EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR
DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE
COMMISSION)
DRAFT
OPINION
ON THE LAW
ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST
IN
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS
OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
On the basis
of comments by
Mr Oliver KASK (Member, Estonia)
Mr Kaarlo TUORI (Member, Finland)
I.
Introduction
1.
On 28 November 2007 the President of the Central Election Commission and
the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina requested an expert assessment by
the Venice Commission of the law on conflict of interest in governmental
institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CDL(2008)010).
2. Messrs Kaarlo Tuori and Oliver Kask acted as Rapporteurs.
3. On 24 and 25 April 2008, Mr
Tuori, accompanied by Ms Granata-Menghini, Head of the Constitutional
Co-operation Division, traveled to
Sarajevo and met with representatives of the Central Election Commission of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Interagency Working Group on Amendments to the Law
on Conflict of Interest, the OSCE
Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the Office of the High Representative.
4. The present opinion was adopted
by the Commission at its … Plenary Session (Venice,
…).
II.
Background
5.
The Law on Conflict of Interest in Governmental Institutions of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (LCoI) was adopted in 2002 and amended in
2004. The implementation of the law was entrusted to the Central Election
Commission (CEC).
6.
Pursuant to Article 1(1), the law is applicable to elected officials,
executive officeholders and advisors in the institutions of government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not also to officials in local
governments or Entities.
7.
According to Article 22(1), the Entities and Brcko District were to
enact within sixty days following the entry into force of the LCoI their own
laws, “which may not contravene the LCoI” (Article 22(3)).
8.
Article 22(2) LCoI in its English version provided that ““2.Until such
time as the laws are enacted in the area of conflict of interest at the level
of the Entities and Brcko District, this Law shall apply.” However, the official version adopted in
local languages by parliament read: “Until such time that Entity and
Brcko District enact their own laws in the area of conflict of interest,
the Entities and Brcko District shall apply the
provisions of this law.”
9.
Brcko District enacted its own law on conflict of interest on 13
December 2002.The implementation of this law was also entrusted to the CEC.
10.
On 13 May 2003, the CEC issued its “Instructions for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the Law on Conflict of Interests in
Governmental Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (herein after “the instructions”).
11.
These instructions also contained a provision (para. 8) concerning the implementation
of LCoI at the level of the Entities. It read as follows:
“In addition to its application to the governmental institutions at the
state level, as provided under Article 22 paragraph 2 of the Law on Conflict of
Interest in Governmental Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the provisions
set out in this Law shall also apply at the level of both entities, until such
time as the relevant laws in the domain of conflict of interest are adopted at
the entity level.
In this sense, the provisions of the Laws on Conflict of Interest shall
in particular apply to the following positions at the level of the entities:
Elected officials:
- members and delegates of the Parliament of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- President and Vice President of Republika Srpska
- members of the National Assembly of Republika
Srpska,
- delegates of the Council of Peoples of Republika
Srpska,
- members of the Cantonal Assemblies,
- councilors of the Municipal Councils
Executive Officeholders:
- President and Vice-Presidents of the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- members of the BiH Federation
Government, including the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and ministers,
- member of the RS Government, including the
President of the Government, Vice-Presidents and ministers,
- member of the Cantonal Government, including the
President of the Government and ministers,
- Head of Municipality, Deputy Head of
Municipality and all those officials in the municipal administrative authority
who are not employees or civil servants pursuant to the civil service law in
the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the civil
service law in the institutions of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
civil service law in the institutions of Republika Srpska.
Advisors:
- Advisors shall include the advisors to the
aforesaid elected officials and executive officeholders as is
set out by the Law on Civil Service in Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the civil service law in the institutions of Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the civil service law in the institutions of Republika Srpska.”
12.
In 2006, a working group led by the BiH Ministry of Justice prepared a
draft law on new amendments. However, this draft law was never submitted to the
parliamentary procedure.
13.
In July 2007, the Council of Ministers of the BiH formed an Inter-Agency
Working Group (IAWG) for the preparation of amendments to the LCoI. This Group
was formed by representatives of State parliament, State government and the
Central Election Commission.
