EUROPEAN
COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE COMMISSION)
AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF
in the case of
Bijelić against Montenegro and Serbia
(Application N°11890/05)
pending before
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
adopted by the Venice Commission
at its 76th Plenary
Session,
(Venice, 17-18 October 2008)
on the basis of comments by
Mr Anthony BRADLEY (Substitute Member, United Kingdom)
Mr Iain CAMERON (Substitute Member, Sweden)
I.
Introduction
1. On 1 July 2008, the
Venice Commission sought leave to intervene as a third party in the proceedings
of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ‘the Court” or “ECtHR) in the
case of Nadez Bijelić, Svetlana Bijelić and Ljiljana Bijelić
against Montenegro and Serbia (application no. 11890/05).
2. The above case raises
the question of whether the Republic of Montenegro and/or the Republic of
Serbia may be held responsible by the Court for breaches of the Applicants’
rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter “the
Convention”, or ECHR) that are alleged to have occurred in Montenegro between 3
March 2004 and 5 June 2006. The interest of the Venice Commission in this
matter arose from previous opinions that it had given on issues relating both
to the process by which Montenegro achieved independence in June 2006 and to
the present constitution of Montenegro.
3. On 11 July, the
President of the relevant Chamber of the Second Section of the Court granted
such leave.
4. The present amicus
curiae brief, which does not address the substantive merits of the applicants’
case, was prepared on the basis of the comments of Messrs Anthony Bradley and
Iain Cameron, and was adopted by the Commission at its 76th Plenary
Session (Venice, 18-19 October 2008).
II.
Background information
5. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (hereafter, “the State Union”) ratified the Convention on 26 December 2003 and the ratification took effect within the territories of Serbia and Montenegro on 3 January 2004. As a matter of international law, the State Union’s adherence to the
Convention became effective on 3 March 2004, when the instrument of
ratification was communicated to the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe. So long as the State Union remained in existence, the State Union was
the appropriate respondent in respect of any claims under the Convention,
whether these arose from acts of the authorities in Serbia, or the authorities
in Montenegro, or the State Union itself.
6. On 3 June 2006 the Montenegrin Parliament adopted a Declaration of Independence. This brought to an end the
existence of the State Union. On 14 June 2006, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe noted that the Republic of Serbia was to continue the
membership of the Council of Europe previously exercised by the State Union,
and that Serbia was to continue as a party to the Convention by reason of the
State Union’s former adherence to the Convention.
7. With effect from 6 June 2006 the Republic of Montenegro is to be regarded as a party to the Convention and
related Protocols. This was decided by the Committee of Ministers in a
resolution dated 7 and 9 May 2007.
III.
The constitution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
8. The legal structure of the State
Union was founded upon the Constitutional Charter of 2003. This Charter
enshrined the principle of equality for the two member states (Article 2) and
recognised a very high degree of autonomy for them both. Under the Charter,
the competence of the State Union authorities was limited to matters concerning
defence, international relations and the maintenance of a common market. The
competence of the State Union’s Minister of Human and Minority Rights was
(Article 45) limited to monitoring the exercise of human rights in the two states
and to coordinating “together with the competent bodies of the member states”
activities for complying with international human rights conventions. The
Court of the State Union was essentially limited to matters arising from the
Constitutional Charter; but its jurisdiction included appeals filed by citizens
claiming that an institution of the State Union had interfered with rights
guaranteed by the Constitutional Charter. The Charter on Human and Minority
Rights and Freedoms was adopted at the same time as the Constitutional Charter,
of which it formed an integral part.
9. It followed from the very
limited competence of the State Union that virtually all matters of domestic
government were within the respective competences of the separate governments
of Serbia and Montenegro. These included the system of justice, the operation
of the civil and criminal courts, the police,
housing, social service and social assistance authorities, local
self-government, and the maintenance of law and order.
