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(VENICE COMMISSION)

COMPILATION

OF VENICE COMMISSION OPINIONS AND REPORTS
CONCERNING COURTS AND JUDGES

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1 This document will be updated regularly. This version contains all opinions and reports/studies adopted up to and including the Venice Commission’s 119th Plenary Session (21-22 June 2019)
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I. INTRODUCTION

This document is a compilation of extracts taken from opinions and reports/studies adopted by the Venice Commission on issues concerning the judicial system (courts, judges and council of justice). The focus of this compilation is on the status of judges, on the internal organisation of the judiciary, its relations with other branches of the Government, guarantees of independence and accountability of the judges. This compilation does not concern constitutional justice and organisation of prosecution system (these topics are presented in separate compilations), as well as other fair trials guarantees than independence and impartiality of the courts.

The compilation is intended to serve as a source of reference for drafters of constitutions and of legislations on the judiciary, researchers, as well as the Venice Commission’s members, who are requested to prepare comments and opinions concerning legislation dealing with such issues. When referring to elements contained in this draft compilation, please cite the original document but not the compilation as such.

The compilation is structured in a thematic manner in order to facilitate access to the general lines adopted by the Venice Commission on various issues in this area. It should not, however, prevent members of the Venice Commission from introducing new points of view or diverge from earlier ones, if there is a good reason for doing so. The compilation should be considered as merely a frame of reference.

The reader should also be aware that most of the opinions from which extracts are cited in the compilation relate to individual countries and take into account the specific situation there. The citations will therefore not necessarily be applicable in other countries. This is not to say that recommendations contained therein cannot be of relevance for other systems as well.

Venice Commission reports and studies quoted in this compilation seek to present general standards for all member and observer states of the Venice Commission. Recommendations made in the reports and studies will therefore be of a more general application, although the specificity of national/local situations is an important factor and should be taken into account adequately.

Each citation in the compilation has a reference that sets out its exact position in the opinion or report/study (paragraph number, page number for older opinions), which allows the reader to find it in the opinion or report/study from which it was taken. In order to shorten the text, most of further references and footnotes are omitted in the text of citations; only the essential part of the relevant paragraph is reproduced.

The compilation is not a static document and will be regularly updated with extracts of recently adopted opinions by the Venice Commission. The Secretariat will be grateful for suggestions on how to improve this draft compilation (venice@coe.int).
II. LEVEL OF REGULATION – CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE LEVELS

2.1 Provisions on appointments, dismissals, salaries and the status of the judges

“The basic principles ensuring the independence of the judiciary should be set out in the Constitution or equivalent texts.”

See also CDL-AD(2016)015, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova on the Right of Recourse by the State against Judges, §§48-49.

“It is […] indispensable to provide […] a constitutional right to have access to independent and impartial tribunals, in accordance with Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.”

CDL-INF(1996)006, Opinion on the draft Constitution of Ukraine, p.15

“[…] [I]n the majority of member states, the criteria for the recruitment or the promotion of judges are established by laws or regulations. The only tacit or explicit exceptions to this are those judicial systems where a discretionary power of selection exists through the election by the people (legislative power) or an independent authority, including a judicial one, which can sometimes have political characteristics.”

CDL-AD(2009)023, Opinion on the Draft Criteria and Standards for the Election of Judges and Court Presidents of Serbia, §12

“Since the appointment of judges is of vital importance for guaranteeing their independence and impartiality, it is recommended to regulate the procedure of appointment in […] detail in the Constitution. […]”

CDL-AD(2008)010, Opinion on the Constitution of Finland, §112

“There are no standards on whether the appointment of court presidents should be explicitly regulated on the constitutional or legislative level. In any case, in view of the important functions of the court presidents, a clear regulation on their appointment must be adopted. […]”

CDL-AD(2018)003, Opinion on the Law on amending and supplementing the Constitution (Judiciary) of the Republic of Moldova, §24

“For the […] reason of independence and impartiality, the grounds for suspension, dismissal or resignation should be laid down in the Constitution, and the competent court should be set out, as well as the right of appeal of the judge concerned.”

CDL-AD(2008)010, Opinion on the Constitution of Finland, §113
See also CDL-AD(2018)011, Opinion on the draft amendments to the constitutional provisions on the judiciary of Serbia, §46; CDL-AD(2016)009, Final Opinion on the revised draft constitutional amendments on the Judiciary (15 January 2016) of Albania, §35; CDL-AD(2015)037, First Opinion on the Draft Amendments to
“Offences leading to disciplinary sanctions and their legal consequences should be set out clearly in law. […]”

CDL-AD(2016)007, Rule of Law Checklist, §78

“A constitutional law is a very rigid legal instrument, which cannot always be quickly adapted to the changing economic conditions. It should set certain basic principles that would ensure privileged status of judicial salaries. For example, the constitutional law might proclaim that judicial salaries may be reduced only in case of a major financial crisis and only after the commensurate reduction of salaries in all other sectors of public service. The constitutional law may guarantee regular indexation of judicial salaries in line with the cost of living, fix the salaries of judges at the same level as salaries of certain high-level State officials, etc. […]”


“[…] Although there is no strict international requirement in this regard, it would be advisable to define the scale of the remuneration for the different types of positions within the judiciary, in the Constitutional Law.”

CDL-AD(2011)012, Joint Opinion on the constitutional law on the judicial system and status of judges of Kazakhstan by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, §52

“[…] By leaving the definition of the election procedure [of the members of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council] to a separate regulation to be adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly in the future, the draft Law makes it difficult to assess the extent to which the requirement of transparency of the procedure has been met. […]

This election procedure should be developed in the law […]”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §§41-42

“Article 5.2 delegates the determination of the procedure for the election of the judges’ component of the Council to the Congress of Judges. While it is possible to have practical questions of the procedure decided by the Congress, at least its principles should be set out in the draft Law. […]”

CDL-AD(2011)019, Opinion on the introduction of changes to the constitutional law ‘on the status of judges’ of Kyrgyzstan, §31
2.2 Provisions on the courts and their structure

“The establishment and jurisdiction of courts, as well as the procedure before the courts, shall be specified by law.”

CDL-INF(1998)015, Opinions on the constitutional regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina, p.44

“It is important that the different types of court are provided for at Constitutional level.”

CDL-AD(2005)003, Joint opinion on a proposal for a constitutional law on the changes and amendments to the Constitution of Georgia by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, §102

“Article 125 will be amended to provide that the network of courts and general jurisdiction is to be determined by law, and that the courts are to be established, reorganised and abolished through the law. The intention behind this provision is to prevent such changes being made by means of a decree. Parliament will be empowered (see Article 85) with the right to determine the structure of the court system (called ‘network’ in the Amendments), to establish, to reorganise and to abolish the courts upon the motion of the President of Ukraine. This solution seems to be reasonable and involves the co-operation between various organs. The Venice Commission welcomes that in the future the network will be defined by law.”

CDL-AD(2013)014, Opinion on the Draft Law on the amendments to the Constitution, Strengthening the Independence of Judges and on the Changes to the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Assembly of Ukraine, §15

“It is a fact that alternative machineries for resolving conflicts are developing in many European states. The relationship between the ordinary courts and these alternative institutions certainly needs to be analysed and even regulated through legal norms. The Constitution is perhaps not the appropriate place to settle such problems, beyond a mere reference to the existence of the problem as such.

It is not necessarily correct that ‘the Constitution must define the individual elements of the court organisational structure’. [...] Only the general framework of the organisation of the court system deserves to be reflected in the Constitution itself.”


“[...] [A] new provision states that the administrative adjudication is to be organised in two instances encompassing the Administrative Court of First Instance and the High Administrative Court. It seems not very logical to refer expressly to a named first instance court in relation to the administrative law when in the previous paragraph the Constitution provides that first instance courts shall be set up by law. [...] It would be preferable if the rules in the Constitution concerning the administrative courts mirror those concerning the ordinary courts, i.e. to make a specific reference to named courts only in relation to the higher courts, leaving it to organic law to organise all courts of first and second instances. [...]”


2.3 Provisions on the Judicial Council
“An appropriate method for guaranteeing judicial independence is the establishment of a judicial council, which should be endowed with constitutional guarantees for its […] powers and autonomy.”


“There are various models of functioning of supreme judicial councils, but the fundamental legal status of each apex state institution, including the judicial council, should be embedded in the Constitution. […]”

**CDL-AD(2018)003.** Opinion on the Law on amending and supplementing the Constitution (Judiciary) of the Republic of Moldova, §56

See also **CDL-AD(2012)014.** Opinion on Legal Certainty and the Independence of the Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, §84

“Given their crucial role in appointing judges the composition of the Supreme Council [of the Judiciary], as well as their appointment or election, should be defined in the Constitution.”

**CDL-AD(2005)003.** Joint opinion on a proposal for a constitutional law on the changes and amendments to the Constitution of Georgia by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, §102

See also **CDL-AD(2019)003.** Opinion on the proposed revision of the Constitution of Luxembourg, §108; **CDL-AD(2014)008.** Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §24

“The lawmaker should consider including in the Constitution provisions guaranteeing independence and impartiality of individual members of the [Judicial Council] and of the [Judicial Council] as a whole. […]”

**CDL-AD(2014)026.** Opinion on the seven amendments to the Constitution of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” concerning, in particular, the judicial Council, the competence of the Constitutional Court and special financial zones, §77

“The Montenegrin authorities have decided to propose two separate draft laws in the area of the judiciary: the Draft law on courts and the law on rights and duties of judges and on the High Judicial Council. To adopt two separate laws on this field seems, however, not to be the best solution, as both issues are closely connected. […]"

[…] ‘[A] single law would make the regulations more coherent and understandable’.”

**CDL-AD(2014)038.** Opinion on the draft laws on courts and on rights and duties of judges and on the Judicial Council of Montenegro, §§13, 14

“The Venice Commission reiterates that the proper functioning of the HJC and the HPC may require creation of sub-bodies […]; this possibility should be at least mentioned at the constitutional level, while the composition of those sub-bodies and their competency may be described in the implementing legislation.”

**CDL-AD(2016)009.** Final Opinion on the revised draft constitutional amendments on the Judiciary (15 January 2016) of Albania, §20
III. JUDGES

3.1 Independence and impartiality - definition

“Independence means independence from the executive and the parties. Courts should also be independent from the legislature except in so far as they are bound to apply laws emanating from the legislative body. While ‘independence’ primarily is a question of absence or presence of organic links between the judiciary and the other poles of public power, ‘impartiality’ is something normally decided in light of the circumstances of a particular case, i.e. a prima facie independent court may act partially. However, in light of the case-law of the ECtHR lack of guarantees of independence may easily create an appearance of lack of impartiality as well. Thus in the present context, as in others, it may be difficult to make a clear distinction between the requirements of independence and impartiality. According to the ECtHR, relevant in the assessment of independence (and impartiality) of a tribunal are ‘the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence’.”

See also CDL-AD(2018)032, Opinion on the Concept Paper on the reform of the High Judicial Council of Kazakhstan, § 11; CDL-AD(2017)005, Opinion on the amendments to the Constitution of Turkey adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 and to be submitted to a National Referendum on 16 April 2017, §110

“Both the judiciary, as an institution, and individual judges must be able to exercise their professional responsibilities in adjudication without being influenced by the executive or any other quarter. Only an independent judiciary is able to render justice impartially on the basis of the law and prevent the abuse of power. It is of vital importance for the rule of law that there is public trust in the proficiency of the judiciary to operate in an independent and impartial manner.”

CDL-AD(2018)028, Opinion on Constitutional arrangements and separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary and law enforcement of Malta, §27

“Judges should be independent and impartial in their decision-making and capable of acting without any restriction, improper influence, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any authority, including ‘authorities internal to the judiciary’.

In general, therefore, judicial independence must be protected both in its ‘external’ and ‘internal’ components.”

CDL-AD(2017)002, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova on the Criminal liability of judges, §§14-15
See also CDL-AD(2016)007, Rule of Law Checklist, §§87, 89; CDL-AD(2018)011, Opinion on the draft amendments to the constitutional provisions on the judiciary of Serbia, §11

“It must be noted, however, that judicial independence is not a prerogative or privilege granted in the judge’s own interest, but is a fundamental principle, an essential element of any democratic state, a pre-condition of the rule of law and the fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. […] Decisions which remove basic safeguards of judicial independence are unacceptable even when disguised and can breach Article 6.1 ECHR.”

CDL-AD(2017)002, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court of Moldova on the Criminal liability of judges, §16.

3.2 Appointment of judges

3.2.1 Qualifications, eligibility and quotas

“The principle that all decisions concerning appointment and the professional career of judges should be based on merit, applying objective criteria within the framework of the law is indisputable.”


“In a number of countries judges are appointed based on the results of a competitive examination, in others they are selected from the experienced practitioners. A priori, both categories of selection can raise questions. It could be argued whether the examination should be the sole ground for appointment or regard should be given to the candidate’s personal qualities and experience as well. As for the selection of judges from a pool of experienced practitioners, it could raise concerns as regards to the objectivity of the selection procedure.”


“The draft Law […] sets out general requirements that persons wishing to be appointed as judges or prosecutors need to satisfy, as well as requirements for the appointments to the different courts and prosecutor’s offices. General requirements include citizenship of BiH, a good medical record, professional competence, the bar exam and the absence of any criminal proceedings. These appear to be appropriate and in line with European standards.”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §73

“Article 127 proposes to require newly appointed judges to be 30 years old as against the current 25 and to have five years rather than three years’ experience. These provisions seem to be reasonable. […]”

CDL-AD(2013)014, Opinion on the Draft Law on the amendments to the Constitution, Strengthening the Independence of Judges and on the Changes to the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Assembly of Ukraine, §26

“It appears from criticisms of the draft Organic Law that it is too lenient with respect to the age requirement and experience, as it may be questioned whether a person will have acquired the necessary experience to be a Supreme Court judge at the age of 30 and after no more than five years of service as a judge, advocate or academic. These relatively low formal thresholds are all the more questionable as they also apply to the position of Chief Justice.”

CDL-AD(2019)009, Urgent Opinion on the selection and appointment of Supreme Court judges of Georgia, §23
“[…] While it is usually a fundamental principle that a country cannot have foreign nationals serving as judges, this is one of the areas where the specificities of a very small country such as Monaco need to be taken into consideration: it is, even today, not possible to recruit only Monegasque nationals to all judges’ positions, as there are not enough qualified candidates. […]”

CDL-AD(2013)018, Opinion on the balance of powers in the Constitution and the Legislation of the Principality of Monaco, §86

“Provisions on the appointment of judges establish a closed judicial career with strictly defined requirements of judicial experience, the positions of Supreme Court judges being the only exception. This is not a self-evident choice, and arguments can be presented for facilitating the entry from outside the judiciary into at least the Commercial Court and the Administrative Court, perhaps even the High Courts and the Appellate Court.”

CDL-AD(2014)038, Opinion on the draft laws on courts and on rights and duties of judges and on the Judicial Council of Montenegro, §53
See also CDL-AD(2002)026, Opinion on the Draft Law on Judicial Power and Corresponding Constitutional Amendments of Latvia, §49

“Strictly limiting access to the Supreme Court to candidates from lower courts could lead to the isolation of the judiciary and promote conservative and rigid opinions […].

As concerns the Supreme Court of the Republic of Moldova, it is essential to note that the removal of this condition [having at least 10 years’ experience as a judge] […], as such, should be commended, as long as it brings into the judicial profession other highly-qualified persons from different legal professional backgrounds and as long as it improves the quality and legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s decision-making. This is necessary to avoid that politically supported judges enter the highest judicial forum.”

CDL-AD(2018)003, Opinion on the Law on amending and supplementing the Constitution (Judiciary) of the Republic of Moldova, §§31, 33
See also CDL-AD(2018)032, Opinion on the Concept Paper on the reform of the High Judicial Council of Kazakhstan, §71

“[…] The composition of both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court should include judges with particular expertise in human rights, especially […] where a core body of case-law on such issues is being established.”


“The list of grounds for which discrimination [in respect of judicial appointments] is prohibited does not include sexual orientation, which should be added. On the other hand, the (absence) of the knowledge of language can be a valid reason to discriminate. A command of the state language is a legitimate requirement for appointment as a judge. The term ‘or other features’ may also be too wide: Sufficient legal qualifications, for example, are of course necessary for appointment.”

CDL-AD(2013)034, Opinion on proposals amending the draft law on the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §38

“The eligibility requirements to achieve judicial office in Article 45 of the Law on Courts were amended to require fluency in either English, French or German. A requirement of fluency is perhaps rather rigid and might reduce the pool of persons available for appointment; probably, a
more lenient standard (such as the requirement to have a basic knowledge of one of those languages) would be more appropriate.”

CDL-AD(2018)022, Opinion on the law amending the law on the Judicial Council and on the law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §80
See also CDL-AD(2018)033, Opinion on the draft law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §12; CDL-AD(2018)032, Opinion on the Concept Paper on the reform of the High Judicial Council of Kazakhstan, §34

“[...] Article 8 sets out the qualifications of trainees. Among the qualities required of a trainee judge or prosecutor is the following [...] ‘Not to have physical or mental health problems or disabilities which will prevent to perform the profession of judgeship [...] throughout the country, or not to have handicaps such as unusual difficulties for speaking or controlling movement of organs that may be regarded as odd by other people.’

This provision is far too broad and would not be regarded as generally acceptable according to European standards in its approach to how to deal with persons under a physical or mental disability. The test of something appearing odd to other people seems an inappropriate one.”

CDL-AD(2011)004, Opinion on the Draft Law on Judges and Prosecutors of Turkey, §31

“[...] In order to ensure the high quality and diversity of candidates, mandatory written exams should be introduced at the entry level; a national pool of vacancies should be established rather than having each vacancy published separately, as this would also improve the mobility of the judiciary across the country.”

CDL-AD(2012)014, Opinion on Legal Certainty and the Independence of the Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, §91

“Draft Article 35(6) obliges the candidates for judge’s office to make a property statement to the High Council of Justice and to authorise the latter to take the data in the statement into account when deciding on appointment. First, the statement of property by a candidate is not relevant at this stage, since only an increase of property during the mandate of the judge should trigger further investigation into possible corruption. It might also raise the issue of discrimination on the basis of the social, i.e. property status. [...]”

Furthermore, the possibility of the ‘structural unit’ of the High Council of Justice to collect information on the financial status of the candidates (draft Art. 351) is also problematic for the same reasons and might jeopardise the right of every citizen to hold any public office protected by the Article 29 of the Georgian Constitution.

Second, although the consent of the candidate is necessary for that the ‘structural unit’ of the High Council of Justice has access to his/her personal details, in practice, it seems not to be possible for a candidate to refuse this consent.”


“[...] A blanket obligation on judges to waive their right to privacy in general, which also constitutes an additional eligibility requirement to become and remain a judge, appears to constitute an undue restriction of judges’ right to privacy. [...]”
3.2.2 Incompatibility with other occupations and activities

“Moreover, judges should not put themselves into a position where their independence or impartiality may be questioned. This justifies national rules on the incompatibility of judicial office with other functions and is also a reason why many states restrict political activities of judges.”

