EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR
DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE COMMISSION)
OPINION
ON THE DRAFT LAW OF UKRAINE
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
PRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
Adopted by the Venice Commission
at its 79th Plenary Session
(Venice, 12-13 June 2009)
based on comments
by
Ms Angelika NUSSBERGER (Substitute Member, Germany)
Ms Hanna SUCHOCKA (Member, Poland)
Mr Kaarlo TUORI (Member, Finland)
Mr Péter PACZOLAY (Member, Hungary)
Mr Gérard MARCOU (Expert, Directorate General of
Democracy
and Political Affairs, Council of Europe)
I.
INTRODUCTION
1. By letter
dated 6 April 2009 the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of
Europe asked the Venice Commission to give an opinion on the draft revised
Constitution submitted by the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine on 13 March 2009. The text of the draft appears in document
CDL(2009)068. It was obviously translated hastily and the text is often
scarcely comprehensible. Some remarks made in this Opinion may be due to
problems of translation.
2. The present
opinion is based on comments by Ms Nussberger (Germany), Mr Paczolay (Hungary), Ms Suchocka (Poland) and Mr Tuori (Finland) as well as by Mr Marcou (France, expert of the
Directorate General of Democracy and Political Affairs). It was adopted by the
Venice Commission at its 79th Plenary Session in Venice on 12-13
June 2009.
3. The draft
has to be seen against the background of the present constitutional situation
in Ukraine. The 1996 Ukrainian Constitution was amended in December 2004. These
amendments weakened the- previously very strong- powers of the President in a
somewhat unfortunate manner (cf. the assessment by the Venice Commission
CDL-AD(2005)015). Following this revision the powers of President and
Government are ill-defined and overlapping and this has contributed to a
constant inter-institutional conflict which threatens to paralyse the
functioning of the state institutions. There have therefore been a number of
efforts to revise the Constitution and the Venice Commission adopted in
particular an opinion on the so-called Shapoval draft (see document
CDL-AD(2008)015).
4. The
presidential proposal is thus a further attempt to finally arrive at a
constitutional reform. Its main goal is to find the best way to solve
the tension existing in Ukraine among the President, Parliament and the Council
of Ministers, as well as to guarantee more efficiency of the state power by a
better division of functions and by avoiding a dualism in the functioning of
executive power. As it has been pointed out in the explanatory note: “These
complex changes to the Constitution are also evoked by practical implementation
of its provisions(…) imperfections of the checks and balances system which
should have been securing balance and integrity of this mechanism”.
5. Under the
terms of Article 155 of the current Constitution any constitutional reform has
to be approved by a two-thirds majority in the Verkhovna Rada, amendments to
Chapters I, III and XIII of the Constitution in addition have to be approved by
a referendum. The present draft is the proposal of a new version of the
Constitution, which- while often similar to the present text- contains
amendments to all Chapters. It thus requires for its adoption both the
two-thirds majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada and
approval by referendum.
II. COMMENTS
ON THE TEXT
Preamble and
Section I – General Principles
General
comments
6. The draft law
includes only minor changes to the Preamble and Section I (General Principles).
Preamble
7. The Preamble
was changed in some details to reflect basic political decisions on the future
of Ukraine such as the reference to the unity of the State, to the
multi-national composition of the Ukrainian people and to the integration in
the European community (“is an integral part of the European community”). Every
State is free to determine basic principles in the Preamble; what is considered
to be relevant in this context cannot be assessed from the legal point of view.
It is also a symbolic amendment to claim that the Constitution is adopted “by
the Ukrainian people” and not by the “Verkhovna Rada on behalf of the Ukrainian
people”.
Article 2
8. In Art.
2(3), a new provision lays down a basic rule to be respected when defining the
territorial organisation: the territorial structure of Ukraine is based on the
principles of the “balanced socio-economic development” (Art 2(3); this implies
a commitment of the national government to achieve such a structure, taking into
account “historical, cultural and ethnical peculiarities”, as mentioned
in the same provision.
Article 3
9.
This article provides for a clearer hierarchy of administrative territorial
units, with three levels: municipal (hromada), district (rayon)
and regional (oblast) units. The hromada becomes an
institution that can be based on various kinds of settlements (Art 3(3) and is
no longer confused with a settlement in itself (as is the case in the present
Constitution and in the law on Local Self-Government of 1997). These provisions would bring a positive change. However, they might
create a problem for Kyiv (and Sevastopil), since the draft gives no
constitutional ground for a special status of the capital city (or other
cities).
Instead, the draft provides for the possibility to confer by law the status of
an oblast or of a rayon to some cities, depending on the number
of inhabitants (Art 3(4). The Autonomous Republic of Crimea is considered as a
unit of the oblast level (Art 3(3) as this is already the case under the
present constitutional arrangements. The same applies to Kyiv according to Art
86(3), and to the transitional provisions.
10. Art 3(5) of
the draft ascribes the responsibility to determine the territorial structure to
the legislator. This could facilitate streamlining the territorial organisation
of Ukraine with a broader competence of the legislator to change the boundaries
and the number of units of each of the categories listed in Art 3(3). This is
confirmed by the fact that, differently from the present Constitution, the
draft does not include a list of the oblasts. This has a major
implication: the existence of the oblasts is not guaranteed and the
existing oblasts may be eliminated.
Article 8
11.
Art. 8 of the draft law includes new provisions on local self-government. It is
particularly welcome that throughout the draft again uses the term of local self-government,
as opposed to the Shapoval draft which used local government. However, the
meaning and legal significance of the new provision in Art. 8(3) (”The State
provides adherence to the Constitution of Ukraine and laws during exercising
local self-government”) remains unclear. The same goes for Art. 8(4) (”The
rights of local self-government are protected by the court.”)
Article 10
12.
Art. 10(2) confirms the primacy of international treaty-law over contradicting
domestic law. This
new provision is to be welcomed.
Article 12
13. The
provision on citizenship was transferred to the section on general principles.
The provision that a citizen of Ukraine cannot be expelled or surrendered to
another State might cause problems in connection with the international obligations
of Ukraine on the basis of the Rome Statute. Many constitutions have been
changed in order to comply with the demands of international law in this
context.
Article 16
14.
According to a new provision in Art. 16(1), ”property shall not be used to
the detriment of the rights, freedoms and dignity of a person, interests of
society, deteriorate ecological situation and natural qualities”. The
proposed provision includes legitimate considerations justifying restrictions
on the use of property. However, taking into account the direct effect of the
Constitution (Art. 9(2)), the provision may lead to legal uncertainty.
Therefore, it is recommendable that it contain a reference to more detailed
regulation through ordinary law.
Article 18
15. According
to Article 18(1) “the State guarantees the freedom of political activity not
prohibited by the Constitution of Ukraine”. In
comparison with the Constitution in force (Art. 15), reference to prohibitions
through law has been deleted. As stated in the opinion on the Shapoval
draft, this would explicitly eliminate the (ab)use of the provision as a
constitutional authorisation for further restrictions on political activities.
