EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY
THROUGH LAW
(VENICE COMMISSION)
CODE
OF GOOD PRACTICE
IN
THE FIELD OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Adopted by the Venice Commission
at its 77th Plenary
Session
(Venice, 12-13 December 2008)
on
the basis of comments by
Mr
Carlos CLOSA MONTERO (Member, Spain)
Mr Jean-Claude
COLLIARD (Member, France)
I.
Introduction
1. On 17 April 2007, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted Resolution 1546 (2007) inviting the
Venice Commission to elaborate a Code of Good Practice in the field of Political
Parties (15) which would set out the most important elements for their conduct.
2. The Venice Commission
has experience in elaborating such codes, as it has already elaborated the Code
of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (CDL-AD(2002)023rev) and the Code of Good
Practice on Referendums (CDL-AD(2007)008) which earned well deserved reputation
and credibility. These codes directly addressed public authorities and this
implies that these codes could be read as a compilation of norms and guidance
for assessing national legislation. On the other hand, the experience and
achievements of the Venice Commission with respect to political parties are
considerable both in the form of general instruments and specific opinions.
Among the former:
-
CDL-INF(2000)001 Guidelines on prohibition and dissolution
of political parties and analogous measures adopted by the Venice Commission at
its 41st Plenary Session (Venice, 10 - 11 December 1999)
-
CDL-INF(2001)008 Guidelines and Report on the Financing of
Political Parties: adopted by the Venice Commission at its 46th Plenary
Meeting, (Venice, 9-10 March 2001)
-
CDL-AD(2004)007rev Guidelines and Explanatory Report on
Legislation on Political Parties: some specific issues, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 58th Plenary Session (Venice, 12-13 March 2004)
-
CDL-AD(2006)014 Opinion on the Prohibition of Financial
Contributions to Political Parties from Foreign Sources adopted by the Venice Commission at its 66th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 March 2006)
-
CDL-AD(2006)025 Report on the Participation of Political
Parties in Elections adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections at its 16th
meeting (Venice, 16 March 2006) and the Venice Commission at its 67th
Plenary Session (Venice, 9-10 June 2006).
3. The Venice Commission has also adopted a number of opinions on legislation on political
parties in countries such as Armenia (CDL-AD(2003)005), Azerbaijan (CDL-AD(2004)025), Moldova (CDL-AD(2003)008), and Ukraine (CDL-AD(2002)017).
4. The proposed Code of Good
Practice in the field of Political Parties has, in comparison with the former
texts on political parties, a number of specific features which introduce a new
approach to the issue. Its explicit aim, as mandated in the PACE Resolution, is
to reinforce political parties’ internal democracy and increase their
credibility in the eyes of citizens, thus contributing to the legitimacy of the
democratic process and institutions as a whole and fostering participation in
political life, as well as to promote democratic principles such as equality,
dialogue, co-operation, transparency and the fight against corruption (10).
5. In order to achieve
this, the Resolution first identifies the addressees of the Code: political
parties (points 8, 9 and 10 of the Resolution) and it also reveals that public
authorities are not considered to be the final addressee of the Code. Second,
the object of the Code differs significantly from the object of former codes:
it aims to offer a repertoire of “best practices” (i.e. not legal norms) for public
agents (i.e. political parties and their members) who nevertheless are not, by
any means, public authorities. In this context, the word “Code” must not be
understood as a codification of norms, but as a systematic repertoire of good
practices. The idea behind these “good practices” is to offer political parties
guidelines stemming from the common and best practice in Europe and,
additionally, offering public authorities and jurisdictional bodies a yardstick
to assess the practice of parties.
6. On this basis, it
is clear that the Code cannot have a mandatory character, it cannot prescribe
rules, nor can it require enforcement from public authorities (apart from the
specific cases in which there may exist precise norms). The only possible
compulsory interpretation derives from what political parties and their members
must do in following the law.
7. A strictly
legalistic interpretation of the Code might see it as a superfluous instrument
if it is not coercive. However, it is not superfluous, as the PACE Resolution
says, the Forum on the Future of Democracy in Europe has emphasised the
importance of good practices and high standards that political parties should
meet for regaining the declining confidence that citizens have in political
parties and the effects that defection may have in the working of democracy.