“Judges at present may not engage in any other occupation or remunerative activities except for ‘pedagogical activities’. To that is now to be added ‘scientific activities’, which is positive […]. On a strict reading this provision might prevent the appointment of judges to public inquiries or commissions representing the state abroad, membership of charitable institutions or the like. Such an interpretation would seem unduly restrictive.”

“[…] [A] judge should first resign before being able to contest political office, because if a judge is a candidate and fails to be elected, he or she is nonetheless identified with a political tendency to the detriment of judicial independence.”

“Article 89.3 of the draft Law provides that judges […] may not be members of any organisation that discriminates on various grounds, including sex and sexual orientation. There are various churches and religions which do so discriminate and it is perhaps not intended to prevent judges […] being adherents of or practising such religions.

Article 90.3 of the draft Law would prohibit the judge […] from membership of any management or supervisory board of the public or private company or any other legal entity. This seems very broad and would prohibit membership of any charitable or non-profit organisation which had legal personality, possibly including even professional organisations.

Article 92 of the draft Law requires a judge […] to seek the opinion of the [High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council] on whether activities he or she intends to undertake are in conflict with his or her duties under the law. Presumably this should be confined to cases where the judge […] has reason to have at least a doubt about the issue.”

“[…] The drafters [of the constitutional law on disciplinary responsibility of the judges] may also consider imposing a duty on the judge to disclose any paid work.”
“Article 36 (amending Article 143 of the Constitution) provides that the mandate of a judge shall be incompatible with ‘other compensated professional activity, unless otherwise provided by law’. First of all, the wording of the article (the words ‘unless otherwise provided by law’) seems to provide extensive discretion to the legislator, while containing no indication regarding possible allowed exceptions. At the same time usual exceptions, such as academic, non-for-profit activity and other similar exceptions should be applied. […]”


“The situation with regard to remuneration seems to be more complicated. The draft Law should provide general restrictions on the type of remunerated work that is incompatible with a judge’s or prosecutor’s position. Any offer of remunerated work that may lead to or appear to lead to improper influence, must be declined. However, receiving remuneration should not systematically be linked to disciplinary misconduct. For instance, where a litigant is a student at or involved in work with a university or research institution at which the judge or prosecutor is engaged in academic work, it would be unreasonable to demand from the judge or prosecutor to abandon the academic work altogether. However, this may (and in some cases must) lead to self-recusal and/or a declaration of conflict of interest.”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §97

3.2.3 Appointing bodies and appointment procedure

3.2.3.1 Multitude of systems

“Choosing the appropriate system for judicial appointments is one of the primary challenges faced by the newly established democracies; where often concerns related to the independence and political impartiality of the judiciary persist. Political involvement in the appointment procedure is endangering the neutrality of the judiciary in these states, while in others, in particular those with democratically proved judicial systems, such methods of appointment are regarded as traditional and effective.

International standards in this respect are more in favour of the extensive depolitisation of the process. However no single non-political 'model' of appointment system exists, which could ideally comply with the principle of the separation of powers and secure full independence of the judiciary.

In some older democracies, systems exist in which the executive power has a strong influence on judicial appointments. Such systems may work well in practice and allow for an independent judiciary because the executive is restrained by legal culture and traditions, which have grown over a long time.

New democracies, however, did not yet have a chance to develop these traditions, which can prevent abuse. Therefore, at least in new democracies explicit constitutional provisions are needed as a safeguard to prevent political abuse by other state powers in the appointment of judges.

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2 See also the Section on Councils of Justice
In Europe, methods of appointment vary greatly according to different countries and their legal systems; furthermore they can differ within the same legal system according to the types of judges to be appointed.

Notwithstanding their particularities appointment rules can be grouped under two main categories.

In elective systems, judges are directly elected by the people (this is an extremely rare example and occurs at the Swiss cantonal level) or by the Parliament [...]. This system is sometimes seen as providing greater democratic legitimacy, but it may also lead to involving judges in the political campaign and to the politisation of the process.

**Appointments of ordinary judges** ([in contrast to constitutional judges]) are not an **appropriate subject for a vote by Parliament** because the danger that political considerations prevail over the objective merits of a candidate cannot be excluded.

In the direct appointment system the appointing body can be the Head of State [...].

In assessing this traditional method, a distinction needs to be made between parliamentary systems where the president (or monarch) has more formal powers and (semi-) presidential systems. In the former system the President is more likely to be withdrawn from party politics and therefore his or her influence constitutes less of a danger for judicial independence. **What matters most is the extent to which the head of state is free in deciding on the appointment.** It should be ensured that the main role in the process is given to an independent body – the judicial council. The proposals from this council may be rejected only exceptionally, and the President would not be allowed to appoint a candidate not included on the list submitted by it. **As long as the President is bound by a proposal made by an independent judicial council [...] the appointment by the President does not appear to be problematic.**

In some countries judges are appointed by the government [...]. There may be a mixture of appointment by the Head of State and appointment by the Government. [...] As pointed out above, this method may function in a system of settled judicial traditions but its introduction in new democracies would clearly raise concern.

Another option is direct appointment (not only a proposal) made by a judicial council [...]. To the extent that the independence or autonomy of the judicial council is ensured, **the direct appointment of judges by the judicial council is clearly a valid model.**


3.2.3.2 Appointment by political bodies (Parliament or President); popular elections

“[...] **The principle of an uninterrupted chain of democratic legitimacy (developed in German doctrine) [...] requires that every state body has to receive its powers – even if indirectly – from the sovereign people. A completely autonomous self-administration would lack such democratic legitimacy.**

[...] **The appointment of judges by the Parliament is** a method for constituting the judiciary which is highly democratic but [...] the balance might be tilted much too far towards the legislative power. This is not without its risks from the point of view of judicial independence, *inter alia* since judicial appointments may over time be more likely than otherwise to become a subject of party politics.
The parliament is undoubtedly much more engrossed in political games and the appointments of judges could result in political bargaining in the parliament [...]. The right of appointment ought to remain linked with the head of state. Of course, the president also represents a given political tendency but in most cases he/she will demonstrate greater political reserve and neutrality. [...] 

[The appointment of judges by the Parliament is] acceptable by European standards, there may be reason to reconsider the possibility of entrusting the President as the appointment authority or by arranging the process of judicial appointments so as to go by submission from the Council of Justice to the President of the Republic (who also is to represent all the people) and from the President [of the Parliament]."


"[...] In order to diminish the danger of politisation of the procedure, Draft art. 78.4 provides for a requirement of a qualified majority in parliament for the election of judges [...]. However, despite the fact that the recommendation is made by a judicial body, i.e. Qualification Commission, the parliament, as a political body, 'is undoubtedly much more engrossed in political games and the appointments of judges could result in political bargaining in the parliament [...]'

Consequently, the role of the Verkhovna Rada should be removed by way of a constitutional amendment [...]. In case such a constitutional amendment cannot be introduced, the involvement of the parliament should be mainly ceremonial one and the decisive say in the election of judges should be entrusted to an independent body composed of a majority of judges or of a substantial element of judges elected by their peers [...]. In this case, Draft Article 78(4) could provide that Parliament will appoint a candidate where the statutory requirements are met so as to avoid any possibility of political interference. [...]"


“To balance the disadvantages of a final vote in Parliament, procedures should ensure that the merits and qualifications of each candidate are made available to Parliament and to the general public to the highest extent possible in order to motivate Parliament to vote on the basis of professional merits rather than political preferences etc.”

CDL-AD(2019)009. Urgent Opinion on the selection and appointment of Supreme Court judges of Georgia, §57

“[...] The Commission considers that the appointment of supreme court judges directly by the High Council of Justice without the involvement of Parliament, or their appointment by the President (who has otherwise limited powers in the proposed parliamentary system) upon proposal by the High Council of Justice, would better guarantee the independence of those judges.”

CDL-AD(2017)023. Opinion on the draft revised Constitution as adopted by the Parliament of Georgia at the second reading on 23 June 2017, §45
See also CDL-AD(2015)037, First Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitution (Chapters 1 to 7 and 10) of the Republic of Armenia, §158

“A priori, the Venice Commission has no objection against appointment of judges by the Head of State when the latter is bound by a proposal of the judicial council and acts in a ‘ceremonial’ way,
only formalising the decision taken by the judicial council in substance. In such a setting, a situation where the President refuses to ratify a decision of the judicial council would be critical because it would de facto give the President a veto against decisions of the judicial council. In order to ensure that the President indeed only has a ceremonial role, the Constitution could provide that proposals by the judicial council would enter into force directly, without the intervention of the President if the President does not enact them within a given period of time.

Of course, direct appointment of judges by the judicial council avoids such complex safeguards.

“[…] There would seem to be no common opinion yet about the most appropriate procedure. For the legitimacy of the administration of justice a certain involvement of democratically elected bodies like the Diet may be desirable. However, the Prince Regnant is not democratically elected. His involvement in the nomination procedure, other than in a merely formal way, is problematic, especially if this involvement is of a decisive character.

The proposed first paragraph of Article 96 provides that no candidate can be recommended to the Diet for election without the consent of the Prince Regnant. His far-reaching involvement in the election procedure could amount to undue influence and could give rise to doubt about the objective independence and impartiality of the elected judge. […] This situation is not adequately remedied by the provision in the second paragraph of Article 96 that, if a proposed candidate is not approved by the Diet, the choice between the proposed candidate and any other candidate would be made by referendum, since a choice by the people would also not guarantee the impartiality of the elected candidate. […]”

“[…] The principle of independence of the judiciary requires that the selection of judges and magistrates be made upon merit and any undue political influence should be excluded. The Prime Minister should not have the power to influence the appointment of Justices and Judges-Magistrates. This would open the door to potential political influence, which is not compatible with modern notions of independence of the judiciary.”

“According to Article 117, justices of the peace and judges of the courts are appointed by the Government, not the Grand Duke. Members of the Superior Court of Justice and presidents and vice-presidents of the district courts are appointed by the Government on nominations from the Superior Court of Justice. In several other parliamentary monarchies, the power to appoint judges appertains to the Crown, which exercises it under ministerial responsibility. However, it is a matter of political choice. Most States have a higher judicial council which nominates judges, who are subsequently appointed by the Head of State. Furthermore, the ‘Commentaire’ proposes setting
up such a body […] Whichever body is formally responsible for appointment (Grand Duke or Government), the necessary guarantees on judicial independence must be provided.”


“As regards the joint power of the President and the Parliament to form the whole judicial corpus, and in particular the election of all judges of local courts (district, city, regional, military and arbitration) upon the approval of each nominee by the [Parliament], the Commission is of the view that this politicizes the process of nominating judges too strongly. […]”

CDL-AD(2002)033, Opinion on the draft amendments to the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, §10

“There is a proposal to introduce elected justices of the peace. It is not clear what is intended. There is no problem with introducing lay judges, but this should not be done through popular elections. Judges would have to campaign for their election or – even worse – political parties would do that for them. This would endanger the impartiality of the judges who might later feel obliged to be ‘grateful’ to the political party, which supported their election. Such a system should not be introduced in Ukraine, in a context where the independence of the judiciary is essential in combatting corruption.”

CDL-AD(2013)014, Opinion on the Draft Law on the amendments to the Constitution, Strengthening the Independence of Judges and on the Changes to the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Assembly of Ukraine, §47

“Another ground for dissolution of Parliament under new Article 98-1 is the second refusal of Parliament to approve a person nominated by the President for the position of a judge of the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court.

This provision represents a serious threat to the independence of the judiciary. […] This new provision renders Parliament’s power to block presidential nominations to the top judicial posts ineffective, since the risk of dissolution will deter Parliament from voting against the candidates proposed by the President. In essence, it would increase even more the dependence of the judiciary on the President.”

CDL-AD(2016)029, Opinion on the draft modifications to the Constitution of Azerbaijan submitted to the Referendum of 26 September 2016, §§65 and 66

3.2.3.3 Involvement of an expert body (Judicial Council) in the appointment

“The mere existence of a high judicial council cannot automatically exclude political considerations in the appointment process. […] The Venice Commission is of the opinion that a judicial council should have a decisive influence on the appointment […] of judges […].”


“[…] It would be desirable that an expert body like an independent judicial council could give an opinion on the suitability or qualification of candidates for the office of judge.”
“[…] The main role in judicial appointments should […] be given to an objective body such as the High Judicial Council provided […] in the Constitution. It should be understood that proposals from this body may be rejected only exceptionally. From an elected parliament such self-restraint cannot be expected and it seems therefore preferable to consider such appointments as a presidential prerogative. Candidatures should be prepared by the High Judicial Council, and the President would not be allowed to appoint a candidate not included on the list submitted by the High Judicial Council. For court presidents (with the possible exception of the President of the Supreme Court) the procedure should be the same.”

3.2.3.4 Appointment procedure

“In Europe, there is a great variety in the method by which judges are appointed in domestic legal orders. No single ‘model’ exists which could ideally comply with the principle of the separation of powers and secure full independence of the judiciary. But, it is fair to say that international standards are more in favour of the extensive depolitisation of the process. Political considerations should not prevail over the objective merits of a candidate. Article 6 ECHR protects not only the independence of the individual judges but requires a system of judicial appointments that excludes arbitrary appointments.”

“It is important that the appointment and promotion of judges is not based upon political or personal considerations, and the system should be constantly monitored to ensure that this is so.”

Doubts arise notably as concerns Section 18.3 ALSRJ, which states that the ‘President of NJO may decide to deviate from the shortlist and propose the second or third candidate on the list to fill the post’. No conditions nor criteria are referred to under which the President of the NJO may deviate from the order of the shortlist. […] [T]he decision cannot be appealed to a court. This means that there is no way to check this kind of use of the discretionary power. While there are other legal systems in Europe that do not provide for judicial review of decisions on judicial appointments, in the specific context of a system, where a largely non-accountable person exercises wide discretionary powers, such review appears necessary. In order to enable the courts to review these decisions, the law would have to indicate the criteria to be used by the President of the NJO.”
“There is nothing in the Constitution to require such a two-candidate rule. It would be preferable if the High Judicial Council were to put forward only one candidate for each vacant position […]. The two-candidate rule has as a consequence that the final appointment remains in the hands of the parliamentary majority.”

“The new Kyrgyz Constitution does not provide for a single body in charge of appointment and career of judges but has charged separate bodies with this task. Article 64.3 of the Constitution provides that the judges shall be appointed on the proposal of the Council for the Selection of Judges (hereinafter, ‘Council’) and same article provides judge shall be dismissed on the basis of a proposal by the Council of Judges, which is distinct from the Council for the Selection of Judges. Regrettably, this constitutional provision makes it impossible to establish a single body competent to take decisions on appointment and career of judges. A future constitutional revision could provide for a single body, possibly with sub-commissions for specialized functions (e.g. discipline).

When a Constitution provides for more than one body competent for all aspects of the career of the judges, provisions on each of these bodies should be examined in the light of the standards developed for single judicial councils.

The Constitution also designates the President and the Parliament as authorities competent to appoint (elect) judges. As a point of departure, this is not problematic. […] However, special precautions are needed to guarantee that in such appointment procedures the merits of the candidate are decisive, not political or similar considerations. The law should clearly determine the procedure for the selection of judges. Excellence and proficiency of judges are the best guarantees for their independence and for a better service to the citizens. A system of competitive entry examination is appropriate for the selection of judges in countries where judges enter the judiciary right after their law studies (as opposed to the common law system of appointing experienced barristers as judges).”

“Article 90.2 provides that the decision on election to a permanent post shall be taken by a majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada. This is a kind of qualified majority as proposed by the Venice Commission. Despite this improvement there are still strong doubts about the role of Parliament in the election of judges. […] The election process is susceptible of being highly politicised. Democratic as it may seem at first sight, a process involving intensive questioning by Parliamentarians may create the image of judges being dependent on the views of the legislature in a manner not compatible with the separation of powers needed in a democracy. […] That a judge later may have to work under the threat of being subjected to similarly politicised dismissal procedure […] is likely to create a picture
of a judiciary which somehow is at the mercy of political forces, quite in breach of the principle of judicial independence. […]"


“[…] A member of the HCoJ [High Council of Justice], who is a candidate, should be excluded from all procedures pertaining to the selection and nomination of candidates for judges of the Supreme Court. In addition, other situations are relevant and should be included, notably where a spouse or close relative etc. is a candidate.

It is also important that the final decision of the HCoJ on which candidates to nominate for Parliament’s consideration [for selection of judges of the Supreme Court], be based exclusively on how each candidate has scored on the different evaluation criteria applied, not on the result of a secret ballot among the HCoJ members. […]”

CDL-AD(2019)009, Urgent Opinion on the selection and appointment of Supreme Court judges of Georgia, §§51-52

“There is a written qualifying exam for the appointment as a judge […]. The introduction of such an exam […] is to be welcomed. […]

[…] The Article also provides for an appeal to the HJPC. It is not clear how this can work, since the HJPC is both the body making the decision and hearing the appeal. There does not appear to be any provision for an appeal to a court of law, which should be added.”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §§77-78

“The appointment process starts with a public announcement of vacancies that must be well-publicised. The announcement is followed by nominations of candidates by special departments set up by the judicial or prosecutorial sub-councils of the [High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council] for nominations for vacancies in the different courts and prosecutors’ offices consisting of four or five judges or prosecutors. This suggests that candidates cannot apply for a certain position directly, but only through the sub-councils. Such a practice could be seen as problematic, as it could undermine the transparency and openness of the process.”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §76

“Article 4 of the Draft Law introduces an obligation for each member of the JC [Judicial Council] to state ‘publicly’ the reasons for his/her voting in the process of election of candidates to the judicial position. […] [A] negative opinion about a particular judge expressed by a member of the JC publicly in the context of the promotion proceedings may be seen as demonstrating a personal bias of the latter against the former. This may lead to disqualification of the member from subsequent disciplinary proceedings concerning the same judge. […]”

See also CDL-AD(2019)008, Opinion on the Draft Law on the Judicial Council of North Macedonia, §18
“According to Article 13.4.2.3 of the draft Law, the Judicial Legal Council Secretariat must publish on its webpage, *inter alia*, information on results of written and oral examinations for the selection of nominees to the position of judges, appraisals of nominees after long-term trainings and of final interviews. It has to be noted that information on the depth of the legal knowledge of judges or candidates for judges should be of limited access to avoid unwanted impacts on the independence of judges after they enter into office. For this reason, the Venice Commission considers that the draft Law should be interpreted in such a way as to only make information on the results of examinations and interviews available to indicate a pass or a fail, without providing further details.”


“Article 67(1)11 of the Law prohibits any request to an applicant for the position of judge to provide documents going beyond those specified in the Law. In order to avoid the protection provided to the candidate being circumvented, it might be desirable to prohibit in addition the submission, receipt or consideration of any documents which are not relevant to assess the judge’s professional skills, as political testimonies.”