14.
On 10 April 2008, the draft amendments proposed by
the IAWG were adopted in first reading by the House of representatives of BiH.
15.
A case raising the issue of whether the LCoI is applicable at entity
level is pending before the Constitutional Court.
16. On 17 January
2008, theCEC suspended the application of para. 8 of the Instructions pending the Constitutional Court’s decision.
III.
General considerations on Conflict of Interest Policies
17. Conflicts of interest are a growing
public concern in all countries. An adequate management of conflict of
interests is essential in order to guarantee that public service functions are
performed effectively, legally, impartially, objectively and in a transparent
manner, and in order to avoid corruption.
18. More and better rules on Conflicts
of Interest for Holders of Public Office should – at least in theory – lead to
more trust, greater accountability, more integrity and less unethical
behaviour/corruption. New rules should also provide a tool for identifying and resolving
potential conflicts of interest, and also:
-
Increase
public confidence in the government.
-
Demonstrate
the high level of integrity of the vast majority of Government officials
-
Deter
conflicts of interest from arising because official activities would be subject
to public scrutiny
-
Deter
persons whose personal finances would not bear up to public scrutiny from entering
public service, and
-
Better
enable the public to judge the performance of public officials in the light of their
outside financial interests.
19.
The object of an effective conflict of interest policy could be, in
principle, the prohibition of all private-capacity interests on the part of
public officials (and not merely financial interests). However, the risk of a too drastic conflict
of interest policy is that it may conflict with other rights, or be unworkable,
or counter-productive in practice or may deter some people from seeking public
office altogether. Therefore, a modern Conflict of Interest policy should seek
to strike a balance, by identifying risks to the integrity of public
organisations and public officials, prohibiting unacceptable forms of conflict,
managing conflict situations appropriately, making public organisations and
individual officials aware of the incidence of such conflicts, ensuring effective
procedures are deployed for the identification, disclosure, management and
promotion of the appropriate resolution of conflict of interest situations.
IV.
Analysis of the law
A. The definition of “conflict of
interest”
20.
Article 1(5) LCoI defines a conflict of interest as follows :
“A conflict of interest is created if there is a private interest that
affects or may affect the legality, transparency, objectivity and impartiality
as to the exercise of the public duty.”
21.
Recommendation (No. R(2000)10) of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe “on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials” contains the following definition (Article
13 of the Code of Conduct):
“1. Conflict of interest arises from a situation in which the public
official has a private interest which is such as to influence, or appear to
influence, the impartial and objective performance of his or her official
duties.
22.
The “Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public
Service” drafted by the Council of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development provide the
following definition of “conflict of interest”:
“A ‘conflict of interest’ involves a conflict between the public duty
and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has
private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of
their official duties and responsibilities.”
23.
The definition given in the LCoI is thus wider than the OECD one, in
that it covers not only actual conflicts of interest, but also potential ones. The CoE definition covers in addition apparent conflicts
of interest.
24.
The principle of independence of officials set out in Article 2(3) aims
to avoid incompatibilities in general. The Commission suggests to regulate in
more precise manner the obligation of officials to withdraw from the
deliberation of the issue and to inform the CEC on a possible incompatibility.
B. Incompatibilities
25.
The Commission underlines that there exists a clear distinction between general
incompatibilities on the one hand, and specific situations of conflict
of interest on the other hand. The general
incompatibility of members of government is connected to issues such as
general confidence in the political system.
In several European countries, it spelled out at the constitutional
level (not in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
Specific situations of
conflict of interests are instead normally addressed in ordinary
legislation, be it in organic or other laws on incompatibility, or else by
administrative law provisions on legal incompetence in concrete matters.
26.
The LCoI provides for both general incompatibilities and case-by-case conflict
situations. However, the distinction between the two is sometimes blurred.
27.
Article 4 LCoI sets out four kinds of general incompatibilities. One of them is problematic. Paragraph 4
provides, insofar as relevant, that “the involvement of close relatives
of elected officials, executive officeholders and advisors in [… serving in management boards,
steering boards, supervisory boards, executive boards or acting in a capacity
of an authorised person of a public enterprise; serving in management boards,
steering boards, supervisory boards, directorates or duty of a Director of an
Agency of Privatisation] also creates situations of
conflict of interest for the official, officeholder or advisor.
