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Strasbourg, 3 October 2006
Study no. 294/ 2004
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Restricted
CDL-MIN(2006)002
Engl. only
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE COMMISSION)
DRAFT
REPORT
ON NON-CITIZENS
AND MINORITY RIGHTS
on the basis of contributions by
Mr Gudmundur Alfredsson (Expert, Iceland)
Mr Bogdan Aurescu (Substitute Member, Romania)
Mr Sergio Bartole (Substitute Member, Italy)
Mr Pieter van Dijk (Member, the Netherlands)
Ms Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska
(Member,
“The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”)
Mr Franz Matscher (Expert, Austria)
Mr Giorgio Malinverni (Member, Switzerland)
in consultation with
The Advisory Committee
on the Framework Convention
for the Protection of
National Minorities
The Committee of
Experts of the European Charter
for Regional or
Minority Languages
The Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe
The OSCE Office of the High Commissioner
on National Minorities
The Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction. 3
II. International standards and practice. 4
A. The absence of a
legally binding definition of the term “minority”. 4
B. The approach followed
at the European level 6
1. The Council of Europe. 6
1.1. The European Convention on Human Rights. 6
1.2. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (FCNM) 8
(a) Analysis of the declarations/reservations under the
FCNM... 8
- Overview of existing declarations. 8
- Position of the States that have not entered
declarations. 9
- Preliminary findings. 10
(b) Monitoring of the FCNM by the ACFC.. 11
(c) Monitoring of the FCNM by the Committee of Ministers
(CM) 16
- First monitoring cycle. 16
- Second monitoring cycle. 17
(d) General assessment 18
1.3.
The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. 19
1.4.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 19
(a) Exclusion of non-citizens as a starting point 19
(b) Latest developments. 20
1.5.
The Venice Commission. 21
2. The Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities. 22
2.1. Background. 22
2.2.
Basic principles. 23
2.3.
Outcome. 23
C. The approach followed
at the UN level 24
1. Equal Rights for Everyone. 25
2. The Rights of Citizens and Non-citizens. 25
3. Non-Citizens and Minority Rights. 26
4. General assessment 27
D. Concurring application
of different international regimes for non-citizens?. 27
III. Identification, relevance and admissibility of
criteria other than citizenship. 29
A. Existence of alternative criteria. 29
B. Complex nature of minority rights. 29
C. Need to target State action through adequate criteria. 31
D. Lawful residence. 32
E. Numerical size of a
minority. 34
F. Time factor and link
with a territory. 36
IV. Findings and conclusions. 38
A. Definition of the term “minority”. 38
B. Minority rights and related State
obligations. 38
C. Relationship between citizenship and other
criteria. 39
D. Restriction of certain rights to citizens:
the exception. 40
1. The issue of whether and to what extent
non-citizens should benefit from specific minority protection is a long-debated
one. The controversial approach to it depends largely on the absence of a
legally-binding and even generally accepted definition of the term “minority”
and the aim of minority protection regimes both in international and domestic
law. In the light of recent trends and developments in the international
protection of human rights as well as recurrent discussions on this subject, a
Working Group composed of members of the Venice Commission was established in
early 2004 and subsequently enlarged with other members (Mr Alfredsson, Mr Bartole,
Mr van Dijk, Ms Lazarova Trajkovska, Mr Matscher and Mr Malinverni) and an
independent expert (Mr Alfredsson) with a view to carrying out further
reflection on the legal and practical significance of the citizenship
requirement and possible alternative criteria.
2. Aware of the importance and complexity of
this matter, the Working Group considered that it would be extremely useful to
have an exchange of views on this matter, with representatives of the other
main international bodies dealing with minority protection. Consequently, the
Working Group held a meeting in Strasbourg on 28 May 2004 which was attended by
the members of the Working Group, members of the Advisory Committee on the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the Working
Group on Minorities within the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, as well as the Committee of Experts of the European
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Furthermore, the meeting was
attended by representatives of the Secretariat of the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
and of the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.
3. The reflection process was pursued further in
the context of the 19th meeting of the Sub-Commission on the
Protection of Minorities, which took place on 9 June 2005 in Venice.
Following a discussion based on various written submissions prepared by
participants and a background note prepared by the Secretariat
(CDL-MIN(2005)001), the Sub-Commission asked the Working Group to
pave the way for a general study through the preparation of working documents aimed
at identifying specific minority rights and the criterion/a (such as
long-standing lawful residence) which could, depending on the circumstances, be
more appropriate than the citizenship one. It was agreed that this work would
be carried out in consultation with the above-mentioned international bodies.
4. Before finalising a draft report and transmitting
it to the plenary, the Working Group decided to organise a Round Table in Genevaon 16 June 2006
with the participation of representatives of the other main international
bodies concerned, as well as external experts. Participants in the round table
addressed a number of arguments, including the implications of a lack of
legally binding definition of the term “minority”, as well as the existence and
practical application of criteria other than citizenship.
5. The present document (CDL-MIN(2006)002) aims
at giving a comprehensive picture of the international standards and practice,
in the light of national examples and bilateral agreements, as regards the
relevance of the citizenship and other criteria for circumscribing the circle
of those entitled to minority rights. This report goes on by suggesting to
depart from a generally restrictive stance based on rigid criteria - including
citizenship - and move towards a more nuanced approach on the question, drawing
inter alia on the above-mentioned exchanges held in Strasbourg, Venice and
Geneva and the points of convergence identified by the participants.
6. This report tackles the situation of (national)
minorities, whose members have a specific ethnic, cultural or linguistic
identity. It is not limited to the (national) minorities in the classical sense
since it also covers the so-called new minorities (immigrants, foreign workers,
refugees). The situation of other groups like disabled persons or homosexuals, who
can also be described as minorities - at least from a social viewpoint – is
however excluded from the scope of this report.
7. This report has been adopted by the
Commission at its … Plenary Session in Veniceon ….
8.
To date, there exists no legally binding definition of the term “minority”
in international law. The term “minority” is not a unified concept either: UN
texts usually address “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities”
and regional European instruments on minority rights use the concept of
“national minorities”.
9.
In the inter-war period, the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ) already concluded that the existence of a minority was a question of
“fact” and not of “law”, which made state “recognition” irrelevant under
international law.
10.
In his study on various legal aspects of the minority question for the
UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti provided in 1979 a definition with regard to
Article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
His suggested definition, which included the citizenship requirement, was
however not accepted by the Sub-Commission. The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC),
which monitors the implementation of the ICCPR, has subsequently adopted the
view that Article 27 ICCPR is not limited to citizens.
11.
At the European level, efforts to come up with a generally agreed
definition of the term “national minority” also met with difficulties. The
Venice Commission and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
each proposed a definition,
but none of these texts has been entrenched in an international convention. The
most relevant legally binding instrument adopted under the auspices of the
Council of Europe, namely the FCNM, contains no definition of the concept of
“national minority”.
12.
While the general view has long been that a definition of the term “minority”
was a sine qua non to make the international protection of minorities a
workable regime in practice, opinions have evolved in the last decade or so.
For example, it is striking to note that within the Council of Europe, the
Committee of Ministers (CM) has discouraged further attempts to come up with a
definition.
Even the PACE now no longer calls for a definition in its latest texts adopted
on minority protection.
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities also has not found it
necessary or even desirable to formulate a definition for the purpose of his
mandate.
13.
It is to be noted that despite the absence of a legally binding
definition of the term “minority” in international law, there is wide agreement
that a minority must combine objective features (such as language, traditions,
cultural heritage or even religion, etc.) with a subjective element, namely the
desire to preserve the specific elements of its identity. Admittedly, this
remains a very broad scheme for addressing minority issues and States can
therefore develop more detailed criteria – or even propose their own definition
– to tackle minority issues, provided they do not rely on arbitrary or
unjustified distinctions, which would be the source of discrimination.
14.
The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 (ECHR) does not contain
specific minority rights provisions
and, from that perspective, it can only deal with the concerns of minorities in
an indirect way. Indeed “everyone” is entitled to the rights guaranteed by the
ECHR as this instrument does not recognise categories of individuals or
minority groups as bearer of rights.
15.
The ECHR has nevertheless proven relevant for persons belonging to
minorities who wish to assert the essential elements of their specific
identity, as this is mainly possible through the exercise of the human rights
and fundamental freedoms which are protected by this instrument, such as
freedom of assembly and association, freedom of expression, respect for private
and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
16.
The main strength of the ECHR - including for persons belonging to
minorities - lies with its supervisory mechanism, which is of a binding
character by the effect of judgments delivered by the European Court of Human
Rights. Furthermore, the overall “pluralist ambience” which extends to forms of
association, ideas and ways of life, coupled with the commitment to pluralist
democracy of which the ECHR is an expression, can make a difference for
minorities: as evidenced by a growing case-law generated by individual
applications from persons belonging to minorities, the ECHR is in the process
of sharpening its sensitivity to “ethnic” issues.
17.
Practice under the ECHR shows a clear reluctance from the former
Commission and the Court to attempt a definition of the term “national
minority”, although the Court has recently shown its preparedness to review the
legal process by which States Parties have denied national minority status to a
given group.
