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Strasbourg, 21
December 2006
Study No. 371 / 2006
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Restricted
CDL-EL(2006)033rev
Or. Fr.
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE COMMISSION)
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE ON REFERENDUMS
GUIDELINES
ON THE HOLDING OF REFERENDUMS
and
DRAFT EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
on the basis of
contributions by
Mr Pieter van DIJK (member,
the Netherlands)
Mr François LUCHAIRE (member,
Andorra)
Mr Giorgio MALINVERNI
(member, Switzerland)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.. 4
GUIDELINES ON THE HOLDING OF REFERENDUMS.. 5
Adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections. 5
at its 18th meeting. 5
(Venice, 12 October 2006) 5
and the Venice Commission. 5
at its 68th plenary session. 5
(Venice, 13-14 October 2006) 5
I. Referendums and Europe’s electoral
heritage. 5
1. Universal suffrage. 5
1.1. Rule and exceptions. 5
1.2. Electoral registers. 5
2. Equal suffrage. 6
2.1. Equal voting rights. 6
2.2. Equality of opportunity. 6
2.3. Equality and national minorities. 7
3. Free suffrage. 7
3.1. Freedom of voters to form an opinion. 7
3.2. Freedom of voters to express their wishes
and action to combat fraud. 8
4. Secret suffrage. 9
II. Conditions for implementing these
principles. 9
1. Respect for fundamental rights. 9
2. Regulatory levels and stability of
referendum law.. 9
3. Procedural guarantees. 9
3.1. Organisation of the referendum by an
impartial body. 9
3.2. Observation of the referendum.. 10
3.3. An effective system of appeal 10
3.4. Funding. 11
III. Specific rules. 11
1. The rule of law.. 11
2. The
procedural validity of texts submitted to a referendum.. 11
3. The substantive validity of texts
submitted to a referendum.. 12
4. Specific rules applicable to
referendums held at the request of a section of the electorate and to popular
initiatives (where they are provided for in the Constitution) 12
5. Parallelism
in procedures and rules governing the referendum.. 13
6. Opinion
of Parliament 13
7. Quorum.. 13
8. Effects
of referendums. 14
DRAFT EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM.. 15
GENERAL REMARKS.. 15
I. Referendums and Europe’s
electoral heritage. 15
1. Universal suffrage. 15
1.1. Rule and exceptions. 15
2. Equal suffrage. 16
2.2. Equality of opportunity. 16
2.3. Equality and national minorities. 16
3. Free suffrage. 16
3.1. Freedom of voters to form an opinion. 16
3.2. Freedom of voters to express their wishes. 17
II. Conditions for implementing these
principles. 18
2. Regulatory levels and stability of
referendum law.. 18
3. Procedural guarantees. 18
3.1 Organisation of the referendum by
an impartial body. 18
3.2 An effective system of appeal 18
3.3. Funding. 19
III. Specific rules. 19
1. The rule of law.. 19
2. The procedural validity of texts
submitted to a referendum.. 19
3. The substantive validity of texts
submitted to a referendum.. 20
4. Specific rules applicable to
referendums held at the request of a section of the electorate and to popular
initiatives (where they are provided for in the Constitution) 21
5. Parallelism in procedures and rules
governing the referendum.. 21
6. Opinion of Parliament 22
7. Quorum.. 22
8. Effects of referendums. 23
INTRODUCTION
1. In response to a request from
the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council for Democratic Elections and
subsequently the Venice Commission adopted the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters in
2002.
2. This document was approved by
the Parliamentary Assembly at its 2003 session (first part) and by the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe at its Spring 2003 session.
3. In a solemn declaration dated
13 May 2004,
the Committee of Ministers recognised “the importance of the Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters, which reflects the principles of Europe's
electoral heritage, as a reference document for the Council of Europe in this
area, and as a basis for possible further development of the legal framework of
democratic elections in European countries”.
4. As democracy spreads through Europe, both pluralist elections and the
use of referendums has become increasingly common.
5. Accordingly, for several years
the Parliamentary Assembly has taken an interest in the issue of referendums
and good practice in this area. Its work led, on 29 April 2005, to the adoption of Recommendation 1704 (2005) on “Referendums: towards
good practices in Europe”. The
Assembly worked in co-operation with the Venice Commission in this connection; the
latter submitted comments on the aforementioned recommendation at the Committee
of Ministers’ request and
drew up a summary report based on replies to a questionnaire sent to its
members on the issue of referendums. This report is entitled: “Referendums in Europe – An analysis of the legal rules in
European States”.
6. It was decided that a Council
of Europe background paper on referendums should be drafted to accompany the Code
of Good Practice in Electoral Matters. The Council for Democratic Elections
took on this task, on the basis of contributions by three members of the Venice Commission, Mr Pieter van Dijk
(Netherlands), Mr François Luchaire (Andorra) and Mr Giorgio Malinverni
(Switzerland).
7. The guidelines on the
organisation of referendums were adopted by the Council for Democratic
Elections at its 18th meeting (12 October 2006) and by the Venice Commission at its 68th plenary session (13-14 October 2006).
8. These guidelines are
accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, which was adopted by the Council for
Democratic Elections at its … meeting and by the Venice Commission at its … plenary session.
Adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections
at its 18th meeting
(Venice, 12 October
2006)
and the Venice Commission
at its 68th plenary session
(Venice, 13-14 October 2006)
Universal suffrage means in
principle that all human beings have the right to vote. This right may,
however, and indeed should, be subject to certain conditions:
the right to vote must
be subject to a minimum age but must be acquired, at the latest, at the age of
majority;
i. a nationality requirement may apply;
ii. however, it would be advisable for
foreigners to be allowed to vote in local elections after a certain period of
residence.
i. a residence
requirement may be imposed;
ii. residence in this
case means habitual residence;
iii. a length of
residence requirement may be imposed on nationals solely for local or regional
elections;
iv. the requisite
period of residence should be reasonable and, as a rule, should not exceed six
months;
v. it is desirable
that the right to vote be accorded to citizens residing abroad.
i. provision may be made for
depriving individuals of their right to vote, but only subject to the following
cumulative conditions:
ii. it must be
provided for by law;
iii. the
proportionality principle must be observed;
iv. the deprivation must be based on mental
incapacity or a criminal conviction for a serious offence;
v. furthermore, the
withdrawal of political rights or finding of mental incapacity may only be
imposed by express decision of a court of law.
Fulfilment of the
following criteria is essential if electoral registers are to be reliable:
i. electoral registers must be
permanent or refer to a register that is constantly updated (population
register or register of births, marriages and deaths);
ii. there
must be regular up-dates, at least once a year. Where voters are not registered
automatically, registration must be possible over a relatively long period;
iii. electoral registers must be
public;
iv. there should be an
administrative procedure – subject to judicial control – or a judicial
procedure, allowing for the registration of a voter who was not registered; the
registration should not take place as a result of a decision taken by the
polling station on election day;
v. a similar procedure should allow
voters to have incorrect inscriptions amended within a reasonable time;
vi. provision may be made for a supplementary
register as a means of giving the vote to persons who have moved or reached
statutory voting age since final publication of the register.
Each voter has in principle one vote; where the electoral
system provides voters with more than one vote (for example, where there are
alternatives), each voter has the same number of votes.
a. Equality
of opportunity must be guaranteed for the supporters and opponents of the
proposal being voted on. This entails a neutral attitude by administrative authorities,
in particular with regard to:
i. the referendum campaign;
ii. coverage by the media, in
particular by the publicly owned media;
iii. public funding of campaign and
its actors;
iv. billposting and advertising;
v. the right to demonstrate on
public thoroughfares.
b. In
public radio and television broadcasts on the referendum campaign, it is advisable
that equality be ensured between the proposal’s supporters and opponents.
c. Balanced coverage must be
guaranteed to the proposal’s supporters and opponents in other public mass
media broadcasts, especially news broadcasts.
Account may be taken of the number of political parties supporting each
option or their election results.
d. Equality must be ensured in terms
of public subsidies and other forms of backing.
It is advisable that equality be ensured between the proposal’s
supporters and opponents. Such backing may, however, be restricted to
supporters and opponents of the proposal who account for a minimum percentage
of the electorate. If equality is ensured between political parties, it may be
strict or proportional. If it is strict, political parties are treated on an equal
footing irrespective of their current parliamentary strength or support among
the electorate. If it is proportional, political parties must be treated
according to the results achieved in the elections.
e. Financial or other conditions for
radio and television advertising must be the same for the proposal’s supporters
and opponents.
f. In conformity with freedom of
expression, legal provision should be made to ensure that there is a minimum
access to privately owned audiovisual media, with regard to the referendum
campaign and to advertising, for all participants in the referendum.
g. Political party and referendum
campaign funding must be transparent.
h. The principle of equality of
opportunity can, in certain cases, lead to a limitation of spending by
political parties and other parties involved in the referendum debate,
especially on advertising.
i. Sanctions must be imposed in the
case of breaches of the duty of neutrality.
a. Special rules providing for an exception
to the normal vote-counting rules, in a proportional way, in the case of a
referendum concerning the situation of national minorities do not, in principle,
run counter to equal suffrage.
b.
Voters must not find themselves obliged to reveal their membership of a
national minority.
a. Administrative authorities must
observe their duty of neutrality (see 1.2.2.a. above), which is one of the
means of ensuring that voters can form an opinion freely.
b. Contrary to the case of
elections, it is not necessarily to prohibit completely intervention by the
authorities in support of or against the proposal submitted to a referendum.
However, the public authorities (national, regional and local) must not
influence the outcome of the vote by excessive, one-sided campaigning. The use of public funds by the authorities
for campaigning purposes must be prohibited.
c. The question put to the vote must
be clear; it must not be misleading; it must not suggest an answer; electors
must be informed of the effects of the referendum; voters must be able to
answer the questions asked solely by yes, no or a blank vote.
d. The authorities must provide
objective information. This implies that
the text submitted to a referendum and an explanatory report or balanced
campaign material from the proposal’s supporters and opponents should be made
available to electors sufficiently in advance, as follows:
a.
they
must be published in the official gazette sufficiently far in advance of the
vote;
ii. they must be sent directly to
citizens and be received sufficiently far in advance of the vote;
iii. the explanatory report must
give a balanced presentation not only of the viewpoint of the executive and
legislative authorities or persons sharing their viewpoint but also of the
opposing one.
e. The above information must be
available in all the official languages and in the languages of the national
minorities.
f. Sanctions must be imposed in the
case of breaches of the duty of neutrality and of voters’ freedom to form an
opinion.