28.
This incompatibility is far too broad, also on account of the relatively
small size of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would be more appropriate to
deal with close relatives under specific situations of conflict of interest,
that is, on a case-by-case basis and only insofar as there exists an actual or
potential conflict of interest.
29.
The Commission notes in this respect that Recommendation R(2000)10
provides a narrower definition:
2. The public official’s private interest includes any advantage to
himself or herself, to his or her family, close relatives, friends and persons
or organisations with whom he or she has or has had business or political
relations. It includes also any liability, whether financial or civil, relating
thereto.(…)”
C. “Pantouflage”
30.
The Commission notes that, while Article 5 LCoI provides for limitations
of movement of public officials to public enterprises and privations agencies
for six months after they leave office, there is no provision aiming at
prohibiting the improper migration by public officials from the public to the
private sector (“pantouflage”).
31.
Provisions on pantouflage are foreseen on Article 16.1.b of the Law on
Civil Servants at State Level, but they are not applicable to “elected
officials, executive officeholders and advisors”, who are thus currently exempt
from any limitation.
32.
The Commission recalls the importance of preventing pantouflage: “In
addition to the fundamental goal of promoting public trust, the most common
goals of a system to address the movement of public officials from public
service to the private sector are: (1)
ensure that specific information gained while in public service is not misused
(2) ensure that the exercise of authority by a public official is not
influenced by personal gain, including by the hope or expectation of future
employment; and, (3) ensure that the access and contacts of current as well as
former public officials are not used for the unwarranted benefits of the
officials or of others. In some degree,
almost any individual who carries out a public function, whether he or she is
elected, appointed, or hired under contract, whether serving full-time or
part-time, whether paid or unpaid, should be accountable to some standards
designed to help meet these goals.”
33.
Actual or potential conflicts of interest created by the prospect of
employment in the private sector may be more of a problem in case of public
officials who do not have a civil service status, as it might well not be rare
for them to leave the public service to take up employment in the private sector
once their election/appointment term comes to an end.
34.
In the Commission’s opinion, the LCoI should therefore contain
provisions limiting the movement of elected officials, executive officeholders
and advisors to the private sector.
D. Gifts
35.
Article 10 LCoI allows elected officials, executive officeholders and
advisors to keep certain gifts without a duty to report them. However, there
are two distinct definitions of the term “gift” (in Article 3(1)(i) and
Article 10 LCoI) and they are different and partly complementary. Point 2 of
the Instructions provides further clarifications as to the meaning of “money”
(“the elected official, executive office holder
and advisor must not accept money, cheque or other securities
regardless of their amount”). As a result, there are, for example, contradictory indications as to
the monetary value of the gifts that can be accepted. These definitions should
be harmonized and merged in Article 3.
E. Retroactive cancellation of
decisions
36.
According to Article 7(3), “if an elected official, executive
officeholder or advisor violates this article, the vote of decision of the
official or officeholder shall be deemed null and void.”
37.
In this respect, the Commission refers to the OECD guidelines, according
to which “the retroactive cancellation of affected decisions and tainted
contracts” can represent an “effective complementary form of redress for
breached conflict of interest policy”.
38.
The Commission notes however that, although the provision might be
appropriate to guarantee the lawfulness of decisions, it has negative impacts
on legal certainty. The level of violation is not considered and persons to
whom the decision is addressed do not know about the violation. It would be
appropriate to leave the nullification to be decided by courts on a
case-by-case basis.
F. Declarations of assets
39.
Article 12 provides a duty of disclosure for elected officials,
executive office holders and advisors. They have to “file regular financial
reports”.
40.
The Commission notes that the LCoI does not provide for an effective review mechanism allowing
for a proper verification (e.g. through random checks of financial reports as
well as adequate coordination and cross-check of information with other
authorities, for example, tax bodies, public prosecutors, etc) of the financial
reports submitted. In this respect, the CEC currently appears to be given a
merely depositary task rather than a fully-fletched supervisory function.
