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Strasbourg, 19 March 2007
Study No. 371 / 2006
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CDL-AD(2007)008
Or. Fr.
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EUROPEAN
COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE COMMISSION)
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE ON REFERENDUMS
adopted by the Council for
Democratic Elections
at its 19th meeting
(Venice, 16 December 2006)
and the Venice Commission
at its 70th plenary
session
(Venice, 16-17 March 2007)
on the basis of contributions by
Mr Pieter van DIJK (member, the Netherlands)
Mr François LUCHAIRE (member, Andorra)
Mr Giorgio MALINVERNI (member, Switzerland)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.. 4
GUIDELINES ON THE HOLDING
OF REFERENDUMS.. 5
Adopted by the Council for
Democratic Elections. 5
at its 18th
meeting. 5
(Venice, 12 October 2006) 5
and the Venice Commission. 5
at its 68th
plenary session. 5
(Venice, 13-14 October 2006) 5
I. Referendums
and Europe’s electoral heritage. 5
1. Universal
suffrage. 5
1.1. Rule and exceptions. 5
1.2. Electoral registers. 5
2. Equal
suffrage. 6
2.1. Equal voting rights. 6
2.2. Equality of opportunity. 6
2.3. Equality and national
minorities. 7
3. Free
suffrage. 7
3.1. Freedom of voters to
form an opinion. 7
3.2. Freedom of voters to
express their wishes and action to combat fraud. 8
4. Secret
suffrage. 9
II. Conditions
for implementing these principles. 9
1. Respect
for fundamental rights. 9
2. Regulatory
levels and stability of referendum law.. 9
3. Procedural
guarantees. 9
3.1. Organisation of the
referendum by an impartial body. 9
3.2. Observation of the
referendum.. 10
3.3. An effective system of
appeal 10
3.4. Funding. 11
III. Specific
rules. 11
1. The
rule of law.. 11
2. The
procedural validity of texts submitted to a referendum.. 11
3. The
substantive validity of texts submitted to a referendum.. 12
4. Specific
rules applicable to referendums held at the request of a section of the
electorate and to popular initiatives (where they are provided for in the
Constitution) 12
5. Parallelism
in procedures and rules governing the referendum.. 13
6. Opinion
of Parliament 13
7. Quorum.. 13
8. Effects
of referendums. 14
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM.. 15
GENERAL REMARKS.. 15
I. Referendums
and Europe’s electoral heritage. 15
1. Universal
suffrage. 15
1.1. Rule and exceptions. 15
2. Equal
suffrage. 16
2.2. Equality of opportunity. 16
2.3. Equality and national
minorities. 16
3. Free
suffrage. 16
3.1. Freedom of voters to
form an opinion. 16
3.2. Freedom of voters to
express their wishes. 17
II. Conditions
for implementing these principles. 18
2. Regulatory
levels and stability of referendum law.. 18
3. Procedural
guarantees. 18
3.1 Organisation
of the referendum by an impartial body. 18
3.2 An
effective system of appeal 18
3.3. Funding. 19
III. Specific
rules. 19
1. The
rule of law.. 19
2. The
procedural validity of texts submitted to a referendum.. 19
3. The
substantive validity of texts submitted to a referendum.. 20
4. Specific
rules applicable to referendums held at the request of a section of the
electorate and to popular initiatives (where they are provided for in the
Constitution) 21
5. Parallelism
in procedures and rules governing the referendum.. 21
6. Opinion
of Parliament 22
7. Quorum.. 22
8. Effects
of referendums. 23
INTRODUCTION
1. In response to a
request from the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council for Democratic Elections
and subsequently the Venice Commission adopted the Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters in 2002.
2. This document was
approved by the Parliamentary Assembly at its 2003 session (first part) and by
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe at its Spring 2003 session.
3. In a solemn
declaration dated 13 May 2004,
the Committee of Ministers recognised “the importance of the Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters, which reflects the principles of Europe's
electoral heritage, as a reference document for the Council of Europe in this
area, and as a basis for possible further development of the legal framework of
democratic elections in European countries”.
4. As democracy spreads
through Europe, both pluralist elections and the use of referendums has become
increasingly common.
5. Accordingly, for
several years the Parliamentary Assembly has taken an interest in the issue of
referendums and good practice in this area. Its work led, on 29 April 2005, to the adoption of Recommendation 1704 (2005) on “Referendums: towards good practices
in Europe”.
The Assembly worked in co-operation with the Venice Commission in this
connection; the latter submitted comments on the aforementioned recommendation
at the Committee of Ministers’ request
and drew up a summary report based on replies to a questionnaire sent to its
members on the issue of referendums. This report is entitled: “Referendums in Europe – An analysis of the legal rules in European States”.
6. It was decided that a
Council of Europe background paper on referendums should be drafted to
accompany the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters. The Council for
Democratic Elections took on this task, on the basis of contributions by three
members of the Venice Commission, Mr Pieter van Dijk (Netherlands), Mr François
Luchaire (Andorra) and Mr Giorgio Malinverni (Switzerland).
7. The guidelines on the
organisation of referendums were adopted by the Council for Democratic
Elections at its 18th meeting (Venice, 12 October 2006) and by the Venice Commission at its 68th plenary session (Venice, 13-14 October
2006).
8. These guidelines are
accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, which was adopted by the Council for
Democratic Elections at its 19th meeting (Venice, 16 December 2006)
and by the Venice Commission at its 70th plenary session (Venice,
16-17 March 2007).
Adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections
at its 18th meeting
(Venice, 12 October 2006)
and the Venice
Commission
at its 68th plenary session
(Venice,
13-14 October 2006)
Universal suffrage means in
principle that all human beings have the right to vote. This right may,
however, and indeed should, be subject to certain conditions:
the right
to vote must be subject to a minimum age but must be acquired, at the latest,
at the age of majority;
i. a
nationality requirement may apply;
ii.
however, it would be advisable for foreigners to be allowed to vote in local
elections after a certain period of residence.
i. a
residence requirement may be imposed;
ii.
residence in this case means habitual residence;
iii. a
length of residence requirement may be imposed on nationals solely for local or
regional elections;
iv. the
requisite period of residence should be reasonable and, as a rule, should not
exceed six months;
v. it is
desirable that the right to vote be accorded to citizens residing abroad.
i. provision may be made
for depriving individuals of their right to vote, but only subject to the
following cumulative conditions:
ii. it must
be provided for by law;
iii. the
proportionality principle must be observed;
iv. the
deprivation must be based on mental incapacity or a criminal conviction for a
serious offence;
v.
furthermore, the withdrawal of political rights or finding of mental incapacity
may only be imposed by express decision of a court of law.
Fulfilment
of the following criteria is essential if electoral registers are to be
reliable:
i. electoral registers
must be permanent or refer to a register that is constantly updated (population
register or register of births, marriages and deaths);
ii. there must be regular
up-dates, at least once a year. Where voters are not registered automatically,
registration must be possible over a relatively long period;
iii. electoral registers
must be public;
iv. there should be an
administrative procedure – subject to judicial control – or a judicial
procedure, allowing for the registration of a voter who was not registered; the
registration should not take place as a result of a decision taken by the
polling station on election day;
v. a similar procedure
should allow voters to have incorrect inscriptions amended within a reasonable
time;
vi. provision may be made for a
supplementary register as a means of giving the vote to persons who have moved
or reached statutory voting age since final publication of the register.
Each voter has in principle one
vote; where the electoral system provides voters with more than one vote (for
example, where there are alternatives), each voter has the same number of votes.
a. Equality of
opportunity must be guaranteed for the supporters and opponents of the proposal
being voted on. This entails a neutral attitude by administrative authorities,
in particular with regard to:
i. the referendum
campaign;
ii. coverage by the
media, in particular by the publicly owned media;
iii. public funding of
campaign and its actors;
iv. billposting and
advertising;
v. the right to
demonstrate on public thoroughfares.
b. In public radio and
television broadcasts on the referendum campaign, it is advisable that equality
be ensured between the proposal’s supporters and opponents.
c. Balanced coverage must
be guaranteed to the proposal’s supporters and opponents in other public mass
media broadcasts, especially news broadcasts. Account may be taken of the
number of political parties supporting each option or their election results.
d. Equality must be
ensured in terms of public subsidies and other forms of backing. It is advisable
that equality be ensured between the proposal’s supporters and opponents. Such
backing may, however, be restricted to supporters and opponents of the proposal
who account for a minimum percentage of the electorate. If equality is ensured
between political parties, it may be strict or proportional. If it is strict,
political parties are treated on an equal footing irrespective of their current
parliamentary strength or support among the electorate. If it is proportional,
political parties must be treated according to the results achieved in the
elections.
e. Financial or other
conditions for radio and television advertising must be the same for the
proposal’s supporters and opponents.
f. In conformity with
freedom of expression, legal provision should be made to ensure that there is a
minimum access to privately owned audiovisual media, with regard to the
referendum campaign and to advertising, for all participants in the referendum.
g. Political party and
referendum campaign funding must be transparent.
h. The principle of
equality of opportunity can, in certain cases, lead to a limitation of spending
by political parties and other parties involved in the referendum debate,
especially on advertising.
i. Sanctions must be
imposed in the case of breaches of the duty of neutrality.
a. Special rules
providing for an exception to the normal vote-counting rules, in a proportional
way, in the case of a referendum concerning the situation of national
minorities do not, in principle, run counter to equal suffrage.
b. Voters must not find themselves obliged to reveal their
membership of a national minority.
a. Administrative authorities
must observe their duty of neutrality (see 1.2.2.a. above), which is one of the
means of ensuring that voters can form an opinion freely.
b. Contrary to the case
of elections, it is not necessary to prohibit completely intervention by the
authorities in support of or against the proposal submitted to a referendum.
However, the public authorities (national, regional and local) must not
influence the outcome of the vote by excessive, one-sided campaigning. The use
of public funds by the authorities for campaigning purposes must be prohibited.
c. The question put to
the vote must be clear; it must not be misleading; it must not suggest an
answer; electors must be informed of the effects of the referendum; voters must
be able to answer the questions asked solely by yes, no or a blank vote.
d. The authorities must
provide objective information. This implies that the text submitted to a
referendum and an explanatory report or balanced campaign material from the
proposal’s supporters and opponents should be made available to electors
sufficiently in advance, as follows:
i. they must be published
in the official gazette sufficiently far in advance of the vote;
ii. they must be sent
directly to citizens and be received sufficiently far in advance of the vote;
iii. the explanatory
report must give a balanced presentation not only of the viewpoint of the
executive and legislative authorities or persons sharing their viewpoint but
also of the opposing one.