10. All the complaints of the
present Applicants appear to have arisen from dealings with the public
authorities in Montenegro. Public authorities in Serbia had no competence to
deal with their concerns. Moreover, the Applicants appear never to have sought
to involve any State Union authorities in their claims. It is very doubtful
whether any such attempts, if they had been made, would have had any realistic
prospect of securing an effective remedy. In particular, during its brief
existence, the Court of the State Union was never convened to deal with appeals
on human rights matters brought by citizens of the two states. In Matijasevic
v Serbia,
the Strasbourg Court outlined the history of the State Union Court and
found that, although the Court had started operating in January 2005, and 200
human rights complaints had been registered with the Court, at no time did it
rule on a single complaint by a citizen alleging a human rights violation;
accordingly, it was held that the applicant (Matijasevic) was “not obliged to
exhaust a remedy which was unavailable at the material time and had remained
ineffective until the very break-up of the State Union”.
IV.
Succession to the treaty obligations of the State Union
11. The Constitutional Charter of
the State Union provided (Article 60) that after a three-year period a member
state would have the right to break away from the State Union. Further, that
if Montenegro broke away from the State Union following a referendum, “the
international instruments pertaining to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
particularly UN SC Resolution 1244, would concern and apply in their entirety
to Serbia as the successor” (Article 60(4)). This provision did not in terms
apply to the State Union’s adherence to the European Convention on Human
Rights. However, the intention was plainly that if Montenegro broke away, Serbia should be the successor to the State Union’s treaty obligations. Further, by
Article 60(5), a member state that broke away “shall not inherit the right
to international personality and all disputable issues shall be separately
regulated between the successor state and the newly independent state”. So
far as the Venice Commission is aware, no disputable issue that might be
relevant for present purposes has been ‘separately regulated’ between Serbia and Montenegro since June 2006.
12. By decision of 14 June 2006, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe accepted that Serbia was the successor state in respect of adherence to Council of Europe treaties. The
Committee noted that Serbia would continue the membership of the Council of
Europe previously exercised by the State Union, “and the obligations and
commitments arising from it” and that Serbia should be regarded as a party to
Council of Europe conventions to which the State Union had been a party. The
effect of this was that Serbia succeeded inter alia to the State Union’s
adherence to the ECHR. This must, absent other circumstances, have included
succession of responsibility to claims pending against the State Union at the
time it ceased to exist in June 2006.
13. The letter of 6 June 2006 from Montenegro to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe stated that Montenegro wished to establish its status as successor to all Council of Europe treaties to
which the State Union had been a party. On this basis, Montenegro would not be required to sign and ratify the European treaties de novo in its own
name. On 14 June 2006, the Committee of Ministers decided that this method of
proceeding was appropriate. This decision took immediate effect as regards
‘open Conventions’, namely treaties that are open to states whether or not they
are members of the Council of Europe. As regards ‘closed Conventions’ (that
is, treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights, restricted to
members of the Council of Europe), on 7-9 May 2007 the Committee of Ministers
invited Montenegro to become a member state of the Council of Europe; and the
Committee accepted Montenegro as a party to these conventions, with retroactive
effect to the date of notification of the independence of Montenegro, namely 6
June 2006.
V.
The present issue, and possible solutions
14. If the facts on which the
Applicants rely had all arisen after 3 March 2004 in respect of property in Serbia rather than Montenegro, it is certain that the alleged acts or
omissions on the part of authorities in Serbia before 6 June 2006 would have raised issues within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Republic of Serbia would have become respondent to the claim by succession. The jurisdiction of the Court
would have continued notwithstanding the decision by Montenegro to break away
from the State Union in June 2006.
15. The question to be addressed is
whether, since the Applicants rely on facts that occurred in respect of
property in Montenegro during the same period:
(a) the Republic of Montenegro is responsible for breaches of the Convention that may have occurred
between March 2004 and June 2006; or
(b) the Republic of Serbia is responsible for such breaches; or
(c) neither state is
responsible for such breaches, unless and until further steps are taken (for
instance, as envisaged by under Article 60(5) of the Constitutional Charter of
the State Union).
16. On the other hand, if breaches
of the Applicants’ Convention rights have occurred since June 2006, the responsibility
of Montenegro for those breaches cannot be doubted.
17. The Venice Commission would
stress that the Court has the power to determine the questions set out in para.