“[...] Under the current legislation the system of judicial appointments and promotions is very complex and involves many actors and procedures. This complexity may create an impression that the system is safe, and that it is virtually impossible for incompetent people to become judges. However, this complexity may also become a breeding ground for cronyism and corruption. If the bar is set too high, if the legal procedures are too intricate and if the final decision depends on too many actors, there will always be a temptation to take the path of informal arrangements.”


“[...] It is positive that the Concept Paper proposes to introduce more “objective and differentiated” criteria for the selection of judges. Rating of candidates on the basis of their graduation exam in the Academy of Justice or the qualification exam may contribute to this goal. It is important, however, to specify the respective weight of different elements (“objective” and “subjective”) in the final decision.”


“As to the use of the “lie detector”, even if the results of this test are not binding, it is a major source of concern for the Venice Commission, since the reliability of this method is open to discussion, and it is unclear how the answers received from the candidate in the course of this test may be used. There is a risk that this test will involve irrelevant questions (for example, questions about political preferences of the candidate). Moreover, a lie detector may at most establish whether a statement was accurate but is not useful to evaluate skills of a candidate. The Venice Commission calls on the authorities of Kazakhstan to be extremely cautious with this method; if there is no other way, the results of the “lie detector” test may only be used to trigger additional security checks in respect of the candidate, and should not become a part of the
candidate’s file accessible to the HJC. But a better solution would be to avoid the “lie detector” test altogether.”


“Finally, p. 4 (2) of the Concept Paper proposes to introduce competitive selection of presidents of the judicial chambers of the courts of appeal. [...] The idea [...] that presidents of the chambers of the regional courts are also to be appointed through the competition by the HJC is welcome.”


“In general, and in order to avoid situations in the future that could lead to a shortage of judges in the Supreme Court, consideration should be given to publishing the vacancy announcement(s) before the end of the term of office of any outgoing judges, so as to render the vacancy period as short as possible.”

CDL-AD(2019)009, Urgent Opinion on the selection and appointment of Supreme Court judges of Georgia, §18

“It might be appropriate to impose on candidates [for judges of the Supreme Court] the obligation to report not only their own assets, but also the assets of their spouses and children.”

CDL-AD(2019)009, Urgent Opinion on the selection and appointment of Supreme Court judges of Georgia, §60

3.3. Term of office and career

3.3.1 Duration

“Limited or renewable terms in office may make judges dependent on the authority which appointed them or has the power to re-appoint them.”

CDL-AD(2016)007, Rule of Law Checklist, §76
See also CDL-AD(2005)005, Opinion on Draft Constitutional Amendments relating to the Reform of the Judiciary in Georgia, §8; CDL-AD(2005)003, Joint opinion on a proposal for a constitutional law on the changes and amendments to the Constitution of Georgia by Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, §105; CDL-AD(2002)32, Opinion on the Amendments to the Constitution of Liechtenstein proposed by the Princely House of Liechtenstein, §31

“[…] The Venice Commission strongly recommends that ordinary judges be appointed permanently until retirement. Probationary periods for judges in office are problematic from the point of view of independence.”


“[…] Any possible renewal of a term of office could adversely affect the independence and impartiality of judges.”

“[...] At any rate, given that [judges of local courts] are appointed for seven years only […], the Commission is of the view that the appropriate constitutional law should set out objective criteria for their reappointment, in order safeguard their independence.”

CDL-AD(2002)033, Opinion on the draft amendments to the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, §10

“[...] The appointment of retired judges where there are no other applicants seems to be inconsistent with judicial independence since such persons are not irremovable and may therefore be subjected to improper pressure. […]"


“[...] It would be appropriate to specify the term of the chairs [of the different courts in the Constitution] […].”

CDL-AD(2005)003, Joint opinion on a proposal for a constitutional law on the changes and amendments to the Constitution of Georgia by Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, §105

“The Supreme Court of Georgia, which is the final instance court in the country, will effectively have an entirely new composition with the appointment of 18 to 20 new judges, who will be appointed for life (until retirement). Since the new Constitution leaves the final decision of the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court to Parliament, this implies that the present parliamentary majority will be entrusted with the appointment of a practically new Supreme Court, the composition of which will possibly remain the same for the next 20 to 30 years.

This is an important and very unusual, if not extraordinary, situation. In most countries, the appointment of judges – especially to a supreme court – is staggered over years, if not decades. This renders the nomination and appointment procedure for these judges in Georgia all the more important and should be considered with great care.

[...] [T]he fact that the HCoJ [the High Council of Justice] – in its current situation – will be selecting nearly all the candidates for judges of the Supreme Court, producing a list which will then be submitted to a political majority in Parliament (in between elections), which in turn will appoint nearly all the Supreme Court judges, should be a matter of concern. […]"

CDL-AD(2019)009, Urgent Opinion on the selection and appointment of Supreme Court judges of Georgia, §§12-14

3.3.2 Probationary period

“[...] The Venice Commission considers that setting probationary periods can undermine the independence of judges, since they might feel under pressure to decide cases in a particular way […].

This should not be interpreted as excluding all possibilities for establishing temporary judges. In countries with relatively new judicial systems there might be a practical need to first ascertain whether a judge is really able to carry out his or her functions effectively before permanent appointment. If probationary appointments are considered indispensable, a ‘refusal to confirm the judge in office should be made according to objective criteria and with the same procedural safeguards as apply where a judge is to be removed from office’. 
The main idea is to exclude the factors that could challenge the impartiality of judges: ‘despite the laudable aim of ensuring high standards through a system of evaluation, it is notoriously difficult to reconcile the independence of the judge with a system of performance appraisal. If one must choose between the two, judicial independence is the crucial value’.

In order to reconcile the need of probation / evaluation with the independence of judges, it should be pointed out that some countries like Austria have established a system whereby candidate judges are being evaluated during a probationary period during which they can assist in the preparation of judgements but they cannot yet take judicial decisions which are reserved to permanent judges.

"Abolishing probationary periods for judges is a guarantee against attempts to influence their behaviour and is a definite improvement in terms of the judicial independence. [...]"

"[...] the system [established by the statute of the High Council of Justice] of having professional tests following appointment is obviously open to abuses in connection with the confirmation of a magistrate in his or her post."

"[...] The discretion of the Supreme Judicial Council in confirming or denying the permanent status to magistrates should be limited by specifying criteria [...]. In any case, this procedure should be restricted to courts of first instance."

"[...] Some states have a practice that gives the opportunity to persons who are qualified as judges or prosecutors to gain experience of the legislative process by serving for a period of time at the Ministry of Justice. However, it is vital that there is a clear demarcation in their rights and duties when they serve in these quite different functions, on the one hand as civil servants within a hierarchy and on the other as independent prosecutors or judges."
“[...] Submitting a candidate’s performance as a judge to scrutiny by the general public, i.e. including by those who have been the object of unfavourable rulings, constitutes a threat to the candidate’s independence as a judge and a real risk of politicisation. [...]”

“ [...] Article 79.2 of the Law provides that the issue concerning the election of a candidate to a lifetime judicial position will be considered at once at a plenary meeting, without preliminary discussions and investigations by a committee of the Verkhovna Rada. This provision is clearly aimed at reducing the role of the Verkhovna Rada in the election process. As such it enhances the independence of the judges, and is therefore welcomed.”

CDL-AD(2010)026, Joint opinion on the law on the judicial system and the status of judges of Ukraine by the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Co-operation within the Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, §§60 and 63

“If the probationary period is to be maintained, the refusal of appointment to the position of tenure should remain an exception. [...]”

CDL-AD(2017)018, Opinion on the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria. §79

“ [...] [[I]n order to meet the proportionality test, the introduction of probationary periods should go hand in hand with safeguards regarding the decision on a permanent appointment. [...]]

Sections 3.3.c and 25.4 ALSRJ even provide for the possibility of repetitive probationary periods. The Law should provide expressis verbis for a maximum limit of cumulative probationary periods with the aim of balancing the need for judicial independence, on the one hand, with the interest of the state, on the other.

The delegation of the Venice Commission was informed that, usually a person who intends to become a judge would first become court secretary and, in some cases, stay in this position for up to six years before he or she would be appointed as a regular judge. Under the new Fundamental Law, Court Secretaries may exercise judicial functions in misdemeanour cases (see also below). This means that a person who is already acting in a judicial function could remain in a precarious situation for up to nine years (six years as court secretary and three years in probationary period). The problem is not so much that the evaluation during the time as court secretary and the probationary period would objectively exert pressure on the person concerned. However, the court secretary or probationary judge will be in a precarious situation for many years and - wishing to please superior judges who evaluate his or her performance - may behave in a different manner from a judge who has permanent tenure (‘pre-emptive obedience’). Probationary periods are problematic already as such. The additional time as court secretary further aggravates this problem.”


“ [...] In order to identify suitable candidates, candidate judges could rather assist sitting judges as trainees. They would prepare judgments which would be adopted under the authority of a judge with permanent tenure.”

3.3.3 Evaluation and promotions

“[…] [A] competition should be the rule for all promotions of judges in order to prevent any abuse. Also, there is the risk that the promotion procedure without competition negatively affects the development of regular promotion procedure and of its criteria which should be determined and developed by the High Council, as required by Article 41(1) of the Organic Law.”

CDL-AD(2014)031, Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Human Rights (DHR) of the Directorate of Human Rights and the Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe, on the draft Law on Amendments to the Organic Law on General Courts of Georgia, §64
See also CDL-AD(2013)014, Opinion on the Draft Law on the amendments to the Constitution, Strengthening the Independence of Judges and on the Changes to the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Assembly of Ukraine, §54

“The evaluation of court and justice systems is generally seen as a good means of implementing managerial or political decisions aimed at improving these systems; whereas, the evaluation of the performance of individual judges is often seen as infringing judges’ independence. Although this danger may well exist, it should not prevent an evaluation from taking place. […]”

CDL-AD(2014)007, Joint opinion on the draft law amending and supplementing the judicial code (evaluation system for judges) of Armenia, §11
See also CDL-AD(2017)018, Opinion on the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria, §§67-68

“A system on evaluation of judges is generally to be welcomed. […] However it should be stressed that such a system properly implemented will consume a lot of time, personal and economic resources to guarantee results that could be relied upon in the long run. […] [I]t is recommended to include the Supreme Court judges in an evaluation system.”

CDL-AD(2014)038, Opinion on the draft laws on courts and on rights and duties of judges and on the Judicial Council of Montenegro, §§59-60

“[…] [I]t should be noted that ‘individual evaluation’ is far from being considered as indispensable by European judicial systems in general.

Countries that have decided not to proceed with an individual evaluation of judges (such as Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and, to some extent, Spain), have instead developed general performance evaluations of the judicial procedure.”


“[…] [L]aws regulating the assessment or evaluation of the professional duties of judges must be worded and applied with great care and the role of the executive or legislative branches of government in this process should be limited to the extent absolutely necessary.”

CDL-AD(2014)039, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court of Moldova on certain provisions of the law on professional integrity testing, §14
See also CDL-AD(2015)031, Interim Opinion on the Draft Law on Integrity Checking of Ukraine, § 43

“If there is to be a system of evaluation, it is essential that control of the evaluation is in the hands of the Judiciary and not the executive. […] Secondly, the criteria for evaluation must be clearly defined. […]”
CDL-PI(2018)008

CDL(2005)066, Opinion on Draft Constitutional Amendments concerning the Reform of the Judicial System in "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", §30

“[…] This provision looks problematic as it defines the President of the Court as a central figure in the process of the evaluation of judges. This may not only lead to a conflict of interest, but also result in malpractice, limiting the independence of individual judges.”

CDL-AD(2013)015, Opinion on the draft law on the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §66

See also CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the Draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §§84

“[…] [E]valuation and disciplinary liability are (or should be) two very different things. Disciplinary liability requires a disciplinary offence. A negative performance, which leads to a negative overall result of an evaluation, can also originate from other factors than a disciplinary offence. Therefore, the proposal that repeatedly low or negative overall evaluation results shall lead to the Ethics and Disciplinary Commission instigating disciplinary proceedings raises problems, because the reasons for a negative result could be other than a disciplinary offence. […]

 […] [I]t should be underlined that not every shortcoming in a judge’s performance is a disciplinary offence.”

CDL-AD(2014)007, Joint opinion on the draft law amending and supplementing the judicial code (evaluation system for judges) of Armenia, §§28, 102 and 108

See also CDL-AD(2011)012, Joint Opinion on the constitutional law on the judicial system and status of judges of Kazakhstan by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, §55

“[…] While some disciplinary breaches may result from the lack of professionalism, in the opinion of the Venice Commission, professional evaluations should be kept separate from the disciplinary proceedings: they have different purpose and are based on different principles. Where there is a risk of a sanction, the situation should be analysed in terms of the disciplinary liability: in particular, the body imposing the sanction should demonstrate the fault of the judge. […] In addition, if there is a risk of a sanction, the proceedings should be accompanied by the appropriate procedural safeguards. In particular, there should be a possibility for the judge to contest the sanction before a judicial body.”


“Regular evaluations of the performances of a judge are important instruments for the judge to improve his/her work and can also serve as a basis for promotion. It is important that the evaluation is primarily qualitative and focuses on the professional skills, personal competence and social competence of the judge. There should not be any evaluation on the basis of the content of the decisions and verdicts, and in particular, quantitative criteria such as the number of reversals and acquittals should be avoided as standard basis for evaluation.”

“If there were to be a measurement of workloads, systems would need to be in place to evaluate the weight and the difficulty of different files. [...] Simply counting the number of cases dealt with is crude and may be completely misleading. At most, such a measurement may serve as a useful tool to indicate a possible problem, but can do no more than this and certainly should not be determinative of a problem.

Measurement of the ‘observance of procedural periods’ [...] again may point to a possible problem, but it is important that the judge be given an opportunity to explain any apparent failings in this regard.

Measuring the ‘stability of judicial acts’ [...] is questionable. It effectively means counting the number of successful appeals. Such a measure should be avoided because it involves an interference with the independence of the judge. [...] Where a case is overturned on appeal, who is to say that the court of first instance got it wrong and the appeal court got it right? The decision of the judge of the first instance court quashed by the Court of Appeal could well later be supported by the decision of the Court of Cassation, the Constitutional Court or the European Court of Human Rights. [...] The threshold of reversals would need to be quite high and the rule for exceptions to be established by the Council of Judges would have to be very generous. Such a system of on-going assessments is likely to produce a timid judiciary [...] 

[...] [T]he caseload of judges in Armenia increases annually and could potentially reach unsustainable levels. Insofar as a judge is able to dispose of a certain number of cases annually, should the caseload continue to increase, it would be unfair to evaluate the judge on the basis of a percentage of disposed cases without properly analysing the reasons for the increase in the caseload. [...] 

The proposal [...] to measure the average duration of examination of cases is inappropriate for similar reasons to those already referred to above [...] . Who is to say that a judge who takes longer over a case is not doing a more thorough job than the speedier colleague? [...] The judge seeking to meet these time frames might be tempted to disregard what would normally be seen as necessary under the law and his or her interpretation of it.

[...] [T]he ‘quality of justification’ (reasoning) is often a problem in new democracies and coherent reasoning should be promoted. Logical argumentation, clarity, and other aspects are of interest and are dealt with in Opinion No. 11 of the CCJE on Quality of Judicial Decisions.

Criterion (2) Professional abilities [...] raises the problem how one measures the ‘(a) ability to withstand pressure and threats’ [...] . If the pressure or the threat is made in open court, one can make a judgment, but pressures or threats made behind-the-scenes are unlikely to be known to the evaluator.

[...] [T]he proposed rating scheme to be assigned to judges is not recommended because it creates more problems than it solves. Although it looks precise, it is not. It is subjective – if the proposed questionnaire or experience judges are used – which is bound to influence the distribution of points. An evaluation does not need exact points. What is important is to know whether or not a judge fulfills all the criteria, where his or her strong points and weaknesses lie and how to improve his or her capacities. This can be done without assigning points. [...]
[...] [The Venice Commission recommends] a greater attribution to the qualitative criteria than to the quantitative ones, because the former include the most important aptitudes that a judge should have, such as knowledge and personal skills. Unless there is malice or repeated gross negligence, qualitative criteria should not relate to the interpretation of the law.”

CDL-AD(2014)007, Joint opinion on the draft law amending and supplementing the judicial code (evaluation system for judges) of Armenia, §§37-40, 42-43, 49-50 and 77-78

“Another source of concern is the part of the Law related to the evaluation of the performance by the courts’ presidents (see Articles 118 et seq.). It appears that the court’s presidents are scored mostly on the basis of the performance of the ordinary judges. This may push presidents to become ‘productivity watchdogs’ within their courts and may ultimately undermine judicial independence.”


“The draft Law contains no details with regard to the procedure and frequency of the evaluation as well as the consequences of such an evaluation. Although the draft Law provides that the HJPC is authorised to adopt evaluation criteria, it is crucial for the criteria, procedure and consequences to be clearly formulated, easily accessible and foreseeable. It is important that the evaluation system be neither used nor seen to be used as a mechanism to subordinate or influence judges.”

CDL-AD(2013)015, Opinion on the draft law on the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §68

“[...] The two years’ period for regular evaluation appears to be too short/frequent: it means practically permanent assessment, which may affect negatively the independence and efficiency of judges. The Venice Commission would recommend a longer period for ordinary judges and an even longer one for senior judges.”

CDL-AD(2018)022, Opinion on the law amending the law on the Judicial Council and on the law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §47
See also CDL-AD(2019)008, Opinion on the Draft Law on the Judicial Council of North Macedonia, §46

“The draft Law also lacks a mechanism for the disqualification of an evaluator at a later stage who fails to recuse him or herself or to report a conflict of interest. Evaluators should also be under the obligation to report any form of communication that attempts to influence the evaluation process by improper means (including, but not limited to, undue pressure, duress, or coercion).

[...] [T]he evaluation of judges with the involvement of prosecutors and advocates is a very sensitive issue. Of course, both prosecutors and advocates are well placed to know a judge’s strengths and weaknesses. However, they are not disinterested observers. There is a risk that a
judge may tailor his or her relations with particular prosecutors or advocates to secure a more favourable assessment or may be perceived as doing so. Furthermore, there is a particular risk in involving prosecutors in assessments of judges in legal cultures where historically the prosecutors dominated the judiciary. However, these considerations would not have the same force if retired advocates or prosecutors were to be used as assessors.

 [...] [T]he use of serving judges to evaluate their colleagues has the potential of causing some difficulties. It could lead to bad personal relationships between colleagues and has the potential to further undermine the morale of the judiciary. Alternatively, where judges receive favourable evaluations this could give rise to allegations of cronyism. There is a danger that such a system could lack credibility.

In general, establishing a mixed team of evaluators, inviting legal professionals from outside the current judicial system may be the least bad option. It is essential to establish an evaluation team with a balanced composition. This will avoid cronyism and the perception of self-protection. In addition, the evaluation must be conducted in a transparent manner and impartially.

Article 96.2.17 provides for the identity of assessors to be kept confidential. Since this rule is not to be applied in cases where the results of an evaluation are appealed against, it is difficult to see what the point of it is. In any event, any system of evaluation should be transparent. The identity of the evaluator may be highly relevant since the person concerned may be biased against the judge. [...]"