e. The above information
must be available in all the official languages and in the languages of the
national minorities.
f. Sanctions must be
imposed in the case of breaches of the duty of neutrality and of voters’
freedom to form an opinion.
a. Voting procedure
i. voting procedures must
be readily understandable by citizens;
ii. voters should always
have the possibility of voting in a polling station. Other means of voting are
acceptable under the following conditions:
iii. postal voting should
be allowed only where the postal service is safe and reliable; the right to
vote using postal votes may be confined to people who are in hospital or
imprisoned or to persons with reduced mobility or to electors residing abroad;
fraud and intimidation must not be possible;
iv. electronic voting
should be in conformity with Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation Rec(2004)11
on Legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting. In particular, it
should be used only if it is safe, reliable, efficient, technically robust,
open to independent verification and easily accessible to voters; the system
must be transparent; unless channels of remote electronic voting are
universally accessible, they shall be only an additional and optional means of
voting;
v. very strict rules must
apply to voting by proxy; the number of proxies a single voter may hold must be
limited;
vi. mobile ballot boxes
should only be allowed under strict conditions that avoid all risks of fraud;
vii. at least two
criteria should be used to assess the accuracy of the outcome of the ballot:
the number of votes cast and the number of voting slips placed in the ballot
box;
viii. voting slips must
not be tampered with or marked in any way by polling station officials;
ix. unused
and invalid voting slips must never leave the polling station;
x. polling stations must
include representatives of a number of parties, and the presence of observers
appointed by the latter or by other groups that have taken a stand on the issue
put to the vote must be permitted during voting and counting;
xi. military personnel
should vote at their place of residence whenever possible. Otherwise, it is
advisable that they be registered to vote at the polling station nearest to their
duty station;
xii.
counting should preferably take place in polling stations;
xiii. counting must be
transparent. Observers, representatives of the proposal’s supporters and
opponents and the media must be allowed to be present. These persons must also
have access to the records;
xiv.
results must be transmitted to the higher level in an open manner;
xv. the
state must punish any kind of electoral fraud.
b. Freedom of voters to
express their wishes also implies:
i. that the executive
must organise referendums provided for by the legislative system; this is
particularly important when it is not subject to the executive’s initiative;
ii. compliance with the
procedural rules; in particular, referendums must be held within the time-limit
prescribed by law;
iii. the right to
accurate establishment of the result by the body responsible for organising the
referendum, in a transparent manner, and formal publication in the official
gazette.
a. For the voter, secrecy of voting
is not only a right but also a duty, non-compliance with which must be
punishable by disqualification of any ballot paper whose content is disclosed.
b. Voting must be individual. Family
voting and any other form of control by one voter over the vote of another must
be prohibited.
c. The list of persons actually
voting should not be published.
d. There should be sanctions against
the violation of secret sufrage.
a. Democratic referendums are not
possible without respect for human rights, in particular freedom of expression
and of the press, freedom of movement inside the country, freedom of assembly
and freedom of association for political purposes, including freedom to set up
political parties.
b. Restrictions on these freedoms
must have a basis in law, be in the public interest and comply with the
principle of proportionality.
a. Apart from rules on technical
matters and detail (which may be included in regulations of the executive),
rules of referendum law should have at least the rank of a statute.
b. The fundamental aspects of
referendum law should not be open to amendment less than one year before a
referendum, or should be written in the Constitution or at a level superior to
ordinary law.
c. Fundamental rules include, in
particular, those concerning:
- the
composition of electoral commissions or any other body responsible for
organising the referendum;
- the
franchise and electoral registers;
- the
procedural and substantive validity of the text put to a referendum;
- the
effects of the referendum (with the exception of rules concerning matters of
detail)
- the
participation of the proposal’s supporters and opponents to broadcasts of
public media.
a. An impartial body must
be in charge of organising the referendum.
b. Where there is no
longstanding tradition of administrative authorities’ impartiality in electoral
matters, independent, impartial electoral commissions must be set up at all
levels, from the national level to polling station level.
c. The central commission
must be permanent in nature.
d. It should include:
i. at least
one member of the judiciary or other independent legal expert;
ii. representatives of
parties already in Parliament or having scored at least a given percentage of
the vote; these persons must be qualified in electoral matters.
It may
include:
iii. a
representative of the Ministry of the Interior;
iv.
representatives of national minorities.
e. Political parties or
supporters and opponents of the proposal put to the vote must be equally
represented on electoral commissions or must be able to observe the work of the
impartial body. Equality between political parties may be construed strictly or
on a proportional basis (see I.2.2.d.).
f. The bodies appointing
members of commissions must not be free to dismiss them at will.
g. Members of commissions
must receive standard training.
h. It is desirable that
commissions take decisions by a qualified majority or by consensus.
a. Both national and
international observers should be given the widest possible opportunity to
participate in a referendum observation exercise.
b. Observation must not
be confined to election day itself, but must include the referendum campaign
and, where appropriate, the voter registration period and the signature
collection period. It must make it possible to determine whether irregularities
occurred before, during or after the vote. It must always be possible during
vote counting.
c. Observers should be
able to go everywhere where operations connected with the referendum are taking
place (for example, vote counting and verification). The places where observers
are not entitled to be present should be clearly specified by law, with the
reasons for their being banned.
d. Observation should
cover respect by the authorities of their duty of neutrality.