Without renouncing to its humble position in this domain, the Venice Commission
must live up to the new request that came from the Parliamentary Assembly and
accept the challenge of going further than the usual (and safer) ground of a
simple opinion on existing norms and propose sound guidelines that may
contribute to enhance democratic processes. Although these guidelines lack the
force of norms, they may empower actors to propose “best practices” and provide
a strong backing for assessing national practices.
8. Accordingly, the
wording of the recommendations in this Code take into account the existing
background. Wherever they can be referred to in international rules or
consistent national legal practices, the latter have been introduced as an
obligation (i.e. parties must do). Where no explicit legal norms back a
practice, but evidence of parties’ regulation present these as such, best
practices are introduced as a strong recommendation (i.e. parties should do).
9. The scope and contents of the Code
were discussed in a number of meetings of the Council for Democratic Elections
(CDE). On January 2007, the Secretariat drafted a Note on the possible
elaboration of the Code (CDL-EL(2006)035rev). Based on this note and additional
sources of PACE, such as Recommendation 1438 (2000) and Resolution 1344 (2003)
on the threat posed to democracy by extremist parties and movements in Europe,
Resolution 1308 (2002) on the restrictions on political parties in the Council
of Europe member states, Recommendation 1516 (2001) on the financing of
political parties, and Resolution 1264 (2001), Resolution 1320 (2003) and Recommendation
1595 (2003) on a Code of Good Practices in Electoral Matters and the discussion
within the CDE in March 2007 in Venice, Mr Carlos Closa Montero, Member, Spain
drafted a preliminary note on its elaboration. The latter, which contained the
structure and methodology of the Code, was discussed by the CDE in June 2007.
Following the methodological path set out in this Preliminary Note, Mr Carlos
Closa Montero compiled a Draft Explanatory Report (CDL-EL(2008)014). A working
meeting of the Rapporteurs was held in Paris on 21 May 2008 and, as result, a
preliminary initial draft of the Code was submitted to the 75th Plenary
Session of the Venice Commission (12-14 June 2008) (CDL-EL(2008)013rev). Following
this presentation, a number of members presented their observations.
II.
General
principles
1.
Definition
a.
A
specific type of association
10. For the purpose of this Code a political
party is an association with the task of presenting
candidates for elections in order to be represented in political institutions
and to exercise political power on any level: national, regional and local or
on all three levels.
11. Whilst a few countries lack specific
legislation on political parties, most Member States of the Council of Europe do,
and in virtually all these cases, legislation aims at differentiating between
political parties and other associations, including those involved in politics.
Legislation on political parties serves, in this way, for the recognition of
their essential role in democratic politics.
b. Freedom
of establishment
12. Political parties in democratic states are
free associations, which are protected by Article 11 of the ECHR. This means
that citizens may freely decide to constitute political parties, however, national
legislations can limit this freedom in certain cases on the basis of principles
consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, the
“ECHR”) and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In a number of
European states, there are no rules on prohibition of parties. In other states,
there are rules on party prohibition, but these are strictly interpreted, and
are only to be used with extreme restraint. In line with this common European
democratic legacy, prohibition or enforced dissolution of political parties may
only be justified in the case of parties which advocate the use of violence or
use violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional
order.
13. Political parties are not, in any Council
of Europe Member State, the creation of public organs. The guideline that can be
deduced from this practice is that State bodies should abstain from
participating in the establishment of political parties and should not limit
the right to establish political parties on a national, regional and local level.
c. Legal
framework
14. Wherever a legal regulation of political
parties exists it must be consistent with the ECHR and the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights. Parties must comply with these norms. When
challenging a legal framework which is considered incompatible with higher
norms, political parties must always take recourse to the use of legal means.
2. Guiding
principles for political parties
15. The rule of law, democracy and human rights
are three pillars of the European and the Council of Europe’s constitutional
heritage. Therefore, provisions on democracy, the rule of law and human rights’
protection alongside norms regulating the political system and the separation
of powers, stand among the basic principles of the Council of Europe’s Member
States. Political parties are major actors in any democratic society, hence
they enjoy the benefits of the guarantees of those principles by the State and,
accordingly, they must also respect and promote these very same principles. The
latter should be taken into account in the parties’ organisation, functioning
and financing.
a. Rule of
law
16. Political parties must comply with the
values expressed by international rules on the exercise of civil and political
rights (UN Covenant and the ECHR). Parties must respect the Constitution and
the law. However, nothing can prevent them from seeking to change both the
Constitution and the legislation through lawful means.
b. Democracy
17. Parties are an integral part of a democracy,
and their activities should ensure its good functioning. Hence, a commitment to
internal democratic functioning reinforces this general function. Although few
European states regulate this requirement in detail, several countries require the
party’s internal structure and operation to be democratic. This positive experience could be
shared between different Council of Europe Member States.
c. Non-discrimination
18. Political parties should not act against
the values of the ECHR and the principle of equality. Parties must not
discriminate against individuals on the basis of any ground prohibited by the
ECHR.
d. Transparency
and openness
19. The parties should offer access to their
programmatic and ideological documents and discussions, to decision-making
procedures and to party accounts in order to enhance transparency and to be
consistent with sound principles of good governance.