On the other hand, it has to be acknowledged that legal regulations on
political parties will always be necessary. The new wording must not be
misinterpreted.
Section II: Human and citizens’ rights,
freedoms and duties
General
comments
16. The section
on human and citizens’ rights, freedoms and duties is in large parts modelled
on the provisions proposed in the Shapoval draft. Therefore, the Venice
Commission can uphold its generally positive assessment (CDL-AD(2008)015).
17. The
catalogue of rights protected continues to be very complete and shows
willingness to protect the full scope of rights guaranteed by the European
Convention on Human Rights. It is especially welcome that many of the positive
changes made by the Shapoval draft in comparison to the present Constitution
have been upheld. This applies e.g. to the definitive abolition of the death
penalty (Art. 28(2)), to the introduction of new rights such as the right to
family and respect for family life, the right to review by a higher court and
the right to seek pardon or mitigation of the sentence, to the redefinition of
some of the citizens’ rights as rights of everybody as well as to the
concretisation of some of the restrictions. It is particularly welcome that the
principle of proportionality has been explicitly introduced into the text of
the Constitution.
18. Nevertheless,
some problems remain. Thus, e.g. the list of rights that can be restricted in
cases of emergency still seems to be excessively long. The status of the social
guarantees has not yet been clarified. It will be the task of the
constitutional case law to further elucidate the guarantees and to interpret
them in such a way that they are not only of theoretical value, but effectively
applied in practice.
Article 25
19. Article 25
provides that “the content and scope of existing rights and freedoms shall
not be diminished in the adoption of new laws” …” This very apodictic
statement that is also contained in the present constitution might cause
problems if laws are necessary to solve conflicts between different human
rights and solutions are only possible based on compromise formula.
Article 27
20. The
catalogue of criteria not allowing for any “privileges or restrictions” has
been widened and now also contains the criterion “minority affiliation”. This
might cause problems, as minority protection on the basis of international law
requires accepting some sorts of privileges (e.g. use of the mother tongue;
special schools). It is important to interpret Article 27 in the light of Article 56 which allows the use of minority languages).
21. The article
does no longer contain a provision on affirmative action in favour of women.
This is in conformity with new approaches to gender equality abstaining from
granting women special privileges, especially if these are based on a
traditional conception of the different roles of men and women.
Article 28
22. As in the Shapoval draft the death penalty is clearly and
explicitly abolished. Although the death penalty was already previously
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, this additional
clarification is highly appreciated.
Article 30
23. The right
to family and respect for family life was added. Yet, it has to be stressed
that in the former version the aspect of non-interference in family life was
formulated in a clearer way.
Article 32
24. In contrast
with the regulation in other constitutions, the provision on disability has not
been inserted in connection with the principle of equality. The draft stresses
the State’s obligation aiming at independence, social integration and full-fledged
participation in social life. The practical application will prove the
efficiency of this approach.
Article 33
25. Article 33
regulates the human rights guarantees for foreigners, but provides neither a
constitutional minimum guarantee, nor circumscribes possible legal
restrictions. The Shapoval draft was clearer in this regard since it provided
that human rights of foreigners can be “restricted only by laws for the
purpose of protection of national security or territorial integrity”.
Article 34
26. It is
welcome that in the case of an arrest a confirmation by a court is necessary
within 24 hours and not only within 72 hours.
Article 37 / Article 55
27. Article 37
grants to every citizen the right to examine information about himself/herself,
that is not a State secret. The problem is that this wording allows an
arbitrary definition of what a State secret is. Therefore the individual is not
effectively protected. In this context it is also questionable in how far
information on the environment can be classified as “state secret”. This would
undermine the rights guaranteed in Article 55.
Article 48 et seq.
28. In
connection with the comprehensive list of social rights contained in the draft
it is worth to quote the Venice Commission’s assessment in its last opinion on
the Shapoval draft:
“The wording of economic, social and cultural rights is still
identical to the wording of civil and political rights. Especially if there are
no further qualifications to the rights guaranteed, unrealistic expectations
might be created. It depends on the courts to interpret these rights without
interfering in the field of activity of the legislator. It must be secured that
the difficulties in implementing economic, social and cultural rights must not
have negative consequences for the direct implementation of civil and political
rights.”
Article 57
29. It might be
mentioned that the protection of the results of the intellectual and creative
activities is not only contained in Article 57 (2), but also in Article 46.
Article 58
30. The wording
of Article 58 (Everyone has the right to protect his/her rights and freedoms
against violations and infringements by any means not forbidden by law) differs
from a very similar provision in Article 28 para. 3: “Everyone has the right
to protect his/her life and health, life and health of other people from
illegal encroachment.” For the sake of clarity duplications should be
avoided, especially if the wording is not consistent.
Article 59
31. The
introduction of a right to a fair trial is a positive change of the text.
Article 68
32. Article 68
explains that the restrictions of human rights must be proportional to the aim
set forth by law and necessary in a democratic society. It thus takes up the
formula used in the ECHR. This change is welcome.
33. The list of
rights which can be restricted in emergency situations is excessively long. The
conditions required for declaring a state of emergency or martial law are
nowhere defined in the draft.
Article 73
34. Article 73
takes up an innovation that was already proposed in the Shapoval draft. It is
therefore appropriate to quote the Venice Commission’s comment on the relevant
provision:
“This
Article on the rights of legal persons is new. It refers only to legal entities
registered on the territory of Ukraine, thus excluding foreign legal entities
active in Ukraine without registration and not-registered Ukrainian legal
entities (if registration is not a precondition for the creation of a legal
person). The wording of the provision might cause problems as registration
might become a precondition for the exercise of basic human rights not only for
foreign, but also for Ukrainian corporations. For example, the arbitrary
refusal to register an organisation would not be covered by the human rights
provisions of the Constitution.”
Section III: People’s Will
General comments
35. The draft
provides a more detailed regulation of elections and referendums than the
current Constitution. On elections, the regulation is essentially the same as
at present but several additional provisions are included in the text of the
Constitution. This reflects also the continuing efforts made by other
constitutional drafts to change and improve the electoral system, and
especially the regulation of the referendum.
This chapter of the draft draws again heavily on the draft constitution of Ukraine prepared by a working group headed by Mr V.M. Shapoval.
36. Section III
clearly enlarges the possibilities of direct democracy. The scope for popular initiatives is very much extended, local popular
initiatives are introduced into the Constitution, constitutional amendments
always require approval by referendum and the possibilities of holding
referendums are expanded. On the other hand, in a controversial and arbitrary
way, the draft tries to limit the possibility of holding referendums by
enlarging the scope of prohibited subjects in an ambiguous way which
will make control by the Constitutional Court very difficult.