a. The appeal body in
referendum matters should be either an electoral commission or a court. In any
case, final appeal to a court must be possible.
b. The procedure must be
simple and devoid of formalism, in particular where the admissibility of
appeals is concerned.
c. The appeal procedure
and, in particular, the powers and responsibilities of the various bodies
should be clearly regulated by law, so as to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction
(whether positive or negative). The law must specifically designate the
competent body in each case.
d. The appeal body must
be competent to deal with the sphere covered by these guidelines, in particular
with:
- the franchise and
electoral registers;
- the completion of
popular initiatives and requests for referendums from a section of the
electorate;
- the procedural and,
where applicable, substantive validity of texts submitted to a referendum: the
review of the validity of texts should take place before the vote; domestic law
determines whether such review is obligatory or optional;
- respect for free
suffrage:
- the results of the
ballot.
e. The appeal body must
have authority to annul the referendum where irregularities may have affected
the outcome. It must be possible to annul the entire referendum or merely the
results for one polling station or constituency. In the event of annulment of
the global result, a new referendum must be called.
f. All voters must be
entitled to appeal. A reasonable quorum may be imposed for appeals by voters
against the results of a referendum.
g. Time-limits for
lodging and deciding appeals must be short.
h. The applicant’s right
to a hearing involving both parties must be protected.
i. Where the appeal body
is a higher electoral commission, it must be able ex officio to rectify or set aside
decisions taken by lower electoral commissions.
a. The general rules on
the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns must be applied to
both public and private funding.
b. The use of public funds
by the authorities for campaigning purposes must be prohibited.
The use of referendums must comply
with the legal system as a whole, and especially the procedural rules. In
particular, referendums cannot be held if the Constitution or a statute in
conformity with the Constitution does not provide for them, for example where
the text submitted to a referendum is a matter for Parliament’s exclusive
jurisdiction.
Questions submitted to a referendum
must respect:
- unity of form: the same
question must not combine a specifically-worded draft amendment with a
generally-worded proposal or a question of principle;
- unity of content: except in
the case of total revision of a text (Constitution, law), there must be an
intrinsic connection between the various parts of each question put to the
vote, in order to guarantee the free suffrage of the voter, who must not be
called to accept or refuse as a whole provisions without an intrinsic link; the
revision of several chapters of a text at the same time is equivalent to a
total revision;
- unity of hierarchical level:
it is desirable that the same question should not simultaneously apply to
legislation of different hierarchical levels.
Texts submitted to a referendum must
comply with all superior law (principle of the hierarchy of norms).
They must not be contrary to
international law or to the Council of Europe’s statutory principles
(democracy, human rights and the rule of law).
Texts that contradict the
requirements mentioned under III.2 and III.3 may not be put to the popular
vote.
a. Everyone enjoying
political rights is entitled to sign a popular initiative or request for a
referendum.
b. The time-limit for
collecting signatures (particularly the day on which the time-limit starts to
run and the last day of the time-limit) must be clearly specified, as well as
the number of signatures to be collected.
c. Everyone (regardless
of whether he or she enjoys political rights) must be entitled to collect
signatures.
d. If authorisation is
required in order to gather signatures for popular initiatives or requests for
a referendum on public thoroughfares, such authorisation may be refused only in
specific cases provided for by law, on the basis of overriding public interest
and in accordance with the principle of equality.
e. Payment from private
sources for the collection of signatures for popular initiatives and requests
for referendums should, as a rule, be prohibited. If permitted, it must be
regulated, with regard to both the total amount allocated and the amount paid
to each person.
f. All signatures must be
checked. In order to facilitate checking, lists of signatures should
preferably contain the names of electors registered in the same municipality.
g. In order to avoid
having to declare a vote totally invalid, an authority must have the power,
prior to the vote, to correct faulty drafting, for example:
i. when the
question is obscure, misleading or suggestive;
ii. when rules on
procedural or substantive validity have been violated; in this event, partial
invalidity may be declared if the remaining text is coherent; sub-division may
be envisaged to correct a lack of substantive unity.
a. When the referendum is
legally binding:
i. For a certain period
of time, a text that has been rejected in a referendum may not be adopted by a
procedure without referendum.
ii. During the same
period of time, a provision that has been accepted in a referendum may not be
revised by another method.
iii. The above does not
apply in the case of a referendum on partial revision of a text, where the
previous referendum concerned a total revision.
iv. The revision of a rule
of superior law that is contrary to the popular vote is not legally
unacceptable but should be avoided during the above-mentioned period.
v. In the event of
rejection of a text adopted by Parliament and put to the popular vote at the
request of a section of the electorate, a similar new text must not be put to
the vote unless a referendum is requested.
b. When a text is adopted
by referendum at the request of a section of the electorate, it should be
possible to organise a further referendum on the same issue at the request of a
section of the electorate, after the expiry, where applicable, of a reasonable period
of time.
c. When a text is adopted
by referendum at the request of an authority other than Parliament, it should
be possible to revise it either by parliamentary means or by referendum, at the
request of Parliament or a section of the electorate, after the expiry, where
applicable, of the same period of time.
d. It is advisable for constitutional
rules relating to referendums to be put to a referendum, compulsorily or at the
request of a section of the electorate.