a. Voting procedure
i. voting procedures must be readily
understandable by citizens;
ii. voters should always have the
possibility of voting in a polling station. Other means of voting are
acceptable under the following conditions:
iii. postal voting should be allowed
only where the postal service is safe and reliable; the right to vote using
postal votes may be confined to people who are in hospital or imprisoned or to
persons with reduced mobility or to electors residing abroad; fraud and
intimidation must not be possible;
iv. electronic voting should be in
conformity with Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation Rec(2004)11 on Legal,
operational and technical standards for e-voting. In particular, it should be
used only if it is safe, reliable, efficient, technically robust, open to
independent verification and easily accessible to voters; the system must be
transparent; unless channels of remote electronic voting are universally
accessible, they shall be only an additional and optional means of voting;
v. very strict rules must apply to
voting by proxy; the number of proxies a single voter may hold must be limited;
vi. mobile ballot boxes should only
be allowed under strict conditions that avoid all risks of fraud;
vii. at least two criteria should be
used to assess the accuracy of the outcome of the ballot: the number of votes
cast and the number of voting slips placed in the ballot box;
viii. voting slips must not be
tampered with or marked in any way by polling station officials;
ix. unused and invalid
voting slips must never leave the polling station;
x. polling stations must include
representatives of a number of parties, and the presence of observers appointed
by the latter or by other groups that have taken a stand on the issue put to
the vote must be permitted during voting and counting;
xi. military personnel should vote
at their place of residence whenever possible. Otherwise, it is advisable that
they be registered to vote at the polling station nearest to their duty
station;
xii. counting should
preferably take place in polling stations;
xiii. counting must be transparent.
Observers, representatives of the proposal’s supporters and opponents and the
media must be allowed to be present. These persons must also have access to the
records;
xiv. results must be
transmitted to the higher level in an open manner;
xv. the state must
punish any kind of electoral fraud.
b. Freedom of voters to express
their wishes also implies:
i. that the executive must organise
referendums provided for by the legislative system; this is particularly
important when it is not subject to the executive’s initiative;
ii. compliance with the procedural
rules; in particular, referendums must be held within the time-limit prescribed
by law;
iii. the right to accurate
establishment of the result by the body responsible for organising the
referendum, in a transparent manner, and formal publication in the official
gazette.
a. For the voter, secrecy of voting is not only a right but
also a duty, non-compliance with which must be punishable by disqualification
of any ballot paper whose content is disclosed.
b. Voting must be individual. Family voting and any other
form of control by one voter over the vote of another must be prohibited.
c. The list of persons actually voting should not be
published.
d. The violation of secret suffrage should be sanctioned.
a. Democratic referendums are not possible without respect
for human rights, in particular freedom of expression and of the press, freedom
of movement inside the country, freedom of assembly and freedom of association
for political purposes, including freedom to set up political parties.
b. Restrictions on these freedoms must have a basis in law,
be in the public interest and comply with the principle of proportionality.
a. Apart from rules on technical matters and detail (which
may be included in regulations of the executive), rules of referendum law
should have at least the rank of a statute.
b. The fundamental aspects of referendum law should not be
open to amendment less than one year before a referendum, or should be written
in the Constitution or at a level superior to ordinary law.
c. Fundamental rules include, in particular, those
concerning:
- the composition of
electoral commissions or any other body responsible for organising the
referendum;
- the franchise and
electoral registers;
- the procedural and
substantive validity of the text put to a referendum;
- the effects of the
referendum (with the exception of rules concerning matters of detail)
- the participation of
the proposal’s supporters and opponents to broadcasts of public media.
a. An impartial body must be in
charge of organising the referendum.
b. Where there is no longstanding
tradition of administrative authorities’ impartiality in electoral matters,
independent, impartial electoral commissions must be set up at all levels, from
the national level to polling station level.
c. The central commission must be
permanent in nature.
d. It should include:
i. at least one member
of the judiciary or other independent legal expert;
ii. representatives of parties
already in Parliament or having scored at least a given percentage of the vote;
these persons must be qualified in electoral matters.
It may include:
iii. a representative
of the Ministry of the Interior;
iv. representatives of
national minorities.
e. Political parties or supporters
and opponents of the proposal put to the vote must be equally represented on
electoral commissions or must be able to observe the work of the impartial
body. Equality between political parties may be construed strictly or on a
proportional basis (see I.2.2.d.).
f. The bodies appointing members of
commissions must not be free to dismiss them at will.
g. Members of commissions must
receive standard training.
h. It is desirable that commissions
take decisions by a qualified majority or by consensus.
a. Both national and international observers
should be given the widest possible opportunity to participate in a referendum
observation exercise.
b. Observation must not be confined
to election day itself, but must include the referendum campaign and, where
appropriate, the voter registration period and the signature collection period.