37. As pointed
out already in OpinionCDL-AD(2008)015, the scope for direct democracy is
generally a matter of political choice. As elements of direct democracy are
very pronounced in the new draft, the Venice Commission reiterates its earlier
comments made inCDL-AD(2008)015:
“As the Venice Commission underlined earlier “Direct consultation of
the people via referendum has long been the subject of heated discussion
between legal and political experts, sociologists, politicians, and indeed the
general public.”[5]
The Venice Commission addressed several times the topic of referendum.
Recently, it summed up its standpoint in the Opinion on the Finnish
constitution. Enlarging the possibility of holding referendums, or the
introduction of their binding effect or of popular initiatives, is a political
choice. However, it is a slippery slope. In the case of negative experiences or
even abuse of the tool of referendum, it is very difficult to withdraw the
means offered to the people by this specific form of direct democracy.
Politicians and political parties would face serious difficulties when
explaining such a withdrawal. Therefore, any widening in the regulation of
referendum requires special caution.[6]
Enlarging the scope of referendums, and lowering the necessary thresholds, may
be dangerous and undermine the ordinary functioning of representative
democracy. Previous experience in Ukraine and other CIS states provides another
reason for a prudent approach.”
Article 76
38. The general
principles applicable to the elections are the same as at present. A strong
accent is put on equal and direct suffrage, as a new provision underlines that “all
voters have equal amount of votes and vote in person” (Art. 76). A new
provision (article 76(4)) does not allow to hold local elections at the same
time with the regular parliamentary or presidential elections. This limitation
is acceptable, other countries also keep apart national and local elections.
Article 77
39.
New provisions are introduced excluding the holders of certain offices from
running at elections. Thus in the case of a quite large group the important
right to be elected is restricted. This restriction is acceptable, even if some
legal systems are more permissive during the campaign period, and similarly
strict only once the candidates have gained the mandate which is incompatible
with the office or position held before.
Article 78
40. Article 78
states that – contrary to the present version of the Constitution, where this
applies to specific chapters only - constitutional amendments can be made
exclusively by referendum. It is questionable if such a restriction is
practicable. Experience in other constitutional systems shows that minor
changes of the Constitution are part of the political everyday business. For
instance, the German constitution was changed more than 50 times during 60
years of existence. Only a few of the changes were fundamental ones. On the
other hand, the provision that changes of the territory and transfer of
sovereign powers are possible only on the basis of a referendum can be found in
many European constitutions.
Article 79
41. This article opens the possibility for a popular
initiative to submit to referendum a draft law repealing – entirely or partly –
an effective law (abrogative referendum). The requirements to initiate such
type of referendum are quite strict (but less so than the present regulation,
the present requirements are the double of those proposed): it may be initiated
on the request of no less than one and a half million citizens of Ukraine
eligible to vote, and on the condition that the signatures in favour of calling
the referendum have been collected in no less than two-thirds of the oblasts,
with no less than 50,000 signatures in each oblast. The fulfilment of the
double requirement of a relatively high number of signatures, and that they
should be collected in no less than two-thirds of the oblasts, proves that
there is a real support in the population for an all-Ukrainian referendum.
42. Paragraph 2 enumerates matters not subject
to an abrogative referendum (the present Constitution prohibits only
referendums on taxes, budget, and amnesty). The draft adds the following
matters:
- laws on rights and obligations of the
citizens and their guarantees,
- dues and fees, compulsory payments,
- legal responsibility,
- consent to be bound by international treaties of Ukraine or the termination or the suspension of international treaties.
43. The last
limitation is acceptable and usual
in the practice of countries allowing for referendum by popular initiative.
However, the other three prohibitions are too vague. Basically all laws may
effect the rights and duties of citizens, and this opens the way to potentially
exclude all subjects from an abrogative referendum by interpreting this
provision broadly. (According to Art.152 of the draft the Constitutional Court
decides on the constitutionality of the popular initiatives.) The notion of
“Legal responsibility” is not clear and vague. It is necessary to avoid
indicating prohibited subjects that open the way to uncertainty and arbitrary
interpretation.
44. A further limitation is specified in
article 79(4): an all-Ukrainian referendum called on
popular initiative may not be held more than once a year. This restriction aims
at avoiding an excessive use of referendums but seems somewhat arbitrary.
Article 80
45. According to this article an All-Ukrainian
referendum is effective if the majority of citizens of Ukraine eligible to vote participated in the voting. Decisions at an All-Ukrainian referendum are
approved by the majority of citizens of Ukraine who participated in the voting
(article 80). This double majority requirement is not unreasonable.
Article 81
46. A draft law on issues falling within the areas
regulated by law may be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on popular initiative supported by no less than 100,000 citizens of Ukraine eligible to vote. This is the genuine legislative popular initiative that is made possible
on issues that belong to the competence of the legislative branch. This is the
usual solution for defining the scope of the popular initiative. But the
required threshold is surprisingly low.
Articles 82-83
47. These articles introduce at constitutional level the
institution of local referendums. This is to be welcomed.
Section IV – National Assembly of Ukraine
General comments
48. The draft opts for the introduction of a bicameral
system. This is a political choice which has both advantages and drawbacks.
Since the territorial structure of Ukraine is not based on federal or regional
principles, a bi-cameral system is not a natural choice. Nevertheless, even in
a unitary system, it can improve territorial representation and, due to the
longer term of office of the Senate, enhance continuity. On the other hand, bi-cameralism complicates legislative and
budgetary processes and may introduce new causes for political dead-locks.
49. The Senate seems to be seen
by the drafters as a “less political” body due to the system of election of
senators. It consists of three senators who are elected in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea, each region (oblast), the City of Kyiv, and in the cities
that have the same status as an oblast. The former Presidents, who were not
removed from the office by the procedure of impeachment, are also members of
the Senate. One third of the Senate is elected every two years. The Senate can
be seen as an instrument which should balance the competences of Verkhovna
Rada. The main role of the Senate is to participate in the legislative process,
and to replace the Verkhovna Rada in the process of the appointment to
important positions in the state. One may have doubts whether this role of the
Senate as a less political body is not overestimated.
50. All in all,
the expected benefits and the possible disadvantages of a second chamber should
be carefully weighed against each other.
Article 86
51. As regards
the composition of the Senate, the draft provides that all regional units would
have the same number of representatives while there are important demographic
inequalities between these units (e.g. 4.6 million inhabitants in the Donetsk oblast; 900.000 inhabitants in the Chernivtsi oblast). This would
lead, in practice, to great inequality between voters (the weight of their
votes) in different regions.
Article 90
52. Art.
90(2-4) of the draft law includes provisions on positions or activities which
are incompatible with the status of a people’s deputy or a senator.
Furthermore, additional incompatibilities could be established through law.
However, it is preferable not to grant to an ordinary parliamentary majority
the power to establish such incompatibilities. All the incompatibilities should
be laid down at the constitutional level.