Since the Court takes the view that a legally binding definition of the term
“national minority” is not necessary to ensure the full respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms to individuals or associations claiming to be
members of a minority, it has, consequently, not taken a general stance on the
citizenship criterion as a possible constituent element of the concept of
minority.
18.
In fact, a review of the numerous decisions and judgements made by the
Court in cases involving persons belonging to minorities reveals that -
provided that admissibility conditions are met - the Court stands ready to
examine any alleged violation of a substantive right on its merits,
irrespective of the fact that the applicant may be non-citizen of the
respondent State and, formally speaking, fall outside the scope of a possible
domestic definition of the term “minority”. For example, important rulings have
been delivered by the Court on the situation of foreign Roma asylum-seekers in Belgium
and Italy.
Similarly, ethnic Russians from Latvia notholding the citizenship of this country have been able to see their complaint
considered by the Court,
even though the authorities of Latvia are of the opinion that members of a
national minority need to be Latvian citizens.
19.
In sum, it can be stated that the ECHR offers a powerful and efficient
mechanism of protection for persons - be they citizens or non-citizens -
belonging to minorities, as long as the violation of classical human rights and
fundamental freedoms is at stake, mainly through a state excessive
interference. The ECHR has, however, produced very limited results under the
prohibition of discrimination as concerns the State obligation to take special
measures on behalf of minorities to compensate their vulnerable and
disadvantaged position. This state of affairs may be explained by the inherent
limitation of Article 14 ECHR,
whose violation needs to be invoked in correlation with another, substantive
right. ECHR practice therefore does not seem to offer examples of rulings
promoting special measures for minority groups, be it in the context of
applications lodged by citizens or non-citizens. The additional protocol 12 to
the ECHR, which entered into force on 1 April 2005, might encourage future developments in this direction,
although its explanatory report suggests some caution in this respect.
20.
The absence of a definition of the concept of “national minority” in the
1994
FCNM itself, coupled with the particular sensitivity of the issue,
prompted many States to enter declarations
upon signature or ratification, with a view to giving further precisions on the
groups to be protected.
21.
Most of these declarations contain a definition of the term “national
minority” for the purposes of the Framework Convention and/or a list of the
groups protected. A few other declarations neither contain a definition nor
list the groups protected, but express a view - at least indirectly - on the
citizenship requirement.
22.
Out of the 14 declarations containing a definition and/or listing the
groups protected, 8 explicitly mention the citizenship (or the nationality) of
the state of residence as a condition for persons belonging to national
minorities to enjoy the protection of the FCNM.
The other 6 declarations, however, do not make any reference to the citizenship
requirement.
23.
Among the States that have entered a declaration making an explicit link
to the citizenship requirement, some of them have thereby simply echoed an already
existing condition entrenched in their constitutional legal order.
For some others, restricting minority rights to citizens is not dictated by the
actual wording of their Constitution: this step is rather inspired by relevant
provisions of their legal order and/ or is simply part of a general policy
towards national minorities formulated in the context of the implementation of
the FCNM.
24.
When considering the text of the declarations, it is also important to
bear in mind that an explicit reference to the citizenship criterion does not
necessarily fully reflect the practice followed by the State concerned in the
different fields covered by the FCNM. In the context of its monitoring work,
the Advisory Committee on the FCNM (ACFC) has on occasions noticed that,
despite the official approach of their Government, some authorities were not
too strictly relying on the citizenship requirement when dealing with persons
belonging to national minorities in their concrete sphere of competences.
25.
Another element inviting to take the wording of declarations with
caution is that even in States that have given their own definition of the term
“national minority” and/or a list of the groups protected without mentioning
the citizenship criterion, an analysis of the related practice may indeed
reveal that most rights and facilities are de facto available to
citizens only.
26.
The current report does not address the situation of States which have
included a citizenship requirement in their legislation without any
corresponding clause in a declaration or in their constitutional order.
27.
In order to have a meaningful overview of the State practice pertaining
to the citizenship requirement under the FCNM, it is necessary to briefly
examine whether those States which have not entered a declaration on the
personal scope of application, have nevertheless expressed a view on this
issue. This is all the more important since the majority of State Parties to
the FCNM have not submitted any declaration.
28.
A first groups of States is made up of those which have unequivocally
indicated they consider the Framework Convention to be applicable to citizens
only. Such statements have been made already in the first State Reports
or in the subsequent stages of the monitoring procedure.
Here again, some of the States concerned have thereby simply reiterated what is
already enshrined in their constitutional legal order.
For some others, restricting minority rights to citizens only does not seems to
result from the wording of their Constitution.
29.
A second group of States is composed of those which have not stated that
they consider the FCNM to be applicable to citizens only. While it is rather
certain that some of these States do not intend to make any difference between
citizens and non-citizens when it comes to granting rights and facilities to
persons belonging to a national minority,
the situation is less clear in some other States which have not formulated a
position of principle on the issue. It may be argued that some of them tend to
disregard the citizenship criterion in practice,
but others seem to rely on this criterion at least in sectoral fields,
depending on the various rights and facilities at stake.
30.
This overview of the position taken by the States signatories to the FCNM
as regards the citizenship criterion clearly shows that there is a great
variety of approaches by the different States. These approaches may in some
cases be dictated by clear constitutional criteria, but appear more frequently
guided by the existence of relevant legislative provisions and/or the
formulation of a general policy towards national minorities.
31.
A closer examination of national situations, as is done in the context
of the monitoring under the FCNM, would probably reveal that even for States
that have taken a clear position in favour of against the citizenship
requirement, be it in a declaration or not, that position is not always
consistently reflected in practice. Indeed, domestic authorities may appear
more flexible vis-à-vis the citizenship requirement when dealing with
practical cases in their concrete sphere of competences.
32.
In sum, the present overview makes it difficult to identify a dominant
trend under the FCNM as regards the position taken by the States on the
citizenship criterion since a meaningful pattern of national examples exist in
both directions. In addition, it must be kept in mind that this topic is under
constant evolution. The monitoring of the FCNM indeed shows that certain States
have (at least partly) reconsidered their approach on the issue on the basis of
the results of the first cycle
and this shall become more apparent in the subsequent cycles of the monitoring.
33.
According to Article 26 §1 FCNM, the Committee of Ministers shall be
“assisted” by an “Advisory Committee” in evaluating the adequacy of the
measures taken by the Parties to give effect to the principles set out in the
FCNM. According to Rules 23-24 of Resolution (97)10, the ACFC shall transmit
its “opinions” to the CM, which is then to adopt its own conclusions and
recommendations on the implementation of the FCNM. From its inception, back in
1998, the ACFC has debated how it would address the personal scope of the FCNM.
This was prompted, amongst other things, by the absence of any definition of
the concept of “national minority” in the FCNM itself, and by the many
declarations made by States Parties giving precisions on the groups to be
protected.
34.
Mindful that it would be very difficult to come up with even a working
definition of the term “national minority”, the ACFC decided that the best way
forward was to adopt a pragmatic approach and deal with personal scope-related
issues on a case-by-case basis as they occurred rather than to try from the
outset to draw up general principles or rules. The ACFC thus decided, in 1999, that
its stance with regard to the declarations relating to the personal scope of
the FCNM should be pragmatic. It decided to engage in a constructive dialogue
with the States concerned in an effort to encourage them to reconsider their
positions where this was deemed to be too restrictive.
35.
In its first four Opinions, adopted in September 2000, the ACFC outlined
its approach vis-à-vis the personal scope of the Framework Convention. The
introductory paragraphs of the Opinions on Slovakia,Hungary, Denmark
and Finlandclearly acknowledged that States have a certain margin of appreciation in this
context but at the same time stressed that this is to be exercised within
certain limits, which were expressed in fairly general terms.
In addition, the ACFC’s Opinions included a general call on the States to apply
the FCNM in a more nuanced manner and to consider the Convention’s application,
on an article-by-article basis, to those groups that were not explicitly
designated as “national minorities” for the purposes of the FCNM.
This clause was meant to help ensure that there was no obstacle to the future
development of the FCNM, including as regards the so-called “new minorities”.
36.
The ACFC continued to follow this approach throughout the first
monitoring cycle, reiterating the “standard” paragraphs relating to Article 3
in virtually all of the Opinions it adopted. The ACFC explained this approach further
in its Opinion concerning PACE Recommendation 1492 (2001).
37.
Although the ACFC’s reasoning remained very concise in the “standard”
paragraphs of its Opinions, on several occasions the ACFC was much more
explicit in its criticism concerning the exclusion by some States of certain
groups from the scope of the FCNM:
-
For example, as regards Roma and certain other
groups in Denmark,
the ACFC took the view that the Government should enter into a dialogue with
representatives of these groups in order to identify any interest they may have
in being given the protection afforded by the FCNM.
-
The ACFC has also commented on the situation of
certain groups whose specific identity and desire to preserve that identity
were beyond doubt but who were not always considered to fall within the scope
of the Framework Convention. Examples include the groups which at national
level were in the majority, but which constituted a minority at regional level,
as well as indigenous peoples.
-
Lastly, on a number of occasions, the ACFC also
commented in detail and with some criticism on the exclusion from the personal
scope of application of the FCNM, not groups as such, but certain persons who
could objectively be considered as belonging to minorities recognised by the State.