When a text is put to the vote at
the request of a section of the electorate or an authority other than
Parliament, Parliament must be able to give a non-binding opinion on the text
put to the vote. In the case of the popular initiatives, it may be entitled to
put forward a counter-proposal to the proposed text, which will be put to the
popular vote at the same time. A deadline must be set for Parliament to give
its opinion: if this deadline is not met, the text will be put to the popular
vote without Parliament’s opinion.
It is advisable not to provide for:
a. a turn-out quorum
(threshold, minimum percentage), because it assimilates voters who abstain to
those who vote no;
b. an approval quorum
(approval by a minimum percentage of registered voters), since it risks involving
a difficult political situation if the draft is adopted by a simple majority
lower than the necessary threshold.
a. The effects of legally
binding or consultative referendums must be clearly specified in the
Constitution or by law.
b. Referendums on
questions of principle or other generally-worded proposals should preferably
not be binding. If they are binding, the subsequent procedure should be laid
down in specific rules.
1. This explanatory
memorandum is intended to elaborate on those aspects of the above guidelines
that are specific to referendums. Accordingly, it does not comment on the
principles and general rules applicable to both elections and referendums. The
explanatory memorandum to the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters[10]
may be referred to in this connection. As far as possible, the guidelines on
the holding of referendums echo the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters.
Not every aspect of the guidelines will be discussed in detail.
2. A number of textual
adjustments were necessary, such as replacing the word “election” with
“referendum”. Others, resulting from the specific nature of referendums, will
not be further discussed. For instance, no reference is made to the right to
stand for election (see point I.1.1.a, for example), the submission of
candidatures
or the distribution of seats between the constituencies (equal voting power); the possibility of
electors casting more than one vote relates to alternatives rather than preference
vote or cross-voting (point I.2.1); election (or rather referendum) observation
must be extended to the signature collection period (point II.3.2.b).
3. In addition, the Code of
Good Practice in Electoral Matters has been clarified in response to questions
raised in connection with its application. For instance, the requirement for
permanent electoral rolls is satisfied if they refer to a register that is
constantly updated (population register or register of births, marriages and
deaths) (point I.1.2.i); it is expressly stated that observers must be able to
go wherever referendum-related operations are taking place (point II.3.2.c).
4. Other points take into
account the adoption of new texts by the Venice Commission or by Council of
Europe organs.
5. It should be made clear
that the guidelines apply to all referendums – national, regional and local –
regardless of the nature of the question they concern (constitutional,
legislative or other). Each reference to Parliament also applies to regional or
local assemblies.
I. Referendums and Europe’s electoral heritage
1. Universal suffrage
1.1. Rule and exceptions
6. The conditions for
according the right to vote are normally the same for both referendums and
elections. In particular, a period of residence requirement may be imposed on
nationals solely for local and regional referendums, and should not exceed six
months other than in exceptional circumstances (point I.1.1.c.iii-iv).
7. It is desirable that the
right to vote be accorded to citizens residing abroad, at least for national
referendums. It is important to ensure that this does not lead to fraud,
however. Accordingly, it is preferable not to record such people on the same
register as residents, but to allow them to vote abroad or from abroad; in
addition, this will help ensure that they exercise their right to vote, which
is unlikely if they have to return to their home country for the sole purpose
of voting (point I.1.1.c.v).
2. Equal suffrage
2.2. Equality of opportunity
8. Respect for equality of
opportunity is crucial for both referendums and elections. While in elections
equality must be ensured between parties and between candidates, simply
replicating this principle in the case of referendums may lead to an
unsatisfactory situation. In countries with popular initiatives or optional
referendums, these are often not instigated by a political party, and may even
propose an option that is rejected by the largest parties – such as reducing
the number of members of Parliament or public funding of parties. Accordingly,
the guidelines emphasise equality between the supporters and opponents of the
proposal being voted on notably as concerns the coverage by the media, in
particular in news broadcasts, as well as public subsidies and other forms of
backing; in this framework, account may be taken of the number of political
parties supporting each option or their election results (points I.2.2.a-e).
9. It would be unrealistic
to require a perfect balance between a text’s supporters and opponents in all
cases. It may be that a degree of consensus emerges in one direction or the
other – particularly in the case of a mandatory referendum on a proposal having
required a qualified parliamentary majority. Supporters and opponents must
always be guaranteed access to the public media, however. As long as this
requirement is satisfied, account may be taken of the number of political
parties supporting each option or of their election results, especially in news
broadcasts (point I.2.2.c).
10. Similarly, it is advisable
to ensure equality between the proposal’s supporters and opponents in terms of
public subsidies and other forms of backing. Such backing may be restricted to
supporters and opponents of the proposal who account for a minimum percentage
of the electorate, provided that the support received by each side is balanced.
If equality is ensured between political parties, it may be proportional,
taking account of their election results. Allocating funds to the parties alone
is not the ideal solution, however, as explained above (point I.2.2.d).
2.3. Equality and national
minorities
11. As in the case of
elections, there may sometimes be grounds for taking into account the specific
circumstances of national minorities. In particular, this would apply to a
referendum on self-government for a territory with a relatively high
concentration of a minority population: a double majority of electors within
that territory and throughout the country may be required.
3. Free suffrage
12. In the case of elections,
intervention by the authorities in support of a list or a candidate is
unacceptable: their duty of neutrality is absolute. An authority must not use
its position, or public funds, to stay in power; nor must it do so on behalf of
its supporters in another organ.