15 above. The Committee of Ministers admittedly has the power under Article 4
of the Statute of the Council of Europe to invite a state to join the Council.
A resolution under Article 4 has “binding effect”. Under Article 16 of the
Statute, the Committee moreover has the power to decide by resolution “with
binding effect all matters relating to the internal organisation and
arrangements of the Council of Europe” (emphasis supplied). Nonetheless,
the Court’s power under Article 32 of the Convention to decide all
issues concerning “the interpretation and application of the Convention”
(emphasis supplied) is clear. This point is not altered by the fact that
Article 54 of the Convention saves the decision-making powers of the Committee
of Ministers under the Statute.
The present issue does not concern the “internal organisation and arrangements
of the Council of Europe”, but at what point in time the ECHR begins to apply
to a state, i.e. “the application of the ECHR”. This is an issue over which the
Court has the final word, and this is confirmed by the fact that Article 32
ECHR provides the Court with Kompetenz-Kompetenz.
VI.
Earlier opinions expressed during preparation of the
Constitution of Montenegro
18. In Opinion No 261 (2007)
adopted in May 2007, concerning the accession of Montenegro to the Council of
Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly welcomed the intention by Montenegro to
honour the international treaties to which the State Union had been a party and
stated (para 10) that it was particularly satisfied to note that Montenegro
considered itself bound since 3 June 2006 by obligations stemming from the
European Convention on Human Rights. The Parliamentary Assembly noted further
that Montenegro had accepted an obligation to ensure that the constitution
would include ‘transitional provisions for the retroactive applicability of
human rights protection to past events’, including such provisions in respect
of the Convention (para 19.2.1.6)
19. In
its Interim Opinion on the draft Constitution of Montenegro, adopted on 1 June
2007, the Venice Commission (para 98) endorsed the need for transitional
provisions on the retroactive applicability of the Convention and added,
“Unless clear provision is made for this, it is probable that past
infringements of human rights, however serious, will remain without a remedy
under the new Constitution”.
VII.
The Constitution of Montenegro of October 2007 and its
implementation
20. In the event, these views of
the Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice Commission were not reflected in the
final text of the Constitution. However, Article 158 of the Constitution
authorised the adoption of a Constitutional Law for the enforcement of the
Constitution, to come into effect concurrently with the Constitution. Article
5 of the Constitutional Law provided:
“Provisions of
international agreements on human rights and freedoms, to which Montenegro acceded before 3 June 2006, shall be applied to legal relations that have arisen
after its signature.”
21. In its Opinion on the
Constitution of Montenegro, adopted on 14 December 2007, the Venice Commission stated that Article 5 of the Constitutional Law was ‘rather obscure’. Further, that as this provision had been
added at the request of the Council of Europe, it could and should be
interpreted as meaning:
“Provisions of
international agreements on human rights and freedoms to which Montenegro was a
party (as a federated entity of the State Union) before 3 June 2006 shall be
applied to legal relations that have arisen after the date of ratification of
those treaties by the State Union”.
22. The Commission observed that it
was only with this meaning that Article 5 fulfilled a principal commitment owed
by Montenegro to the Parliamentary Assembly (see para 17 above), and added:
“the meaning of this provision should be clarified, and brought to the
knowledge of the Montenegrin courts and public”.
23. Before 3 June 2006, Montenegro was not an independent state, and was unable to enter into international
agreements in its own name. Accordingly, Article 5 of the Constitutional Law
is deprived of all meaning unless it is understood as applying to treaties
affecting Montenegro which were entered into by the State Union before 3 June 2006.
24. As the UN Human Rights
Committee has made clear in respect of obligations arising from the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, an important principle is
that fundamental rights protected by international treaties ‘belong to the
people living in the territory of the State party.’ The Human Rights
Committee:
“has consistently taken
the view … that once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under
the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong
to them, notwithstanding change in government of the State party, including
dismemberment in more than one State or State succession”.
VIII.
Decision of the Committee of Ministers
25. On 9 May 2007, as already stated, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe invited Montenegro to become a member state. As regards application of the Convention to Montenegro, the Committee of Ministers had ‘regard to the declaration of succession of the Republic of Montenegro by the letter of 6 June 2006’ and resolved that Montenegro had been a party to the Convention ‘with retroactive effect from 6 June 2006’.