Such is the case where the protection afforded by the FCNM - not in the context
of the new minorities - but rather in that of the traditional minorities, is
restricted solely to those who have acquired the citizenship of the country of
residence.
38.
Apart from the more substantiated criticisms under Article 3 with regard
to the exclusion of the above-mentioned groups or individuals, the ACFC has, in
the course of its Opinions, commented at greater length on the situation of
groups which governments do not consider to be protected by the FCNM; however,
this has been almost exclusively in connection with Article 6, regarding the
promotion of a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue, and protection
against acts of discrimination. In the view of the ACFC, the spirit and the
letter of this provision allow for no limitation of the scope exclusively to
those groups that are considered to be national minorities. Starting with its
opinion on Ukraine,the ACFC has repeatedly expressed this interpretation.
The ACFC’s comments in relation to Article 6 in many opinions show that the situation of groups not
considered by governments as protected by the Framework Convention – especially
the new minorities – has been raised on several occasions in order to condemn
an atmosphere of hostility or intolerance,
prejudice, shortcomings or discriminatory practices in fields such as education,
the media,
the attitude of the law-enforcement agencies
and access to the labour market.
There is a clear material link between Articles 4 and 6 of the FCNM, and the ACFC
has often, at least implicitly, addressed the situation of groups other than
the minorities recognised by the State concerned, in the wider context of the
fight against all forms of discrimination.
39.
When following the ‘article by article’ approach of the ACFC, the
question is to identify which of the protective measures envisaged in the FCNM
can be restricted to citizens, and which other criteria are relevant. It may be
useful, in this connection, to make use of the distinction now generally used
in human rights analysis between the threefold levels of State obligations
which apply to all human rights: the obligation to respect, the obligation to protect, and the
obligation to fulfil
the rights.
40.
The ACFC takes the view that the obligation to respect the
freedoms contained in the FCNM is generally applicable to all persons belonging
to minorities, irrespective of their citizenship. In general, these are
universal human rights, not limited to minorities. States are obliged to respect
the rights of minorities under Article
7 FCNM to freedom of assembly, association and expression, the right of
minorities under Article 8 FCNM to practice their religion, and the freedom of minorities under Article 9 FCNM of expression and information including
their own media. States are also obliged to respect the right of minorities
under Article 10 §1 FCNM to use their own minority language, in private and public, their right
under Article 13 FCNM to manage their own private educational institutions, and
their right under Article 14 §1 FCNM to learn their own language. States have a
duty to respect the use of these rights also for minorities, or individuals
within the minorities, whether they are citizens or not.
41.
It is also clear from the practice of the ACFC that the State has a duty
to encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue between all
groups living on its territory, irrespective of citizenship (Article 6 §1 FCNM)
and that an important function of the State is to protect minorities and their members -
including non-citizens - against threats or acts of discrimination (Article 6 §2
FCNM).
42.
What remains more debatable is whether those rights which require more
active or proactive measures (the duty to fulfill) also apply to non-citizens. It
seems in particular that the ACFC has not yet formulated a comprehensive
response to three important questions:
-
While
States generally must ensure equality before the law to minorities, whether
citizens or not (Article 4 §1 FCNM), do States have a duty under Article 4 §2
FCNM to adopt proactive measures, in all areas of economic, social and cultural
life, even for non-citizen members of minorities? Selected elements of the
ACFC’s practice suggest that this duty does exist, at least with regard to permanent
non-citizen residents.
-
Is
the State obliged, under Article 10 §2 FCNM (and provided the other conditions
in that article are fulfilled such as “inhabited traditionally or in
substantial number and where there is a real need”), to ensure conditions under
which the minority can use their own language in relations with the
authorities? The ACFC seems to admit that non-citizen individuals who are
affiliated with a group traditionally residing in the territory must be entitled, together with those who
lived there before, to use their own language in such contexts, but that ‘new
minorities’ as such cannot generally
demand this.
On the other hand, could resident minorities affected by a sudden territorial/constitutional
change (such as the restoration of the independence of the Baltic States or the
dissolution of former Yugoslavia) demand that the language they have traditionally
used in relation to authorities can still be used ? It seems that no
general answer can be given but rather that each country-specific situation,
including from a socio-historical perspective, plays a crucial role.
-
The
third question concerns language education. Can non-citizens legitimately
demand publicly funded education in their own language or instruction in their
language? As in the previous example, it will probably depend on the national
context. ‘New minorities’, in the sense of persons who have on their own will
entered into and settled in a country they knew was not their own, are not
necessarily entitled to demand instruction in their language. On the other
hand, groups of non-citizen residents who lived there at the time of
independence or restored independence should in principle have the possibility
to learn their language and, at least to some extent, obtain education in their
language, especially in primary school. Here again, the practice of the ACFC
regarding the Baltic States and former Yugoslavia has to be carefully analysed, but
overall seems to point to this direction.
43.
With regard to effective participation in public life (Article 15 FCNM)
it is a general rule accepted by the ACFC that the right to vote and to be
elected to certain kinds of public office can be reserved to citizens, in line
with Article 25 of the ICCPR. The ACFC has pointed out, however, that this
restriction must not go beyond what is the legitimate purpose of the
restriction contained in Article 25 ICCPR. The term ‘public service’ in Article
25 (c) should in particular be limited only to positions which imply exercise
of public authority, and should not include employment in service institutions
such as railways, telecommunication enterprises and others, even if publicly
run.
44.
Restrictions to citizens of the right to be elected and to vote should
apply only to elections for regular governmental bodies. The ACFC has for
instance criticized Estonia for their restriction to citizens
of the right to be elected to the governing boards of cultural groups under the
law on cultural autonomy.
According to the ACFC, the right also set out in Article 15 FCNM for persons
belonging to minorities to effective participation in the economic, social and
cultural life of the country concerned can generally not be restricted to
citizens. The relevant criterion would therefore probably be residence of a
certain duration, though the details of this may still have to be worked out.
45.
As mentioned above, the CM is assisted by the ACFC to adopt its own
conclusions and recommendations but keep the final responsibility in the
monitoring of the FCNM. A survey of the resolutions adopted by the CM during
the first monitoring cycle shows that the question of the personal scope of
application has been explicitly addressed on various occasions, although not
with full consistency.
The most well-known cases concern Denmarkand those countries which claim to have no minorities on their territory, i.e. Liechtenstein,
San Marino and Malta.Other countries also need to be mentioned, such as Ireland,
Spain, Estoniaand Finland.
46.
In the case of Denmark,the CM asked the Government to give further consideration to the personal
scope, in consultation with those concerned. This is undoubtedly the furthest
the CM has gone on this subject in the context of the first monitoring cycle,
bearing in mind that the Government of Denmark had entered a restrictive
declaration upon ratification of the FCNM. It has to be borne in mind, however,
that the Government had never made the effort to give any serious reasons in
the monitoring procedure to justify its exclusion of certain groups which clearly
had a distinct identity.
47.
With regard to Liechtenstein,San Marino and Malta,
the CM merely pointed out that there remained potential for application of a
number of provisions of the FCNM, albeit rather limited.
In view of the fact that neither the governments in question nor the ACFC had
identified any traditional minorities in these countries, the CM’s reference to
the “potential for application of a number of provisions of the Framework
Convention” can relate only to new minorities.
Such potential should, logically, have also been recognised by the CM in
relation to the other States Parties, and especially those which had
experienced large-scale waves of immigration in recent decades; however, this
was not the case.
48.
With regard to Ireland,the Resolution made explicit reference not only to the Traveller community, but
also to the new “immigrant communities” and “other communities”, albeit the Government
held the view that “immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers cannot be
considered to constitute a national minority under the terms of the Convention”.
49.
With regard to Spain,there is a clear discrepancy between the ACFC Opinion and the Resolution of the
CM concerning the personal scope of application of the FCNM.
While the concluding remarks of the Opinion clearly stress the absence of an
effective State policy for implementing the principles set out in the FCNM and
point to the fact that such a policy is closely linked to the personal scope of
application of this instrument, the Resolution does not embrace at all this
reasoning.
50.
In some cases, the CM Resolutions contain references or at least
potential references to groups other than those to which the State grants the
protection of the FCNM, including new minorities. Such references are, however,
invariably implicit and it is doubtful whether the countries concerned will be
prepared to interpret them in such a progressive way. Examples are the
reference to the need to promote the naturalisation process in the Resolution
on Estonia,
the reference to the Russian-speakingpopulation (and not to the “Old Russians”) in
the Resolution on Finland,
and several references to the need to strengthen safeguards in the fight
against discrimination.
51.
In the context of the second monitoring cycle, the CM has pursued its
monitoring tasks largely according to the already-established practice, with
preparation of its Resolutions, based on the concluding remarks of the ACFC.
The second-cycle Resolutions adopted so far repeat, by and large, the
concluding remarks of the ACFC, in some cases virtually verbatim. But
there are also cases where the CM has opted for softer phrases, partly echoing
the ACFC’s message, but with toned-down terminology. At the same time, it is
important to bear in mind that all second-cycle Resolutions “invite” the States
to take measures to implement the detailed recommendations of the ACFC,
including those that are not explicitly repeated in the resolutions, providing
a firm basis to address them in the follow-up dialogue.