It must make it possible to determine whether irregularities occurred before,
during or after the vote. It must always be possible during vote counting.
c. Observers should be able to go
everywhere where operations connected with the referendum are taking place (for
example, vote counting and verification). The places where observers are not
entitled to be present should be clearly specified by law, with the reasons for
their being banned.
d. Observation should cover respect
by the authorities of their duty of neutrality.
a. The appeal body in referendum
matters should be either an electoral commission or a court. In any case, final
appeal to a court must be possible.
b. The procedure must be simple and
devoid of formalism, in particular where the admissibility of appeals is
concerned.
c. The appeal procedure and, in
particular, the powers and responsibilities of the various bodies should be
clearly regulated by law, so as to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction (whether
positive or negative). The law must specifically designate the competent body
in each case.
d. The appeal body must be competent
to deal with the sphere covered by these guidelines, in particular with:
- the franchise and electoral
registers;
- the completion of popular
initiatives and requests for referendums from a section of the electorate;
- the procedural and, where
applicable, substantive validity of texts submitted to a referendum: the review
of the validity of texts should take place before the vote; domestic law
determines whether such review is obligatory or optional;
- respect for free suffrage:
- the results of the ballot.
e. The appeal body must have
authority to annul the referendum where irregularities may have affected the
outcome. It must be possible to annul
the entire referendum or merely the results for one polling station or
constituency. In the event of annulment of the global result, a new referendum
must be called.
f. All voters must be entitled to
appeal. A reasonable quorum may be imposed for appeals by voters against the
results of a referendum.
g. Time-limits for lodging and
deciding appeals must be short.
h. The applicant’s right to a
hearing involving both parties must be protected.
i. Where the appeal body is a higher
electoral commission, it must be able ex officio to rectify or set aside decisions
taken by lower electoral commissions.
a. The general rules on the funding
of political parties and electoral campaigns must be applied to both public and
private funding.
b. The use of public funds by the
authorities for campaigning purposes must be prohibited.
The use of referendums must comply with the legal system as
a whole, and especially the procedural rules. In particular, referendums cannot
be held if the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the Constitution does
not provide for them, for example where the text submitted to a referendum is a
matter for Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Questions submitted to a referendum must respect:
- unity of form: the same question must not combine a
specifically-worded draft amendment with a generally-worded proposal or a
question of principle;
- unity of content: except in the case of total
revision of a text (Constitution, law), there must be an intrinsic connection
between the various parts of each question put to the vote, in order to
guarantee the free suffrage of the voter, who must not be called to accept or
refuse as a whole provisions without an intrinsic link; the revision of several
chapters of a text at the same time is equivalent to a total revision;
- unity of hierarchical level: it is desirable that
the same question should not simultaneously apply to legislation of different
hierarchical levels.
Texts submitted to a referendum must comply with all superior
law (principle of the hierarchy of norms).
They must not be contrary to international law or to the
Council of Europe’s statutory principles (democracy, human rights and the rule
of law).
Texts submitted to a constitutional referendum must abide by
the substantive limits (intrinsic and extrinsic) of constitutional reform.
Texts that contradict the requirements mentioned under III.2
and III.3 may not be put to the popular vote.
a. Everyone enjoying political
rights is entitled to sign a popular initiative or request for a referendum.
b. The time-limit for collecting
signatures (particularly the day on which the time-limit starts to run and the
last day of the time-limit) must be clearly specified, as well as the number of
signatures to be collected.
c. Everyone (regardless of whether
he or she enjoys political rights) must be entitled to collect signatures.
d. If authorisation is required in
order to gather signatures for popular initiatives or requests for a referendum
on public thoroughfares, such authorisation may be refused only in specific
cases provided for by law, on the basis of overriding public interest and in
accordance with the principle of equality.
e. Payment from private sources for
the collection of signatures for popular initiatives and requests for
referendums should, as a rule, be prohibited. If permitted, it must be
regulated, with regard to both the total amount allocated and the amount paid
to each person.
f. All signatures must be
checked. In order to facilitate
checking, lists of signatures should preferably contain the names of electors
registered in the same municipality.
g. In order to avoid having to
declare a vote totally invalid, an authority must have the power, prior to the
vote, to correct faulty drafting, for example:
i.
when the question is obscure, misleading or suggestive;
ii. when rules on procedural or
substantive validity have been violated; in this event, partial invalidity may
be declared if the remaining text is coherent; sub-division may be envisaged to
correct a lack of substantive unity.
a. When the referendum is legally
binding:
i. For a certain period of time, a
text that has been rejected in a referendum may not be adopted by a procedure
without referendum.
ii. During the same period of time,
a provision that has been accepted in a referendum may not be revised by
another method.
iii. The above does not apply in the
case of a referendum on partial revision of a text, where the previous
referendum concerned a total revision.
iv. The revision of a rule of superior
law that is contrary to the popular vote is not legally unacceptable but should
be avoided during the above-mentioned period.
v. In the event of rejection of a
text adopted by Parliament and put to the popular vote at the request of a
section of the electorate, a similar new text must not be put to the vote
unless a referendum is requested.
b. When a text is adopted by
referendum at the request of a section of the electorate, it should be possible
to organise a further referendum on the same issue at the request of a section
of the electorate, after the expiry, where applicable, of a reasonable period
of time.
c. When a text is adopted by
referendum at the request of an authority other than Parliament, it should be
possible to revise it either by parliamentary means or by referendum, at the
request of Parliament or a section of the electorate, after the expiry, where
applicable, of the same period of time.
d. It is advisable for constitutional
rules relating to referendums to be put to a referendum, compulsorily or at the
request of ap section of the electorate.
When a text is put to the vote at the request of a section
of the electorate or an authority other than Parliament, Parliament must be
able to give a non-binding opinion on the text put to the vote. In the case of
the popular initiatives, it may be entitled to put forward a counter-proposal
to the proposed text, which will be put the popular vote at the same time. A
deadline must be set for Parliament to give its opinion: if this deadline is
not met, the text will be put to the popular vote without Parliament’s opinion.