26. Does this resolution preclude Montenegro from succeeding to the obligations of the former State Union in respect of
alleged violations of human rights occurring after 3 March 2004? In the Venice Commission’s view, there are several reasons why it does not.
27. Firstly, when a state becomes a
party to the Convention and the people within its jurisdiction come under the
Convention for the first time, the state does not retroactively become
responsible for ‘breaches of the Convention’ which occurred earlier. The
reason for this is that, at the time the relevant events were alleged to have
occurred, the events were not breaches of the Convention. That is not the
present situation. The question here is a different one: whether, if breaches
of the Convention occurred in Montenegro between March 2004 and June 2006, the Republic of Montenegro may now be held responsible for them.
28. Secondly, as already stated,
the Committee of Ministers accepted that because of the earlier ratification of
the Convention by the State Union in December 2003, it was not necessary for Montenegro to lodge a formal ratification of the Convention.
29. In addition, on a purely
practical level, all evidence that is relevant to the merits of the present
case will be held by the authorities in Montenegro and not in Serbia. If the view were to be taken that Serbia should answer now for acts and omissions of the
Montenegrin authorities between March 2004 and June 2006, this would certainly
not promote the speed and effectiveness of the Court’s procedures.
30. In any event, if continuing
breaches occurred after June 2006, responsibility for them is borne by Montenegro. It is the settled jurisprudence of the Court that a state bears responsibility
for “continuing violations” of the Convention, that is, incidents which began
occurring in a contracting state prior to it being bound by the Convention but
which continued after this date. In the present case, the
Applicants are complaining about unreasonably long proceedings, and/or that the
authorities have refused to ensure the Applicants’ access to their property
that has led to a continuing denial of the right to property (Article 1,
Protocol 1) and/or respect for the home (Article 8). Similar issues were raised
in the well-known Loizidou case which also had a temporal aspect. If the case is seen as a continuing denial of
property, then the responsibility of the Montenegrin authorities seems clear.
This strengthens the conclusion that it would be an artificial and complicating
factor without practical benefit if state responsibility towards the applicants
were to be divided between Serbia and Montenegro.
31. Finally, although the
circumstances of the creation of the Czech and Slovak Republics as separate
states on 1 January 1993 were not identical, the response of the Court to the
dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic provides an important
precedent for the position that the Court should now adopt. The former
Republic had been a party to the Convention since 18 March 1992. On 30 June 1993, the Committee of Ministers admitted the two new states to the Council of
Europe and decided that, as both states wished, they were to be regarded as
succeeding to the Convention retroactively with effect from their independence
on 1 January 1993.
However, the practice of the Court has been to regard the operative date in the
case of breaches that arose earlier than 1 January 1993 as being 18 March 1992. As the Court said in Konecny v Czech Republic (16 October 2004, para 62):
“The Court observes
that the period to be taken into consideration only began on 18 March 1992,
when the recognition by the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, to which
the Czech Republic is one of the successor States, of the right of individual
petition took effect”.
32. One expert commentator has
argued that this position is justified by reason of the particular importance
of giving effect to international obligations arising from human rights
treaties, even if it may depart from general rules of international law
relating to succession to treaties.
IX.
International law considerations – a further appraisal
33. Although the Court has stated that the Convention
is a special type of treaty, to the extent it considers it appropriate, it will
interpret and apply the Convention in accordance with the general rules of
public international law. The question thus arises
whether the above solution is in some way incompatible with general
international law. An argument might be made that a newly independent state begins
its existence with a totally “clean slate” and cannot inherit any
responsibility for the wrongful acts of its predecessors. However, for the
reasons explained below, this is not tenable
34. The Committee of Ministers
fixed the date at which Montenegro as a state becomes responsible under
the Convention. This date is in accordance with the predominant view in
international law, that the creation of a state is a question of fact. As the Montenegrin
declaration of independence was in June 2006, and the Montenegrin authorities
were in effective control of the territory at that time, then it was in
accordance with this predominant view to set the date at which Montenegro
became bound by the ECHR as an independent state as June 2006, not the date at
which it was formally admitted retrospectively to membership of the Council of
Europe (May 2007). However, the Committee of Ministers declaration does not deal
in any way with the question of the liability of a successor state for the
wrongful acts of a predecessor state.