CDL-AD(2014)007, Joint opinion on the draft law amending and supplementing the judicial code (evaluation system for judges) of Armenia, §§62, 67, 69-70 and 75

“20 points may be gained by a judge from another type of assessment, described in the third paragraph of Article 104: it is an assessment of the quality of the legal reasoning in 10 sample judgements (5 selected randomly and 5 selected by the judge him/herself). This assessment is made by a three-member commission composed of judges of the higher court drawn by lot. This is an interesting model; however, such assessment should only extend to such aspects as the style and clarity of drafting, and not call into doubt the validity of the decisions taken by the judge.”

CDL-AD(2018)022, Opinion on the law amending the law on the Judicial Council and on the law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §49

3.4 Accountability

3.4.1 Immunities

“It is indisputable that judges have to be protected against undue external influence. To this end they should enjoy functional – but only functional – immunity (immunity from prosecution for acts performed in the exercise of their functions, with the exception of intentional crimes, e.g. taking bribes).”

“[...] Magistrates [...] should not benefit from a general immunity [...]. According to general standards they indeed needed protection from civil suits for actions done in good faith in the course of their functions. They should not, however, benefit from a general immunity which protected them against prosecution for criminal acts committed by them for which they should be answerable before the courts. [...]”

CDL-AD(2003)012, Memorandum: Reform of the Judicial System in Bulgaria, §15

“It is reasonable to grant immunity from civil suit to a judge acting in good faith in the performance of his or her duty. But, it should not be extended to a corrupt or fraudulent act carried out by a judge.”


“[...]

- while judges may be subject to criminal liability for the interpretation of a law, the ascertainment of facts or the assessment of evidence, such liability should only be possible in cases of malice and, arguably, gross negligence;
- judges should not be held liable for judicial mistakes that do not involve bad faith and for differences in the interpretation of the law. The principal remedy for such mistakes is the appellate procedure;
- criminal and disciplinary liability are not mutually exclusive: disciplinary sanctions may still be appropriate in case of a criminal acquittal; also, the fact that criminal proceedings have not been initiated due to the failure to establish criminal guilt or the facts in a criminal case, does not mean that there was no disciplinary breach by the judge concerned, precisely because of the different nature of these liabilities;
- if a judge’s misconduct is capable of undermining public confidence in the judiciary, it is in the public interest to institute disciplinary proceedings against that judge. Criminal proceedings, however, do not consider the particular disciplinary aspect of the misconduct, but criminal guilt;
- In conclusion: only failures performed intentionally, with deliberate abuse or, arguably, with repeated, serious or gross negligence should give rise to disciplinary actions and penalties, criminal responsibility or civil liability.”

CDL-AD(2017)002, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova on the Criminal liability of judges, §53

“As regards the immunity of judges, it is necessary to separate the substantive issue relating to the material scope of the functional immunity, which should provide the legal grounds to pronounce the inadmissibility of a complaint against a judge, from the procedural safeguards which exist to protect such functional immunity [...]”
“[…] [A] limited functional immunity from arrest and detention which would interfere with the workings of the court is one thing but a total immunity from prosecution is difficult to justify. […]”

“[…] It is worth highlighting that even if the material scope of the functional immunity is reduced (e.g., by expressly excluding certain criminal offenses such as bribery, corruption or traffic of influence), the procedural safeguards […] will still protect the judges e.g., from blackmail relating to an alleged crime committed in office, by ensuring that only duly substantiated claims or complaints will get the consent of the Council of Judges to proceed further.”

“[…] A ‘procedural immunity’, in other words a special legal protection/procedural safeguard for judges accused of breaking the law, typically directed against arrest, detention and prosecution, would help ensure that judges can properly exercise their functions without their independence being compromised through fear of prosecution or other judicial actions by an aggrieved party, including state authorities.

In a number of countries, such ‘inviolability’ or ‘procedural immunity’ exists to protect judges from potentially frivolous or false accusations, vexatious or manifestly ill-founded complaints that could exert pressure on them. Should the drafters opt for this type of wider immunity, the scope of such immunity should be strictly circumscribed. In any case, the procedure for lifting the immunity should include procedural safeguards to protect judicial independence and the requisite decision should be taken by an independent judicial body or other independent entity, while ensuring that conditions and mechanisms for lifting such immunity do not put judges beyond the reach of the law. One way to achieve this would be to ensure that the disciplinary commission is composed of a wide variety of stakeholders that would ensure its independence and neutrality [...]”

“[...] In the Commission’s view, there is no justification in principle for treating judges differently in matters of discipline and removal according to whether they are members of superior or inferior courts. All judges should enjoy equal guarantees of independence and equal immunities in the exercise of their judicial functions. […]”

“The issue of the personal liability of judges was raised by the Committee of Ministers in its Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 on judges [...]”

While imposing civil liability on a judge is a possibility, the grounds for the compensation of damage should be considered with great caution, as this may have a negative impact on the work of the judiciary as a whole. It could limit the discretion of an individual judge to interpret and apply the law. […]
It is not uncommon for violations of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and/or the national Constitution to occur as a result of the application and/or interpretation of the law. It is also not unusual for the European Court of Human Rights to reach different conclusions in defining the scope and content of a right (including procedural rights) or of a legal provision. Should the judge be liable if s/he ‘wilfully’ did not follow the standards established by any of these international organisations? The argument could be made that where the international case-law is well-established, the judge should be expected to follow it. However, the fact that a judge has wilfully chosen not to follow the established standards should not in itself become a ground for personal liability. It is of great importance that issues pertaining to the personal liability of judges be determined by national courts, but this should only be allowed on the basis of criteria and procedures that are clearly defined by the law.

“[...] Holding judges liable for the application of the ECHR without any assessment of individual guilt may have an impact on their independence, which includes giving them the professional freedom to interpret the law, assess facts and weigh evidence in each individual case. Erroneous decisions should be challenged through the appeals process and not by holding judges individually liable, unless the error is due to malice or gross negligence by the judge.”

“There is a suggestion that the decision on detention or arrest in the case of judges of the Constitutional Court should be by Parliament. This would certainly not be desirable, as it would represent a continued politicisation of judicial immunity and endanger judicial independence. [...] For ordinary judges, immunity should be lifted by the HCJ. [...]”

“ [...] The consent of the VerkhovnaRada for lifting judges’ immunity is not an appropriate solution, since this involves a political body in a decision concerning the status of judges and their immunities. Consequently, the competence to lift judges’ immunity should not belong to a political body like the VerkhovnaRada, but to a truly independent judicial authority. [...]”

Furthermore, the criteria for the lifting of such immunity should be specified and the decision should be reasoned.”
the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §57; CDL-AD(2011)033. Joint opinion on the draft law amending the law on the judiciary and the status of judges and other legislative acts of Ukraine by the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Justice and Human Dignity within the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law of the Council of Europe, §79

“[...] Where it exists, judicial inviolability should be lifted only by organs of the judicial system. Therefore the lifting of immunity by the Supreme Judicial Council or the Constitutional Court respectively is welcome.”

CDL-AD(2015)037, First Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitution (Chapters 1 to 7 and 10) of the Republic of Armenia, §154

3.4.2 Disciplinary control

3.4.2.1 Grounds for disciplinary proceedings (material aspect)

“[...] Disciplinary proceedings against judges based on the rule of law should correspond to certain basic principles, which include the following: the liability should follow a violation of a duty expressly defined by law; there should be fair trial with full hearing of the parties and representation of the judge; the law should define the scale of sanctions; the imposition of the sanction should be subject to the principle of proportionality; there should be a right to appeal to a higher judicial authority.”

CDL-AD(2016)009, Final Opinion on the revised draft constitutional amendments on the Judiciary (15 January 2016) of Albania, §34

“It must be pointed out that internationally, there is no uniform approach to the organization of the system of judicial discipline and that practice varies greatly in different countries with regard to the choices between defining in rather general terms the grounds for the disciplinary liability of judges and providing an all-inclusive list of disciplinary violations. [...]”

CDL-AD(2014)018, Joint opinion of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR on the draft amendments to the legal framework on the disciplinary responsibility of judges in the Kyrgyz Republic, § 23

“[...] Only failures performed intentionally or with gross negligence should give rise to disciplinary actions. [...]”


“[...] The rules on disciplinary liability have direct effect on the independence of the judges. Vague provisions (such as the ‘breach of oath’ or ‘unethical behavior’) increase the risk of their overbroad
interpretation and abuse, which may be dangerous for the independence of the judges. This is why the Venice Commission has always been in favor of a more specific definition of disciplinary offences in the legislation itself. [...] 

[...] [T]he types of unethical behavior which may lead to a disciplinary liability should be described in sufficient detail in the Constitutional Law itself. [...] [T]he Code of Ethics may serve as a supplementary tool of interpretation of the law. However, the Code should not be used as the one and only instrument regulating the disciplinary liability of the judges [...]”

See also CDL-AD(2018)032, Opinion on the Concept Paper on the reform of the High Judicial Council of Kazakhstan, §78

“The Venice Commission acknowledges that, in defining unethical behavior, the law may have recourse to some comprehensive formulas. In such cases, it is better to use a mixed legislative technique: together with such comprehensive formulas, the law should list most common types of unethical behavior. [...]”

See also CDL-AD(2018)028, Opinion on Constitutional arrangements and separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary and law enforcement of Malta, §§46-49

“[...] In general, enumerating an exhaustive list of specific disciplinary offences, rather than giving a general definition which may prove too vague, is a good practice/approach in conformity with international standards.”


“[...] [P]eriodical breaches of discipline, professional incompetence and immoral acts are categories of conduct which are imprecise as legal concepts and capable of giving rise to abuse.”

CDL(1995)074rev, Opinion on the Albanian law on the organisation of the judiciary (chapter VI of the Transitional Constitution of Albania), p.4

“[...] [M]any of the offences in this catalogue are formulated too vaguely. For example, a judge may be disciplined for 'causing more severe disruption of the relations in the court', which is a very vague definition. Such obscure formulas open the door to abusive interpretations and are very dangerous for judicial independence. [...] Indeed, depending on the constitutional tradition of the state, a more general formula for judicial misconduct can be acceptable, but only under condition that it is understood to be narrowly interpreted.”

See also CDL-AD(2018)033, Opinion on the draft law amending the law on Courts of "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", §34

“In the absence of a specific list of undignified or indecent acts, concepts such as 'indecency' and 'indignity' should be avoided as bases for disciplinary action.”
“[…] The Venice Commission strongly criticised the vague term of ‘breach of oath’ as a basis for the dismissal of a judge and welcomed the introduction of the clause ‘commitment of an offence, incompatible with further discharge of the duties of a judge’.

[…] No dismissal should be possible unless the conduct of a judge is covered by the definition of a disciplinary offence. The obligation to typify disciplinary offences on the level of the law also stems from the judgment Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine of the European Court of Human Rights.”

“Due to the closeness of disciplinary proceedings against judges with criminal proceedings, the criminal procedure principles of foreseeability of statutory offences and of their narrow interpretation, also apply mutatis mutandis to disciplinary proceedings. […]"

“[…] The terms in Article 6.2.a that public agents – including judges – should ‘not admit in their activity any corruption acts, corruption-related acts and deeds of corruptive behaviour’, are generic, hybrid, vague and overlap. […]”

“[…] [A legislative measure penalising the imposition of] a final judicial verdict, recognised and known to be unjust […] is so clearly open to abuse [and] it should be repealed as a matter of urgency.”

“It is important to underline that, as a rule in European practice, it is not the judge’s task to supervise the execution of judgments. […] It therefore seems to be inappropriate to establish the judge’s liability in this context. This could even be used to undermine the judges’ independence.”

“Article 92(9) and (10) refer to activities carried out by members of the judge’s family. Family is not defined. Furthermore, while it is important that judges are not able to avoid provisions designed to eliminate corruption through the use of family members, it is also important that judges not be penalised for misbehaviour by members of their family over which they have no control. The provision needs to be expanded to provide for a defense right to the judge concerned in such a case.”
“Ss. 18 apparently speaks of the judge’s failure to declare his property; it is, however, not normal that such behaviour is characterised as a medium-gravity disciplinary violation. […] In the opinion of the Venice Commission the requirement to disclose assets and revenues should be associated with a sanction which is serious enough to serve the purpose of deterrence. While an exception may be made for minor or unintended omissions in the declarations, in principle the failure to declare assets is a sufficiently serious violation to give rise to a dismissal.”

“The principle ne bis in idem prohibits double trial and punishment for the same offense in two different criminal proceedings (Article 4 of Protocol no. 7 ECHR). This, in principle, does not exclude the initiation of disciplinary proceedings for the same offence in parallel to criminal proceedings. […]”

[…] [T]he disciplinary authorities […] should not be obliged to terminate the disciplinary proceedings when a criminal case is initiated for the same offense. In order to prevent the breach of the principle ne bis in idem those authorities should rather have the possibility to terminate the proceedings if they consider that the disciplinary case has a criminal character (the nature of the offense and the gravity of the correspondent disciplinary penalty will be the guiding criteria in the light of the case law of the European Court). […]”

“[…] It would seem desirable to provide that where an event consists of an offence under criminal or administrative law as well as under the disciplinary law, the criminal or administrative proceedings take precedence. […]”

“A disciplinary sanction might be imposed on a judge after an acquittal before a criminal court or where the criminal proceedings against him or her have been discontinued but such disciplinary actions and proceedings must not violate the presumption of innocence provided by Article 6.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. ‘Disciplinary bodies should be capable of establishing independently the facts of the cases before them’.”
“Disciplinary proceedings should deal with gross and inexcusable professional misconduct, but should never extend to differences in legal interpretation of the law or judicial mistakes. The basic rules on disciplinary misconduct are outlined in Article 39 of the Constitutional Law. The first ground mentioned therein, namely ‘breaching the law while reviewing court cases’, is open to a very wide application. […] It is recommended that Article 39 par 1 (1) is amended in order to clarify that it only refers to gross and inexcusable misbehavior and not to the incorrect application of the law.”

CDL-AD(2011)012, Joint Opinion on the constitutional law on the judicial system and status of judges of Kazakhstan by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, §60

“…such criteria for the establishment of a disciplinary violation as the number of overturned decisions ‘should be approached with a great degree of caution. It does not necessarily follow that because a judge has been overruled on a number of occasions that the judge has not acted in a competent or professional manner. It is however reasonable that a judge who had an unduly high number of cases overruled might have his or her competence called into question. Nevertheless, any final decision would have to be made on the basis of an actual assessment of the cases concerned and not on the basis of a simple counting of the numbers of cases which had been overruled.’ In addition, a distinction might be drawn between decisions made on the basis of obvious errors, which any lawyer of reasonable competence should have avoided and decisions where the conclusion arrived at was a perfectly arguable one which nonetheless was overturned by a higher court.’

Independence of every judge is a precondition that must allow every judge and every panel of judges to make effort in order to change the practice – to adopt a different decision – if s/he thinks it appropriate in a particular case. Only stubborn resistance against an enhanced practice which leads to a repeated overturning in cases where there is a well-established and clear case-law should probably be counted as a blatant lack of professionalism. […] The same criticism may be formulated regarding violation of rights so decided by the ECtHR. Judges should follow the European jurisprudence but an erroneous decision should not necessarily result with their dismissal (see new Article CC, ss. 10, first part).

Furthermore, the ‘modification’ of the lower court judgements may be relatively minor or reflect the discretionary power of the appellate court (for example, the appellate court may reduce a
sentence imposed by a lower court even though the lower court acted lawfully and within the authorised limits.”


See also CDL-AD(2018)022, Opinion on the law amending the law on the Judicial Council and on the law amending the law on Courts of “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §§72-77; CDL-AD(2014)007, Joint opinion on the draft law amending and supplementing the judicial code (evaluation system for judges) of Armenia, §§114 and 122

“[…] It would be problematic to discipline judges for merely criticising judicial decisions […] or ‘assessments with regard to the activities of state authorities and local authorities, and of the heads of those authorities’ […]”

CDL-AD(2013)035, Opinion on the draft Code on Judicial Ethics of the Republic of Tajikistan, §33

“Article 66.j defines as a disciplinary offense as ‘unjustified delays in making decisions or other actions in connection with the performance of the duties of a judge or any other repeated disregard of the duties of a judge’. Due to a lack of clarity and the ability to foresee consequences of one’s own actions, this paragraph should also be revised. The wording such as ‘other actions in connection with performance of the duties’ or ‘repeated disregard of duties’ should be more detailed and clarified. The draft Law should stipulate more specifically what types of duties and actions may result in disciplinary proceedings.”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §101

“[…] The absence of the reference to the fault of the judge in other provisions may be interpreted as implying that it is not a mandatory element for establishing the judge’s liability, while it should be so. The liability of the judges should be considered in the light of their influence on workload and backlog. For example, delays in the court proceedings may be caused by the judge’s lack of organisational skills, but may as well be explained by objective reasons outside his/her control, for example, by the failure of the court bailiffs to ensure appearance of witnesses. […]

Actually, Article 74 of the Law on the Judicial Council does stipulate that in the sentencing process the Judicial Council has to take into account ‘the degree of responsibility’ of the judge. However, the very existence of a disciplinary breach (not only the sanction) should be conditioned upon the fault of the judge. The honest and hard-working judges should not be disciplined for the situations which result from the poor management of the judicial system as a whole or from other circumstances outside their control.”


See also CDL-AD(2018)033, Opinion on the draft law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §57; CDL-AD(2017)018, Opinion on the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria, §106

“Ss. 3 lists as a severe disciplinary violation the ‘biased conduct of court proceedings in particular in terms of equal treatment of parties.’ […] ‘Unequal treatment of parties’ or ‘bias’ of a judge are against the principle of fair trial and should normally lead to the quashing of a judgement. Hence, if a disciplinary body establishes that the judge was guilty of such behaviour in a particular case, that case should normally be reopened. […]

[…] The existence of a bias is often established from the point of view of a reasonable external observer, which does not necessarily mean that the bias actually existed or that the judge realised
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that he had a predisposition against one of the parties. [...] Next, the ‘unequal treatment’ of the parties may result from a well-established practice or other external factors which the judge does not really control. Even if the court of appeal establishes that one of the parties has been put in a disadvantage vis-à-vis another by the first instance court, the judge’s fault in it may be minimal. [...]”


“Similarly, without providing any guidance or reference to the meaning of ‘inappropriate contact with a party to the proceedings or his/her representative’, Article 66.k may potentially result in an overbroad interpretation. Is a meeting with either or both parties always inappropriate? Do judges have clear guidance with regard to the actions that are inappropriate?”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §103

“Article 66.n, which makes it a disciplinary offense for a judge to make – ‘any comments while the case is deliberated in court, which may be reasonably expected to interfere with or harm the equitable proceedings or trial, or failing to take appropriate steps to ensure that court employees subordinated to him/her also refrain from making comments’ - also seems to be vague and may result in a disproportionate response. [...] A judge, while making certain public comments or statements during the deliberation may indeed harm the reputation and credibility of the court. It would, however, be unreasonable to punish a judge where a court employee, who is subordinated to him or her, fails to refrain from making similar comments. [...]”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §105

“[In the draft code on judicial ethics] [...] there is a requirement of judges [...] not to disclose any information in the performance of their duties which seems excessive. It would be appropriate to refer to confidential information. [...]”