It is advisable not to provide for:
a. a turn-out quorum (threshold,
minimum percentage), because it assimilates voters who abstain to those who
vote no;
b. an approval quorum (approval by a
minimum percentage of registered voters), since it risks involving a difficult
political situation if the draft is adopted by a simple majority lower than the
necessary threshold.
a. The effects of legally binding or
consultative referendums must be clearly specified in the Constitution or by
law.
b. Referendums on questions of
principle or other generally-worded proposals should preferably not be binding.
If they are binding, the subsequent procedure should be laid down in specific
rules.
1. This
explanatory memorandum is intended to elaborate on those aspects of the above
guidelines that are specific to referendums. Accordingly, it does not comment
on the principles and general rules applicable to both elections and
referendums. The explanatory memorandum to the Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters[10]
may be referred to in this connection. As far as possible, the guidelines on
the holding of referendums echo the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters.
Not every aspect of the guidelines will be discussed in detail.
2. A number of
textual adjustments were necessary, such as replacing the word “election” with
“referendum”. Others, resulting from the specific nature of referendums, will
not be further discussed. For instance, no reference is made to the right to
stand for election (see point I.1.1.a, for example), the submission of
candidatures
or the distribution of seats between the constituencies (equal voting power);
the possibility of electors casting more than one vote relates to alternatives
rather than preference vote or cross-voting (point I.2.1); election (or rather
referendum) observation must be extended to the signature collection period
(point II.3.2.b).
3. In addition,
the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters has been clarified in response
to questions raised in connection with its application. For instance, the
requirement for permanent electoral rolls is satisfied if they refer to a
register that is constantly updated (population register or register of births,
marriages and deaths) (point I.1.2.i); it is expressly stated that observers
must be able to go wherever referendum-related operations are taking place
(point II.3.2.c).
4. Other points
take into account the adoption of new texts by the Venice Commission
or by Council of Europe organs.
5. It should be
made clear that the guidelines apply to all referendums – national, regional
and local – regardless of the nature of the question they concern
(constitutional, legislative or other). Each reference to Parliament also
applies to regional or local assemblies.
I. Referendums and Europe’s electoral heritage
1. Universal suffrage
1.1. Rule and
exceptions
6. The conditions
for according the right to vote are normally the same for both referendums and
elections. In particular, a period of residence requirement may be imposed on
nationals solely for local and regional referendums, and should not exceed six
months other than in exceptional circumstances (point I.1.1.c.iii-iv).
7. It is
desirable that the right to vote be accorded to citizens residing abroad, at
least for national referendums. It is important to ensure that this does not
lead to fraud, however. Accordingly, it is preferable not to record such people
on the same register as residents, but to allow them to vote abroad or from
abroad; in addition, this will help ensure that they exercise their right to
vote, which is unlikely if they have to return to their home country for the
sole purpose of voting (point I.1.1.c.v).
2. Equal suffrage
2.2. Equality
of opportunity
8. Respect for
equality of opportunity is crucial for both referendums and elections. While in
elections equality must be ensured between parties and between candidates,
simply replicating this principle in the case of referendums may lead to an
unsatisfactory situation. In countries with popular initiatives or optional
referendums, these are often not instigated by a political party, and may even
propose an option that is rejected by the largest parties – such as reducing
the number of members of Parliament or public funding of parties. Accordingly,
the guidelines emphasise equality between the supporters and opponents of the
proposal being voted on notably as concerns the coverage by the media, in
particular in news broadcasts, as well as public subsidies and other forms of
backing; in this framework, account may be taken of the number of political
parties supporting each option or their election results (points I.2.2.a-e).
9. It would be
unrealistic to require a perfect balance between a text’s supporters and
opponents in all cases. It may be that a degree of consensus emerges in one
direction or the other – particularly in the case of a mandatory referendum on
a proposal having required a qualified parliamentary majority. Supporters and
opponents must always be guaranteed access to the public media, however. As
long as this requirement is satisfied, account may be taken of the number of
political parties supporting each option or of their election results,
especially in news broadcasts (point I.2.2.c).
10. Similarly, it
is advisable to ensure equality between the proposal’s supporters and opponents
in terms of public subsidies and other forms of backing. Such backing may be
restricted to supporters and opponents of the proposal who account for a
minimum percentage of the electorate, provided that the support received by
each side is balanced. If equality is ensured between political parties, it may
be proportional, taking account of their election results. Allocating funds to
the parties alone is not the ideal solution, however, as explained above (point
I.2.2.d).
2.3. Equality
and national minorities
11. As in the
case of elections, there may sometimes be grounds for taking into account the
specific circumstances of national minorities. In particular, this would apply
to a referendum on self-government for a territory with a relatively high
concentration of a minority population: a double majority of electors within
that territory and throughout the country may be required.
3. Free suffrage
12. In the case
of elections, intervention by the authorities in support of a list or a
candidate is unacceptable: their duty of neutrality is absolute. An authority
must not use its position, or public funds, to stay in power; nor must it do so
on behalf of its supporters in another organ.
13. The situation
is different in the case of referendums, since it is legitimate for the
different organs of government to convey their viewpoint in the debate for or
against the text put to the vote. They must not abuse their position, however.