35. There are relatively few
settled rules on state succession.
The area of state succession tends to be characterized by ad hoc solutions, motivated by
pragmatic considerations.
The 1978 Convention on the Succession of States in respect of Treaties and the1983 Convention on Succession of
States in Respect to State Property, Archives and Debts have relatively few
parties, indicating the caution with which the majority of states regard the
rules contained in these treaties.
The 1983 treaty is not yet in force. Serbia is listed as a party to the 1978
treaty
by means of succession, the FRY having ratified the
convention in 1980.
The treaty thus, prior to Montenegrin independence, was binding upon the State
Union in 2004. But the European Court of Human Rights is obviously not bound by
this treaty. Bearing in mind the Court’s desire to interpret the Convention,
where possible, within the wider framework of public international law, the
question nonetheless arises whether the 1978 treaty can be seen as reflecting
general rules of international law. The discussion surrounding the adoption of
both treaties indicates that many states were skeptical of the idea that a
“newly independent state” should start its life with a totally “clean state”.
However, even if (which is doubtful) the 1978 treaty is seen as reflecting
custom in this respect, it only provides (in Article 16) that
“A newly independent state is not
bound to maintain in force or to become a party to, any treaty by reason
only of the fact that at the date of the succession of states the treaty
was in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of states
relates” (emphasis supplied).
36. Thus, if there is a rule that a certain type of treaty
continues in force by reason of its nature – and, as noted above (para. 24) strong
evidence exists that this applies for a treaty for the protection of the human
rights of the inhabitants of the territory – and/or if the newly independent
state expressly or by implication accepts succeeding to the treaty, then the
state continues to be bound. Implicit acceptance of continuation is common. Certainly, state practice
does not support there being a totally clean slate.
37. In any event, as explained below, the crucial issue is
about the devolving of state responsibility. In this respect, no real guidance
can be drawn from the 1978 treaty, because issues of state responsibility were
deliberately left outside the scope of the treaty.
38. The question of the devolving of state responsibility
arose during proceedings brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina against the FRY before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
By the time the case came to judgment, Montenegro had seceded from the State
Union. The ICJ accepted that Montenegro did not continue the legal personality
of the FRY (later Serbia-Montenegro). In the circumstances, the issue then
became, had Montenegro consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the case? As
the Court found that it had not, the conclusion was that there was no
jurisdiction over Montenegro in the case.
39. It is submitted that only very
limited guidance for the present case can be obtained from the judgment. The
ICJ case concerned allegations of extraterritorial military activities by FRY
forces and FRY-supported forces in another state, namely Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and the conduct of the then Milosevic regime in control of FRY. There are
obvious differences with the factual situation in the present case.
40. There is some authority
supporting the view that responsibility for some types of breaches of
international law does not devolve on a seceding state on the basis that the
wrongdoing state has ceased to exist.However, as Brownlie puts it, such reasoning
“cannot have general application”.
There have undoubtedly been cases and situations in which the view was taken
that responsibility did devolve.
41. The Venice Commission considers
that the correct approach is to judge each specific case by reference to all
the factors to determine how reasonable it is to impose continuity of
responsibility on a successor state for a specific wrongful act by a
predecessor state.
The specific case here is activity (or rather inactivity) attributable to
agencies under the complete control of an entity which later becomes the
government of a new state. The Venice Commission refers in this respect to the
approach of the International Law Commission in its Articles on State
Responsibility.
Article 10 deals with conduct of an insurrectional or other movement and states
(in relevant parts):
“1. The conduct of an
insurrectional movement which becomes the new government of a State shall be
considered an act of that State under international law. 2. The conduct of a
movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State
in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its
administration shall be considered an act of the new State under international
law.”