41.
In addition, the Commission notes that GRECO considered that, from the
point of view of a preventive policy in the fight against corruption, the CEC
could use the financial declarations in a proactive way, to help advise
officials on how to avoid potential conflicts of interest with their specific
interests or activities or incompatibilities.
42.
The Commission considers in conclusion that the law should provide for
mechanisms allowing financial declarations to be effectively reviewed for both
repressive and preventive purposes.
43.
The capacity of the Central Election Commission to check the assets/interests'
declarations (and to use them in a proactive way) must be ensured both in terms
of adequate authority and in terms of resources.
G. Publication of statements and
reports
44.
The provisions on disclosure foresee in many cases publication of
statements and reports (Articles 13(3), 14(4), 15(3) and 16(2). It could be
suggested to provide in more detail the way those documents should be made
public. In Article 13(3) it is left open to the enterprise and governmental
authority, in other cases the documents may be copied and accessed in the
authority. In some cases such possibilities are not enough to avoid conflict of
interests by disclosure.
H. Implementation
45.
Implementation of the LCoI is entrusted in the Central Election
Commission. This may appear as an unusual choice, as regulation of conflicts of
interest is not, as such, an electoral matter.
46.
The Commission does not find that
the choice of a State as to what organ is responsible for implementing
provisions on conflict of interest can be criticised, on condition that: a) the implementing body
be independent, b) that it dispose of the necessary capacity and skills and c)
that an appeal to court against its decisions be possible. These conditions have been met insofar as the
Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned.
47.
Once a choice is made, the local tradition starts developing, and skills
and experience start to be accumulated. In the Commission’s view, these
elements are worth taking into account and drastic changes as to the
implementing body should be avoided or considered very carefully.
48.
According to Article 17(1)(b) and (c), the CEC prescribes forms for the
purpose of applying the provisions of the law and rules on forms, the
implementation rules of handling the procedure and furnishing of decisions and
compiling of reports. The exact meaning of this provision is unclear. The
“forms” which have to be filled out by officials and regulations are of crucial
importance, as their content determines the effectiveness of enforcement and
control mechanisms. Common formats should be developed to present financial
information of officials in a coherent and comparable manner, which facilitates
and enables a proper verification of financial reports.
49.
In order to give an opinion on the effectiveness of the regulation, it
would be necessary to examine the regulations and forms adopted by the CEC.
I.
Duty to co-operate with CEC
50.
Pursuant to Article 18(3), all authorities, institutions and courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina on all levels are obliged to
provide the CEC with legal and other official assistance as requested. This is
necessary and important, also in relation to the control mechanisms to be
developed (see para. 35 above) It remains unclear whether the term “institutions”
encompasses also private institutions, e.g. banks or companies taking part in
public procurements. The meaning of assistance could be interpreted as not
covering the duty to give person related data e.g. on transactions. It could be
suggested thus to clarify the provision by a more detailed regulation providing
also the terms in which such assistance has to be given.
J. Sanctions
51.
Article 20 LCoI provides for the system of sanctions. In addition to
fines, an ineligibility to stand for any directly or indirectly elected
office for a period of four years is foreseen as an automatic consequence
of a breach of the provisions on incompatibilities, participation in public
enterprises and privatization agencies, personal service contracts or officials
exercising other tasks.
52.
The Commission notes that Recommendation R(10)2000 provides:
3. Since the public
official is usually the only person who knows whether he or she is in that
situation, the public official has a personal responsibility to:
- be alert to any actual or potential conflict of
interest;
- take steps to avoid such conflict;
- disclose to his or her supervisor any such
conflict as soon as he or she becomes aware of it;
- comply with any final decision to withdraw from
the situation or to divest himself or herself of the advantage causing the
conflict.
4. Whenever required
to do so, the public official should declare whether or not he or she has a
conflict of interest.
5. Any conflict of
interest declared by a candidate to the public service or to a new post in the
public service should be resolved before appointment”.
53.