13. The situation is different
in the case of referendums, since it is legitimate for the different organs of
government to convey their viewpoint in the debate for or against the text put
to the vote. They must not abuse their position, however. In any event, the use
of public funds for campaigning purposes must be prohibited in order to
guarantee equality of opportunity and the freedom of voters to form an opinion.
In addition, the public authorities at every level (national, regional or
local), must not engage in excessive, one-sided campaigning, but show
neutrality. Clearly, this does not mean they will not take a stand, but they
must provide a certain amount of necessary information in order to enable
voters to arrive at an informed opinion. Voters must be able to acquaint
themselves, sufficiently in advance, with both the text put to the vote and,
above all, a detailed explanation (point I.3.1.d):
-
the
best solution is for the authorities to provide voters with an explanatory
report setting out not only their viewpoint or that of persons sharing it, but
also the opposing viewpoint, in a balanced way;
-
another
possibility would be for the authorities to send voters balanced campaign
material from the proposal’s supporters and opponents – corresponding, mutatis mutandis, to candidates’ election
addresses made available to citizens prior to some elections.
14. Both the text and the
explanatory report or balanced campaign material must be sent directly to
citizens sufficiently in advance of the vote (at least two weeks beforehand).
15. The clarity of the
question is a crucial aspect of voters’ freedom to form an opinion. The
question must not be misleading; it must not suggest an answer, particularly by
mentioning the presumed consequences of approving or rejecting the proposal;
voters must be able to answer the questions asked solely by yes, no or a blank
vote; and it must not ask an open question necessitating a more detailed
answer. Lastly, electors must be informed of the impact of their votes, and
thus of the effects of the referendum (is it legally binding or consultative?
does a positive outcome lead to the adoption or repeal of a measure, or is it
just one stage in a longer procedure?) (point I.3.1.c).
3.2. Freedom of voters to
express their wishes
16. The paragraph on
electronic voting has been brought into line with the new standards introduced
by the Council of Europe through the adoption of Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of
the Committee of Ministers on legal, operational and technical standards for
e-voting (point I.3.2.a.iv).
17. Given the distinctive
nature of referendums, in that they divide not only parties but also other
groupings not seeking representation within elected organs, representatives of
the proposal’s supporters and opponents – including representatives independent
of the parties – and observers appointed by both sides should have access to
polling stations during both the voting itself and counting (points I.3.2.a.x
and xiii).
18. The guidelines also
emphasise another aspect of voters’ freedom to express their wishes, which is
also necessary in elections but is more likely to be violated in the case of
referendums: voters must be allowed to express their wishes in accordance with
rules prescribed by law, and have the right to accurate establishment of the
result (see point I.3.2.b). In particular, the time-limit prescribed by law
must be observed. In the case of a referendum or a popular initiative requested
by a section of the electorate, the authorities may actually be tempted to draw
the process out until the question is no longer relevant.
II. Conditions for
implementing these principles
2. Regulatory levels and
stability of referendum law
19. The wording of the
guidelines is slightly less restrictive than the Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters
as regards the requirement that all rules of referendum law – apart from rules
on technical matters and detail – should have the rank of a statute, using the
term “should” rather than “must”. Where a referendum is requested by the
executive, it is conceivable that the latter could set the rules for it. Such a
situation is not entirely satisfactory, however, and the requirement for a
procedural statute is the norm (point II.2.a).
20. The list of fundamental
aspects of referendum law, which should not be open to amendment less than one
year before a referendum, at least if they are set out in ordinary legislation,
takes into account the specific nature of referendums by including rules on the
procedural and substantive validity of texts put to a referendum and the
effects of referendums. It also emphasises the need for rules on the franchise
and electoral registers, and access to the public media for the proposal’s
supporters and opponents. In addition, it must be understood in the light of
the Interpretive Declaration on the Stability of the Electoral Law adopted by
the Venice Commission in 2005:
in particular, the stability of referendum law cannot be invoked to maintain a
situation contrary to the norms of Europe’s electoral heritage in the area of
direct democracy or to prevent the implementation of recommendations by
international organisations. Furthermore, given that it is unusual for the date
of a referendum to be known a year or more in advance (whereas elections
normally take place at set intervals), it is a matter not so much of
prohibiting legislative amendments during the year preceding the vote as of
prohibiting the application of such amendments during the year following their
enactment, in case there are suspicions of manipulation (point II.2.b).
3. Procedural guarantees
3.1 Organisation of the
referendum by an impartial body
21. Once again, the fact that
referendums do not necessarily entail a divide along party lines but may
involve other political players means a choice must be offered, as regards the
membership of electoral commissions, between balanced representation of the
parties and balanced representation of the proposal’s supporters and opponents
(point II.3.1.e).
3.2 An effective system of
appeal
22. The appeal body’s minimum
powers are specified, insofar as respect for free suffrage and the results of
the ballot are expressly mentioned. Other aspects specific to referendums and
popular initiatives should be subject to judicial review, at least in the last
instance: the completion of popular initiatives and requests for referendums
from a section of the electorate, along with the procedural and, where
applicable, substantive validity of texts submitted to a referendum. The review
of validity, whether obligatory or optional, should take place before the text
is put to the vote: this will avoid the people having to express their views –
in vain – on a text that is subsequently ruled invalid because it is contrary
to superior law (substantive invalidity) or the content of which breaches the
requirements for procedural validity (point II.3.3.d, cf. points III.2-3).