III.
Internal organisation of political parties
1. Membership
20. Everyone must be free to choose to be a member of a
political party or not and to choose which party to join. Whilst this principle
is universally acknowledged, it is also very common among European parties that
they have specific admission procedures. This serves to secure the necessary
congruence between the views of the would-be member and the party. Best
practices are those that clearly establish in party statutes the procedures and
requirements for joining and which clearly state the criteria to be fulfilled
to be members.
21. Parties may withhold membership from any applicant who
rejects the values they uphold or whose conduct goes against the values and
ideals of the party. Best practice requires the existence of disciplinary
bodies and clear procedures for reasoned decisions. Parties must ensure that
their members comply with the legal order.
22. European best practices and legal frameworks share the
principle of non discrimination. Hence, parties’ adherence to this principle
must be taken as proof of good practices, which have a number of specific
applications. In some cases, such as gender discrimination, national and
international legislation plainly prohibit these. In particular, discrimination
on the basis of sex, race, colour, language, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property or birth should be avoided (cf.
Article 14 ECHR).
23. Political parties must comply with any domestic legislation
prohibiting affiliation to a party by specified officials (for instance, in
cases of members of the army and police).
24. It is not unusual for parties to establish different forms
of involvement of individuals in their activities such as members, recognised sympathisers,
collaborators, campaigners, etc. These statuses mark different thresholds of
personal commitment. Hence, in order to identify the kind of commitments and to
respect personal choices, a good practice is for party statutes to clearly
spell out the different rights and duties of each situation. Any person must be
able to define freely his or her personal form of relationship with a party.
25. There is a well established practice
among most European states, under the Council of Europe norms to grant voting
rights, at least in local elections, to some or all their foreign residents. It is therefore fully in line with
this development that, unless prohibited by domestic law, parties accept the
accession of non nationals, who share their values. Nationality is not a solid
ground on which to restrict the membership of non nationals, and the law should
make this clear.
26. Whilst some parties may
aim at promoting the interests of specific age groups (for instance, retired
persons), no national legislation accepts membership discrimination based on
age (except what is referred to as the legal voting age). On the contrary,
inclusive practices that successfully include all age groups can be deemed an
example of good practice. Moreover, it is a fairly common practice that parties
create specific structures (for instance, for young people, particularly for
those under the legal voting age) and develop specific programmes for
integrating experienced members.
27. Transnational parties, which exist in the
framework of the European Union, are organised as federations of national
parties. In most cases, this excludes direct membership. Direct membership does
not erode democratic principles, and may reinforce the legitimacy of
transnational parties.
2.
Organisation
28. The general
principles that inspire this Code also apply to the organisation of a political
party. In particular:
-
Representativeness and receptiveness. Applied within a party,
these principles mean that the structure of the party and its procedures should
represent the opinion of the members and they should be receptive towards
these. Although this commitment may not entail a legally expressed obligation,
their breach runs against the basic intuitive concept of democratic organisation.
-
Responsibility
and accountability. Organs (both collective and individual) should be held
accountable and responsible to party members. Procedures should secure internal
(and external) responsibility and rendering account of actions and policies. Although
this commitment may not entail a legally expressed obligation, their breach
runs against the basic intuitive concept of democratic organisation.
-
Transparency.
Parties should make public their statutes and their programme. Publishing financial reports improves
transparency and public confidence in political parties. Even
though this commitment may not entail a legally expressed obligation, their
breach runs against the basic intuitive concept of democratic organisation.
29. The existence of party statutes is a legal
requirement for recognising and/or registering them in several countries of the
Council of Europe. Statutes must comply with constitutional and legal
regulations and reflect the international rules contained in the ECHR. The lack
of compliance with party statutes constitutes, in some legal systems, a violation
that can be legally challenged in extra-party jurisdictions. To the extent that
compliance may be legally required, legal force may be deduced from party
statutes.