Article 92 et seq.
53. It is
highly appreciated that the new draft does no longer provide that a member of
parliament loses his mandate if he or she does no longer belong to the
political party on whose list he or she was elected (so-called imperative
mandate).
Article 97
54. Article 97
contains a comprehensive list of competences of the Parliamentary Assembly.
Some of them give rise to remarks.
55. According
to Art. 97 No. 11, the Chamber of Deputies would appoint and dismiss the
Authorized Human Rights Representative of the National Assembly. A requirement
of a qualified majority is recommendable to ensure the non-political nature of
the decisions.
56. The Chamber
of Deputies has the right (No. 12) to “adopt by the law decisions on
establishing and altering the boundaries of administrative and territorial
units, establish and abolish oblasts, districts”. It is not clear in how
far local referendums in the sense of Article 82 are indispensable
preconditions in this respect. It is recommendable to change these provisions
in order to guarantee a sufficient level of self-determination for the local
population (see below). In this respect elements of direct democracy are
extremely valuable.
57. The
competence of naming and renaming inhabited localities, districts and oblasts
(No. 15) does not seem compatible with basic requirements of minority
protection.
Article 98
58. The right
to an enquiry exists only in connection with the implementation of the Action
Programme. It might be considered to provide for such enquiries on a broader
basis.
Article 99
59. It is
positive that the Verkhovna Rada cannot dismiss individual ministers but only
express no confidence in the Cabinet as a whole. It seems to be arbitrary to
restrict the vote of no confidence to once per year. A better system would be
to introduce a constructive vote of no confidence (see the comments in the
Opinion on the Shapoval draft).
Article 100
60. Art. 100
No. 5 includes the power of the Senate to dissolve, on the submission of the
President and after receiving the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the
Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on the grounds of a
violation of the Constitution of Ukraine. Such an extreme measure should only
be possible provided that the Constitutional Court has found a violation of the
Constitution and endorsed the measure. Moreover, the provision should be
transferred to the same context as the other provisions on Crimea, preferably a
separate section of the Constitution.
Article 103
61. The right
of the President to dissolve the Deputies Chamber without giving any reason has
already been expressly criticised in the Shapoval draft. The statement of the
Venice Commission can be repeated here:
“Neither of the alternatives of the regulation on the pre-term
termination of the authority of the Verkhovna Rada is satisfactory. As the
deputies of the Verkhovna Rada get their mandate directly from the voters for a
certain period of time, there should be compelling reasons for a pre-term
termination. The suggested Article 95 (1) would lead to dissolutions also in
situations where dissolution could be avoided. According to the text proposed
the authority of the Verkhovna Rada “may be terminated pre-term by the
President after consultations …”. According to the text these consultations do
not have any specific consequences. Even if the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada,
the Prime Minister and the leaders of parliamentary factions are opposed, the
President can dissolve the Verkhovna Rada. Moreover, no grounds justifying the
dissolution have to be provided.”
Art. 104
62. The comments on the Shapoval draft can
also be quoted in relation to the regulation on the majority required for
taking decisions in the Chamber of Deputies:
“This Article maintains the requirement of the current Constitution
that nearly all decisions of the Rada require the majority of its
constitutional membership. This makes decision-making excessively difficult,
especially if there is only a thin majority. In accordance with usual
parliamentary practice, for most decisions the majority of deputies present and
voting should be sufficient once a quorum has been established.”
Article 105
63. It is
interesting to note that the extensive list contained in the present
Constitution on all the questions that have to be regulated by law has been
replaced by a more abstract formula and thus reflects the German doctrine of
the “Gesetzesvorbehalt”. The adoption of laws is required in order to regulate
the “most important social relations”, to define rights and obligations of
citizens and for some additional basic questions. This approach follows the one
accepted in other constitutional systems.
Art. 107
64. It might be
unrealistic to grant to the Senate only 15 days to approve or to reject a law,
especially if the draft is very complex.
Art. 108
65. In most
constitutional systems the President has the right to block a law by his veto.
Nevertheless, the requirement to adopt a law vetoed by the President by
two-thirds of the composition of the Deputies’ Chamber is a very high hurdle.
Section V – President of Ukraine
General
comments
66. The draft
law does not really solve the issue of dual executive power, which constitutes
one of the main background factors to Ukraine’s political instability. The
President’s present powers would remain largely as they now are, and the draft
law does not imply any change in the present situation of parallel governmental
and presidential administrative machineries. On the contrary, the fact that the
President would retain the right of legislative initiative and that
presidential bills, declared urgent, would enjoy primacy in parliamentary
deliberations implies an important role of the President and the presidential
administration in ongoing legislative processes. The introduction of a second
chamber and easier recourse to national referendums are likely to weaken the
position of the Cabinet of Ministers with respect to the President. On the
other hand, the new rules on forming the cabinet of Ministers should make this
body more cohesive
Article
112
67. The general description of
the role of the President is similar to the current Constitution. Part of the
text is, however, not comprehensible in the English translation. The new
provision, according to which the President contributes to the coordination of
state bodies, organs of local self-government, could be questioned. This should
rather be a competence of the Cabinet of Minister.
68. Many
constitutions, especially in the countries of Eastern Europe, grant to the
President the competence “to guarantee the human and citizens’ rights and
freedom”. As this is the basic task of the judiciary and in particular of the Constitutional Court, it is not quite clear in how far this provision confers concrete
rights to the President or is just meant as a general description of the status
of the President. There is a risk of abuse of such provisions.
Article
113
69. Article 113
contains the important restriction that the President can only be elected for
two consecutive terms.
Article 118
70. Article 118
contains an extensive list of competences of the President. The
abrogation of the constitutional provision which gave to the President the
right to propose to the Verkhovna Rada the names of candidates to the offices
of the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs is positive. The
new wording eliminates the double status of ministers, members of the Council
of Ministers, guaranteeing a coherent procedure of forming the government.
71. Other
powers are more problematic. According to a new provision (No. 1) the
President exercises leadership in the spheres of foreign policy,
defense and national security. ”,while the Cabinet of Ministers is responsible for the “implementation
of foreign policy”. By introducing directly into the Constitution
the word “leadership” in the above mentioned areas, the drafters intended to
underline the guiding role of the President and thus limit the power of the
Cabinet of Ministers. It is nevertheless doubtful, whether this formula is
sufficiently clear. It does not belong to legal language; it is rather a
political description which can lead, in practice, to misinterpretation and
conflicts.