In any event, the use of public funds for campaigning purposes must be
prohibited in order to guarantee equality of opportunity and the freedom of
voters to form an opinion. In addition, the public authorities at every level
(national, regional or local), must not engage in excessive, one-sided
campaigning, but show neutrality. Clearly, this does not mean they will not
take a stand, but they must provide a certain amount of necessary information
in order to enable voters to arrive at an informed opinion. Voters must be able
to acquaint themselves, sufficiently in advance, with both the text put to the
vote and, above all, a detailed explanation (point I.3.1.d):
-
the
best solution is for the authorities to provide voters with an explanatory
report setting out not only their viewpoint or that of persons sharing it, but
also the opposing viewpoint, in a balanced way;
-
another
possibility would be for the authorities to send voters balanced campaign
material from the proposal’s supporters and opponents – corresponding, mutatis mutandis, to candidates’ election addresses made available to citizens prior to
some elections.
14. Both the text
and the explanatory report or balanced campaign material must be sent directly
to citizens sufficiently in advance of the vote (at least two weeks
beforehand).
15. The clarity
of the question is a crucial aspect of voters’ freedom to form an opinion. The
question must not be misleading; it must not suggest an answer, particularly by
mentioning the presumed consequences of approving or rejecting the proposal;
voters must be able to answer the questions asked solely by yes, no or a blank
vote; and it must not ask an open question necessitating a more detailed
answer. Lastly, electors must be informed of the impact of their votes, and
thus of the effects of the referendum (is it legally binding or consultative?
does a positive outcome lead to the adoption or repeal of a measure, or is it
just one stage in a longer procedure?) (point I.3.1.c).
3.2. Freedom
of voters to express their wishes
16. The
paragraph on electronic voting has been brought into line with the new standards
introduced by the Council of Europe through the adoption of Recommendation
Rec(2004)11 of the Committee of Ministers on legal, operational and technical
standards for e-voting (point I.3.2.a.iv).
17. Given
the distinctive nature of referendums, in that they divide not only parties but
also other groupings not seeking representation within elected organs,
representatives of the proposal’s supporters and opponents – including
representatives independent of the parties – and observers appointed by both sides
should have access to polling stations during both the voting itself and
counting (points I.3.2.a.x and xiii).
18. The
guidelines also emphasise another aspect of voters’ freedom to express their
wishes, which is also necessary in elections but is more likely to be violated
in the case of referendums: voters must be allowed to express their wishes in
accordance with rules prescribed by law, and have the right to accurate
establishment of the result (see point I.3.2.b). In particular, the time-limit
prescribed by law must be observed. In the case of a referendum or a popular
initiative requested by a section of the electorate, the authorities may be
tempted to draw the process out until the question is no longer relevant.
II. Conditions for implementing these principles
2. Regulatory levels and stability of referendum
law
19. The wording
of the guidelines is slightly less restrictive than the Code of Good Practice
in Electoral Matters
as regards the requirement that all rules of referendum law – apart from rules
on technical matters and detail – should have the rank of a statute, using the
term “should” rather than “must”. Where a referendum is requested by the
executive, it is conceivable that the latter could set the rules for it. Such a
situation is not entirely satisfactory, however, and the requirement for a
procedural statute is the norm (point II.2.a).
20. The list of
fundamental aspects of referendum law, which should not be open to amendment
less than one year before a referendum, at least if they are set out in
ordinary legislation, takes into account the specific nature of referendums by
including rules on the procedural and substantive validity of texts put to a
referendum and the effects of referendums. It also emphasises the need for
rules on the franchise and electoral registers, and access to the public media
for the proposal’s supporters and opponents. In addition, it must be understood
in the light of the Interpretive Declaration on the Stability of the Electoral
Law adopted by the Venice Commission in 2005:
in particular, the stability of referendum law cannot be invoked to maintain a
situation contrary to the norms of Europe’s electoral heritage in the area of
direct democracy or to prevent the implementation of recommendations by international
organisations. Furthermore, given that it is unusual for the date of a
referendum to be known a year or more in advance (whereas elections normally
take place at set intervals), it is a matter not so much of prohibiting
legislative amendments during the year preceding the vote as of prohibiting the
application of such amendments during the year following their enactment, in
case there are suspicions of manipulation (point II.2.b).
3. Procedural guarantees
3.1 Organisation of the referendum by an impartial
body
21. Once again,
the fact that referendums do not necessarily entail a divide along party lines
but may involve other political players means a choice must be offered, as
regards the membership of electoral commissions, between balanced representation
of the parties and balanced representation of the proposal’s supporters and
opponents (point II.3.1.e).
3.2 An effective system of appeal
22. The appeal
body’s minimum powers are specified, insofar as respect for free suffrage and
the results of the ballot are expressly mentioned. Other aspects specific to
referendums and popular initiatives should be subject to judicial review, at
least in the last instance: the completion of popular initiatives and requests
for referendums from a section of the electorate, along with the procedural
and, where applicable, substantive validity of texts submitted to a referendum.
The review of validity, whether obligatory or optional, should take place
before the text is put to the vote: this will avoid the people having to
express their views – in vain – on a text that is subsequently ruled invalid
because it is contrary to superior law (substantive invalidity) or the content
of which breaches the requirements for procedural validity (point II.3.3.d, cf.
points III.2-3).