52.
As regards the personal scope of application, the CM’s second Resolution
on Estoniashows that problems faced by non-citizens are increasingly relevant in the
context of the implementation of the FCNM in spite of the restrictive declaration
made by Estonia.Indeed, in the first recommendation contained in the said Resolution, the CM
calls for “further positive measures to facilitate and encourage
naturalisation, including through increased free-of-charge state language
training”.
While this recommendation is primarily aimed at promoting integration through
naturalisation, in practice it targets mostly non-citizens belonging to the
Russian minority, i.e. persons which fall outside the scope of the Estonian
declaration.
53.
As regards Denmark,there have been noteworthy developments in the substance of the monitoring
dialogue, the scope of which clearly goes further than the formal declaration.
This is particularly so regarding the Roma, whose concerns have become a
central issue in the FCNM process in Demark as well, even though Roma remain,
formally speaking, outside the Danish declaration. Issues concerning Roma –
with or without Danish citizenship - are therefore not only a key theme for the
ACFC, but also in the CM’s Resolution, in which the Danish authorities are
urged to “find alternative solutions for the Roma children which remain in a
separate Roma class in order to guarantee equal education”.
54.
As regards Slovenia, it is significant that the CM included several
paragraphs related to non-Slovenes from other parts of the former Yugoslavia
residing in Slovenia in its second Resolution, reflecting a proposal by the ACFC
that included calls to “look for ways to increase level of state assistance
granted” to them, and thereby further increased the relevance of the FCNM’s
monitoring process to groups that fall outside the scope of the formal
declaration.
55.
In the above cases, the States’ definition is rooted in the ratification
bill, which means that a formal change in position would not be a simple task.
In those cases where the State Party has indicated its position only in the State
report, it can be easier to adapt the approach on the issue. Finland is one of
the States Parties where the ACFC has encouraged the authorities to reconsider
their approach to the scope of application as explained in the State report,
especially regarding the distinction drawn between the so-called “old Russians”(covered by the FCNM, according to the Government) and other Russians
(not covered). In the second cycle, the authorities, while not explicitly
stating any change in their formal position in this regard, recognize the
criticism that this approach has prompted, including that coming from minority
representatives. The distinction is given only little attention by the ACFC in
those parts of the second opinion that relate to substantive paragraphs of the FCNM,
and the inclusive term “Russian-speakingpopulation” is regularly used.
It will be interesting to see whether the approach is maintained by the CM in
its forthcoming Resolution on Finland.
56.
The above developments are perhaps not enough to merit revisiting the
general assessment that “Governments are generally reluctant to reconsider, let
alone amend, their approach to the personal scope of application of the
convention”.
They do, however, indicate that a significantly more flexible and nuanced
approach has gained ground in the implementation and monitoring practice under
the FCNM, even in those cases where the Government’s formal position on the
issue has remained intact. It is interesting to note that a move towards a more
nuanced approach to the definition issue can be detected not only in the work
of the ACFC, but also in the work of the CM and, although to a lesser extent,
in governmental practice.
57. The foundation of the European Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages of 1992 (ECRML) is the need to promote and
protect regional and minority languages. It combines concerns relating to
conservation of Europe’s linguistic
heritage and the promotion of diversity with more conventional concepts such as
human rights and non-discrimination.
58. The ECRML is a normative instrument which
does not create justiciable rights, whether for minorities or for persons
belonging to minorities. While of necessity it acknowledges the concept of a
minority, it tends to focus more on the concept of “speakers” of the language
in question. The ECRML places, however, obligations on States which accede to
it. Those obligations require them to adopt the measures laid down in it,
unless domestic law already affords the same guarantees as in the ECRML. In
that sense, the obligations may therefore eventually result in rights for
individuals.
59.
The ECRML avoids equating too closely membership of a group of speakers
of a particular language with membership of a national or ethnic minority.
While the two concepts are frequently indistinguishable, they are not
necessarily connected, since any language is capable of being learnt by anyone
from any background, who can then claim to be a speaker of that language.
60.
According to the definition set out in Article 1 (a) ECRML, the
expression “regional or minority languages” does not include the languages of
migrants. The term “migrants” applies in principle to persons of foreign origin
who are not nationals of an acceding states. The question as to whether non-citizens
can also benefit from the measures aimed at protecting a regional or minority
language remains, however, not an easy one to answer: it would seem difficult
to distinguish in practice between citizens and non-citizens speaking the same
language so as to deny the latter and not the former the right to make use of
their language in certain contexts.
61.
In its Recommendation 1134(1990) on the rights of minorities, the PACE
for the first time recommended to “draw up a Protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights or a special Council of Europe convention to protect
the rights of minorities in the light of the principles” stated in this
Recommendation. This proposal was reiterated in PACE Recommendation 1177
(1992).
62.
The PACE has since exerted pressure on Council of Europe Governments to prepare
a treaty, preferably in the form of an additional protocol to the ECHR. The PACE has been at the origin of
standard setting for the rights of minorities by adopting Recommendation 1201
(1993) on an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the
European Convention on Human Rights, which included the proposal of a concrete
text for an additional protocol to the ECHR.
63.
The draft additional protocol contained in Appendix to Recommendation
1201 was not endorsed by the CM. However, the PACE has succeeded in persuading
the implementation of its provisions in a number of Council of Europe member States,
through its role in the consideration and acceptance of new candidates for
membership. The fact that the treaties on good-neighbourly relations and
friendly co-operation concluded by Hungary with Slovakia in March 1995, Hungary
with Romania in September 1996, and Romania with Ukraine in 1997 make express reference to the
Recommendation confers on the draft protocol the same legal standing as the
other provisions of those treaties.
64.
The PACE has long considered that the text of the draft additional
protocol, as proposed in Recommendation 1201 (1993), remained an important
reference document for a new additional protocol to the ECHR. According to this
recommendation, which sets out a definition of the term “national minority”, members
of a national minority means a group of persons who are citizens of that State.
This is to be understood as a clear citizenship requirement.
65.
Subsequent texts adopted by the PACE on the rights of national
minorities repeatedly made reference to Recommendation 1201 and its definition
therein.
66.
This definition was clearly confirmed by the PACE in its Recommendation
1255 (1995) on the protection of the rights of minorities adopted on 31
January 1995.
In Recommendation 1492 (2001) on rights
of national minorities adopted on 23 January 2001, the PACE reaffirmed its position
that an additional protocol to the ECHR on the rights of national minorities was
necessary “drawing on the principles contained in Recommendation 1201 (1993),
and endeavouring to include therein the definition of national minority adopted
in the same recommendation;” in order to ensure justiciability of
minority rights before independent judicial courts, notably the European Court
of Human Rights.
67.
In its Recommendation 1492 (2001) , the PACE used for the first time more
specific and considerably stronger language to make the FCNM a universal and
effective European instrument on minority protection. In this context, the PACE
condemned “the denial of the existence of minorities and of minority rights in
several Council of Europe member states and the fact that many minorities in Europeare not afforded adequate protection”.
68.
The latest comprehensive recommendation on the rights of national
minorities shows a clear evolution in that the concerns of the PACE have
changed to focus on the risk of discriminatory exclusion of minority groups by
those States which have entered declarations or reservations upon ratification
of the FCNM.
Having somewhat shifted its priorities, in Recommendation 1623(2003) the PACE no
longer referred to Recommendation 1201(1993) and the necessity to adopt a
definition of the term “national minorities”. The rapporteur stressed in
particular that it would be rather unfortunate if the European standards of minority
protection appear to be more restrictive in nature than the universal
standards, the more so as Article 27
ICCPR is binding for all State Parties to the FCNM.
Bearing in mind that the scope of Article 27 ICCPR is not limited to citizens,
this suggests that the PACE wanted to warn against undue restrictions of the
scope of application of the FCNM, based on the citizenship criterion.
69.
The approach of the PACE is still likely to evolve in the future as this
body regularly reviews issues linked to the protection of national minorities,
although not always in a consistent way. For example, a recent recommendation
of the PACE on the concept of "nation" seemed to imply that national
minorities must be made up of citizens only.
The next Recommendation in preparation, however, seems more in line with
Recommendation 1623(2003) as it calls for more ratifications of the FCNM and
the withdrawal of restrictive declarations or reservations.
1.5. The Venice Commission
70.
The approach of the Venice Commission towards the question of
citizenship as a constitutive element of the concept of national minorities has
significantly evolved from its early years of existence. In that evolution, the
Venice Commission has been influenced by similar contemporary developments of
minority protection both within the UN system and the European context (OSCE
and Council of Europe).
71.
The starting point is certainly the proposal for a European Convention
for the Protection of Minorities prepared by the Venice Commission in 1993.
Indeed, Article 2 of this text set out a definition of the term “minority”,
which covered only “nationals” of the State.
The legal instrument eventually adopted by the member States of the Council of
Europe in 1994, namely the FCNM, did however not contain any definition of the
term “national minority” and made no reference whatsoever to the citizenship
criterion.
72.