CDL-AD(2013)035, Opinion on the draft Code on Judicial Ethics of the Republic of Tajikistan, §61


“Ss. 8 speaks of a ‘violation of the regulations or otherwise violating the independence of judges during trial’, which is categorised as a severe violation. A clearer description of actions which constitute violations of judicial independence should be included. [...]”

Ss. 11 lists as a severe disciplinary violation a ‘more severe violation of public law and order, which undermines [a judge’s] reputation and the reputation of the court.’ This provision likewise lacks sufficient clarity and foreseeability. While a ‘more severe violation of public law and order’ may be statutorily defined in other laws (for example, a code on minor offences, called in some other jurisdictions ‘administrative offences’, or elsewhere), the requirement that the conduct also undermines the judge’s reputation and the reputation of the court is open to subjectivity, and should be excluded or narrowed to more specific types of offences.

[...]
S. 1, ss. 2 lists as a ‘serious’ violation ‘misuse of office and exceeding of official authorisation’. This provision is extremely broad as it can be interpreted as sanctioning any judicial act not permitted by law. This has the potential to have a chilling effect on the independence.”


“[...] [I]nsofar as several repeated less serious disciplinary violations are regarded as a ‘gross violation’, it is necessary to indicate the time-period within which such violation may have this effect by accumulation. [...]”


“[...] [I]nappropriate behaviour of a judge in public which harms the image of the judiciary may constitute a ground for disciplinary liability. [...] [I]n the event that such inappropriate behaviour in public is serious or repeated, it must even constitute a ground for the dismissal of a judge [...]”

CDL-AD(2018)033, Opinion on the draft law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §59.

“[...] [N]ot all training should be mandatory and only non-attendance of mandatory trainings should be taken into consideration when deciding whether or not a judge failed to fulfill his/her duty of continuous training.”

CDL-AD(2018)033, Opinion on the draft law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §60

“[...] To serve as a ground for dismissal, “bad evaluation” should convincingly demonstrate total ineptitude of the judge to perform judicial functions. [...]”


3.4.2.2 Disciplinary sanctions – types and proportionality

“It is a universally acknowledged principle that interfering actions of the public administration must always follow the principle of proportionality. As concerns criminal and disciplinary sanctions, the principle asks for a reasonable relationship between the seriousness of the offence, on the one hand, and the quality and the amount of the sanction, on the other.”

CDL-AD(2014)039, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court of Moldova on certain provisions of the law on professional integrity testing, §72
See also CDL-AD(2015)042, Opinion on the Laws on the Disciplinary Liability and Evaluation of Judges of “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §57; CDL-AD(2014)039, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court of Moldova on certain provisions of the law on professional integrity testing, §§67, 68, 71 and 75

“Article 6.1 prescribes four different types of disciplinary sanctions, namely warnings, reprimands, reductions of salary, and removal from office.

Having a reasonable range of possible sanctions facilitates compliance with the principle of proportionality [...]. From this point of view, the authors of the draft may also wish to consider adding ‘temporary suspension from office’ as another possible disciplinary sanction. Other possible sanctions could be withdrawal of cases from a judge, or moving a judge to other judicial tasks.”
“[…] Only deliberate abuse of judicial power or repeated and gross negligence should give rise to a disciplinary violation; the disciplinary system should use less drastic sanctions for smaller violations; dismissal of a judge should only be ordered in exceptionally serious cases; […]”

“[…] [I]t would be preferable not to pursue disciplinary proceedings at all if the violation (even committed with gross negligence) itself is insignificant, to introduce a sort of a de minimis requirement (in addition to the proportionality principle set in Article 138 § 2). […]”

“As concerns reduction of salary […] it is recommended to specify that reduction of salary may be applied only in cases of deliberate wrongdoing and not in cases having more to do with performance. As concerns ‘removal from office’ [it] should be reserved to most serious cases or cases of repetition. It could also be applied in cases of incapacity or behaviour that renders judges unfit to discharge their duties.”

“[…] Amongst the sanctions the Draft Law mentions a temporary transfer of a judge to another court. This is most unusual – the judges are generally transferred from one court to another to support the normal functioning of the latter, i.e. as an organisational measure and not as a punishment. In addition, transferring a judge even for a short period of time is a very costly option, as the judge concerned should be given appropriate housing and otherwise compensated for the drastic change of his lifestyle. In absence of such compensations a transfer may be a much more serious measure than, for instance, a reduction of salary. […] Hence, it is recommended not to use transfer as a disciplinary sanction.”

“[…] According to Article 97, paras 3, 4, it is considered to be a ‘severe disciplinary offense’ when a judge ‘4. Unjustifiably fails to recuse himself/herself in the cases in which there is a reason for his/her recusal’. The reasons on the basis of which a judge has to recuse himself/herself should be determined and defined by the law. The decision of a judge not to recuse him/herself should only be considered a ‘very serious offense’ in cases in which there is manifestly a reason for his/her recusal and not in cases in which this decision is based on his or her interpretation of the law.”
See also CDL-AD(2018)033, Opinion on the draft law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §38

“All of the privileges provided to a judge, as well as retirement benefits, can be withdrawn pursuant to a decision terminating the powers of a judge by the Disciplinary and Qualification Board or a decision by the Judicial Jury according to Article 55-1. The termination of all benefits may be justified in certain cases, however, the sanction imposed should be proportionate to the violation in the individual case. The present provision does not in sufficient detail outline the connection between the breaches of ethics or other offences and the sanction. It is recommended that the provision is further elaborated and describes in more detail which offence or misdemeanour can trigger which sanction.”

CDL-AD(2011)012, Joint Opinion on the constitutional law on the judicial system and status of judges of Kazakhstan by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, §54

3.4.2.3 Examination of disciplinary cases against judges – procedural aspects

3.4.2.3.1 Who may initiate a disciplinary case and decide on it

“As regards the dismissal of judges, here again the President [of the Republic] plays a crucial role. As regards ordinary judges, they are revoked by a presidential decree, on the basis of a decision of the Judicial Jury. Again, it is not clear to what extent the President is bound by the opinion of the Judicial Jury in this respect. In the opinion of the Venice Commission, when it comes to the dismissals, the President should follow the proposal of the Judicial Jury, and, in case of disagreement, should at least be required to state reasons for this. In addition, there should be an appeal against the decision by Judicial Jury to a court.”


“[…] Any action to remove incompetent or corrupt judges had to live up to the high standards set by the principle of the irremovability of the judges whose independence had to be protected. It was necessary to depoliticise any such move. A means to achieve this could be to have a small expert body composed solely of judges giving an opinion on the capacity or behaviour of the judges concerned before an independent body would make a final decision.”

CDL-AD(2003)012, Memorandum: Reform of the Judicial System in Bulgaria, §15

“[…] It would be dangerous to give every person the right to initiate proceedings for the dismissal of a judge. A complaints mechanism for individuals should exist for cases where the judge has misbehaved, but such a complaint should not directly result in initiating dismissal proceedings of the judge.”

CDL-AD(2013)005, Opinion on Draft amendments to Laws on the Judiciary of Serbia, §68

“[…] According to Article 19.1.a the notification regarding the committed actions which may constitute disciplinary offenses committed by judges can be submitted by ‘any interested person’. This right should be limited either to persons who have been affected by the acts of the judge or to those who have some form of ‘legal interest’ in the matter.
According to Article 21, notification on actions that may constitute disciplinary offences shall be filed with the secretariat of the Superior Council of Magistracy, which does not investigate. Investigations are the task of the inspector-judges to whom cases are distributed on a random basis. These provisions are to be welcomed.

Article 26 seems to limit the role of the inspector-judge to preparing and substantiating the disciplinary case file. Inspector-judges should have a strengthened role and in particular should be responsible for drafting the disciplinary charges. Such a provision should be usefully added to the draft Law which is silent on this aspect of the procedure. The inspector-judge would be the best placed for this since the admissibility panel should act only as a filter – deciding on the admissibility – but should not be involved in the drafting of charges.”

“Article 99 grants the Minister of Justice the right to initiate disciplinary proceedings against judges. It may be asked whether this is in harmony with the independence of the judiciary and the principle of the separation of powers.”

“[...] The Venice Commission notes that the Inspector […] shall have the status of a High Court judge (Article147/d p. 3), but in the same time s/he is to a certain extent under the control of the Minister of Justice. It is desirable to leave the executive at a certain distance from deciding on the disciplinary liability of judges. As an alternative, the Constitution could simply provide for an impeachment procedure for the Inspector for gross misbehaviour, with the Disciplinary Tribunal having the final word on the issue.”

“[...] There is nothing wrong with entrusting the Minister with the inspection functions, or imposing on the court presidents an obligation to submit regular reports to the MoJ. However, the MoJ
should not be able to interfere with the salary of court presidents (at least not without any participation of the judiciary). [...]"

CDL-AD(2017)031, Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, §114

"[...] [A] qualified majority [of 2/3 of votes] for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings creates the serious risk that too many complaints would not be followed up at this early stage because of corporatist attitudes within the High Council of Justice. A simple majority should be enough in this respect. Furthermore, draft Article 15 also requires a 2/3 majority in the High Council for the ‘arraignment of the judge’ on disciplinary proceedings and draft Article 60(3) requires again the same qualified majority to appeal against decisions of the Disciplinary Board. Those are too high majorities which may [...] slow down, if not impede the efficient development of disciplinary proceedings as a whole. [...]"


"[...] [A] mixture of different powers in one hand, in particular, the power to initiate the proceedings and the power to adjudicate [...] risks leading to problems [...]"


"[...] Indeed, a person or a body initiating a disciplinary procedure as an ‘accuser’ should not then take part in the determination of charges in the capacity of a ‘judge’. That being said, this does not require the creation of a separate institution; a clear division of functions within the same body would suffice to address the concerns raised by the ECtHR. [...]"


"[...] The Venice Commission [...] recommends removing from the Draft Code the power of the presidents to trigger proceedings before the Ethics Commission. [...]"

The Venice Commission also recommends excluding the possibility for the Ethics Commission to start the examination of the case on its own initiative, since it may raise serious doubts as to its impartiality during the ensuing consideration of it. A possible solution would be to give the right to bring proceedings to interested persons and to any member of the Ethics Commission, who in this case should not sit on a panel deciding on the issue."
“[..] [T]he powers which put presidents in a hierarchically superior position vis-à-vis their fellow judges should be reconsidered; in particular, powers in the disciplinary field (to impose reprimands and to initiate disciplinary proceeding) and inspection powers should be withdrawn from court presidents […]”

CDL-AD(2017)018, Opinion on the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria, §113

“[..] The reporting member of the High Qualifications Commission, whose position is similar to that of a prosecutor, should be excluded from the deliberations and the vote.”

CDL-AD(2010)026, Joint opinion on the law on the judicial system and the status of judges of Ukraine by the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Co-operation within the Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, §74
See also CDL-AD(2002)015, Opinion on the Draft Law on Amendments to the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria, §5

“[..] The principle of the ‘natural judge’ implies that disciplinary procedures have to be conducted by a disciplinary jurisdiction ‘foreseen by the law’. This excludes an ad hoc disciplinary panel, composed on a case-by-case basis. […]”

CDL-AD(2014)038, Opinion on the draft laws on courts and on rights and duties of judges and on the Judicial Council of Montenegro, §69

“[..] [T]he composition of the Judicial Inspection composed of five independent investigator-judges, who are selected in a transparent manner, as well as the detailed rules for the ‘verification proceedings’ during the examination phase, are strong safeguards against any undue or illegitimate influence by the executive branch on disciplinary proceedings. […]”

CDL-AD(2014)039, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court of Moldova on certain provisions of the law on professional integrity testing, §22

“Article 28 deals with the admissibility examination of the notification. A decision on admissibility is to be adopted where at least one member of the panel voted in favour of declaring the notification admissible. Rejection of the notification, on the other hand, requires a unanimous vote […]. This seems to balance the system in favour of acceptance. While this is an unusual system, it is acceptable […].

It is to be welcomed that decisions rejecting the notification shall be mandatorily motivated […]. Article 28.7 should provide that decisions of admissibility panels should be notified not only to the person who submitted the notification, but also to the judge concerned.”


“The admissibility of the complaint is then confirmed by the JC. From the second paragraph of Article 52 it appears that such decision is to be taken by the plenary JC, but this solution may seriously increase the work-load of the body. […] It would be more logical to give the power to take
admissibility decisions to a smaller body within the JC, for example, to the commission entrusted with the inquiry [...].”

CDL-AD(2018)022, Opinion on the law amending the law on the Judicial Council and on the law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §20

“[...] Article 32, in its last paragraph, requires decisions about the submission of the HCJ’s petition regarding dismissal of a judge to be taken by a simpler rather than a two thirds majority. In the light of the flawed composition of the HCJ, this is a regrettable step which would go against the independence of the judges.”


“The creation of a Disciplinary Board [i.e. a body which examines disciplinary cases and applies disciplinary sanctions to judges] which is separate from the Superior Council of Magistracy is to be welcomed [...].

Article 9.1 defines the composition of the Disciplinary Board (5 judges and 4 persons from civil society). Such a composition is to be welcomed as it should help ensure transparency, as well as community involvement in disciplinary proceedings, while also averting the risk of judicial corporatism.”


“[...] Imposition of the [most serious] sanction[s] in the end is in the hands of a political entity, the House of Representatives. This is problematic under European standards, even if dismissal requires a two-thirds majority of all Members of the House and is open to contestation in court. [...]”

CDL-AD(2018)028, Opinion on Constitutional arrangements and separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary and law enforcement of Malta, §52

3.4.2.3.2 Due process requirements in the disciplinary proceedings against judges

“[...] Disciplinary proceedings should be started based on factual grounds what requires reliable sources, and the decision to open a case should mention the verifiable factual background which led to the opening of the proceedings.”


“[...] [T]he draft law [should] be amended so as to enable the judge to be informed of the investigation as early as the preliminary investigation stage to allow him/her to benefit from his/her right to counsel in early stages. In this respect, it is not sufficient that draft Article 39(4) states that the judge may invite a counsel to the hearing before the High Council, but this right should be set out in a different article and apply to all stages of disciplinary proceedings and not only in the context of hearing before the Disciplinary Board.”

“The provisions concerning the right of the judge […] accused to be heard and represented before the panel seems appropriate but there is no mention of a right to be heard and represented before the Supreme Judicial Council, which takes the actual decision […]”


“The legal solution concerning the involvement of the complainant into disciplinary procedure against a judge may differ from one country to another. On one hand, in general the disciplinary liability of judges is regarded as an internal matter to the judiciary […]. On the other hand, the complainant can be the direct victim of the judge’s possible disciplinary misconduct, and may have a legitimate interest in participating to the proceedings, in particular where his/her rights are infringed as a result of judge’s misconduct. The input of the complainant may also serve to shed light on the concrete circumstances of a given case […]. Yet in order to guarantee the rights of the judge subjected to disciplinary procedures, the non-disclosure provisions should be effectively implemented.

[…] [T]he draft law should also provide for some indications on the consequences of disclosure of information on a disciplinary case by the complainant. It is also recommended that clear criteria be provided in Article 17(5), on the basis of which the High Council of Justice can decide whether the hearing of the complainant is necessary in a given case. Further, Article 39(7) should also indicate unambiguously whether the complainant may be invited to the hearings before the Disciplinary Board as an exception to the principle of confidentiality and under which conditions.”


 “[The] Article sets out that the [High Judicial Council]’s sessions are open to the public and that it may decide to work in closed session in accordance with the rules of procedure. It is recommended that this be regulated by law rather than by the rules of procedure and clear criteria for in camera proceedings should be provided.
It is, however, also important that provisions be included which allow the judge – whose position is being deliberated on – to request a closed session, especially where disciplinary proceedings are concerned. […]”


“[…] [P]ublicity should also be the guiding principle for later stages of disciplinary proceedings. […] [T]he draft Article 30(4), according to which ‘Sessions of the Disciplinary Board shall be
closed’, is problematic. First, it is recommended that sessions, as a general rule, be held in public and be held in camera only exceptionally, at the request of the judge and in the circumstances prescribed by law. Secondly, it is not clear from the wording of Article 30(4) whether the judge’s request for publicity, as in the procedure before the High Council […] constitutes an exception to the principle of confidentiality of sessions of the Disciplinary Board or only of information related to the hearings. […]”


See also CDL-AD(2011)033, Joint opinion on the draft law amending the law on the judiciary and the status of judges and other legislative acts of Ukraine by the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Justice and Human Dignity within the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law of the Council of Europe, §60

“Article 31 […] provides in paragraph 3 that ‘Repeated absence and in the absence of pleas alleging of the judge or of the person who filed the notification or of their representatives at the meeting of the Disciplinary Board shall not prevent its consideration”. This provision is to be welcomed as it is a preventive tool against obstructive non-appearances before the Board. Article 31.5 further states that ‘The Board member appointed reporter or any member of the Disciplinary Board may require hearing of witnesses or to other persons within meeting of examination of disciplinary case’. The judge whose case is considered by the Board should be provided with similar rights.”


“Concerning the complaints procedure about the judges performance […], it can be indeed be regulated in the rules of procedure. However, the law should require clearly the publication of the decisions taken in this respect in order to ensure transparency and accountability. Finally, Article 52.5, which provides that the record of the disciplinary proceedings taken will be deleted after 2 years seems to establish a period too short to allow the appropriate information to be available when considering promotion procedures or future disciplinary cases.”

CDL-AD(2011)010, Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitution of Montenegro, as well as on the Draft Amendments to the Law on Courts, the Law on the State Prosecutor's Office and the Law on the Judicial Council of Montenegro, §§41 and 44

“With respect to Article 60, it should be clarified what is meant by ‘open records’. The right of personality has to be protected. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to include medical reports in open records as well as disciplinary and penal investigations and prosecutions, at least if they have not resulted in sanctions. If there have been sanctions, only sanctions for severe violations should be included in open records. In any case, access to the file should be regulated, i.e. not just anyone should have access to this information.”

CDL-AD(2011)004, Opinion on the Draft Law on Judges and Prosecutors of Turkey, §58

“[…] While the body deciding or recommending on promotions should have access to evaluations, the judge in question should have the opportunity to explain or challenge any adverse finding before that body. […]”
“[…] [T]he representative [of the High Council of Justice] should at least be obliged to provide reasons for dropping the case, not only because of the requirements of the principle of legal certainty but also in order to protect the professional and personal reputation of the judge in question.”

“It is thus recommended to supplement the draft law to clearly indicate that in case a procedural issue is not regulated in the Law on Disciplinary Liability, one of the procedural codes can be applied by analogy and to state that only the evidence collected in compliance with the rules of evidence contained in that code will be admissible. The fact that the criminal procedural codes provide generally better safeguards to ensure the fairness of the procedure should be taken into account.”