30. Party statutes normally regulate the rights
and duties of their members, and the organs, organisation and procedures for
decision making of the parties. In certain national legal systems, there is a
legal requirement that party statutes must establish a procedure for changing
them. When this legal requirement is further enriched with the explicit
involvement of members aimed at seeking their support through voting procedures,
it comes closer to being a paradigm of good practice.
31. As an internal norm, the statutes also have
the very important function of setting disciplinary procedures that may affect
the rights of members. In cases of failure to comply with these requirements or of
serious infringements of party rules, disciplinary measures may be adopted, the
severest measure being expulsion from the party. The measures must be governed
by a procedure set out in the party statutes, with respect to the rights of the
defence. In order to eliminate any impression of arbitrariness, the
existence of redress mechanisms is an important element.
32. Wherever required by
law, parties
must define their national, regional or local organisation in their statutes. Wherever
this is not required by law, these specifications contribute to enhance the good
governance principles identified above. At each of these levels, bodies
involving all members or their representatives, meeting on regular
basis, must take the major decisions. Ideally, the supreme body (National
congress or assembly) should meet at least once for each legislative term. In the interim periods the
governing boards are usually responsible for decision-making. These boards,
which are usually made up of members elected by the party membership, must be
elected in accordance with the procedures set out in the party statutes.
33. The procedures for decision-making should
be clearly specified in the statutes. When possible (i.e. on the local level),
members should take decisions directly; otherwise, decisions should be taken on
the basis of democratic delegation.
34. Party operational procedures should enable the opinions of
grassroot members to be heard by party leaders.
3.
Appointment
of leaders and candidates for election
35. Whether directly or indirectly, party leaders must be
democratically chosen at any given level (local, regional, national and
European). This means that members must be able to vote for their selection.
Bottom-up practices for the selection of nominees and candidates are a healthy
expression of internal democracy which is very positively perceived by
citizens.
36. Equally,
whether directly or indirectly, candidates must be democratically chosen for elections at any level (local,
regional, national and European).
37. According to international
regulation and practice, parties must comply with the principle of non discrimination
on the basis of gender both for party office and election candidatures. Several
national legislations and practices of several European parties have gone a
step further to introduce quotas to either improve gender balance or, more directly,
achieve equal representation of women and men in the elected body. Whilst these
practices are country and party specific, the introduction of measures for
gender equality is progressively becoming the dominant trend. On the contrary,
continued and repeated situations of gender unequal representation cannot, by
any means, be considered proof of good practice.
IV.
Funding
38. Party funding must comply with the principles of accountability
and transparency. The Venice Commission has extensively dealt with the issue of
party financing in its Guidelines on financing of political parties.
1.
Sources
39. A political party may ask its members to pay
dues, the amount of which it is free to fix, although the latter must not be
discriminatory in nature. Non payment of dues may constitute grounds for
expulsion from the party.
40. A party may receive donations within the limits of domestic law, which
may prohibit donations from certain sources. By no means may parties interpret
private donations as granting any possibility to influence and/or alter the
party programme and/or party policies. Parties must adhere to laws that require
disclosing the origin of private donations to parties.
41. Where legislation
foresees public funding ,political parties must have access to it subject to
possible minimum requirements. The latter must be reasonable and
non-discriminatory. Apart from different forms of funding provided for by law,
any party must refrain from receiving assistance, financial or in kind, from
any public authorities, particularly those directed by its members.
2.
Restrictions
42. No party may receive clandestine or fraudulently obtained
financial aid.
43. For the purposes of financing electoral campaigns, parties
must make sure that their candidates comply with current regulations,
particularly where there is a ceiling on electoral expenditure.
3.
Supervisory
mechanisms
44. Every political party should include in its statutes
mechanisms for audits of its accounts at the national level and for supervising
accounting on any regional and local levels. It must also be subject to the State
authorities’ audit, especially in the field of financing.
V.
Political functions
1.
Programme
45. One of the most important functions of political
parties is the elaboration of a programme which in best practice results from
the internal debate of party members and its approval according to established
procedures. Programmes lead party action when the party is in power.