72. Art. 118 No. 5 leaves some questions
open. It is not clear what happens if the Senate does not
approve the decrees. The use of armed forces is possible even without any
approval of another constitutional organ. In this context the previous comment
of the Venice Commission has to be recalled:
“There are no objections to defining the President’s role in
situations of war and emergency as predominant. Nevertheless the division of
roles in item 6 is not quite clear. The Verkhovna Rada has to approve the
decrees introducing martial law or a state of emergency. But it is not
explained what are the consequences if the Verkhovna Rada declines to approve
them. It seems advisable to grant to the President only a power of “first
reaction” and to clarify that such a decree looses its validity if it is not
approved by the Verkhovna Rada. According to the wording of the provision, the
use of the armed forces in the event of a military aggression does not have to
be confirmed by the Verkhovna Rada. It is recommended to grant to the
parliament a right of approval also in this area.”
73. Neither
Art. 118 No. 5 nor Art. 100 No. 7 granting to the Senate the power to approve
the President’s declaration does include any provision on the situations where
martial law or a state of emergency could be declared. Art. 68(2), in turn,
provides for the possibility of restricting enumerated fundamental rights under
martial law or in a state of emergency. Therefore it is recommended to include
such a provision in the text.
Article 124
74. It should be specified which crimes
justify the opening of an impeachment procedure.
Section VI – Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
General comments
75. Some of the
proposed changes point to the strengthening of the parliamentary traits of the
political system. Thus, according to the draft law, the Cabinet of Ministers
would no longer be responsible to the President and the distinction between
Ministers appointed on the proposal of the President and Ministers appointed on
the proposal of the Prime Minister is abandoned. These changes are to be
welcomed. Equally positive is the abrogation of the provisions on the formal
coalition of the parliamentary majority.
Article 126
76. Art. 126 maintains the
current constitutional description of the Cabinet of Ministers as the highest
body within the executive power system. This formula has always raised some
doubts especially in a system where there are two organs of executive power and
one of them is elected in general elections. Which of the two should be defined
as the highest one? How can one define, within the executive power system, the
relationship between the president, who exercises his leadership for example in
the sphere of defense, and the Cabinet of Ministers, which is defined as the
highest body within executive power.
77. A positive solution proposed
by the draft is the elimination of the double responsibility of the government,
introduced by the amendments to the Constitution in 2004. In the light of the
current Constitution (Art.113) the government is responsible to the President
and to Verkhovna Rada. This type of responsibility must cause tensions among
all three organs. Thus the proposed solution contains a much clearer principle
of responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers.
Article 128
78. The provisions on the
forming of the government are much clearer than in the present Constitution and
avoid recourse to a formal coalition of the parliamentary majority which was
criticised by the Venice Commission in earlier opinions.
Article 131
79. Art. 116 of the present
Constitution contains quite a long list of the competences of the Cabinet of
Ministers. The new Art. 131 regulates only more technical competences but not
the substantial ones. Does this mean that the Cabinet of Ministers is deprived
of these competences (which should not be the case) or rather that they are
supposed to be regulated by a lower act (a law on the Cabinet of Ministers).
This solution seems not justified. The Constitution, which describes the
Cabinet of Ministers as the highest body in the executive system, should also
regulate the scope of the substantial competences of such a body.
Section VII –
Courts and Justice
General
comments
80. The Commission expressed its
opinion on the judicial system in Ukraine several times. One of the most
detailed opinions concerned the draft “Law on the Judiciary” and the draft “Law
on the Status of Judges of Ukraine” (CDL-AD(2007)003) In those opinions the
Commission provided indications on possible future amendments to the
Constitution that should better guarantee the independence of the Judiciary. In
many respects the present draft follows the indications of the Venice
Commission. In general, it is a clear improvement with respect to the present
Constitution. In particular, the draft abandons the Soviet model of the prokuratura
and thus complies with a commitment of Ukraine to the Council of Europe.
Article 134
81. In view of
basic requirements of independence of judges it is generally not recommended to
have judges elected by the public. The scope of the reference to elected judges
in this Article is not clear. Article 142 on the appointment of judges does in
effect rightly not provide for the election of judges by the people.
Article 135
82. There is a
new provision inserted the content of which is not very clear. According to
Article 135 “courts shall not decide on the execution of powers of other
bodies or officials, except in cases defined by law.”
Article 137
83. It might
not be necessary to repeat the principle of the “rule of law” in this context
as it is already contained in Article 5. At the same time it is good to
introduce the requirement of a “reasonable time for considering the case”
in the list of main principles of judicial proceedings. Procedural requirements
concerning criminal justice are taken out (prove of guilt, right to defence,
prosecution by the Prosecutor on behalf of the State). This is acceptable since
they are already contained in other sections of the Constitution.
Article 139
84. The Venice Commission
already expressed its opinion that it is not appropriate that the parliament
should have any role in lifting a judge's immunity. In Art. 139 of the draft
the requirement of the consent of the Verkhovna Rada is replaced by the consent
of the newly established Senate. This does not remove the concerns previously
expressed.
85. According to paragraph 3 of
this Article the State ensures the personal security of judges and their
families. This goes too far. State protection can be provided to a judge only
in specific circumstances.
Article 141
86. The question of appointment
of judges was one of the crucial problems. The current Constitution provides
two categories of judges, those appointed for a period of time (nominated for
the first time) and judges appointed for an unlimited period of time. The new
draft in Art. 141 replaces the provision of Art. 126 and provides for only one
category of judges appointed for permanent terms. This is a welcome solution. It
is also reasonable to fix a minimum age of 27 years and to determine experience
and professional level by law.
Article 142
87. The second problem regarding
the appointments of judges concerns the organ authorised to appoint judges.
With regard to the present situation the Venice Commission pointed out that the
“appointments of judges of ordinary (non-constitutional) courts are not an
appropriate subject for a vote by Parliament because the danger that political
considerations prevail over the objective merits of a candidate cannot be
excluded. Admittedly, in order to avoid the involvement of Parliament in the
appointment of judges, it would be necessary to change Article 128 of the
Constitution.” (CDL-AD(2007)003).
88. The present draft proposes
new regulations in this area in art. 142. The English translation is barely
comprehensible: “Judges of the Supreme Court and judges of high specialized
courts are appointed by the Senate within the recommends by the High Council of
Justice, judges of other courts to appoint and dismiss the post of President of
Ukraine by the Supreme Council of Justice (?) in accordance with law.” It
has to be noted positively that, with respect to the judges of the lower courts,
parliament will no longer be involved in the appointment procedure. With
respect to the judges of the higher courts, decisions would be taken by the
newly established Senate instead of the Verkhovna Rada. The Senate is also a
part of the Parliament. Would it be possible for the Senate to be more
apolitical than the Verkhovna Rada? This is one of the main arguments advanced
to justify the introduction of the Senate into the Ukrainian system of power.
The electoral system to the Senate is different from that to the Verkhovna Rada
and in the opinion of the drafters the Senate would not be so strongly involved
in political games. For the moment it is difficult to say how significant this
change is, and to what extent it will better guarantee the non-political character
of the appointments of judges. It depends also on the rules of procedure
adopted by the Senate for the process of appointment of judges.