The Commission also refers to the OECD Guidelines, which contain the
following non-exhaustive list of “strategies for positive resolution or
management of a continuing or pervasive conflict”:
“Divestment or liquidation of the interest by the public official.
Recusal of the public official from
involvement in an affected decision-making process.
Restriction of access by the
affected public official to particular information.
Transfer of the public official to
duty in a non-conflicting function.
Re-arrangement of the public
official’s duties and responsibilities.
Assignment of the conflicting
interest in a genuinely ‘blind trust’ arrangement.
Resignation of the public official
from the conflicting private-capacity function, and/or
Resignation of the public official
from their public office.”
54.
The Commission considers that an effective management of conflicts of
interest should aim at preventing conflict of interest rather than merely
punishing it.
55.
In addition, as it has underlined above, too strict a conflict of
interest policy may conflict with other rights, or be unworkable, or
counter-productive in practice or may deter some people from seeking public
office altogether.
56.
A four-year ban from running for elections is of itself an extremely
serious sanction. Article 20 LCoI does not make it dependent on the seriousness
or modalities of the breach committed by the public official in question. In
addition, the Commission notes that it is applicable also in cases of breach of
the incompatibility related to “close relatives”(see para. 28 above), which the
Commission finds to be too broad. The imposition of the ban automatically
derives from the finding of a breach of the LCoI, and as such cannot be
reviewed.
57.
Under these circumstances, there is a clear risk that the sanction be
disproportionate, and impinge on the fundamental right to be elected, which is
guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human
Rights.
58.
In the Commission’s opinion, it would be appropriate to revise this
system of imposition of sanctions, making it dependent on the seriousness of
the breach. A scale of sanctions should be introduced including for example the
obligation to regularize the situation within a given time (possibly coupled
with a fine) in cases of simple failure to register a relevant interest as
required. Most severe sanctions such as a political ban should be reserved for
the most serious breaches, such as the refusal by an official to resolve an
actual conflict of which he or she is aware.
59.
The Commission considers in any event that a system of sanctions should
be enforceable. In this respect, it notes that, to the extent that Article 20
implies (but does not explicitly provide for) the loss of the position, the CEC
does not have the power to enforce it.
V.
The application of the LCoI at the level of the entities
60.
The LCoI is designed to be applicable to the authorities of the State
only. The Entities and Brcko District were to adopt their own legislation,
which only Brcko district has done so far. The LCoI has been applied in the
Entities too by virtue of Article 8 of the instructions of the CEC until
January 2008, when the CEC suspended the said provision. As from January,
therefore, no rules on conflict of interests for elected officials, executive
officeholders and advisors are in force at the level of the entities. The
Republika Srpska is currently preparing a law, which was adopted in first reading
on 16 April 2008.
61.
The Commission notes that the conflict of interest does not fall under
the competence of the State, either under Article 3 (1) of the BiH Constitution or under the Annexes 5-8
to it. It is rather a matter which
requires an agreement by the Entities, as provided in Art. 3(5) of the BiH
Constitution.
62.
Accordingly, the relevant competence can only be voluntarily transferred
to the State by the Entities.
63.
At the time of the visit of the Commission’s delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 24-25 April 2008, there did not
appear to be the political will for such transfer. Two other options were being
discussed, and the Commission was asked to look into both.
64.
The first option is that both Entities adopt their own laws on CoI and entrust
the enforcement of the laws to the Central Election Commission, similarly to
the what happens under the institute of the Organleihe. This solution has already been
chosen by the Brcko District.
65.
The second option is that the Entities adopt their own laws but entrust
the implementation to authorities at the entity level.
66.
The Commission underlines in the first place that it is extremely
important that the content of the Entities’ laws on CoI be consistent and
harmonized with the State LCoI. The regulation of conflicts of interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be uniform throughout the
country, as there are no divergent local circumstances to justify divergent
solutions.
67.