The first comments discussed by the Venice Commission on domestic draft
legislation governing the rights of national minorities confirmed this approach
in that they held that a definition not including the element of nationality
was “incomplete”.
In its Opinion on the interpretation of Article 11 of the Draft Protocol to the
ECHR appended to PACE Recommendation 1201, the Venice Commission endorsed – at
least implicitly – the reference to the citizenship criterion entrenched in the
definition proposed by the PACE.
73. The Opinions adopted in respect of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 2001 represent a turning point in
the approach followed by the Venice Commission. Indeed, the Commission noted
for the time that the restriction of the notion of minority to citizens only “departs,
however, from recent tendencies of minority protection in international law
(Article 27 of the ICCPR and practice of the HCNM). Furthermore, except in
the case of political representation at levels other than the local level,
citizenship is generally irrelevant to the content of internationally
prescribed minority rights”.
74. The subsequent Opinions of the Venice
Commission in relation to several draft laws on minorities have confirmed this
new approach. Having occasionally recalled that no binding international rule
was formally prohibiting a citizenship requirement, the Venice Commission has
often explicitly encouraged the States concerned to withdraw such a requirement
from their legislation since this would be more in keeping with the purpose of
the protection of national minorities and the most recent developments in
international law. This
recommendation to abandon the citizenship requirement was voiced even more
forcefully by the Venice Commission in the particular political and social
context of state succession following the break-up of former larger
federations.
75.
Citizenship is a notion that has presented problems for many persons
belonging to minorities across the OSCE. This gives rise to practical questions
and difficulties in several situations in which the OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities (HCNM) has become involved.
76.
The documents of the OSCE contain no definition of minorities. Minority
rights were developed within the overall context of the human rights law. The
1990 CSCE Copenhagen Document provides that “to belong to a national minority
is a matter of a person’s individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from
the exercise of such choice”.
77.
The former HCNM, Mr Max van der Stoel, has asserted “I know a minority
when I see one”. Furthermore, in his keynote address at the opening of the OSCE
Minorities Seminar in Warsaw in 1994, the former HCNM went on to
clarify a minority as follows: “First of all, a minority is a group with
linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics, which distinguish it from the
majority. Secondly, a minority is a
group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to
give stronger expression of that identity”.
78.
Over the years, the HCNM has been involved in a variety of situations
and with regard to a variety of groups, including non-citizens (e.g. Russian ethnics
in Estonia and Latvia) and some without a kin-state (e.g.
Crimean Tatars). In his work, citizenship is very closely related to the idea
of integrating diversity. For the HCNM, a policy of integration means the
integration of all persons residing on the territory of a State, whether they
are citizens or not. The risks of alienation or isolation leading to tensions,
which a policy of integration seeks to combat, are not confined to citizens.
Indeed such tensions may well be exacerbated by the absence of citizenship.
79.
The focus of the HCNM is mainly political, geared towards conflict
prevention. While his tools are political, his blueprints are based on
international legal standards, including the ICCPR, the ECHR and the FCNM.
These standards map out the framework in which political compromise can be
made. They constitute the minimum level of acceptable behaviour concerning
specific individuals.
80.
In all these situations, the HCNM has emphasised that internationally
protected human rights are universal, also in the sense that they must be
guaranteed to everyone within the jurisdiction of the State without discrimination.
He has stressed that minority rights are an integral part of human rights and
the principal of equal treatment extends to the enjoyment of minority rights.
Indeed, in order to achieve full equality, minority rights have to be secured
in addition to non-discrimination measures.
81.
In the light of recurrent problems relating to citizenship and the
enjoyment by persons belonging to national minorities of rights and privileges
on the basis of equality with other persons within various States, the Office
of the HCNM has reflected upon the underlying issues and specific problems. To
this end, it has been engaged in an internal process of analysis on the subject
of citizenship, based upon practical experiences in real country situations in
which the HCNM has been involved.
82.
The essence of the findings of this process can be summarized as
follows:
-
Citizenship
is not a basis upon which a priori to exclude the enjoyment of minority
rights. Indeed, both the philosophy and international law of human rights
confer minority rights on the bases of specific differentiated needs and
desires which relate to all human beings within the jurisdiction of the State,
precisely in contradiction to the citizen/alien distinction. There are very few
rights, including the rights of minorities specifically, which are in any way
connected to the content of citizenship – the clear permissible exception being
certain political participatory rights at the central State level and the right
to return to one’s country, which may be reserved for citizens under
international human rights law. Consequently, the formal position of some
States that non-citizens are not entitled to minority rights per se does
not accord with the essential impetus or logic of human rights.
-
Given
the limited relevance of citizenship for the realization of rights generally
and the enjoyment of minority rights in particular, criteria other than
citizenship appear to be more relevant as an indicator of an individual’s
“genuine and effective link”, i.e. a factual and legal connection with the
State. The will of the individual to establish and maintain such a bond is
significant in this respect. Residency, for example, is more important for
realizing the content of the various rights; it denotes a factual and legal
connection, but also a degree of commitment to the State on the part of the
individual. The longer the period of residency, the more likely it is that
social ties will develop and the greater the degree of "insiderness".
It can logically be argued on this basis that those non-citizens able to
demonstrate an "effective link" with the State e.g. through permanent
residency, could be entitled to exercise the political right to vote or stand
for office, at least at a local government level.
-
If
citizenship is largely irrelevant for purposes of entitlements to human rights,
including minority rights, the question arises as to whether it is relevant at
all. The legal content of citizenship is considered to be very “thin” in terms
of the rights (and the duties) which can be attributed exclusively to
citizenship beyond those human rights which are to be enjoyed by all within the
State’s jurisdiction. In terms of
duties, citizenship is relevant in relatively few areas, e.g. for military
service (which may be of declining importance). However, while the content may
be thin, the important exclusionary role of citizenship as a legal status was
recognized (as a way of limiting immigration, expelling non-citizens, etc.).
Citizenship does, therefore, make a difference from the perspective of the
outsider. From the individual citizen's point of view, paradoxically,
citizenship may matter more when s/he leaves the territory of their own State, at
which point diplomatic protection abroad and other support including the right
to return becomes important.
83.
In sum, it may be concluded that for the HCNM, citizenship is not a
meaningful criterion for entitlement to minority rights (with the exception of
political participation at the central/State level) and, following this logic,
should not be invoked by States for such a purpose.
84.
Citizenship has traditionally been viewed as a matter so close to the
core of statehood and sovereignty that international organizations in their
human rights standard-setting and monitoring activities have only made
occasional inroads into the questions concerned. It would seem that these
inroads have not always been well-coordinated, including in the UN.
85.
The main rule is that all human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights.
Logically, subsequent articles of the UDHR and those of many other instruments,
like the two International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), stipulate that everyone, with
one major exception pertaining to the running for office and voting in
elections,
is entitled to the rights contained therein. For the purpose of realizing equal
enjoyment of everyone to all human rights, the prohibition of discrimination
and established special rights and special measures, like those adopted to the
benefit of minority persons and/or minority groups, apply across the board of
civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.
86.
In paragraph 3 of General Comment No. 25 on article 25 of the ICCPR
entitled “The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the
right of equal access to public service”, the Human Rights Committee stated:
“In contrast with other rights and freedoms recognized
by the Covenant … article 25 protects the rights of ‘every citizen’. State
reports should outline the legal provisions which define citizenship in the
context of the rights protected by article 25. No distinctions are permitted
between citizens in the enjoyment of these rights on the grounds of race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. Distinctions between those who are
entitled to citizenship by birth and those who acquire it by naturalization may
raise questions of compatibility with article 25. State reports should indicate
whether any groups, such as permanent residents, enjoy these rights on a
limited basis, for example, by having the right to vote in local elections or
to hold particular public service positions.”
87.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination of 1965 (ICEAFRD) stipulates in Article 1 paragraph 2 that it
“shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made
by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens”. Despite
this inherent limitation in the text of the ICEAFRD, its implementation by the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has given rise to innovative
comments in relation to non-citizens.
88.
In this context, the CERD stated, in paragraph 4 of General Recommendation
No. 30 entitled “Discrimination Against Non-Citizens”,:
“Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or
immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such
differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the
Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not
proportional to the achievement of this aim.” In paragraph 13, the CERD
recommended: “Ensure that particular groups of non-citizens are not
discriminated against with regard to access to citizenship or naturalization,
and to pay due attention to possible barriers to naturalization that may exist
for long-term or permanent residents.” In paragraph 17, it is recommended that
States “Regularize the status of former citizens of predecessor States who now
reside within the jurisdiction of the State party”. While the CERD does not
address directly minority rights in this General Recommendation, it called in
paragraph 37 for “the necessary measures to prevent practices that deny
non-citizens their cultural identity, such as legal or de facto requirements that non-citizens change their
name in order to obtain citizenship, and to take measures to enable
non-citizens to preserve and develop their culture”.
89.
Article 2, paragraph 3 of the ICESC states: “Developing countries, with
due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what
extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present
Covenant to non-nationals.” This exception is not available to developed
countries.
90.
The Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are Not Nationals
of the Country in which They Live (adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
40/144 of 1985) contains, in its Articles 5-9, a list of the rights that aliens
shall enjoy. The Declaration is not subject to a separate monitoring procedure,
but it can be and is quoted by other monitoring instances when issues
concerning non-citizens, non-nationals and aliens come up. .