Article 143
89. The Venice Commission stated in its opinion thatthe principle of
irremovability of judges is explicitly guaranteed in many national
constitutions. It suggested to amend the Constitution of Ukraine in this
respect to provide an additional guarantee. This suggestion has not been taken
into account by the drafters. Articles 139 and 143 repeat the solutions that
exist in the current constitution with some changes.
90. It might be dangerous to
allow the dismissal of a judge from office for the “breach of oath”. The oath a
judge has to pronounce is not fixed in the Constitution. This provision might
be (mis)used to get rid of judges as the provisions used in the oath will
necessarily be very vague.
Article 144
91. The draft proposes a changed composition of the High
Council of Justice. The new solution is welcome. The Council would consist of
sixteen members, with the Congress of Judges appointing eight members and the
President and the Senate appointing four members each. The draft does, however,
not address the issue of the qualification of the persons to be appointed by
the President and the Senate. In the explanatory notes it is stated that all
members appointed by the President and the Senate should be retired judges. This
demonstrates the intention that the High Council of Justice should be composed
in a major part of judges. This is a good solution. Art. 144 also says that the
chairman of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor
General are not longer ex officio members of the HCJ, but that they may
participate in the plenary of HCJ, at the meetings of the qualification
commission of judges and the disciplinary committee of judges. This changes
completely the structure of the Council which was strongly criticised by
European institutions.
92. The role and competences of the HCJ are also better
described, in line with European standards. The HCJ: 1. forwarding
submission on the appointment of judges to the office; 2. forwarding submission
on the dismissal of judges from the office in cases stipulated by the part one
of Art. 143 of the Constitution; 3. terminate the authority of judges in the
cases stipulated by the part two of art. 143 of the Constitution(age 65, and
death ); 4. takes a decision on suspension of the judges in the cases
stipulated by part three of art. 143 (in the case of the prosecution of a crime
or to correct violations of the requirements for incompatibility); 5. decides
to bring the judges to disciplinary liability.
Article 145
93. The draft proposes some important and mainly very
welcome changes to the Prosecutor's office. The provisions on the Prosecutor’s
office are to be included in the part of Constitution dedicated to the courts.
This change is justified by the general role of the Prosecutor’s office
described by art. 145, “Maintenance of prosecution in the court on behalf of
the state is entrusted to the Prosecutor’s Office”.
94. The Prosecutor General is appointed by the President
with the “concern” (i.e. consent) of the Senate (at present with the consent of
the Verkhovna Rada) but dismissed by the President acting alone on grounds
determined by law (not by the constitution). The latter circumstance can weaken
the position of the Prosecutor. The new draft excludes the possibility to take
a vote of no confidence in the Prosecutor General. This solution is justified,
as it helps avoid the politicisation of the prosecutor’s office.
95. Particularly positive is the
proposal to abolish the competence of the prosecutor (always strongly
criticised by the Venice Commission), “to supervise over the respect for
human rights and freedoms and over how laws governing such issues are observed
by executive authorities, bodies of local self-government and by their
officials and officers”. This provision is a typical example of a
reminiscence of the old system of the Soviet prokuratura. The proposal
to eliminate this provision from the Constitution of democratic Ukraine is
therefore very welcome and an important step towards the fulfillment of the
commitment of Ukraine towards the Council of Europe “the role and functions
of the Prosecutor's Office will change (particularly with regard to the
exercise of a general control of legality), transforming this institution into
a body which is in accordance with Council of Europe standards;”
Section VIII – Constitutional Court
of Ukraine
General comments
96. This
Section is basically similar to the Constitution in force. Some amendments are
clear improvements (as in the administration of the oath, the introduction of
the constitutional complaint), some give rise to reservations (the appointment
procedure). The draft preserves some solutions (as for the dismissal of judges)
previously criticised by the Venice Commission.
Article 147
97. The proposed procedure for the
appointment of constitutional court judges is identical to the one in the
Shapoval draft. The Venice Commission therefore reiterates its previous
comments:
“Under the Constitution in force constitutional judges are recruited
through three different channels: the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine and the Congress of Judges of Ukraine each appoint six judges to the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine. According to the draft the judges of the Constitutional Court would be appointed on the submission of the President of Ukraine by a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the Verkhovna Rada. In another
case the Venice Commission welcomed the shift from the system of exclusive
direct appointment of constitutional judges by the President to the mixed
system providing for the election or appointment by the three main branches of
power because this system has more democratic legitimacy. A
contrario, abandoning this system and moving to a combination of nomination of
candidates by the President and their election by parliament is not welcome,
although the proposed solution as such is acceptable and known in other
countries. Moreover, in the present situation in Ukraine the proposed system
could easily lead to deadlocks and the monopoly of presenting proposals gives
an extremely strong role to the President.”
98. As regards the requirements to become a
constitutional court judge, the draft removes the requirement of residing in Ukraine for the last twenty years, and diminishes the period of practical experience from
fifteen to ten years. Both solutions may help to enlarge the number of the
possible candidates.
Article 148
99. This Article contains the text of the oath.
It is a very important new provision that the elected judge has to take the
oath at the plenum of the Constitutional Court, and not the parliament. It is
recalled that in 2005 there remained only five judges of the Constitutional Court and the Court was not able to operate. The Verkhovna Rada seemed reluctant both to
appoint the four judges remaining from its own quota and to allow for the
procedure of swearing in to take place. At that time the Venice Commission
proposed as one of the possible solutions to swear in the new judges before the
Constitutional Court (or, if this were not possible, before the chairman of
the Court).
The solution proposed by the draft follows the recommendation of the Venice
Commission.
Article 149
100. As regards the guarantees for judicial independence, this
Article refers to the rules applicable to the judges of the ordinary courts.
Thus, the reservations expressed above under Article 137 with respect to the
role of the Senate in lifting the immunity of judges apply here as well. The
solution guaranteeing full independence would be to provide the plenum of the Constitutional Court with these powers. There is quite a long list of the possible reasons
for dismissal, but these are clearly defined, and in case of the most delicate
grounds for dismissal (the violation by the judge of requirements concerning
incompatibility; and breach of oath by the judge) two-thirds majority decision
is required. The same objection applies to the role of the Senate in the
dismissal of constitutional court judges. Here the solution in the Shapoval
draft providing the Court itself with this power was by far preferable.
Article 150
101. The draft maintains the current powers of
the Constitutional Court. However, the Authorised Human Rights Representative
and the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea no longer appear in
the list of bodies with standing to introduce a submission. The draft adds two
new powers in this Article and Article 152. The most important addition is
without doubt the introduction of the individual constitutional complaint
against legislative acts in paragraph 3. The Venice
Commission addressed in previous opinions the importance of the institution of
constitutional complaint. It welcomed initiatives to introduce a constitutional
complaint procedure and declared that “the
possibility of individual complaint would definitely serve the better and more
effective protection of fundamental rights.”
