation
with the High Representative, also in the latter’s capacity as European Union Special
Representative.
52.
In the Venice Commission’ opinion, thereview process of the approximately 150 cases which are currently pending
before the Bosnian courts (several of which raise similar issues) could be
expected to be completed within a relatively short period of time. The review
body should be assisted by a small secretariat, which should immediately
proceed with preparing appropriate rules of procedure. The decisions should be
rendered in both English and the applicant’s local language.
IV.
Conclusions
53.
The Venice Commission considers ithighly appropriate that the decertification cases that have been challenged
before the Bosnian courts be reviewed by the United Nations. The Commission
wishes to underline that it by no means considers that domestic authorities are
entitled or competent to proceed themselves to review decisions on
decertification.
54. While it is up to the UN Security
Council to decide on the body that most appropriately should review the
decertification proceedings, the Venice Commission suggests that a special body
be set up by the Security Council and mandated to review the decertification
cases that have been challenged before the Bosnian authorities.
55.
This review body might be composed of (three) independent experts,
appointed by the UN Secretary General, in consultation with the High Representative,
also in the latter’s capacity as European Union Special Representative.
56.
This body would be competent to review the recommendations on
decertification previously made by IPTF, on the basis of the information previously
gathered by IPTF (with the assistance of the UN Secretariat) and in the course
of an adversarial procedure in which the former policeman concerned would be
allowed to have access to such a file (with the exception of duly classified
information) and provide new information.
57.
Should the review body come to the conclusion that the original
recommendation needs to be reversed, the competent national authorities would
have to implement the new recommendation and annul their previous decision on
decertification.
58.
The Venice Commission considers thatthis review body, with the assistance of a small secretariat, could be expected
to complete the review process within a short period of time (six months).
59.
The Venice Commission remains at the disposal of the Bosnian authorities
and of the United Nations, should any further assistance be necessary in this
matter.