91.
In General Comment No. 23 on article 27 of the ICCPR, that is on
minority rights, the Human Rights Committee spelled out in paragraph 5.1:
“The terms used in article 27 indicate that the persons designed to be
protected are those who belong to a group and who share in common a culture, a
religion and/or a language. Those terms also indicate that the individuals
designed to be protected need not be citizens of the State party. In this
regard, the obligations deriving from article 2.1 are also relevant, since a
State party is required under that article to ensure that the rights protected
under the Covenant are available to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction, except rights which are expressly made to apply to
citizens, for example, political rights under article 25. A State party
may not, therefore, restrict the rights under article 27 to its citizens
alone.”
92.
Following the presentation and debate about the State report by Japan
under the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee observed in paragraph 13 of its
concluding observations, under the heading of principal
subjects of concern and recommendations:
“The Committee is concerned about
instances of discrimination against members of the Japanese-Korean minority who
are not Japanese citizens, including the non-recognition of Korean schools. The
Committee draws the attention of the State party to General Comment No. 23
(1994) which stresses that protection under article 27 may not be restricted to
citizens.”
93.
Based on the arguments above, it would seem that in the UN system minority
persons need not have citizenship in order to enjoy human rights and minority
rights.
In other words, a group can constitute a minority even if its members have not (yet)
obtained citizenship. Indeed, the existence of a minority is and should be a
question of fact and not of law or of government recognition, as governments
should not be allowed to exclude minorities or define them away by
non-acknowledgement or by arbitrary denial of citizenship.
Admittedly, non-citizens will not have the right to run for office or vote in
elections - at least at the national level -, but minority persons without
citizenship should have access to practically all other human rights, including
minority rights. States have significant leeway for deciding on the criteria
for the granting of citizenship, as long as they do not discriminate in their
legislation and practices.
94.
Non-citizens residing on the territory of a given State can be
classified into three different categories in international law. Firstly non-citizens may enjoy the status of “aliens”,
i.e. foreign citizens. Secondly, non-citizens may under certain circumstances
be granted the status of “refugees”. Thirdly, non-citizens may be “stateless”
persons.
95.
In the case of aliens, there is no general international instrument
regarding their protection.
The receiving State has, in principle, the sovereign right to admit aliens on
its territory and to govern the regime of aliens residing on its territory.
However, each State has the obligation to provide aliens residing on its
territory with a set of minimal guarantees of norms agreed through
international treaties., irrespective of the treatment granted to its own
citizens. The content of this principle may be identified on a case-by-case
basis, but there is a broad acceptance that it implies respect of the core of
fundamental human rights.
96.
At the same time, aliens living on the territory of a given State enjoy
the diplomatic and consular protection of the State of citizenship. Hence the
State of citizenship may exercise diplomatic protection when its citizens have
suffered a prejudice which results from certain action/measures taken by the
authorities of the State of residence, provided that such measures are deemed incompatible
with international law and after exhaustion of domestic legal remedies. Moreover,
according to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the sending
State may intervene for defending its own citizens’ rights which should have
been observed by the receiving State (Article 5).
97.
As regards refugees, the reference document is the 1951 Convention
related to the Status of Refugees.
This instrument enshrines the principle of non-refoulement, which means
that no Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee
against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a State where he or she
fears persecution. As a rule, the State Parties to this Convention shall grant
refugees the same treatment as the aliens accepted on their territory (Article
7 of the Convention). Moreover, this instrument sets out a number of rights and
principles. For example, State Parties cannot discriminate against refugees by
reference to their race, religion or State of origin (Article 3 of the
Convention); Article 4 of the Convention regarding the right to religion
provides for a treatment not less favourable to the one granted to the
citizens; Article 22 of the Convention regarding the right to education provides
for the same treatment for refugees as for citizens of the State as far elementary
education is concerned.
98.
In the case of stateless persons, the 1954 Convention relating to the
Status of Stateless persons, which has however a limited role in international
relations, sets up a similar framework for stateless persons as for refugees:
principle of non-discriminatory treatment on the basis of race, religion or
State of origin (Article 3), treatment similar to the one granted to
aliens, unless the Convention provides for a more favourable treatment.
99.
In view of the foregoing, it has been suggested that extending the scope
of certain minority rights and facilities to non-citizens would create a
parallel - or even overlapping - application of different sets of international
norms: protection of national minorities and, at the same time, protective
measures for aliens, refugees or stateless persons. It has been further argued
that the simultaneous application of these different regimes would result in
practical and conceptual difficulties and contradictions raising issues of
discrimination, in particular when the diplomatic protection would be exercised
on behalf of an individual already enjoying protection in his home State as a
member of a minority group.
100.
Bearing in mind the overall coherence of the protection of human rights
in international law, it seems, however, that the aforementioned potential
difficulties could be easily avoided. These specific regimes protecting
non-citizens under international law indeed pursue a specific goal by
responding to a particular need for protection. Such a goal cannot contradict
the very principles of minority protection, which form part and parcel of human
rights.
The diplomatic protection in particular should not be construed as a means of
“compensating” a possibly deficient implementation of minority rights by the
authorities of the home-State of the individuals concerned.
101.
The relevance of the citizenship criterion as a precondition for
enjoying minority rights has been both a long-debated and a controversial issue.
Moreover, international standards and practice have been under significant
evolution in recent decades. While the question of citizenship has regularly
featured prominently in the debate, it should be borne in mind that other
elements, often considered constitutive of a minority, have also been proposed,
analysed and even implemented in practice. Such elements can be found in various
international standards - legally binding or not – and/or in their corresponding
explanatory reports. National legislation and practice offer further evidence
of the relevance of such criteria.
102.
It may be argued that the relationship between such elements and the
citizenship criterion has often remained unclear: in other words, one would
have difficulty to contend that these criteria have been specifically developed
in order to replace the reference which is still often made to citizenship. While
this may be true, it is equally pertinent to stress that they have not been
developed in a way that would exclude this possibility. In any event and for
the purposes of this report, it is important to underline that the relevance of
other criteria has already been analysed and their “workability” has often been
tested in various national contexts.
103.
The protection of persons belonging to minorities in international law
is generally viewed as a combination of classical individual rights and
freedoms on the one hand and “enhanced” or “core” minority rights on the other.
The first category includes basic rights such as freedom of association,
freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, respect for private life and of course the prohibition
of discrimination. These rights, which are enshrined in a number of
international treaties such as the ECHR, the ICCPR and the ICERD, are universal
in nature and can be invoked by every human being, irrespective of his or her
affiliation with a minority.
It has nevertheless been found indispensable to repeat them in most if not all
international standards dealing specifically with the position of minorities since
they represent essential and perhaps even foundational guarantees for persons
belonging to minorities: without an unimpeded exercise of these basic rights
and freedoms, together with a particular sensitivity for their key role in enabling
the affirmation of a specific identity, state schemes, policies and strategies
intended to support minorities could never be fully operational and successful.
104.
The second category is made up of “enhanced” or “core” minority rights. Although
this notion is not legally defined, it embraces a set of States’ obligations
and principles which in turn result in rights, facilities and concrete measures
taken on behalf of persons belonging to minorities. These enhanced minority
rights can in principle not be inferred from the catalogue contained in the general
human rights treaties as they are more demanding.
They are entrenched in instruments or provisions dealing specifically with
minorities, such as the FCNM,
the ECRML, the CSCE/OSCE commitments and Article 27 ICCPR.
Furthermore, enhanced minority rights are also entrenched in certain peace
treaties and in a number of bilateral agreements between neighbouring
countries.
105.
Although human rights and fundamental freedoms were originally meant to place
an obligation on States not to interfere with their exercise (i.e. an essentially
negative obligation), subsequent interpretation and especially ECHR case-law have
inferred positive obligations on the part of the States: the latter now have a
duty to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms against violations which
do not emanate from them. The possibility of such positive obligations has also
been recognised in different contexts by the European Court of Human Rights,
including that of persons entitled to a protection under minority instruments.
106.
While each person belonging to a minority enjoys almost all individual
human rights and freedoms, the exercise of such rights “in community with
others”, in particular through the freedom of association, is often
indispensable for a minority to be able to preserve and develop its specific
identity. This is, however, not sufficient: the exercise of basic freedoms and
enhanced minority rights by members of a minority - even in community with
others - but without any State involvement whatsoever would most probably mean
nearly insurmountable difficulties for many minorities to maintain their
identity.
107.
It follows that organised State action aimed at helping minorities
preserve and develop the essential elements of their identity is crucial and actually
even dictated by both the letter and the spirit of relevant international
standards, such as the FCNM
and the ECRML.
Although initially somewhat controversial, a State duty to take positive action
is now also widely accepted in relation to Article 27 ICCPR, as attested by the
HRC itself
and corroborated by academic legal opinions.
The 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities makes it clear that the rights it spells
out often require action, including protective measures and encouragement of
conditions for the promotion of their identity and specified, active measures
by the State.
108.