102. In its opinion on the draft constitutional amendments with
regard to the Constitutional Court of Turkey,
the Venice Commission outlined generally and in a comparative perspective the
role and importance of the individual complaint: “The
institutions of Verfassungsbeschwerde in Germany and recurso de amparó in Spain
are the most well-known examples of constitutional complaint. Other European
countries have also established some procedures for the adjudication of
constitutional complaint (among others Russia, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Slovenia, ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, Croatia, Portugal,
Hungary, etc.). Recent tendencies in constitutional adjudication can rightly be
described as a path from the review of the constitutionality of laws to the
review of the application of laws. This means a shift from the review of
legislature to the review of the judiciary.” Welcoming the introduction of the constitutional complaint,
the Commission draws attention to the fact that this will probably change the
function of judicial review as increasing the case-load of the Constitutional Court.
Article 152
103. The other new power of the Court is to
provide opinions on the constitutionality of issues proposed to nationwide
referendum (article 152.2). This is again a power also exercised by
Constitutional Courts in other countries (Italy, Hungary).
Article 153
104. The rules on the distribution of tasks between the
plenum and the chambers are not very precise.
Article 154
105. In several
cases the Constitutional Court does not take a decision, but give an opinion.
The legal consequences of such an opinion are not quite clear. According to
Article 154 they are mandatory, final and shall not be appealed. But it is not
clear if they are also binding on all the other State organs.
Section IX – Local Self-Government and Territorial Structure
of State Power
General comments
106. The
current Constitution devotes three chapters to: the territorial organisation of
the State (Chapter IX); the Republic of Crimea (Chapter X), and local
self-government (Chapter XI). In the draft, these matters are joined in a
single Section/ Chapter IX: “Local Self-Government and Territorial Structure of
State Power”. Having a separate Chapter for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
underlines the significance of the autonomy and the Venice Commission recommends
maintaining such a separate Chapter. The provisions on Crimea are also
organised differently from the present Constitution. The present order, which
starts from the provision on the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, corresponds better to the respective importance and inter-connections
of the provisions.
107. The draft
brings a very important change by introducing a clear separation between local
self-government and state administrations at the regional and local level (as
has been the case in France since 1982). However, as mentioned before,
provisions on “State Power”, i.e. de-concentrated state executive bodies and
their relationship with local self-government authorities appear in Section IX.
The recommendation is to present the provisions on local self-government and
those on State executive bodies operating at territorial level (and their
administrations) in two separate chapters, to avoid the confusion of two very
different kind of public authorities.
Article 155
108. According
to this provision local self-government is “the right and ability of the
community residents to regulate and manage the public affairs of local
significance in the interests of local residents
within the limits envisaged by the Constitution of Ukraine and laws”. The
comparison of this definition with the one in Article 2 of the European Charter
of Local Self-Government (ECLSG) shows that the draft could be improved. The
definition refers to “residents” but not to the elected local authorities,
which will normally exercise the local self-government rights and it does not
guarantee explicitly that a “substantial share” of public affairs will be
regulated and managed by the local communities and their bodies.
109. A further
issue is that, following the reference made by Art 155(2), to Art 3(3), second
line, the communities which are entitled to local self-government rights are
those of the “cities, towns, villages or associations of several
settlements”. This is problematic as rayon and oblast
communities are not recognised as such, although local self-government bodies
are elected also at these upper territorial levels.
110. The draft
makes it impossible for a municipality to be included in another municipality
(Art. 155(3). As a consequence, city districts which could be created freely by
municipal councils (Art 157(3) will no longer be vested with municipalities’
rights. These provisions would bring a positive change.
Article
156
111. While it
is commended that some basic principles are clearly stated in the draft, the
scope and the large amount of detail (namely on electoral arrangements,
competencies and organisational issues) may create problems. Therefore, the
recommendation is to review and simplify Article 156 (as well as Articles 157
and 159) which are too detailed. Art 76 is sufficient for the right to vote and
to be elected. There is no need to mention in the Constitution the terms of
office for the local government bodies.
Article
157
112. The list
of competencies in Article 157(1) is too casuistic and should be replaced by a
more general wording.
Article
159
113. The draft
maintains the approach of the current Constitution regarding the relationships
between municipalities and the district and regional councils. The councils, as
well as their elected executive bodies, will not represent specific territorial
interests at the district or regional level, but they will continue to
“represent the common interests of municipalities” (Art 159(1)), although
councils will be directly elected (par.2). This should be considered further:
it seems important to recognise the rayon and oblast
self-governments’ own role and sphere of competencies, and the existence of
supra-municipal interests of the rayon and oblast communities (which are
different from the common interest of the hromadas). If this is not the
case, direct elections of rayon and oblast councils (although most welcomed and
commended) would make little difference in practice.
114. The list
of competencies of rayons and oblasts in Article 159(4) is
problematic. If the intention is to exclude the possibilities of having
municipal functions in the area listed for rayons and oblasts,
the scope of municipal functions may be seriously reduced in practice. It is
also unusual that a unique list is applicable to rayons and oblasts.
These lists should therefore either be seriously reconsidered, or maybe
deleted. Rightly, there is no general competence clause for district and
regional councils.
Article
160
115. This
article, together with some other provisions (the possibility to delegate
powers to other councils on the basis of an agreement (Art 157(4)) and the
possibility of agreements for joint projects or joint financing of enterprises
and organisations (Art 158(2)) facilitates co-operation between municipalities
or with councils of the upper level. These changes would be positive,
especially if Ukraine keeps a high number of small municipalities, since the
scope of the territorial reform has not been decided yet. However, some
improvements would be required.
116. The
possibility to delegate should not be unlimited and cannot lead to deprive the
local authorities of certain core functions.
Therefore, the recommendation is to complete the relevant provisions with a
formula making possible judicial review, e.g., “The delegation should not
deprive the delegating council of the substance of self-government: the budget
and the accounts may not be delegated.” On the other hand, the right to
delegate or conclude agreements is not sufficient and it is necessary to
recognise the right to form consortia or other joint institutions to perform
tasks of common interest. This right should clearly be distinguished (as in Art
10 of the ECLSG) from the right to belong to associations for the protection
and promotion of common interests.
Article
161
117. State
powers would be exercised locally by state authorities, while all local
self-government powers would be exercised by local self-government bodies,
except in the case when specific state duties are delegated to local
self-government bodies and exercised on behalf of the state. This provision
should stimulate the development of local self-government at all levels. It is
also stipulated that the costs of delegated functions should be covered by
budget transfers or by the transfer of resources or properties. However, this
provision does not guarantee that the amount of resources allocated will cover
the costs of the delegated functions. Therefore, the recommendation is to
modify the provision and provide explicitly for full compensation of the
financial burden resulting from delegation, thus avoiding the risk that state
tasks are delegated mainly to alleviate the pressure on the state budget.