42. The commentary to these
articles
states that:
“(4) The general principle
that the conduct of an insurrectional or other movement is not attributable to
the State is premised on the assumption that the structures and organization of
the movement are and remain independent of those of the State. This will be the
case where the State successfully puts down the revolt. In contrast, where the
movement achieves its aims and either installs itself as the new government of
the State or forms a new State in part of the territory of the pre-existing
State or in a territory under its administration, it would be anomalous if the
new regime or new State could avoid responsibility for conduct earlier
committed by it. In these exceptional circumstances, article 10 provides for
the attribution of the conduct of the successful insurrectional or other
movement to the State. The basis for the attribution of conduct of a successful
insurrectional or other movement to the State under international law lies in
the continuity between the movement and the eventual government.
…..
(6) Where the
insurrectional or other movement succeeds in establishing a new State, either
in part of the territory of the pre-existing State or in a territory which was
previously under its administration, the attribution to the new State of the
conduct of the insurrectional or other movement is again justified by virtue of
the continuity between the organization of the movement and the organization of
the State to which it has given rise. Effectively the same entity which
previously had the characteristics of an insurrectional or other movement has
become the government of the State it was struggling to establish. The predecessor State will not be responsible for those acts. The only possibility is that
the new State be required to assume responsibility for conduct committed with a
view to its own establishment, and this represents the accepted rule.”
43. The International Law
Commission thus provides for a general rule that responsibility devolves to a
successful independence movement, while leaving it open for a successor state
as regards a specific breach to show that this would be unreasonable because of
an absence of real continuity between the independence movement and the new
government. Applying this rule to the facts alleged by the present Applicants,
it is undoubtedly reasonable to hold the newly-independent state of Montenegro responsible for all the alleged breaches of the ECHR which occurred in Montenegro between 3 March 2004 and 6 June 2006. Conversely, it would be unreasonable to hold Serbia, as the “continuing state” of the former State Union, responsible for these alleged
breaches. As already explained (paragraph 9 above), the relevant public
services within Montenegro were under the full control of the Montenegrin
authorities. There is full continuity between these authorities and the
authorities of the present state of Montenegro. If, in different factual
circumstances, the European Court of Human Rights were to be satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that an alleged specific breach of the ECHR in
Montenegrin territory was wholly due to the action, or inaction, of the Union
authorities, the Court would be justified in holding that this responsibility
would not wholly devolve to the Montenegrin authorities.
44. The correctness of this
conclusion is buttressed by other arguments. First, such a solution cannot be
said to be against the interests of the Montenegrin authorities (and certainly
not against the interests of the people of Montenegro). As already stated, the
Council of Europe institutions stressed the importance that no vacuum of
protection of human rights should arise as a result of Montenegrin independence
and the Montenegrin authorities demonstrated their commitment to effective
supranational human rights protection by seeking, at the earliest possible
stage, membership of the Council of Europe and consenting to the jurisdiction
of the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, Montenegro accepted the Kompetenz- Kompetenz of the Court (cf. the
situation in the ICJ case above). Secondly, as a human rights treaty, the ECHR
involves not simply reciprocal rights and duties between states, but the
creation of a special type of European public order for the benefit of
individuals.
The Convention is to be interpreted so as to ensure the effective
interpretation of rights.
To interpret the resolution of the Committee of Ministers of May 2007 in a way
that created a vacuum of responsibility in Montenegro between March 2004 and
June 2006 would not be to ensure the effective protection of human rights.
X.
Conclusion
45. For these reasons, the Venice
Commission concludes that it would both further the protection of European
human rights and be in accordance with the earlier practice of the Court, if
the Court were now to hold Montenegro responsible for breaches of the applicants’
Convention rights that might have been caused by the authorities of the
Republic of Montenegro in the period from 3 March 2004 until 5 June 2006.
46. In the opinion of the Venice
Commission, there are no difficulties of international or constitutional law
that should lead the Court to make a different decision. Accordingly, the Venice
Commission does not consider that the outcome should be delayed until attempts
were made to see whether the matter might be “separately regulated” between the
states of Serbia and Montenegro as envisaged by the Constitutional Charter of
the State Union, Article 60(5). Nor is it necessary for the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe to be requested to vary the decision that
was taken in May 2007.