“The random case distribution [amongst members of the Disciplinary Board] […] is to be welcomed.”

“The presumption of innocence, amongst others, laid down in Article 6.2 ECHR, is supposed to apply during the entire criminal (or disciplinary) procedure. […]”

“[…] [T]he use of such means as covert video and audio recordings (Article 12.5) [by professional integrity testers] without any warrant from an independent body, is questionable and raises concern with respect to the right to private life of a judge as well as with respect to the independence of the judiciary in general.”

“[…] Sanctions applicable to court president should be governed by the same rules as disciplinary measures applied in respect of ordinary judges. This is particularly true in Poland, where court presidents are very powerful and play an important role in the case-processing […]”
“Article 67 of the Law on Courts provides that the judge may be suspended pending the disciplinary procedures in case of “initiated procedure for establishing liability”. [...] Suspension should not follow automatically the commencement of the procedure. Such decisions should be taken only in the most serious cases, and the JC (or a body within the JC) should have a discretion in these questions, by taking a case-by-case decision.”

CDL-AD(2018)022, Opinion on the law amending the law on the Judicial Council and on the law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §27
See also CDL-AD(2018)033, Opinion on the draft law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §66

“The next question is the majority required to take a decision in a disciplinary case. [...]”

While the Venice Commission expressed a preference for a simple majority, there is no hard international standards on this point. If the legislator fears judicial corporatism, it is better to avoid a 2/3 majority rule; by contrast, if the aim is to protect the judges from political pressure the 2/3 majority may be helpful. [...]”

[...] As regards the 2/3 majority requirement, the authorities might wish to consider intermediate solutions: for example, a higher majority may be required for the dismissals, whereas lesser disciplinary sanctions may be imposed by a simple majority. When the simple majority in favour of a lesser disciplinary sanction is not reached, the case may be considered as dropped.”

CDL-AD(2018)022, Opinion on the law amending the law on the Judicial Council and on the law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §§30, 31 and 34

3.4.2.3.3 Appeals against disciplinary measures

“[...] [A] judicial council should have a decisive influence on the [...] promotion of judges and (maybe via a disciplinary board set up within the council) on disciplinary measures against them. An appeal against disciplinary measures to an independent court should be available.”


“[...] Once the disciplinary panel of the Supreme Judicial Council has found in favour of the judge, this decision should be final. [...]”


“[...] [A] future law on the status of magistrates should provide for judicial review of decisions affecting judges and prosecutors more generally, prior to the review exercised by the Constitutional Court.”

See also CDL-AD(2017)019, Opinion on the Draft Judicial Code of Armenia, §§144 and 145
“The need for provisions that introduce an appeal to a court of law should not be limited to disciplinary sanctions, but should also cover other acts that have negative effects on the status or the activities of judges, for instance: denial of a promotion, adding (negative) comments to files, class allocation, changes of location etc. […]"

CDL-AD(2011)004, Opinion on the Draft Law on Judges and Prosecutors of Turkey, §76

“[…][I]t is very important that the composition of the appellate judicial body be predetermined by law. Normally the disciplinary decisions should be reviewed by a judicial impartial body […], which decides with all the guarantees of the judicial proceeding.”


“[…]. Every appeal against disciplinary proceedings should prevent the decision from becoming final until the appeal is determined (not only decisions to dismiss a judge from the office of Court chairman or from office as a judge as provided in Article 38.2).

[…].

Article 40 provides that decisions of the Superior Council of Magistracy can be appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice ‘by people who have filed complaints, judicial inspection or the judge concerned’. It is not clear why the judicial inspection should be allowed to appeal. The appeal should be allowed to the parties concerned – the complainant and the judge concerned.”


“It is important […] that the appeal instance qualifies as a ‘court’, i.e. provides for sufficient procedural guarantees and is institutionally independent. In addition, in developing this model the authorities should ensure that the functions of initiating disciplinary proceedings, imposing a disciplinary sanction and deciding on appeals are clearly separated; for example, a person who triggered a disciplinary case should not participate in the subsequent decision-making.

Finally, the Venice Commission recalls that ‘Judicial Councils should have a certain discretion, which must be respected by the appellate body’. In exercising its appellate review the appellate body should act with deference to the SJC (or any other body or panel within the SJC imposing the disciplinary sanction), especially as regards the establishment of the factual circumstances and interpretation of the relevant rules of conduct.”


“The performance of the Presidents of the most senior courts and the Chief Prosecutor are assessed by the relevant sub-council. […] There is an appeal to the HJPC itself. Assessment of performance is to be taken into account when making appointments to senior positions. In addition, where the President of a court or the Chief Prosecutor receives one of the two lowest
assessments he or she loses office. Given the importance of these assessments the specific statement that the appeal to the HJPC is final and no remedies shall be available seems difficult to justify. **An appeal should lie to a court of law.**

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §92

“Article 97 describes the process of reopening of a disciplinary case if the ECtHR has established that the judge’s rights have been violated in the disciplinary proceedings. […] The reopening of the proceedings should be possible where it is dictated by the findings of the ECtHR, but not mandatory in all cases where a violation of the European Convention has been found.”


### 3.4.3 Ethical rules of behaviour: duty of restraint, conflicts of interest, duty to disclose certain information, etc.

“[…] Judges should not put themselves into a position where their independence may be questioned […]

Although there are countries in Europe and beyond that have achieved high standards of judicial conduct without adopting a code of conduct or ethics for judges, the Council of Europe recommends that a code be adopted: […]

In addition, ‘new democracies’ of Central and Eastern Europe and of Central Asia tend to acknowledge the need for establishing codes of professional conduct as part of an overall judicial reform. […]

Such a code, or in other words a statement of standards of professional conduct, should also not be seen as a piece of legislation or other provisions of a legal nature, and it should be the judges and their organisation(s) that take the responsibility for the implementation of such a code.

[…] A code of ethics should not be directly applied as a ground for criticism or disciplinary sanctions. Guidelines provide the principles which enable judges to assess how to address specific issues which arise in conducting their day-to-day work, whereas disciplinary procedures are designed to police misconduct and inappropriate conduct which calls out for some form of disciplinary sanction.

[…] The purpose of a code of ethics is entirely different from that achieved by a disciplinary procedure and using a code as a tool for disciplinary procedure has grave potential implications for judicial independence.

However, serious violations of ethical norms could also imply fault and acts of negligence that should, in accordance with the law, lead to disciplinary sanctions. Judges may be held accountable accordingly for their unethical conduct by appropriate institutions, which are themselves independent and impartial, and are intended to supplement and not to derogate from existing rules of law and conduct which bind the judge. There will always be a certain interplay between the principles of ethical conduct and those of disciplinary regulations. In order to avoid the suppression of the independence of a particular judge on the basis of general and sometimes
vague provisions of a code of ethics, sanctions have to rely on explicit provisions in the law and should be proportionate to and be applied as a last resort in response to recurring, unethical judicial practice.”

CDL-AD(2013)035, Opinion on the draft Code on Judicial Ethics of the Republic of Tajikistan, §§8, 12-13, 15 and 16, 30-31

“[…] [I]t is important to ensure a strict separation of duties and responsibilities between the advisory body on ethics and the disciplinary body, since the judge should not have to face the risk that his/her request to the advisory body on ethics be transferred to another procedure that could result in a disciplinary sanction. […]”

CDL-AD(2014)018, Joint opinion of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR on the draft amendments to the legal framework on the disciplinary responsibility of judges in the Kyrgyz Republic, §30
See also CDL-AD(2017)019, Opinion on the Draft Judicial Code of Armenia, §62

“[…] [A]s to the retired judges, their behaviour may affect the image of the judiciary and may, at least to some extent, be regulated by the Code. However, the requirements for a retired judge cannot be the same as for an active judge, and this should be properly reflected in the Draft Code. For example, the involvement in the public life is probably one of the areas where drastic limitations which may be justified for the serving judges are not necessary in respect of former judges. […]”

See also CDL-AD(2013)035, Opinion on the draft Code on Judicial Ethics of the Republic of Tajikistan, §§40-41

“This Article states that the chairman of the court, chief, Judicial Legal Council Secretariat, proper executive body or other persons that has been given authority by the chairman is the official representative of the court or Judicial Legal Council Secretariat or proper executive body in relationship with editorial offices of the mass media.

The aim of this Article could be understood as being that persons who have not received an authorisation by the chairman are not allowed to be in contact with journalists. This would limit the publicity of courts’ activities. Furthermore, it should be noted that the chairman of the court has no authority to intervene in the decision-making process and statements of courts are public.”


“[…] [J]udges should indeed exercise caution while discussing or criticizing the work of their colleagues. Indeed ‘they shall refrain from public statements or remarks that may undermine the authority of the Court or give rise to reasonable doubt as to their impartiality’.

However, judges should not be limited in their freedom to discuss shortcomings of the judiciary outside the circle of their colleagues (for instance, at events such as seminars, conferences, in academic or educational circles). Judges must not fear sanctions for expressing their views publicly on issues that are problematic for the judiciary.”
“[…] [S]hould [the prohibition for a judge of] […] ‘speaking in support or against any political party’ be interpreted as including speech on the functioning of the judicial system, the fact that this may lead to dismissal would constitute a disproportionate interference.”

CDL-AD(2014)018, Joint opinion of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR on the draft amendments to the legal framework on the disciplinary responsibility of judges in the Kyrgyz Republic, §34

“[…] Article 21 prevents judges from criticizing publicly the laws and legal policies of the State. […] ‘Critical assessment’ of such norms which is a necessary part of the process of adjudication is perfectly admissible, and the Draft Code should expressly allow it (even when it is expressed in open procedural documents). As regards more abstract criticism, not connected to the adjudication of a specific case, indeed, the judge should speak with caution, especially when expressing him/or herself on a fora accessible to the general public (as opposed to more closed discussions amongst the professionals of the law; thus, the exception covering ‘the scientific and practical conferences, round tables, seminars and other events of educational character’, where it is possible for the judge to express critical views, is reasonable). However, judges should not be excluded from sharing experiences and giving voice to opinions on legislative matters. […]”


“The Venice Commission admits that manifest, gross and deliberate disregard of procedural rights of one of the parties which resulted in a denial of justice may exceptionally lead to a disciplinary liability. That being said, the Venice Commission always warned the States from disciplining judges for errors of law or of fact […]. If these provisions are to remain in the Code as ‘ethical obligations’, and if they may ultimately lead to the disciplinary liability, the Code should make it clear that procedural errors are to be corrected primarily through the system of appeals, and not through disciplinary liability. It is only when a judge has roughly and systematically infringed his/her own competence that such procedural errors can be considered as a ground for a disciplinary sanction.”


“The obligation to report on the facts of illegal interference in judicial activity (Article 9 p. 4) is not only an ethical norm but should be regarded as a legal obligation. The ‘illegal interference’ and ‘direct or indirect pressure’ on a judge is a crime and must be reported to the prosecuting authorities in all cases. Moreover, the judge should report to the competent authorities even in cases where there is only an appearance of ‘interference’ or ‘pressure’ and let them decide whether there is a case to answer.”


“This Article is intended to prevent the judge from showing any signs of religious, political, ethnic or other affiliation and is to be welcomed. The references to ‘signs’ and to ‘such insignia’ suggest that it is only physical emblems which are covered. The prohibition should also extend to conduct such as praying or religious gestures or utterances.”

CDL-AD(2013)015, Opinion on the draft law on the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §35
See also CDL-AD(2016)013, Opinion on the Draft Code of Judicial Ethic of the Republic of Kazakhstan, §64
“[...] Article 60 § 4 [...] inter alia requires the judge ‘to refrain from practicing any conduct that may leave an impression of being engaged in political activities’. This is a very high standard, difficult to reach. [...] There is no doubt that ‘the right of political participation’ of judges (essentially the rights guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR) may be legitimately restricted. Thus, a judge may be required to carefully choose the forums where s/he speaks and the format of his public interventions. However, this rule should not prohibit the judge, as a legal expert, from expressing his views before a professional audience, in specialised journals etc., even if those views relate to policy issues.”


“Article 93 of the draft Law requires judges and prosecutors to provide an annual financial report concerning their activities outside their duty as a judge or as a prosecutor. However, the provision falls short of requiring a judge to declare all of his or her assets. It should be noted that full asset disclosure has proved a valuable weapon in combating corruption in other countries.”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §120

“[...] The Constitution should not give a carte blanche to the security services to intercept all communications of a specialised judge/prosecutor and, in particular, of their family members. Any such ‘review of telecommunications’ should be accompanied by adequate and effective procedural guarantees, protecting those persons from abuses, and clearly described in the law [...]. While specialised judges and prosecutors may waive some of their own privacy rights, this waiver may not cover all their relatives, and the law must provide for a special mechanism to protect privacy interest of those who may accidentally be affected by the surveillance measures.”

CDL-AD(2016)009, Final Opinion on the revised draft constitutional amendments on the Judiciary (15 January 2016) of Albania, §51

“[...] While judges should conduct themselves in a respectable way in their private life, it is difficult to lay down very precisely the standards applying to judges’ behaviour in their off-duty activities, also considering the constant evolution in moral values in a given country.”

CDL-AD(2014)018, Joint opinion of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR on the draft amendments to the legal framework on the disciplinary responsibility of judges in the Kyrgyz Republic, §29

“[...] While the judge may be held legally responsible for the behaviour of his/her minor children, the Draft Code should make it clear that the judge should not answer for his/her grown-up kids and other adults. At the same time a judge might be required to distance him/herself from those family members who infringed the law [...]”


“Article 22 of the Draft Code goes too far when it requires that the judge should inform the president of the court and the judicial community body about the fact of the divorce and, in particularly, about the reasons thereof. The Venice Commission does not see any justification for this rule. [...]”

“[...] [T]he duty of the judge to maintain a healthy lifestyle (see Article 29) is both unclear and excessive. [...]”


“[...] [T]he choice to state the principle of equality and non-discrimination as an ethical principle is questionable (even if it can be found in the Bangalore principles and some other ethical codes). To treat the parties without discrimination is, first of all, a legal obligation of the judge.

Article 11 establishes the duty of a judge to inform competent authorities about attempts to bribe him/her. Again, this should be a legal obligation, not only a moral duty. Failure to report about such ‘offers’ should entail legal liability (disciplinary and even criminal), even if the judge has ultimately refused the offer. [...]”


“Article 11 p. 2 prohibits disclosing private information which the judge may learn through working on a case. However, such disclosure may take procedural forms – for example, private information may become known from the testimony of a witness, or from the court judgement itself. When disclosure serves a specific procedural purpose (for example, to establish the facts of the case), and is in the interests of justice, it should be allowed (with some exceptions which may be justified by the interests of minors, protection of witnesses etc.). The Code may only regulate ‘non-procedural’ disclosures (such as relating ‘spicy details’ of a criminal case to the press, where there is no procedural need for doing it).”


“Articles 14 – 16 contain provisions which relate partly to labour discipline and managerial duties of the judge (the duty to start the hearings on time, the duty to oversee the work of the employees of the court, etc.) and partly to the quality of the judicial decision-making and procedural propriety (draft clear and well-reasoned texts, do not adjourn hearings because of poor knowledge of the case materials, etc.). However, these rules should be applied with caution: the judge should enjoy wide discretion in conducting the proceedings, and there is no single standard of ‘convincing, logical and well-reasoned’ decisions. [...]”


3.5 Transfers and early termination of office

3.5.1 Transfers and missions

“The Venice Commission has consistently supported the principle of irremovability in constitutions. Transfers against the will of the judge may be permissible only in exceptional cases. [...]”


“[T]he non-consensual transfer of judges to another court [...] is [...] justified in principle in cases of legitimate institutional reorganisation.”

CDL-AD(2016)007. Rule of Law Checklist, §80
See also CDL-AD(2018)033, Opinion on the draft law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §§21-23; CDL-AD(2015)026, Opinion on the Amendments to the Constitution of
Ukraine regarding the Judiciary as proposed by the Working Group of the Constitutional Commission in July 2015, §24; CDL-AD(2013)034, Opinion on proposals amending the draft law on the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §17

“It is also important to ensure that the same level of remuneration and an equivalent or similar position is guaranteed to the judge to be transferred and needs to be stipulated in this provision. […]"

CDL-AD(2018)011, Opinion on the draft amendments to the constitutional provisions on the judiciary of Serbia, §52
See also CDL-AD(2018)033, Opinion on the draft law amending the law on Courts of "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", §24; CDL-AD(2014)038, Opinion on the draft laws on courts and on rights and duties of judges and on the Judicial Council of Montenegro, §58; CDL-AD(2008)007, Opinion on the Draft Laws on Judges and the Organisation of Courts of the Republic of Serbia, §23

“[…] Section 31 ALSRJ entitles the chair of the tribunal to re-assign judges without their consent to a judicial position at another service post on a temporary basis out of service interests, every three years for a maximum of one year, or for the promotion of his or her professional development. Section 34 enables the President of the NJO to transfer a judge to another court, if a court is closed or its competence or territorial jurisdiction is reduced to such an extent that it no longer permits the employment of a judge. […]

As long as such transfers are made with the agreement of the judge concerned, it seems that these provisions comply with the above-mentioned principles on the transfer of judges, with the exception of the generally phrased and excessively large possibility of transferring a judge ‘for service reasons’, for a maximum of one year every three years, which seems to be too often.

However, if the judge does not agree with the transfer he or she is automatically ‘exempted from office’ for six months and his or her service relationship is terminated […]. This seems to be an overly harsh automatic sanction. While under certain circumstances transfers may be justified, in exceptional cases even without the consent of the judge – for instance due to an organizational reform - there must be clear and proportional rules for such actions as well as a right of appeal.”


“Transfer to a higher court is possible on the basis of the results of a competition. During the competition, the Qualification Commission monitors of the judges lifestyle, and in addition questions the judges of the court where the applicant judges are sitting about personal qualities of the candidates and their rapport with colleagues. These provisions create considerable unease. If such a procedure is to be followed, it should be on the basis that anything said must be made available to the applicant who should have an opportunity to comment on it.”


“[…] The Commission welcomes the fact that the amendments provide for judicial review by the administrative and labour court in the event of a transfer. However, this should be a full review on procedure and substance of the decision […]”

CDL-AD(2012)020, Opinion on the Cardinal Acts on the Judiciary that were amended following the adoption of Opinion CDL-AD(2012)001 on Hungary, §56
“[

[A]ssignment [of the judge to a different court or] sending on mission should only be possible under strict criteria clearly identified in the law, for instance, the number of cases at the receiving court, the number of cases at the sending court, the number of cases dealt with by the judge who is being assigned. […] Also, the maximum duration of the assignment or the mission should be indicated in the law.”