23. Unlike
elections, which take place in a number of constituencies, referendums involve
a whole territory. Consequently, where partial annulment of the results does
not affect the overall result, it must not give rise to a repeat ballot in the
area in which the vote was annulled, since this would not lead to a different
result. Unless the entire referendum is repeated, however, it must be possible
to call a new partial referendum in part of the territory if the overall result
is in question; careful consideration must be given to calling a new partial
ballot rather than an entire new referendum, however, so as to avoid the
massive concentration of campaign resources in a limited area (point II.3.3.e).
24. National
rules on both public and private funding of political parties and election
campaigns must be applicable to referendum campaigns (point II.3.4.a). As in
the case of elections, funding must be transparent, particularly when it comes
to campaign accounts. In the event of a failure to abide by the statutory
requirements, for instance if the cap on spending is exceeded by a significant
margin, the vote must be annulled.
It should be pointed out that the principle of equality of opportunity applies
to public funding; equality should be ensured between a proposal’s supporters
and opponents (point I.2.2.d).
25. There must be
no use of public funds by the authorities for campaigning purposes, in order to
guarantee equality of opportunity and the freedom of voters to form an opinion
(point II.3.4.b, cf. point I.3.1.b).
III. Specific rules
1. The rule of law
26. The principle
of the rule of law, which is one of the three pillars of the Council of Europe
along with democracy and human rights,
applies to referendums just as it does to every other area. The principle of
the sovereignty of the people allows the latter to take decisions only in
accordance with the law. The use of referendums must be permitted only where it
is provided for by the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the latter,
and the procedural rules applicable to referendums must be followed. On the
other hand, referendums must be organised where the legal system provides for
them (point I.3.2.b.i).
2. The procedural validity of texts submitted to
a referendum
27. Procedural
validity comprises three aspects: unity of form, unity of content and unity of
hierarchical level.
28. The text
submitted to referendum may be presented in various forms:
- a specifically-worded
draft of a constitutional amendment, legislative enactment or other measure
- repeal
of an existing provision
- a question of principle (for example: “Are
you in favour of amending the Constitution to introduce a presidential system
of government?”) or
- a concrete proposal, not presented in the form of a
specific provision and known as a “generally-worded proposal” (for example: “Are you in favour of
amending the Constitution in order to reduce the number of seats in Parliament
from 300 to 200?”).
29. A “yes” vote
on a specifically-worded draft – at least in the case of a legally binding
referendum – means a statute is enacted and the procedure comes to an end,
subject to procedural aspects such as publication and promulgation. On the
other hand, a “yes” vote on a question of principle or a generally-worded
proposal is simply a stage, which will be followed by the drafting and
subsequent enactment of a statute. Combining a specifically-worded draft with a
generally-worded proposal or a question of principle would create confusion,
preventing electors from being informed of the import of their votes and
thereby prejudicing their free suffrage.
30. An even more
stringent requirement of free suffrage is respect for unity of content. Electors must not be called to vote simultaneously on several
questions without any intrinsic link, given that they may be in favour of one
and against another. Where the revision of a text covers several separate
aspects, a number of questions must therefore be put to the people. However,
total revision of a text, particularly a Constitution, naturally cannot relate
solely to aspects that are closely linked. In this case, therefore, the
requirement for unity of content does not apply. Substantial revision of a
text, involving a number of chapters, may be regarded as being equivalent to
total revision; clearly, this does not mean the different chapters cannot be
put separately to the popular vote.
31. The rule of unity of hierarchical level is not as crucial as the previous two rules. It is
desirable, however, that the same question should not simultaneously apply to
legislation of different hierarchical levels, for example a constitutional
revision and the associated implementing Act.
32. Under the
principle of the rule of law, the people are not exempt from compliance with
the law. This applies to both procedural aspects and the substance of texts put
to the vote, which must comply with all superior law. Legislative referendums
must therefore comply with the Constitution; referendums within federated or
regional entities must comply with the law of the central State.
33. Irrespective
of what national law has to say about the relationship between international
and domestic law, texts put to a referendum must not be contrary to
international law or to the Council of Europe’s statutory principles
(democracy, human rights and the rule of law).
34. In order to
prevent unlawful referendums, texts that are procedurally or substantively
invalid must not be put to a referendum.
35. (Optional)
referendums held at the request of a section of the electorate and popular
initiatives entail the collection of signatures. The guidelines set out a
number of rules in this respect, not all of which will be discussed in detail
here.
36. Entitlement
to collect signatures must not be confined to registered electors, but apply to
everyone, including foreigners and minors (particularly in respect of texts
concerning their status) (point III.4.c).
37. Authorisation
may be required in order to gather signatures on public thoroughfares. As with
any restriction of fundamental rights, such authorisation may be refused only
where there is a legal basis for doing so and in accordance with the principles
of public interest, proportionality and equality (point III.4.d).
38. The collection of signatures should not be
remunerated or funded from private sources. Where remuneration is permitted, it
must apply only to those who collect signatures, and not to electors who sign a
popular initiative or a request for a referendum; it must be regulated, with
regard to both the total amount allocated and the amount paid to each person
collecting signatures (point III.4.e).
39. It is
important that all signatures are checked (point III.4.f). The success or
failure of an initiative or a request for a referendum must not be determined on
the basis of a sample, which might contain an unusually high number of invalid
signatures or, on the contrary, might not contain any while other sheets of
signatures might be full of them. At the very most, some signatures need not be
checked once it has been established beyond doubt that the number of valid
signatures required by law has been collected.