As regards the enforcement of the entity laws, there are strong
arguments in favour of
entrusting it to the Central Election Commission:
-
Consistency
: the same body would be responsible for all decisions (this argument is even
stronger is one were to think that Municipal Election Commissions could have a
competence);
-
Competence :
the CEC and its staff have developed significant expertise in this complex
field
-
Efficiency:
the CEC already disposes of trained staff and necessary tools. CEC is the body
responsible to certify the candidates for elections at all levels. In
particular, it already disposes of the databases necessary to verify the
suitability with electoral legislation of candidates to run in election.
-
Cost-savings : the CEC appears to have the capacity to
deal with CoI in the entities too (which is has done for four years, until
January 2008), and this would avoid setting up an Election Commission in the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a specialized department within the Republika Srpska Election
Commission.
68.
Should the implementation of entity legislation on CoI be kept at the
entity level, in order to ensure consistency it could be envisaged that an
appeal to the CEC against decisions by the Entity Election Commissions be
introduced (should the municipal election commissions be competent, their
decisions should first be appealed to the Federation Election Commission).
69.
Were the CEC to supervise the implementation of the entity laws on CoI,
which is recommended, it would of course be necessary that not only the
substantial provisions of the entity laws, but also those about the procedures
and time-frames of the controlling mechanisms mirror those of the State LCoI,
otherwise it might become unnecessarily difficult for the CEC to supervise the
implementation of three laws through three different procedures.
70.
Whatever option may be chosen as to the implementation supervision body,
in the Commission’s view it is essential, for the sake of consistency, that judicial
review of all decisions on conflict of interest either by the Central Election
Commissions or by the Entity Election Commissions (if they are given competence
and if no appeal to the Central Election Commission is foreseen against their
decisions) be possible and be entrusted to the same court, that is the Court of
BiH, similarly to what happens in electoral matters.
VI.
Conclusions
71.
The Commission has examined the Law on Conflict of Interest in
governmental institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is of the view that it presents
certain shortcomings:
-
The
current general incompatibility relating to the involvement of close relatives
of elected officials, executive officeholders and advisors in certain public
functions should rather be considered as a case-by-case incompatibility.
-
Provisions
aiming at prohibiting the improper movement of elected officials, executive
officeholders and advisors to the private sector (“pantouflage”) should be
introduced.
-
The
definitions of “gifts” should be harmonized and merged.
-
Retroactive
cancellation of affected decisions and tainted contracts should not be
automatic.
-
Common
formats should be developed to present financial information of officials in a
coherent and comparable manner.
-
The
duty to co-operate with the Central Election Commission should be spelled out
more clearly.
-
Adequate
mechanisms allowing financial declarations to be effectively reviewed for both
repressive and preventive purposes should be introduced in the LCoI.
-
The
current system of imposition of sanctions should be revised and made dependent
on the seriousness of the breach. A scale of sanctions should be introduced
including for example the obligation to regularize the situation within a given
time (possibly coupled with a fine) in cases of simple failure to register a
relevant interest as required.
72.
The regulation of the conflict of interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina also raises issues of
constitutional nature, related to the state competence for conflict of interest
at entity level.
73.
The Commission is of the view that, in the absence of a voluntary
transfer of competence from the entities to the State, the latter cannot
exercise jurisdiction over the elected officials, executive officeholders and
advisors of the Entities.
74.
Entities should ensure that their legislation on CoI is consistent and
mirrors the law on conflict of interest at the State level, and are consistent
with each other insofar as possible, in terms of both substantial provisions
and procedural ones.
75.
It would be preferable that the entities entrust the implementation of
their legislation on conflict of interest to the Central Election Commissions.
76.
Should the entities entrust the implementation of their legislation on
conflict of interest to the respective Entity Election Commission (and, in the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, possibly to the Municipal Election
Commissions as well), it would be appropriate to provide that the decisions
taken at the entity level may be appealed to the Central Election Commission.
77.
Appeals against all decisions on conflict of interest, either by the
Central Election Commissions or by the Entity Election Commissions (if they are
given competence and if no appeal to the Central Election Commission is
foreseen against their decisions) should be heard by the Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
78.
The Commission has been informed of the intention of the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina to prepare a new law codifying all
rules on conflict of interest. The Commission is ready to assist the Bosnian
authorities in this task.