See also CDL-AD(2018)033, Opinion on the draft law amending the law on Courts of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, §19

“The absence of consent to a transfer to another court in case of closure or reorganisation of a court is too wide a formulation for a ground for dismissal of a judge, even if the closure or reorganisation has been decided by the Verkhovna Rada in the form of a law. Much will depend on the proposals for transfer made to the judge and on their timing. […] Before being faced with a dismissal, the judge should receive more than one proposal for transfer and the prospect of upcoming retirements of judges in other courts should be taken into account when making such proposals. Rather than simply dismissing the judge, he or she should be transferred against his or her will. If the judge then does not turn up for work at the new post, ordinary disciplinary measures could be taken, which eventually could lead to a dismissal of the judge but not because of the refusal of the transfer but because of the refusal to work.”

CDL-AD(2013)034, Opinion on proposals amending the draft law on the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §29

“Pursuant to the new Article 95 par 6, the transfer and rotation of judges of local courts shall be undertaken by the President upon submission of the Council of Judges in accordance with the procedures and cases laid down in the constitutional law. […] It would […] be advisable to omit the involvement of the President in such internal matters of the judiciary.”

CDL-AD(2016)025, Endorsed joint opinion on the draft law "on Introduction of amendments and changes to the Constitution" of the Kyrgyz Republic, §71

“The presidents have an important power of seconding judges to other courts. […]

The Venice Commission considers that there should be an external check on the presidents’ power to second; for example, such decisions should be appealable to the SJC Chambers by interested parties (those who were seconded against their will or who wished to be seconded but were not).”

CDL-AD(2017)018, Opinion on the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria, §§86 and 87

3.5.2 Early termination of office and impeachment

“[…] It would not be in accordance with the principles of a society governed by the rule of law to allow the dismissal of serving judges without providing any guarantees. […]”


3 See also section 2.4.2 above on disciplinary control
“[…] [G]ranting the [Chair of Parliament] the right to propose the dismissal of judges of the Supreme Court […] and of the Economic Court […] is a serious distortion of the principles of judicial independence and of the separation of powers.”


“[…] [T]he Commission finds that the Supreme Court should not have the power to dismiss cantonal judges, nor the cantonal high court to dismiss municipal judges […].”

CDL-INF(1998)015, Opinions on the constitutional regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina, chapter B.I, §9

“The Commission observes that decisions as to the removal of judges is left to the Constitutional Court […]. Although this may be seen as an additional guarantee for judicial independence, the absence of any remedy against such a decision of the Constitutional Court can raise problems. A more adequate solution would be to leave the initial decision as to the removal of a judge to the Council of Justice with the possibility for the judge dismissed to appeal to the Constitutional Court. […]”


“The provision that a judge may be removed for systematically failing to perform official responsibilities seems to be a provision which is not inappropriate. The failing to perform the official responsibilities has to be caused by a voluntary choice of the concerned person and not by his or her health problems. […]”

CDL-AD(2003)016, Opinion on the Constitutional Amendments reforming the Judicial System in Bulgaria, §16

“[…] The third paragraph of this Amendment provides for four reasons for a judge’s dismissal: 1) being sentenced to at least six months’ imprisonment; 2) committing a crime that makes the person unworthy of judgeship; 3) performing judicial functions incompetently, and 4) having committed a serious disciplinary offence.

The first reason raises no apparent issue. In the second, the wording ‘a crime that makes the person unworthy of judgeship’ is vague and would benefit from more precise wording by setting out clearly what kind of criminal offence is being referred to.

The third reason poses a real problem as ‘performing judicial functions incompetently’ is not precise and can cover a variety of situations, notably, it could apply to a judge who has made a mistake. […]

The fourth reason needs to provide detail on what these serious disciplinary offences are. […]”

CDL-AD(2018)011, Opinion on the draft amendments to the constitutional provisions on the judiciary of Serbia, §§46-49

“[…] The choice of automatic termination of tenure following any criminal conviction, irrespective of its gravity, is a very severe one, arguably raising issues under the ECHR.”

CDL-AD(2015)026, Opinion on the Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine regarding the Judiciary as proposed by the Working Group of the Constitutional Commission in July 2015, §24
“The consequences of the dismissal/suspension are the suspension of the payment of salary […]. It should, in the view of the Venice Commission, be taken into consideration that the suspension of salary, besides the fact that it also affects the family of the judge, may seriously hinder the right to a legitimate defence by taking away all of his or her financial means and might therefore seriously affect the human rights of the judge who, until a final condemnation is made, is deemed to be innocent. […]”

CDL-AD(2011)017, Opinion on the introduction of changes to the constitutional law “on the status of judges” of Kyrgyzstan, §§55-56

“[…] [T]he guarantees for dismissal of post holders need to be higher than those for appointment. In particular, it is essential that dismissal due to offences committed by the post holder be investigated by an independent body and not by a political organ as the Parliament or the President. […] Consequently, it should be that decision that leads to dismissal and not the decision of a political organ. Such dismissal should be distinguished from votes of no-confidence, which Parliament can take against certain state officials, like ministers (political responsibility). A vote of no-confidence is not appropriate for judicial officials who do not have a political responsibility before a representative body.”

See also CDL-CR-PV(1998)004, Meeting of the Working Group on Albania of the Sub-commission on Constitutional Reform with the Constitutional Commission of Albania, «Parts of the constitution considered for the first time», «Article 130».

“[…] [T]here should be no decision of a political organ once the Supreme Judicial Council has decided on the ground for dismissal. There should be an appeal to a court against the Council’s decision but after such an appeal the dismissal should enter into force without any decision of Parliament. […]”

CDL-AD(2015)037, First Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitution (Chapters 1 to 7 and 10) of the Republic of Armenia, §153
See also CDL-AD(2016)025, Endorsed joint opinion on the draft law “on Introduction of amendments and changes to the Constitution” of the Kyrgyz Republic, §73

“[…] [T]he High Council of Justice is empowered to ‘decide on the termination of powers’ of the judges. In addition, the need for a Presidential act after the decision of the HCJ to dismiss a judge would complicate and delay the process of dismissal and raise potential risks of deadlocks if the President fails to act. […]”

CDL-AD(2015)026, Opinion on the Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine regarding the Judiciary as proposed by the Working Group of the Constitutional Commission in July 2015, §28

“This proposal would introduce an impeachment procedure against a judge of lower instance courts, which would be initiated by at least 20 per cent of the citizens of Ukraine of the respective court district or by one third of the members of the Verkhovna Rada. Following such an initiative, the Verkhovna Rada voted on the impeachment and the judge would be dismissed if more than half of all members of the Rada voted for it. Initiatives for the impeachment of judges of the high specialised courts and the Supreme Court could be introduced by one third of all members of the Rada and would be carried if two thirds of all members voted for it.
The introduction of such a procedure is clear contradiction of the principle of the independence of the judiciary and would make the position of the judges dependent on a political organ, the Verkhovna Rada. The initiation of an impeachment by the citizens could even lead to judges trying to please ‘the voters’ rather than to apply the Constitution and the laws, for example through harsh sentences in highly mediatised criminal cases.”

“[…] A qualification test for all sitting judges could […] endanger judicial independence and should be avoided. Problems with the qualification of judges should be settled through efficient disciplinary proceedings in individual cases.”

“[…] [D]ismissing all the judges, outside very exceptional situations such as constitutional discontinuity, is not in line with European standards and the Rule of Law. […]”

“[…] [T]o serve as a ground for dismissal bad evaluations should cover a substantial period of the judge’s work, and be based on carefully chosen indicators. It would be wrong to conduct two “exceptional” evaluations quickly one after another and dismiss the judge on this basis.”

“[…] Amongst other grounds, the president [of the court] may be dismissed for the failure to start disciplinary proceedings against the judge of his/her court when there are reasons for it. […] [T]he question of whether or not a disciplinary offence has been committed is a matter of assessment. […] This duty should be formulated so as to concern only the evident and gross breaches committed by the judges, known to the president, and not every potential irregularity.”

“Article 47 of the Law on Courts provides that the candidate to the position of president of the court should produce to the JC a work program which should include “measurable parameters” and “time frame for realisation of program objectives”. Furthermore, the court president may be dismissed from this position for the “failure to complete work program” (see Article 79, (1) p. 8). These provisions risk turning the court president into a “productivity watchdog”, and, in addition, do not take into account objective factors which may prevent the judge from completing the “work program” (such as understaffing, sudden influx of new cases, etc.). These provisions should be reconsidered.”
3.6 Retirement

“The retirement age for judges should be clearly set out in the legislation. Any doubt or ambiguity has to be avoided and a body taking decisions on retirement should not be able to exert discretion. […]”

CDL-AD(2013)034, Opinion on proposals amending the draft law on the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §52

“[…] Under Article 36 of the Draft Act, a SC [the Supreme Court] judge shall retire upon reaching 65 years of age (under the current Act the upper age-limit for the SC justices is 70).

It is up to the democratic legislator to define the retirement age of judges. However, the general European trend consists of introducing a higher age of retirement.”

CDL-AD(2017)031, Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, §§44 and 45

“The MoJ may at his/her discretion extend the judge’s mandate beyond the retirement age (Article 69 § 1b). The Act does not say for how long the mandate may be prolonged; those prolongations may be allowed for short periods of time, so that the judge remains uncertain about the further prolongation of his/her contract and becomes more vulnerable to pressure. This possibility should be removed, since it places the career of (usually the most senior) judges in the hands of the MoJ.”

CDL-AD(2017)031, Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, §109

“Sections 90.h.ha, 94.3 and 96.2 ALSRJ provide for judges who are reaching the so-called ‘upper age limit’ to be exempted from office six months before the actual retirement date. It seems questionable – even more so in times of strained budgets – to exempt people from office with full payment just because they are going to retire within the next six months.”


“The new early retirement scheme for judges and prosecutors, assistant magistrates of the High Court, assistant magistrates of the Constitutional Court and assimilated legal specialty personnel, (proposed new Articles 82 and 83 of Law no. 303/2004) allows retirement at the age of 60, after 25 years seniority, and even between 20 and 25 years seniority, with a slightly reduced pension. […]”

This proposal creates a real risk of a severe decrease in the body of magistrates within the Romanian judiciary, especially at the senior level. The Romanian judiciary risks losing its most experienced and qualified members, while the training time for junior judges and prosecutors to join the magistracy will be increased.

[...]
In the current situation of conflict between some holders of political office and magistrates and increased pressure on the magistrates including through some of the amendments discussed, there is a risk that many qualified judges will choose early retirement.

[...] The proposed early retirement scheme should be abandoned unless it can be ascertained that it will have no adverse impact on the functioning of the system.”


“[...] The text of these provisions implies that retired judges are permanently limited in the possibility of engaging in law practice, which is clearly an unnecessary and excessive limitation. Although there may be some restrictions, such as temporarily limiting the possibility of a former judge to act as a lawyer before the court of which that judge was a member, they should be narrowly targeted and proportional. [...]”

CDL-AD(2013)035, Opinion on the draft Code on Judicial Ethics of the Republic of Tajikistan, §67

“Proposal no. 10 sets the age of 75 as the retirement age for judges of the Supreme Court and the high specialised courts whereas 65 is fixed as the retirement age for all other judges. Such a stark distinction seems excessive because it would create two classes of judges [...] Such a distinction within the profession of judges is not only discriminatory, it might also lead to judges being willing to compromise in their adjudication in order to obtain promotion before they have to retire at 65.”

CDL-AD(2013)034, Opinion on proposals amending the draft law on the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §30

“[...] The early removal of a large number of justices of the Supreme Court (including the First President) by applying to them, with immediate effect, a lower retirement age violates their individual rights and jeopardises the independence of the judiciary as a whole [...]”

CDL-AD(2017)031, Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, § 130

“[...] As concerns the retirement age, the Venice Commission has expressed strong criticism of the reduction of the retirement age when this applies to sitting judges but there is no objection in principle to extend the retirement age if sitting judges retain a possibility to retire under current rules.”

CDL-AD(2018)028, Opinion on Constitutional arrangements and separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary and law enforcement of Malta, §42

3.7 Remuneration

“[...] The Venice Commission is of the opinion that for judges a level of remuneration should be guaranteed by law in conformity with the dignity of their office and the scope of their duties. Bonuses and non-financial benefits, the distribution of which involves a discretionary element, should be phased out.”
“[…] [T]hat the salaries of judges cannot be reduced during their term of office […] is a common and desirable guarantee of judicial independence.”

“The proposed increase of salary in article 99.3 for a judge acting upon a case on the criminal offence of organized crime or corruption or terrorism or war crimes, as well as in cases of ‘difficult work conditions’ could be problematic, creating the danger that judges categorize ordinary cases as organized crime cases in order to keep their salaries higher.”

“The conclusion, therefore, is that, in the absence of an explicit constitutional prohibition, a reduction of the salaries of judges may in exceptional situations and under specific conditions be justified and cannot be regarded as an infringement of the independence of the judiciary. In the process of reduction of the judges’ salaries, dictated by an economic crisis, proper attention shall be paid to the fact whether remuneration continues to be commensurate with the dignity of a judge’s profession and his or her burden of responsibility. […].

[…] In [a situation of a serious economic crisis], a general reduction of salaries funded by the state budget may include the judiciary, and cannot be qualified as a breach of the principle of the independence of judges. Such a general measure is in line with the Venice Commission’s Report on the Independence of the Judicial System which states that ‘the level of remuneration should be determined in the light of the social conditions in the country and compared to the level of remuneration of higher civil servants. The remuneration should be based on a general standard and rely on objective and transparent criteria’. Finally, it may be seen as a token of solidarity and social justice […].”

“Allowing the President of the SAC [Supreme Administrative Court] and the Minister, a member of the executive, to choose which judges should receive a distinction associated with higher remuneration raises concerns regarding judicial independence. A judge’s remuneration must be established by law and be equal for all judges performing the same duties; differences may exist based on seniority, court level or other reasons clearly laid down by law but not as a result of an individual decision reserved by the Law for a member of the executive. […]

[…]
The Venice Commission maintains its reservations with regard to the honorary titles to judges by the executive, even if they are not accompanied by financial benefits."

CDL-AD(2019)004, Opinion on the law on administrative courts and the law on the entry into force of the law on administrative courts and certain transitional rules of Hungary, §§80 and 83

3.8 Jurors, Lay Assessors, military Judges and other persons performing judicial functions

"[...] Although the perception that a jury system can enhance fair trial and lead to higher acquittal rates may be explained through historical evidence, this view should be approached with caution. Jury systems in and of their own are no guarantee for the independence and fairness of the justice system. This will depend on the legal framework and the practical application of the rules.

The number of jurors is set at 12. This seems to have been controversial, as the presidential administration wanted to have only 7 or a maximum of 9 jurors. However, it is better to have 12 jurors, as a larger number of jurors helps to base the decision on a broader consensus.

[...] The draft Law should explain the process of ‘random selection’ in order to exclude any misuse and corruption.

Article 9 is of great importance as it regulates who can be excluded from the list of candidates by the administration. This provision excludes a wide range of professionals such as judges, prosecutors (prokuror), military servicemen etc. This is to be highly welcomed. Article 12 regulates the material compensation for jurors. This seems to be acceptable insofar as it does not place jurors at a financial disadvantage due to their work.

[...] The guarantees of the independence and immunity of judges on the basis of the Law on the status of judges of the Kyrgyz Republic is extended to jurors and members of their family. It is however strange that immunity also applies to the members of the family."

CDL-AD(2008)038, Opinion on the Constitutional Law on Court Juries of Kyrgyzstan, §§7, 14, 18, 21, 22 and 23

“The lay assessors seem to be a firm part of the Bulgarian judicial system [...]. They have the same rights and obligations as the judges and the fact that they are nominated by the next higher general assembly of judges helps to ensure their qualification. [...] However, their nomination to the specialised criminal court will be made by the Municipal Council of Sofia [...], which might be in line with the Bulgarian legal system but, in the context of the accurate selection of judges, may not be an appropriate solution, taking into consideration that those lay assessors have the majority vote in the senate.

Having chosen to have lay assessors in their system to fight corruption and organised crime, the Bulgarian authorities may be aware that these could represent a weak link in their system as they could perhaps be exposed to a greater risk to potential undue influence by persons being judged by the specialised criminal courts. For this reason, lay assessors must be carefully chosen. [...]”


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4 See also section 3.1.2 below on military, commercial and other specialised courts
“Article 62 envisages that people’s assessors and jurors are to be paid compensation for the period of their service. This is in principle a very welcome provision but in practice may well create an inhibition to the use of jurors on a wide scale. It is certainly likely to be expensive if juries are commonly used.”

CDL-AD(2011)033, Joint opinion on the draft law amending the law on the judiciary and the status of judges and other legislative acts of Ukraine by the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Justice and Human Dignity within the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law of the Council of Europe, §44

“[…] [T]he Act provides for court assessors in military courts who may be generals, admirals, officers or non-commissioned officers in permanent military service. They take part in court hearings. There seem to be no safeguards in the legislation to ensure that serving military personnel acting as court assessors are independent and impartial unless the requirement in Article 68.3 that they be designated by the General Assembly of the judges of the Appellate Military Court on the proposal of their commanding officers can be so regarded (see the case of Findlay v. the United Kingdom […]).”


“[…] According to Draft Article 58 (4)6 a person who does not speak Ukrainian is excluded from being a juror. […] It seems reasonable that all judges should have knowledge of the state language, but one has to wonder about a provision which would exclude a substantial part of the population from jury service.

[…] These are important issues which should be carefully examined and addressed. This might include considering practical and more constructive solutions likely to enable access by all to jury service.”


IV. COURTS

4.1 Establishment and structuring

4.1.1 Establishment, structuring, and composition of the courts

“[…] While it is obviously appropriate that questions pertaining to appeals and the procedure before the various courts are determined in the various codes of procedure, it may be preferable, under the specific conditions of a country newly establishing a judicial system based on the rule of law, to have one comprehensive text covering all questions pertaining to the composition, organisation, activities and standing of the judiciary.”

CDL-INF(2000)005, Opinion on the draft law of Ukraine on the judicial system, p.2

“The most competent body for designing and changing the court network is the High Judicial Council (‘HJC’). The adoption of the network can of course be a competence of Parliament because such decisions have important budgetary implications. However, the initiative for such decisions should come from the HJC rather than the President.
[...] While it is positive that the court network is established by the Rada, this should not be done through a resolution but through the ordinary legislative procedure.

CDL-AD(2013)034: Opinion on proposals amending the draft law on the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §§13-14


“It would seem that the territorial organisation of the court system under the draft would be based on the administrative structure of [a country], both as regards the local general courts of first instance and the establishment of [...] courts of appeal [...]. While the overriding criteria determining the territorial structure of the court system should be the needs of the court system itself and the facility of access by people to the courts, such a system is acceptable in principle. In a new democracy [...] it would however seem preferable to avoid such a link between administrative division and court organisation to make it more difficult for the administration to exert undue influence on the courts.”

CDL-INF(2000)005: Opinion on the draft law of Ukraine on the judicial system, p.4

“However, it would be preferable to leave the composition of the panels to the rules of procedure.”

CDL-AD(2013)015: Opinion on the draft law on the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §59

“[...] According to [the principle of the 'lawful' or 'natural' judge and/or panel], the composition of the panel examining a case should be defined in advance by a statute or at least by objective criteria based on the law. [...]”