23. Unlike elections, which
take place in a number of constituencies, referendums involve a whole
territory. Consequently, where partial annulment of the results does not affect
the overall result, it must not give rise to a repeat ballot in the area in
which the vote was annulled, since this would not lead to a different result.
Unless the entire referendum is repeated, however, it must be possible to call
a new partial referendum in part of the territory if the overall result is in
question; careful consideration must be given to calling a new partial ballot
rather than an entire new referendum, however, so as to avoid the massive
concentration of campaign resources in a limited area (point II.3.3.e).
24. National rules on both
public and private funding of political parties and election campaigns must be
applicable to referendum campaigns (point II.3.4.a). As in the case of
elections, funding must be transparent, particularly when it comes to campaign
accounts. In the event of a failure to abide by the statutory requirements, for
instance if the cap on spending is exceeded by a significant margin, the vote
must be annulled.
It should be pointed out that the principle of equality of opportunity applies
to public funding; equality should be ensured between a proposal’s supporters
and opponents (point I.2.2.d).
25. There must be no use of
public funds by the authorities for campaigning purposes, in order to guarantee
equality of opportunity and the freedom of voters to form an opinion (point
II.3.4.b, cf. point I.3.1.b).
III. Specific rules
1. The rule of law
26. The principle of the rule
of law, which is one of the three pillars of the Council of Europe along with
democracy and human rights,
applies to referendums just as it does to every other area. The principle of
the sovereignty of the people allows the latter to take decisions only in
accordance with the law. The use of referendums must be permitted only where it
is provided for by the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the latter,
and the procedural rules applicable to referendums must be followed. On the
other hand, referendums must be organised where the legal system provides for
them (point I.3.2.b.i).
2. The procedural validity
of texts submitted to a referendum
27. Procedural validity
comprises three aspects: unity of form, unity of content and unity of
hierarchical level.
28. The text submitted to
referendum may be presented in various forms:
-
a specifically-worded draft of a constitutional amendment, legislative
enactment or other measure
-
repeal of an existing provision
-
a question of principle (for example: “Are you in favour of amending the
Constitution to introduce a presidential system of government?”) or
- a concrete proposal, not presented in the form of a
specific provision and known as a “generally-worded proposal” (for example: “Are you in
favour of amending the Constitution in order to reduce the number of seats in
Parliament from 300 to 200?”).
29. A “yes” vote on a
specifically-worded draft – at least in the case of a legally binding
referendum – means a statute is enacted and the procedure comes to an end,
subject to procedural aspects such as publication and promulgation. On the
other hand, a “yes” vote on a question of principle or a generally-worded
proposal is simply a stage, which will be followed by the drafting and
subsequent enactment of a statute. Combining a specifically-worded draft with a
generally-worded proposal or a question of principle would create confusion,
preventing electors from being informed of the import of their votes and
thereby prejudicing their free suffrage.
30. An even more stringent
requirement of free suffrage is respect for unity of content. Electors must not be
called to vote simultaneously on several questions without any intrinsic link,
given that they may be in favour of one and against another. Where the revision
of a text covers several separate aspects, a number of questions must therefore
be put to the people. However, total revision of a text, particularly a
Constitution, naturally cannot relate solely to aspects that are closely
linked. In this case, therefore, the requirement for unity of content does not
apply. Substantial revision of a text, involving a number of chapters, may be
regarded as being equivalent to total revision; clearly, this does not mean the
different chapters cannot be put separately to the popular vote.
31. The rule of unity of hierarchical
level is
not as crucial as the previous two rules. It is desirable, however, that the
same question should not simultaneously apply to legislation of different
hierarchical levels, for example a constitutional revision and the associated
implementing Act.
32. Under the principle of the
rule of law, the people are not exempt from compliance with the law. This
applies to both procedural aspects and the substance of texts put to the vote,
which must comply with all superior law. Legislative referendums must therefore
comply with the Constitution; referendums within federated or regional entities
must comply with the law of the central State.
33. Irrespective of what
national law has to say about the relationship between international and domestic
law, texts put to a referendum must not be contrary to international law or to
the Council of Europe’s statutory principles (democracy, human rights and the
rule of law).
34. In order to prevent
unlawful referendums, texts that are procedurally or substantively invalid must
not be put to a referendum.
35. (Optional) referendums
held at the request of a section of the electorate and popular initiatives
entail the collection of signatures. The guidelines set out a number of rules
in this respect, not all of which will be discussed in detail here.
36. Entitlement to collect
signatures must not be confined to registered electors, but apply to everyone,
including foreigners and minors (particularly in respect of texts concerning
their status) (point III.4.c).
37. Authorisation may be
required in order to gather signatures on public thoroughfares. As with any
restriction of fundamental rights, such authorisation may be refused only where
there is a legal basis for doing so and in accordance with the principles of
public interest, proportionality and equality (point III.4.d).
38. The collection of
signatures should not be remunerated or funded from private sources. Where
remuneration is permitted, it must apply only to those who collect signatures,
and not to electors who sign a popular initiative or a request for a
referendum; it must be regulated, with regard to both the total amount
allocated and the amount paid to each person collecting signatures (point III.4.e).
39. It is important that all
signatures are checked (point III.4.f). The success or failure of an initiative
or a request for a referendum must not be determined on the basis of a sample,
which might contain an unusually high number of invalid signatures or, on the
contrary, might not contain any while other sheets of signatures might be full
of them. At the very most, some signatures need not be checked once it has been
established beyond doubt that the number of valid signatures required by law
has been collected.