40. In addition,
a popular initiative – or a request for a referendum – should be declared
partially invalid where it is possible to modify the proposed text, without
distorting it, so that it complies with the law. An authority must have the
power to correct a question that is obscure or misleading or suggests an
answer. In the event that the rules on procedural or substantive validity have
been violated, it may also declare partial invalidity where the signatories
would have approved the remaining part if it had been submitted on its own, or
declare the sub-division of a text that is not consistent with unity of
content, form or hierarchical level.
41. When the
referendum is legally binding, the authorities must respect the people’s
decision. The guidelines provide, for instance, that for a certain period of
time (a few years at the most) a text rejected in a referendum may not be
adopted by a procedure without referendum. An optional referendum at the
request of a section of the electorate is regarded as a referendum procedure:
unless such a referendum is requested, a text rejected the first time round may
therefore be adopted without a popular vote (points III.5.a.i and v). A similar
rule applies to the revision of a provision approved in a referendum (point
III.5.a.ii).
42. Two exceptions are provided for:
-
where
the Constitution provides for a referendum on a total revision of a text (in
practice, the Constitution itself) but not on partial revision, a partial
revision of that text does not necessarily have to be put to a popular vote
(point III.5.a.iii);
-
Parliament
may revise a rule of law superior to that adopted by the popular vote without a
referendum; it is entitled to do so in accordance with the principle of
hierarchy of legal rules,
but this should be avoided for a certain period of time (point III.5.a.iv).
43. The foregoing
does not apply to consultative referendums, which are not legally binding on
the authorities. The political wisdom of Parliament going against the wishes of
(the majority of) the people is clearly another matter.
44. The adoption
of a text at the request of an authority other than Parliament, such as the
head of state or government, must not freeze the legal situation indefinitely.
Accordingly, the guidelines provide that such a text may be revised either by
parliamentary means or at the request of a section of the electorate, where
applicable after the expiry of a certain period of time (point III.5.c). When a
text is adopted as the result of a popular initiative, it must be possible for
the people to pronounce on the issue again at the request of another popular
initiative, at least after the expiry, where applicable, of a certain period of
time (point III.5.b).
45. Constitutional
rules relating to referendums should enjoy direct popular legitimacy, ie they
should be put to a referendum, compulsorily or at the request of a section of
the electorate. In any event, should Parliament wish to introduce a measure
limiting popular rights, it should have the power to do so only by means of a
measure submitted to one of these forms of referendum (point III.5.d).
6. Opinion of Parliament
46. In the case
of popular initiatives, it is important for the people to be informed of
Parliament’s opinion. Accordingly, the guidelines provide for Parliament to
give its opinion. Where Parliament opposes a text but wishes to take a step in
a similar direction, it is very helpful if it can put a counter-proposal to the
popular vote at the same time.
47. Parliament’s
opinion is all the more necessary when the referendum is requested by the
executive. In such cases, it is important to ascertain whether the call to the
people is designed to bypass Parliament. Electors must be informed of
Parliament’s position.
48. Consultation
of Parliament must not give rise to delaying tactics. The law must therefore
set a deadline for Parliament to give its opinion, and a deadline for the
popular vote to take place, where necessary without Parliament’s opinion if the
latter has not given it in time.
49. In the case
of regional or local referendums, the regional or local assembly shall take
over the role played by Parliament at the national level.
50. Based on its
experience in the area of referendums, the Venice Commission has decided to recommend
that no provision be made for rules on quorums.
51. A turn-out quorum (minimum percentage) means that it is in the
interests of a proposal’s opponents to abstain rather than to vote against it.
For example, if 48% of electors are in favour of a proposal, 5% are against it
and 47% intend to abstain, the 5% of opponents need only desert the ballot box
in order to impose their viewpoint, even though they are very much in the
minority. In addition, their absence from the campaign is liable to increase
the number of abstentions and thus the likelihood that the quorum will not be
reached. Encouraging either abstention or the imposition of a minority
viewpoint is not healthy for democracy (point III.7.a). Moreover, there is a
great temptation to falsify the turn-out rate in the face of weak opposition.
52. An approval
quorum (acceptance by a minimum percentage of registered electors) may also be
inconclusive. It may be so high as to make change excessively difficult. If a
text is approved – even by a substantial margin – by a majority of voters
without the quorum being reached, the political situation becomes extremely
awkward, as the majority will feel that they have been deprived of victory
without an adequate reason; the risk of the turn-out rate being falsified is
the same as for a turn-out quorum.
8. Effects of referendums
53. If electors
are to cast an informed vote, it is essential for them to be informed of the
effects of their votes; it must therefore be clearly specified in the
Constitution or by law whether referendums are legally binding or consultative
(point III.8.a, cf. point I.3.1.c on free suffrage).
54. Where a
legally binding referendum concerns a question of principle or a
generally-worded proposal, it is up to Parliament to implement the people’s
decision. Parliament may be obstructive, particularly where its direct
interests are affected (reducing the number of members of Parliament or the
allowances paid to them, for example). It is preferable, therefore, for
referendums on questions of principle or generally-worded proposals to be
consultative. If they are legally binding, the subsequent procedure should be
laid down in specific constitutional or legislative rules. It should be
possible to appeal before the courts in the event that Parliament fails to act
(point III.8.b).