Given the particular nature of minority rights and the corresponding importance
to take positive action, most if not all State policies aimed at protecting
minorities provide for and regulate cultural support through specific
legislation, assistance programmes, budgetary and other measures.
Furthermore, enhanced minority rights such as language rights and participatory
rights almost inevitably necessitate the setting up of specific infrastructures
and/or the adoption of special measures to ensure that those concerned can make
an effective use of their rights in practice.
109.
Against this background, States are confronted with the need to design
schemes to support minority language and culture. In doing so, they may
legitimately look for certain guarantees to make sure the impact of their (often
long-term) efforts will be maximised and will meet the real needs of persons
belonging to minorities. States therefore often identify - or in practice make use
of - certain criteria which are meant to attest the viability of the services
offered and the representativity of the (group of) persons submitting specific
requests for linguistic services or other cultural support. In this context, a
number of alternative criteria can be envisaged, such as the requirement of a
lawful residence, the size of a minority, the length of time on a given
territory or even other criteria likely to attest the existence of strong and
lasting ties coupled with real needs.
110.
These alternative criteria must remain flexible in nature and should
therefore not be applied in an automatic way, without due consideration being
given to the right, measure or facility at issue. For example, it is now widely
admitted that the numerical size of a minority can be taken into account to
determine to what extent certain rights and measures can be implemented in
favour of persons belonging to minorities.
This does not mean, however, that the same numerical threshold should be
required for all the rights concerned. For example, while a sizeable percentage
may legitimately be asked to introduce bilingual topographical indications, the
right to make use of a minority language in judicial (criminal) proceedings or
the right to use one’s surname and first names in a minority language and their
official recognition cannot be subject to the same threshold. In other words a
nuanced approach, based on the right or measure at issue,
seems also required in the use of these other criteria.
111.
International standards specifically designed for persons belonging to
minorities do not explicitly mention the requirement of a (lawful) residence. The
notion of residence had been included in the draft additional protocol on the
rights of national minorities to the ECHR adopted by the PACE.
Moreover, several declarations/reservations entered upon ratification of the
FCNM make mention of it.
In both contexts though residence is envisaged as a constitutive element of
various attempts to define the term national minorities, rather than as a
particular criterion to be relied upon for certain specific minority rights and
facilities.
112.
State practice, however, suggest that the notion of (lawful) residence
is often used or referred to as a condition, even implicitly, for being
entitled to certain rights and measures. For example, States often set up minority
consultation structures with a view to identifying regular interlocutors who
can express the needs of persons belonging to minorities and submit requests
for financial or other support for their initiatives. Channelling positive
measures, such as support for cultural initiatives, through such structures is indeed
meant to ensure a well-targeted impact on those concerned. Several types of
consultation mechanisms coexist in European practice, ranging from ad hoc
consultative commissions, advisory bodies to Parliament and/or the Government, to
systems of cultural autonomy involving the setting up of minority councils through
free and secret ballot.
113. States usually try to ensure a certain
representativeness of the minority consultation structures they establish and may
therefore adopt legislative provisions governing their legal status. In this
context, the requirement of a minimum number (or percentage) of persons who
belong to a given minority and reside in the country – or in a given
administrative division of it - is commonly prescribed among the conditions
laid down in such regulations.
114.
In principle, the requirement by a State wishing to establish
consultation mechanisms and/or provide support for cultural and other
initiatives, namely that a sufficient number of persons belonging to a minority
are legal residents, is justifiable and does not seem to have met with objections
from human rights treaty bodies.
Lawful residence actually testifies to the existence of a factual and legal
link between a group of persons and the State. The latter may therefore legitimately
ask for some evidence of such a link, including through the requirement of a
lawful residence,
before creating new consultation structures, taking positive measures and
thereby committing public money for minority groups.
115.
It should be stressed, however, that an additional requirement such as
the citizenship criterion has often been criticised in the same context by
different international bodies in that it could not be reasonable or might in some
cases lead to arbitrary exclusions.
The Venice Commission itself has already questioned the admissibility of
restricting certain cultural and linguistic rights to citizens only and highlighted
in this regard the exclusion of non-citizens from membership in a system of
cultural autonomy as well as in associations established to promote and protect
the identity of minorities.
116.
The qualification as a minority shall not depend on the numerical
strength of a group. Indeed even tiny groups are to be considered covered by
the instruments protecting minorities, provided they meet the necessary
objective elements and express the wish to cohere as a minority with a view to
preserving their specific identity. This is attested both by State practice,
which contains numerous examples of protection granted to tiny minorities,
and findings adopted by international bodies.
117.
While numbers may not per se justify the exclusion of a group
from the general protection any minority is entitled to, they are not without
relevance when it comes to determining the level of protection granted to a
minority. General human rights can of course not be subject to restrictions
based on numbers but enhanced minority rights can. This is especially the case
for those language rights and facilities which go beyond the mere personal
right to use one’s language freely in private and in public, which is already guaranteed
by articles 8 and 10 ECHR. Most frequently quoted examples include the right to
make use of a minority language in official dealings, the right to minority
language education and the display of bilingual topographical indications.
118.
Different expressions can be found in the corresponding international
standards, such as “substantial numbers”, “sufficient demand”, “numerical
strength”
or “number considered sufficient/justifying measures”.
At least some forms of limitation - based on numbers - in the enjoyment of language
rights and facilities must therefore be regarded as compatible with these
expressions. It is no coincidence that international standards do not specify
further which proportions or percentages should trigger the rights and
facilities at issue since the assumption is that flexibility is needed in this
respect to adequately cope with the variety of national situations.
119.
Practice suggests that several States have set more precise conditions
pertaining to numbers in their legal order, including through the entrenching of
numerical minimum thresholds in relevant statutory provisions. This is a useful
step as the absence of a legal basis in domestic law for the use of minority
languages or even a complete discretion left to the authorities to decide on
the admissibility of such a use do not seem acceptable.
Numerical thresholds, albeit permissible and regularly used, should not be
demanding to such an extent as to impair the very essence of language rights
for persons belonging to minorities or deprive these rights of their
effectiveness.
Furthermore, it seems preferable not to base decisions on the maintenance or
closure of minority language classes exclusively on minimum numbers but rather
balance such numbers with other criteria equally useful to determine needs and
assess the level of demand.
More generally and without questioning the practice of adopting thresholds or
percentages, States may also opt for less automatic criteria which would
reserve a real margin of appreciation for the authorities, thus making it
possible to take into account the numerical size of a minority as one element in
a general balance of interests before reaching a decision.
120.
In view of the foregoing, it seems justifiable for States to rely on the
numerical size of a minority - often in combination with other criteria – when
confronted with a choice to be made on the extension of language rights. As
part of core or enhanced minority rights, language rights indeed involve
significant (financial and other) effort by the State, mainly through positive
measures, in order to be fully operational in practice. For example, to be able
to process requests received in a minority language or even to respond in such
a language certainly requires from the authority or public service concerned a
minimum infrastructure, qualified staff members and/or translators, language
training for civil servants, etc. The argument is all the more valid as
concerns the creation of real opportunities to receive minority language
teaching within the education system. In this context, it is legitimate for the
State to take into account the capacity of a minority to contribute to the
durability of such services and facilities over time, notably by looking at its
numerical size. The level of protection may therefore depend on the numbers of
minority members in a given area of the State, not least of all for reasons of
practicability.
121.
“Minority area” provisions are to be found in international standards.
This is mostly - if not exclusively - the case in relation to core minority
rights, i.e. essentially language rights. Illustrative examples include the
expression “in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities
(…) traditionally (…)” used in Articles 10 §2, 11 §3 and
14 §2 FCNM, which respectively deal with the use of minority languages in
relation with administrative authorities, bilingual topographical indications
and minority language teaching. Such clauses clearly allow for some form of
territorial limitations by the States. Indeed it would not seem reasonable to
oblige them to make, for example, minority language education systematically available
across the whole country, including in areas where there is no evidence of the
presence of a minority, at least for a significant period of time. The ECRML
proceeds from the same assumption in that most of its provisions contain a
territorial clause (“within the territories in which such languages are used”).
122.
The question of the length of time needed of the presence of a minority
in a given area cannot receive a general, abstract answer. A “traditional”
settlement may probably require a continuous presence over years, perhaps even
generations, although it is not possible to articulate any precise time limit.
This requirement needs to be distinguished from that of longstanding and
lasting ties with the state of residence, which is often considered a
constitutive element in various attempts to define the term “minority”.
The purpose of the latter is to require a traditional (or even historic)
presence of a minority group in the territory of the State, not in a specific
area of it. It is thus not used as a criterion to decide on the activation of
enhanced language rights in specific areas, but rather as a general test to
decide on the granting of minority protection status.
123.
In view of the foregoing, territorial limitations - coupled with time
requirement - in the availability of linguistic rights and facilities seem in
principle admissible. They should, however, be based on reasonable and
objective criteria. For example, States may check the traditional presence of a
minority in a given region using inter alia census results, although in
this case they must not base themselves exclusively on the latest census figure
but rather consider such results over a longer period of time.
Moreover, the designation of certain zones for the purpose of applying these
“minority area” provisions should not be made in too rigid a way so as to
exclude any possibility for a more flexible application in justified,
individual cases.