40. In addition, a popular
initiative – or a request for a referendum – should be declared partially
invalid where it is possible to modify the proposed text, without distorting
it, so that it complies with the law. An authority must have the power to
correct a question that is obscure or misleading or suggests an answer. In the
event that the rules on procedural or substantive validity have been violated,
it may also declare partial invalidity where the signatories would have
approved the remaining part if it had been submitted on its own, or declare the
sub-division of a text that is not consistent with unity of content, form or
hierarchical level.
41. When the referendum is
legally binding, the authorities must respect the people’s decision. The
guidelines provide, for instance, that for a certain period of time (a few
years at the most) a text rejected in a referendum may not be adopted by a
procedure without referendum. An optional referendum at the request of a
section of the electorate is regarded as a referendum procedure: unless such a
referendum is requested, a text rejected the first time round may therefore be
adopted without a popular vote (points III.5.a.i and v). A similar rule applies
to the revision of a provision approved in a referendum (point III.5.a.ii).
42. Two exceptions are provided for:
-
where
the Constitution provides for a referendum on a total revision of a text (in
practice, the Constitution itself) but not on partial revision, a partial
revision of that text does not necessarily have to be put to a popular vote (point
III.5.a.iii);
-
Parliament
may revise a rule of law superior to that adopted by the popular vote without a
referendum; it is entitled to do so in accordance with the principle of
hierarchy of legal rules,
but this should be avoided for a certain period of time (point III.5.a.iv).
43. The foregoing does not
apply to consultative referendums, which are not legally binding on the
authorities. The political wisdom of Parliament going against the wishes of
(the majority of) the people is clearly another matter.
44. The adoption of a text at
the request of an authority other than Parliament, such as the head of state or
government, must not freeze the legal situation indefinitely. Accordingly, the
guidelines provide that such a text may be revised either by parliamentary
means or at the request of a section of the electorate, where applicable after
the expiry of a certain period of time (point III.5.c). When a text is adopted
as the result of a popular initiative, it must be possible for the people to pronounce
on the issue again at the request of another popular initiative, at least after
the expiry, where applicable, of a certain period of time (point III.5.b).
45. Constitutional rules
relating to referendums should enjoy direct popular legitimacy, ie they should
be put to a referendum, compulsorily or at the request of a section of the
electorate. In any event, should Parliament wish to introduce a measure
limiting popular rights, it should have the power to do so only by means of a
measure submitted to one of these forms of referendum (point III.5.d).
6. Opinion of Parliament
46. In the case of popular
initiatives, it is important for the people to be informed of Parliament’s
opinion. Accordingly, the guidelines provide for Parliament to give its opinion.
Where Parliament opposes a text but wishes to take a step in a similar
direction, it is very helpful if it can put a counter-proposal to the popular
vote at the same time.
47. Parliament’s opinion is
all the more necessary when the referendum is requested by the executive. In
such cases, it is important to ascertain whether the call to the people is
designed to bypass Parliament. Electors must be informed of Parliament’s
position.
48. Consultation of Parliament
must not give rise to delaying tactics. The law must therefore set a deadline
for Parliament to give its opinion, and a deadline for the popular vote to take
place, where necessary without Parliament’s opinion if the latter has not given
it in time.
49. In the case of regional or
local referendums, the regional or local assembly shall take over the role
played by Parliament at the national level.
50. Based on its experience in
the area of referendums, the Venice Commission has decided to recommend that no
provision be made for rules on quorums.
51. A turn-out quorum (minimum percentage) means
that it is in the interests of a proposal’s opponents to abstain rather than to
vote against it. For example, if 48% of electors are in favour of a proposal,
5% are against it and 47% intend to abstain, the 5% of opponents need only
desert the ballot box in order to impose their viewpoint, even though they are
very much in the minority. In addition, their absence from the campaign is
liable to increase the number of abstentions and thus the likelihood that the
quorum will not be reached. Encouraging either abstention or the imposition of
a minority viewpoint is not healthy for democracy (point III.7.a). Moreover,
there is a great temptation to falsify the turn-out rate in the face of weak opposition.
52. An approval quorum
(acceptance by a minimum percentage of registered voters) may also be
inconclusive. It may be so high as to make change excessively difficult. If a
text is approved – even by a substantial margin – by a majority of voters
without the quorum being reached, the political situation becomes extremely
awkward, as the majority will feel that they have been deprived of victory
without an adequate reason; the risk of the turn-out rate being falsified is
the same as for a turn-out quorum.
8. Effects of referendums
53. If electors are to cast an
informed vote, it is essential for them to be informed of the effects of their
votes; it must therefore be clearly specified in the Constitution or by law
whether referendums are legally binding or consultative (point III.8.a, cf.
point I.3.1.c on free suffrage).
54. Where a legally binding
referendum concerns a question of principle or a generally-worded proposal, it
is up to Parliament to implement the people’s decision. Parliament may be
obstructive, particularly where its direct interests are affected (reducing the
number of members of Parliament or the allowances paid to them, for example).
It is preferable, therefore, for referendums on questions of principle or
generally-worded proposals to be consultative. If they are legally binding, the
subsequent procedure should be laid down in specific constitutional or
legislative rules. It should be possible to appeal before the courts in the
event that Parliament fails to act (point III.8.b).