46. Party programmes are not legally binding
contracts, their enforcement can not be legally demanded and all European states
rely on the principle of representative democracy, which excludes the imperative
mandate. Nevertheless, the programme provides guidelines for citizens to
understand and identify the party policies on given issues. In this way,
programmes do not only serve to enlighten citizens but they also reflect a sort
of “soft contract” or moral commitment between parties and voters. Hence, the
publication of the programme not only satisfies the principle of transparency
but it also serves to further promote accountability. Moreover, its permanent
availability, through the electoral mandate serves to check the adherence to
the electoral promises.
47. A measure of good governance is if a party
alters its programme after coming to power, it should explain why changes in the
original programme have been introduced.
2.
Training
48. Parties should provide
civic and political training for their members. To that end, the party may set
up a training institute, which may receive specific aid in addition to that
earmarked for the party itself.
3.
Elections
49. The Council of Europe Member States have different
approaches to the regulation of political parties’ activities and their
participation in political life, notably in elections. Specific issues related
to participation of political parties were treated in the report of the Venice
Commission on the participation of political parties in elections. In fact, political parties precisely aim to participate in
the political process, mainly presenting candidates to elections. Of course,
parties are important throughout the whole electoral process. But once the
voters come directly into the scene, the fact of political representation loses
part of its relevance. Once the elections have been held, and even during the
election day, all the constitutional or legal rules (and, most particularly,
those relating to the system of appeals and complaints) must provide for an equal
treatment of all candidates and citizens.
50. It is widely acknowledged that the electoral system itself exercises an
influence on the party’s internal structure. For example, a candidate-based
first past the post electoral systems hardly requires any party involvement in
other issues than candidate’s political backing and contribution to the
campaign financing. On the contrary, in proportional systems with closed party
lists, a party has very important prerogatives in defining, among other issues,
the place of each given candidate on the list.
4. Performance
in office and opposition
51. The general principles inspiring this Code apply also to
performance in office and to situations where parties are in opposition
52. Party members should clearly distinguish between their
allegiance to the party and their office duties. Implementation of the party
programme is inherent to the notion of democratic election, but this must always
be framed within the existing legislation concerning the exercise of public
offices. Normally, national regulations prohibit public officers from abusing
or seeking advantage of their ruling position to create discriminatory
conditions for other political forces. But even when these obligations are not
explicitly spelt out, their respect is consistent with the principles of this Code
and their breach may be considered illegal.
53. Normally, the legal requirements of the function
of opposition is lower than that for government or even non-existant. Opposition
function implies scrupulous control, scrutiny and checks on authorities and
officials behaviour and policies. However, good governance advises that parties
in opposition (as well as ruling parties) refrain from practices that may erode
the democratic debate and which, could eventually undermine the trust of
citizens in politicians and parties.
54. Political corruption is generally considered
to be a type of crime by all European legislations. Parties must therefore aim to
fight corruption not only because of its criminal dimension, but also because
widespread political corruption erodes the trust of citizens in parties in
general. This threatens the whole democratic process. Hence, mechanisms for the prevention
of political corruption, such as ethical codes for party members in public
offices, are welcome. Additionally, if the membership of a person who has been
condemned on corruption charges is maintained, this will lead citizens to
believe that the whole party is corrupt (and they may even extend this view to
apply to all parties) and contributes to questioning the fairness of politics
in general. Therefore, the exclusion from office of candidatures and from party
membership of persons convincted for corruption is fully coherent with basic
democratic principles.
55. Representative mandate makes a representative
independent from his or her party once it has been elected. This allows him or her
to change party once in office. In some specific cases, there may be reasons
that justify this (for instance, disappearance of political parties). In other
cases, however, these practices may respond mainly to personal private
interests or are a result of corruption. These erode the party system and
undermine the trust of citizens in the electoral and political game. Even when
the legal rules protect representatives, parties should be vigilant that these
practices are not used in a fraudulent and counter-democratic way. Practices
such as inter-party agreements to reject the inclusion of representatives
elected on other party’s lists have to be welcomed.
56. Parties should inform the civil society and voters
about their action and adopt any possible measures and practices
that would increase transparency, offer grounds for constructive criticism and
provide a yardstick for measuring achievements.
5. International
co-operation
57. The practice of international co-operation among parties
sharing the same ideology is a widespread one. Some parties have projected
further their international dimension by assisting sister parties in third
countries. In the past, these practices assisted, for instance, the democratic
consolidation in a number of European countries. Whenever this assistance is
compatible with national legislation and in line with ECHR principles and European
standards, it must be welcomed as a good practice, since it contributes to
creating solid democratic party systems.