What essentially matters eventually in the use of territorial restrictions is
that persons belonging to minorities do not lose their status – and thereby all
protection – when they take residence outside their traditional area of
settlement. It should therefore be accepted that the range of rights and
facilities at their disposal can be reduced, provided the authorities ensure
that the specific needs of these persons living outside their traditional areas
of settlement are being catered for.
124.
The term “minority” has not been given a legally binding definition in
international law. Furthermore, different categories may be covered by this term:
in the UN system, the beneficiaries of the rights under Article 27 ICCPR are persons belonging to “ethnic, religious or
linguistic” minorities and the 1992 Declaration adds the category “national”
minorities. In the European context, the term “national minority” is preferred and
can be found in the FCNM and in the OSCE documents.
125.
The general attitude towards attempts to propose a common definition has
gradually changed. Whereas until the early nineties, it was felt that a legally
binding concept of “minority” was needed in international law, it has become
increasingly clear in the last decade that efforts to bring about such a
definition would not be successful and could even lead to a weakening of the minority
rights regime. A definition would indeed be likely to reflect only the smallest
common denominator. It follows that in the future, terminology and concepts are
unlikely to be defined and unified in international law. Recent experience,
however, has shown that through a pragmatic approach the corpus of
international norms protecting minorities is workable in practice, even without
a legally binding definition.
126.
Bearing in mind the absence of a legally binding definition in
international law, a number of States have chosen to formulate their own
definition of the term “minority”. Most of them have done so through a
declaration submitted during the accession to the FCNM and/or in general laws
on minorities. While a general definition at the domestic level is neither required by international standards
nor indispensable to render the said laws operational, it is widely seen as
acceptable in international law, provided that the definition does not result
in arbitrary or unjustified distinctions or, indeed, in a standard of
protection that is inferior as compared to the international standards
concerned.
127.
The inclusion of a citizenship requirement in a general (domestic) definition
should be avoided as not being in conformity with the object and purpose of
minority protection. Such a restrictive element, which should also be avoided
in a declaration, is likely to have discriminatory effects by excluding certain
members of minority groups who might also wish to preserve their specific identity.
For example, it is likely to give the wrong signal that non-citizens cannot be
entitled to rights and facilities which exist for minorities: in reality, human
rights are universal and most of the enhanced minority rights - especially
linguistic ones - already available to a minority group should not be refused to
certain individuals on the basis of their citizenship as such a differentiation
would hardly be in compliance with the principles of equality and
non-discrimination.
128.
Minority rights should not be regarded as a distinct category, nor
interpreted and analysed in isolation from the human rights family. It is
rather a combination of classical (universal) human rights - which are often
exercised in community with others - and enhanced minority rights/facilities.
While the former may occasionally entail positive obligations from the States,
the latter undoubtedly and inherently necessitate a concerted, coherent and
sustained state action aimed at offering adequate opportunities and
providing a range of linguistic and other rights and facilities. Hence due regard must be given to this
complex set of rights and obligations in any attempt to determine the
exact scope of a state’s action through the use of relevant criteria.
129.
Positive action is essential to enable personsbelonging to minorities to assert their specific identity, which is the
objective of every minority protection regime. International standards require such positive action mostly through
programme-type provisions which set out objectives.
These provisions, which are in principle not directly applicable, leave the
States concerned an important margin of appreciation in the implementation of
the objectives which they have undertaken to achieve, thus enabling them to
take particular circumstances into account.
130.
Each State shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction - including
non-citizens – the human rights guaranteed by the general human rights treaties
binding upon them, mainly by refraining from undue interference in their
exercise. A restrictive declaration entered upon ratification of the FCNM
and/or a general law on minorities containing a citizenship-based definition
can in no way mitigate this international obligation.
131.
The State's (positive) obligation to take special measures on behalf of
minorities and their members needs to be further qualified, especially for
those (enhanced) rights and facilities which have resource-implications: it is
legitimate for a State to try and circumscribe the circle of those who will
directly benefit from its special measures designed to promote the specific
identity of minorities. Such special measures are indeed costly and often
require the setting up of a heavy infrastructure which is meant to meet lasting
needs of the population concerned. States are therefore entitled to ascertain
the existence of genuine and effective links with the minority group concerned
before deciding to develop special measures.
132.
Bearing in mind the need to respect the principle of equality and the
prohibition of discrimination, it is necessary to rely on objective criteria when
deciding on the development of special measures on behalf of minority groups.
Criteria such as residence, numerical size
and time factor, coupled with a certain link with a territory, are amongst
those which can be found most frequently in relevant international standards
and are often matched by concurring State practice. They should, however, not
be considered exhaustive as other criteria may also prove useful and workable
in practice.
133.
While citizenship undoubtedly indicates a strong link, these alternative
criteria also bear witness – at least to an extent – to genuine ties between persons belonging to minorities and their home-state.
In this context, the aforementioned distinction between positive and
negative obligations needs to be borne in mind and may justify in certain
contexts the requirement by the State of more stringent criteria, for example
when it comes to deciding on the opening of a new infrastructure or the
establishment of (linguistic or other) facilities.
134.
States are therefore entitled to require that different objective
criteria be met according to the rights and measures at stake. For example, a
series of criteria attesting a strong and lasting link with a territory may be
warranted when it comes to authorising the display of bilingual topographical
indications, but certainly not before taking measures to protect persons
subject to acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their
affiliation with a minority. Furthermore, the use of a given criterion
should not be applied in an automatic way since due consideration must be given
to the particular right or measure at issue: a sizeable numerical threshold may
indeed be admissible for bilingual topographical indications, but not for the
right to use one’s name in a minority language. In other words, an article-by-article approach leaving room for
flexibility seems preferable to determine the exact personal scope of
application of minority rights and more in keeping with both the wording and
spirit of the relevant international standards, especially the FCNM.
135.
The call for flexibility in the application of programme-type minority provisions
also implies that common principles and objectives may not necessarily result
in the same conclusions in different national contexts. For example, it has
been repeatedly stressed that in the case of a break-up of a multi-ethnic
State, those who suddenly lost the citizenship of their state of residence were
at particular risk of exclusion. In such cases, a citizenship criterion intended
to determine the scope of minority rights and facilities is therefore even more
problematic than in other domestic situations and should be replaced by a
residence requirement. In sum, an article-by-article approach of the relevant
international standards necessarily needs to be combined with an interpretation
drawing on the national context at issue.
136.
There seem to be very few individual rights explicitly reserved for
citizens in the various international instruments which are relevant to persons
belonging to minorities. This does not mean that in practice all minority
rights, especially enhanced linguistic rights, are equally relevant to all
minorities (or persons belonging to a minority) since States may legitimately
use other criteria to target their measures aimed at helping minorities to
preserve and develop their identity.
137.
The most frequently quoted example, in terms of admissible restrictions to
citizens only, concerns the field of political rights. In this context, it is
worth recalling that Article 25 ICCPR, which deals with the right to
participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to
public service, addresses “every citizen” and not “everyone” or “every person”
as in other provisions of the same treaty. Restricting certain political rights
- including
those guaranteeing minority
representation in the legislature - to
citizens who belong to a
national minority is also viewed as a legitimate requirement under the FCNM.
138.
Even though the restriction of the right to vote and to stand for office
to citizens only can be regarded as admissible under international law,
mentions needs to be made of a more recent tendency in Europe to extend these
rights to non-citizens at the local level, provided non-citizens have been
lawful residents of the area concerned for a certain period of time. Another
cautious word must be added to stress that all rights, facilities and measures
which are reserved for citizens and aim at ensuring an effective participation
of persons belonging to minorities in public affairs cannot automatically be
considered admissible. Although this is beyond doubt for the right to vote and
to be elected in the legislature, the restriction of other participatory rights
to citizens only has already raised concerns in different contexts, including
in relation to cultural rights, and may not always appear legitimate.
139.
In addition to certain political rights, it seems that the right to
equal access to the military service and civil service - at least for higher
functions -, which may be seen as contributing to the effective participation
of minorities, can legitimately be restricted to citizens. The right for a
person to return to his/her own country, guaranteed inter alia by
Article 12 ICCPR, may be another example of a right which can be restricted to
citizens.
140.
The relationship between citizenship and other criteria is not finally
settled. On the one hand, the use of other criteria may appear preferable in
certain fields such as enhanced linguistic rights, especially as concerns
education and use of minority languages in the public realm. The use of other
criteria is also more appropriate in certain national contexts like State
succession resulting from the dissolution of larger units: allocation of
citizenship following the formation or consolidation of new entities is often
slow and contested, which makes it essential that such problems do not spill
over into the treatment of minorities. On the other hand, the use of the
citizenship criterion remains admissible - and perhaps even more suitable - in
certain limited contexts, in particular as concerns some political rights and
access to certain public functions.
141.
What seems increasingly problematic from the point of international law is
the general and systematic use of the citizenship criterion made by certain
States, irrespective of the complex nature of the set of individual’s rights
and State’s obligations concerned. A more nuanced and restrictive use of the
citizenship criterion, together with other relevant criteria, would certainly
avoid the risk of arbitrary exclusions while preserving the State’s capacity to
target its effort and channel its resources to those who most need it.