Article
162
118. Under this
Article acts of local self-government bodies may be suspended by the Head of
state administration with a simultaneous appeal to the court, for
reasons of nonconformity to the Constitution of Ukraine and to laws. This
open-ended provision may raise an issue of proportionality of the interference
on the exercise of the local self-government rights: while the power to
challenge the conformity of local self-government acts in the court is
perfectly legitimate (and even to be required), the possibility to decide on
the suspension of their effects should be reserved to the competent court (upon
request of the Head of state administration) in case this is required (e.g. for
the protection of citizens’ rights, which would be difficult to restore, or to
avoid financial losses, which would be difficult to recover).
Article
163
119. There are
two relevant changes of the scope of competences of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea. It has no longer the right to organise and conduct local referendums.
This right does also not result from the provisions of Section III of the
Constitution on People’s Will. Furthermore, the property belonging to the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea is no longer mentioned.
120. The
procedure of adoption of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
has been changed as well. Whereas according to the regulation in the present
constitution it is adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea and approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by one-half of its
constitutional composition, it is now “approved by law”. This means that the
President can use his right to veto the law.
Article
164
121. In the
wording of Article 164 the term “normative regulation” has been replaced by
“regulation” although no substantive change seems to be intended in this
respect. The list of issues has not been changed.
122. It is
remarkable that there is also one provision that enlarges the scope of
self-government. Thus the Head of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea is appointed and dismissed without the approval of the
President of Ukraine. But this has to be seen in the context of the competences
accorded to the new organs of the State administration.
Article 165
123. Art 165(1)
implies, as does the current Constitution, that in the exercise of its powers,
the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea would be bound, not
only by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, but also by the acts of the
President and the Cabinet of Ministers. This is to be considered problematic
from the point of view of the autonomous status of Crimea. Even restrictions
through law in fields where the Constitution explicitly grants legislative
powers to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea are questionable.
124. The
present Constitution includes a provision on the President’s power to suspend,
for reasons of nonconformity with the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of Ukraine, normative legal acts of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
with a simultaneous appeal to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in regard to
the constitutionality of the acts at issue. According to Art. 165(2) of the
draft law, the power of suspension would be transferred to the head of state
administration in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, appeal to the
Constitutional Court would be replaced by ”judicial recourse” and the reference
to the mere control of constitutionality would be dropped. In order to
guarantee the autonomous status of Crimea, the references to the Constitutional Court and the constitutional nature of the control should be retained.
Article
166
125. Article
166 replaces Articles 118 and 119 of the current Constitution on local state
administration and Article 139 on the Representative Office of the President of
Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Under the current Constitution
the heads of the local state administration are appointed and dismissed by the
President on the submission of the Cabinet of Ministers. According to the draft
they would be appointed and dismissed by the President without involvement of
the Cabinet of Ministers. This does not seem in line with the role of the
Cabinet of Ministers as the highest body within the executive power system.
126. As regards
Crimea, the change is more substantial. According to
the present Constitution there is no local state administration but only a
Representative Office of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea. Representation is different from administration. Thus the creation of a
structure of State administration has been proposed that has not existed up to
now. This is a clear sign of a reduction of the autonomy.
127. Generally,
the Head of State Administration, in the respective
territorial unit, “exercises control over the observance of the
Constitution, laws, acts of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine by territorial offices of ministries, other central executive
authorities and local governments as well as their officials”. In other terms, this article authorises a control of local government
(and Autonomous Republic of Crimea) actions not only on their conformity with
the Constitution and the law, but also on their compliance with government
decisions. This would be a major threat to true local self-government and
should not be admitted.
128. The idea
behind the changes seems to be that the new State administrative entities
fulfil the competences of the prokuratura in the field of supervision of
the observance of human and citizens’ rights and freedoms (cf. Transitional Provision
No. 12).
Section X – Introducing Amendments to
the Constitution of Ukraine
129. There are
no longer different procedures for the amendment of the Constitution according
to the part of the Constitution that is concerned. A referendum is required for
all amendments. The popular initiative for the amendment of the Constitution is
an additional new element of direct democracy. The proposed rules make it more
difficult to amend the Constitution, guaranteeing its ‘rigid’ character. The
President, both chambers of parliament, and popular referendum play a part in
the process, reflecting the new system of separation of powers.
Section XII - Transitional Provisions
130. This last
part of the Constitution contains regulations on the continuity and
discontinuity of existing State organs regulated in the constitution. It would
be recommendable to clearly state that the provision limiting the possibility
of the President to be re-elected to two consecutive terms applies despite the
amendment of the Constitution. This question has given rise to difficulties in
many new democracies; there was also a constitutional dispute in Ukraine. Such problems could be avoided with an unequivocal solution in the Section on the Transitional
Provisions.
III. CONCLUSIONS
131. The
present draft shows that the process of constitutional reform in Ukraine is moving into the right direction although no reform has yet been adopted.
132. First of
all, as regards the procedure, the Venice Commission welcomes that the draft
was submitted by the President to the Verkhovna Rada, thus showing his
acceptance of the constitutional requirement that any new version of the
Constitution has to be adopted by a two-thirds majority in the Verkhovna Rada
before its final approbation by referendum.
133. Secondly,
as regards substance, the Venice Commission notes clear improvements both with
respect to previous drafts and to the current Constitution. These improvements
are particularly apparent in the Section on the judiciary, regarding in
particular the appointment of judges, the composition of the High Judicial
Council and the new rules on the prosecution service. The draft no longer
reflects the Soviet model of prokuratura but a model of the prosecution
service in line with European standards and in compliance with Ukraine’s commitments to the Council of Europe.
134. The draft
also abandons a number of questionable provisions of the current Constitution,
e.g. on the formalised majority coalition in the Verkhovna Rada, on the
so-called imperative mandate, the double responsibility of the Cabinet of
Ministers to the President and to the Verkhovna Rada and the distinction
between ministers appointed on the proposal of the President and ministers
appointed on the proposal of the Prime Minister. It should strengthen the
coherence of the Cabinet of Ministers.
135. On one of
the major innovations of the draft, the establishment of a second chamber,
opinions may differ. Advantages and drawbacks of this solution have to be
weighed carefully.
136. Other
proposed amendments merit a more critical assessment. The requirement that all
constitutional amendments require a referendum risks making the Constitution
excessively rigid and the expansion of direct democracy at the national level
creates additional risks for political stability. While changes with respect to
the position of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea are not dramatic, they tend
to decrease the autonomy.
137. Finally, the Commission notes that the draft describes the powers of
the state organs more precisely and removes a number of sources of tensions
between them. Nevertheless, it is not evident that it attains its main aim of
putting an end to the constant institutional conflicts between the main state
organs. The draft maintains a semi-presidential system with a double executive
and areas of potential conflict between the President and the Cabinet of
Ministers remain.