[...] [T]he First President/Presidents of Chambers [of the Supreme Court] should not have an unlimited discretion in setting up panels, distributing cases amongst them and assigning judges (and lay judges) to the benches.”

CDL-AD(2017)031: Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, §§87 and 88

“It would be desirable to avoid extensive involvement of the executive (Ministry of Justice) in adopting court rules for internal operation and procedure and delegate the adoption of the internal regulation and rules of procedure to the courts, within the limits set by the laws.”

CDL-AD(2013)015: Opinion on the draft law on the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §70


“[...] There is no international standard on the number of judicial instances; the State is free to choose a model which best suits its needs and is compatible with the national legal traditions.”

“The court system is rather complex […]. There are four levels of jurisdiction […]. It should be kept in mind that a very elaborate and complicated judicial system carries with it the risk of prolongation of proceedings. […] Thus structural features in a legal system that cause delays are not an excuse under Article 6. Although the Supreme Court is apparently overloaded today, the solution in a longer term can hardly lie in the establishment of additional court levels but in the streamlining of the proceedings and making them more effective. […] The complicated system of judicial self-government may potentially deprive many judges of the time needed for the real judicial work. […]”


“[…] [I]f the President's function of establishing and liquidating courts is to remain in the Constitution, the future constitutional reform should ensure that the ceremonial character of that function is clearly reflected. […]”


“The Venice Commission […] consider that the appropriate body to make the ultimate assessment on the number of Supreme Court judges and of the need for more judges is usually the legislator or the High Council of Justice, given that the choice depends, inter alia, on the available budgetary means, which cannot be determined by the Supreme Court judges. It is nevertheless highly recommended that the legislator takes into consideration the opinion of the Supreme Court in the legislative process […].”

...CDL-AD(2014)031, Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Human Rights (DHR) of the Directorate of Human Rights and the Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe, on the draft Law on Amendments to the Organic Law on General Courts of Georgia, §19

“[…] [I]t may be necessary to fix [in the Draft Code] […] the number of judges of the Court of Cassation, to avoid ‘packing’ this court by new judges. By contrast, as to the lower courts, it would be better to provide in the Draft Code only general criteria for determining the number of judges and to entrust the SJC and/or Parliament with the power to determine the exact numbers and repartition of judges amongst the lower courts.”

...CDL-AD(2017)019, Opinion on the Draft Judicial Code of Armenia, §42

“Article 4(3) reads: ‘The total number of judges for each court shall be determined by the HJPC, on the elaborated proposal of the President of the Court and the express consent of the Ministry of Justice’. While the first part of the provision […] is logical and not objectionable, it is less clear (1) why the proposal should be submitted by the President of the Court, and (2) when this should be done. It seems that since the total number of judges is to be determined for each Court, the President of each Court should make a proposal, but this needs to be clarified. Equally problematic is the requirement of the express consent of the Minister of Justice of BiH. The draft Law does not provide details on whether and in what case the Minister of Justice may refuse consent or what is to happen in such an eventuality, which has the potential to lead to deadlock.”
“Article 4(2) provides that ‘the High Court shall have an equal number of judges from each of the constituent Peoples and the appropriate number of judges from the ranks of Others’. The Venice Commission understands that this provision aims to ensure the equitable representation of various peoples living in the territory of BiH. While such an effort is legitimate in the political sphere, for instance in setting the parameters of the voting system, it would be highly problematic to apply it within the judiciary. […]

[…] Organising courts along ethnic lines would be wrong, counterproductive and damaging to the credibility of the judicial institutions. […]”

“ […] Several provisions of the Draft confer to the Ministry of Justice powers over the judiciary. Article 47 imposes the obligation on the president of the court to deliver the activity report of the court to the Ministry of Justice, and, at the request of the Ministry of Justice, to deliver specific or periodic reports which are necessary for the performance of tasks falling under their jurisdiction. These obligations seem to place the president of the court in a position of subordination to the Ministry of Justice.

According to Article 50, ‘the performance of court administration tasks shall be supervised by the Ministry of Justice. […]’. Article 52 further establishes the possibility for the Ministry of Justice to carry out inspections in courts, for example, in relation to the organisation of work in courts […]

Article 50, para. 2 includes a specific provision which rightly sets out that ‘In exercising its supervision functions, the Ministry of Justice may not take actions that interfere with court’s decision issuance in legal cases’. However, it should be noted that no clear-cut boundary separates supervision of court administration from supervision of fulfilment of adjudicative tasks. […] It should be considered whether the Judicial Council could be entrusted with the supervision of court administration as defined in Chapter IV of the Draft law on courts […]

It should be considered to harmonize the two laws in this respect, limiting the supervisory role of the Ministry of Justice in a clearer manner. It is recalled in this context that Montenegro has a long history of risk of politicisation of the judiciary, and that, as proposed in the Draft law on rights and duties of judges and on judicial council, the Judicial Council will have a special (more balanced) composition to combat both this risk and the risk of too corporatist approach within the judiciary.”

“The Venice Commission accepts that lay judges may take part in the proceedings before the first instance courts. However, their participation at the level of the SC is, as a rule, ill-advised. […]”

4.1.2 Specialised courts
“[…] [I]t would seem *inter alia* desirable to state clearly that the general courts have residual jurisdiction, i.e. that they are competent to deal with all justiciable matters which are not specifically referred by law to the specialised courts within the overall system.”

*CDL-INF(2000)005.* Opinion on the draft law of Ukraine on the judicial system, p. 3

“Usually, the Venice Commission refrains from taking a definite stance on the establishment of separate administrative courts. Both models (having special administrative courts or keeping administrative cases within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts) are legitimate. While specialisation may be very useful in certain circumstances, it creates a risk of complicating the system and is not always cost-efficient, especially in small countries. That being said, ‘it is of course perfectly compatible with European standards to introduce administrative courts with specific jurisdiction standing beside the ordinary general courts’.

What may be problematic is where such a three-pillar system has no common highest instance, since the three different chambers remain separated within the Court of Cassation. It may give rise to two types of complications: jurisdictional disputes (disputes about which court is competent to hear a particular case) and inconsistent case law, especially between the civil and the administrative pillars. […] If different branches of the judiciary are completely separate, there is a risk that they develop conflicting approaches to the same issues.

There are different solutions to this problem. One would be to have a joint chamber with a greater amount of judges, but with separate civil and administrative panels. Within this chamber it would be possible to develop case-management and case-distribution with provisions or routines that could support uniformity. […] Another solution would be to keep separate chambers, but provide for a regular (or *ad hoc*) common sitting of all three chambers of the Court of Cassation, which would resolve jurisdictional disputes and ensure coherence of the case law.”


“[…] The Venice Commission has previously pointed out the need to unify the system of ordinary courts and to transform the high specialised courts into sections within the Supreme Court, with the (possible) exception of the high administrative court. This could help to ensure the harmonisation of case-law and the uniform application of the law and avoid conflicts between courts and would diminish the bureaucracy. It would also reduce the length of the proceedings, which must be reasonable under Article 6 ECHR.”

See also *CDL-AD(2013)014.* Opinion on the Draft Law on the amendments to the Constitution, Strengthening the Independence of Judges and on the Changes to the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Assembly of Ukraine, §45

“The draft provides for a system of separate economic (arbitration) courts. Such systems exist in various countries and the need for judges to specialise in various areas of commercial law to efficiently deal with commercial disputes justifies dealing with commercial cases separately. It is
however more common in Western Europe to use special panels of the ordinary courts for such matters, often providing for the involvement of merchants as lay judges. By contrast, the Ukrainian solution appears problematic since it is a simple continuation of the Soviet model which was based on different legal regulations for individuals and socially owned entities. The conceptual justification for this model does not exist in a market economy in which inter-enterprise relations are governed by private law.”

CDL-INF(2000)005, Opinion on the draft law of Ukraine on the judicial system, p. 5

“[The law provides that Regional Courts shall have a Civil Case Panel and a Criminal Case Panel]. Ideally there should be the principle of rotation of the judges between panels from time to time. The same applies to the Supreme Court (having Senates) […].”


“ […] A system of granting jurisdiction to military courts for cases involving civilians and where there seems no need to have recourse to military judges is bound to produce violations of the Convention.”

CDL-INF(2000)005, Opinion on the draft law of Ukraine on the judicial system, p. 5

“It is true that military courts exist in other countries and are not objectionable as such. The proposed system nevertheless goes beyond what is acceptable. In a democratic country the military has to be integrated into society and not kept apart. Democracies therefore generally provide for the possibility of appeals from military courts to civilian courts and a final appeal to a panel composed of military officers appears wholly unsatisfactory.”

CDL-INF(2000)005, Opinion on the draft law of Ukraine on the judicial system, p. 4

“[…] The transfer of the power to adjudicate misdemeanour proceedings to the judiciary is to be welcomed. Under the current system, bodies in charge of misdemeanour procedure do not have the status of courts, although in such procedures sentence of imprisonment may be passed.”

CDL-AD(2014)038, Opinion on the draft laws on courts and on rights and duties of judges and on the Judicial Council of Montenegro, §§5-60

“The arguments for specialisation are notably weak when it comes to central matters of criminal jurisdiction. Measures against individuals suspected of having committed a crime are an important part of criminal procedure. In most countries, criminal judges take such decisions during the investigation phase and in Turkey, even after the establishment of the peace judgements, criminal judges continue to do so during the prosecution phase. For this reason, all criminal judges must be fully competent to take decisions on such matters.

The creation of a specialist court to deal with pre-trial criminal matters does not appear to be a tradition of judicial systems in many European democracies. […]”

CDL-AD(2017)004, Opinion on the duties, competences and functioning of the criminal peace judgements of Turkey, §§59-60
4.2 Organisation of work within the courts

4.2.1 The role of the higher courts vis-à-vis the lower courts

“[…] Judicial decisions should not be subject to revision outside the appeal process […]”

CDL-AD(2013)035, Opinion on the draft Code on Judicial Ethics of the Republic of Tajikistan, §8

“[…] The internal judicial independence requires that they be free from instructions or pressure from their fellow judges and vis-à-vis their judicial superiors. Seeking instructions in individual cases from higher instance judges, who would be deciding the appeal, deprives the parties from an independent review of their judgment, thereby violating their right of access to the courts […]. Such practice (including providing instructions) is not only inefficient (one level of jurisdiction is, de facto, removed), but it also violates human rights. This practice, if persisted in, should be dealt with through disciplinary means against judges taking part in such practice.”

CDL-AD(2014)007, Joint opinion on the draft law amending and supplementing the judicial code (evaluation system for judges) of Armenia, §§15 and 18


“In the previous Opinion, the Venice Commission pointed out different ways in which the Curia and the court leaders can interfere in the administration of justice of the lower courts. The Curia ensures the uniformity of the application of the law by adopting ‘an obligatory decision applicable for courts’ […], by ‘publishing court rulings and decisions or authoritative rulings’ […], by making a ‘legal standardisation decision’ […] and by conducting an analysis of the jurisprudence.

Crucially, chairs and division heads of courts and tribunals continuously monitor the administration of justice by the courts under their supervision and have to inform the higher levels of judgments handed down contrary to ‘theoretical issues’ and ‘theoretical grounds’ […]. Non-compliance with the rulings of the higher courts could have a negative influence on the evaluation of the judges and thus on their career.

 […] Uniformity procedure and its system of supervision by the court presidents might have a chilling effect on the independence of the individual judge […] [and] may only be acceptable if it does not have a negative influence on the career of the judges […].

 […] The supervision of judges by chairs and division heads of courts and tribunals should be abolished.”

CDL-AD(2012)020, Opinion on the Cardinal Acts on the Judiciary that were amended following the adoption of Opinion CDL-AD(2012)001 on Hungary, §§50-53

“[…] While a supreme judicial body such as the Supreme Court generally plays a key role in a country, by, among others, providing legal certainty, foreseeability, and uniformity in the interpretation and application of laws, it should not supervise lower courts nor issue guidelines, directives, explanations, or resolutions that would be binding on judges. Article 96 par 2, as amended, allowing the Supreme Court to give mandatory ‘explanations’ should, therefore, be deleted.
At the same time, this does not mean that judges at lower instances may simply ignore the judgments of the Supreme Court. By way of appeal, the Supreme Court will ensure that its interpretation of the law prevails. However, lower court judges should have the possibility to distinguish their cases at hand from previous cases and they should be in a position to present new arguments, which then will be tested at the appeals stage.”

CDL-AD(2016)025, Endorsed joint opinion on the draft law “on Introduction of amendments and changes to the Constitution” of the Kyrgyz Republic, §§68-69

“[…] Uniformity of interpretation of law shall be encouraged through studies of judicial practice that […] have no binding force.”

CDL-AD(2015)014, Joint Opinion on the draft law “on introduction of changes and amendments to the Constitution” of the Kyrgyz Republic, §71
See also CDL-AD(2015)008, Preliminary Opinion on the Draft Law on amending the Law on the Judicial System and the Status of Judges of Ukraine, §36

“[…] The highest courts’ guidance is very important for the lower courts in the interpretation and implementation of human rights standards in their case-law. It is evident that an appeal procedure before a superior court would provide for better guarantees to the interested parties compared to an appeal procedure before a same level judgeship.

[…] It is hard to see how the system of horizontal appeals can contribute to the objective of standardisation. On the contrary, the horizontal appeals appear to be problematic from the viewpoint of the unification of case-law.”

CDL-AD(2017)004, Opinion on the duties, competences and functioning of the criminal peace judichecks of Turkey, §§72-73

“Article 15(3)(b) permits the State Court to reopen criminal proceedings that have been concluded with a legally-binding decision of the Court. This provision is too wide in its current form and would permit the Court to reopen an acquittal in breach of the rule against double jeopardy. The circumstances in which a legally-binding decision can be revisited need to be set out. […]”

CDL-AD(2013)015, Opinion on the draft law on the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §45

“[…] If a non-judicial body were to review judicial decisions, the rights of all possible victims of the criminal conduct punished by the courts would remain unprotected. In addition, if new circumstances have arisen, including awareness of past miscarriages of justice, only courts can be able to review them in final instance. This is why it is essential that when deciding whether or not a case should be referred to a Court of Appeal, the [commission on the miscarriages of justice] should not touch upon what should have been or should be the outcome of the case at issue.
The establishment of a special 'chamber for miscarriages of justice' would be contrary to the constitutional prohibition of extraordinary courts."

“The newly created Extraordinary Chamber will receive the power to revise legally binding judgments by way of ‘extraordinary control’. […]

A system of extraordinary appeals against final judgements existed in many former communist countries. Such system was found by the ECtHR as violating the principle of *res judicata* and of the legal certainty. The proposed Polish system is not entirely identical to the old Soviet system, but has a lot of similarities with it.

Under the Rule of Law Checklist, the principle of *res judicata* implies that ‘final judgments must be respected, unless there are cogent reasons for revising them’. Some of the proposals made by the Draft Act are acceptable. For example, Article 86 § 1 provides for the reopening of the proceedings where there has been a violation of human rights and freedoms. In such circumstances, the reopening must be possible, but only under certain conditions – namely, where the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland or the ECtHR established the fact of such violations.”

“[According to the draft amendments to] the constitution of Kyrgyzstan, the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic has a right of legislative initiative. The Commission finds that the Supreme Court should not be directly involved in the negotiating efforts to force specific draft legislation through the parliament because this could draw the Supreme Court into the political arena and may thus endanger its independence.”

4.2.2 Allocation of cases

“[…] [T]he Venice Commission strongly recommends that the allocation of cases to individual judges should be based to the maximum extent possible on objective and transparent criteria established in advance by the law or by special regulations on the basis of the law, e.g. in court regulations. Exceptions should be motivated.”

“[…] [T]he Venice Commission recommends that the Hungarian authorities use other mechanisms for the distribution of cases […] ‘[…] for example on the basis of alphabetical order, on the basis of a computerised system or on the basis of objective criteria such as categories of cases’. The general rules (including exceptions) should be formulated by the law or by special regulations on the basis of the law, e.g. in court regulations laid down by the presidium or
president. It may not always be possible to establish a fully comprehensive abstract system that operates for all cases, leaving no room to decisions regarding allocation in individual cases. There may be circumstances requiring a need to take into account the workload or the specialisation of judges. Especially complex legal issues may require the participation of judges who are expert in that area. Moreover, it may be prudent to place newly appointed judges in a panel with more experienced members for a certain period of time. Furthermore, it may be prudent when a court has to give a principled ruling on a complex or landmark case, that senior judges sit in on that case. The criteria for making such decisions by the court president or presidium should, however, be defined in advance on the basis of objective criteria. [...]."


“[…] It should be made sure that specialisation of judges cannot be used to circumvent the system of random case assignment [...].”

“[…] Whenever there is an electronic case-attribution system [of distribution of cases amongst judges], the rules according to which it operates must be clear and it should be possible to verify their correct application. Ideally, the allocation should be subject to review. [...]"

“[…] If there are to be exceptions to the general principle of random allocation of cases, they should be clearly and narrowly formulated in the law. Setting of the method of distribution of cases should not be within the discretionary power of the MoJ.”
CDL-AD(2017)031, Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, §120

“Articles 31 to 33 establish the rules concerning the adoption by the president of the court of the annual schedule of assignments. It is a well-conceived system, which excludes any external interference, provides for the participation of the judges of the court and guarantees transparency.”
CDL-AD(2014)038, Opinion on the draft laws on courts and on rights and duties of judges and on the Judicial Council of Montenegro, §37

4.2.3 Transfer of cases from one judge to another

“[…] Workload statistics provide objective statistical data, but they are not sufficient as a basis for the decision on transfer [...]. In order to prevent any risk of abuse, court presidents and the President of the NJO (National Judicial Office) should not have the discretion to decide which cases should be transferred or to select the ‘sending’ or ‘receiving’ courts. In addition, any such
case allocation should be subject to review in order to take into account possible harsh situations where persons without the means to come to a court that is far away from their home town.”

“...”

“The second urgent topic is the procedure of the transfer of cases. While the NJC adopted criteria on the selection of the court, which is to receive the case, the most critical decision is the selection of individual cases by the president of the overburdened court. The amendments do not provide for the establishment of criteria for this selection.

The NJC should be mandated to establish such criteria, which would have to be objective (e.g. a transparent random selection). The conformity of the selection of a case with such criteria should be the standard for the judicial review of the transfer.

In addition, further issues are linked to the transfer of cases:

1. the date of notification of the transfer to the parties should be the starting point for the 8 days deadline for appeals against transfers, not the date of their publication on the web-site;

2. in case of annulment by the Curia of the assignment of a case to another court, the case should be dealt with by the original court and the President of the NJO should not be able to assign a case to another court instead;

3. even if the Curia uses the NJC’s principles on the transfer of cases, the President of the NJO should be explicitly bound by them (and not only ‘take them into account’) and the judicial review of the transfer of cases should not be restricted to compliance with ‘legal provisions’ but should explicitly include the principles established by the NJC;

4. as a contradiction of the principle of equality of arms, the competence of the Prosecutor General to give instructions that charges be brought before a court other than the court of general competence should be removed.”

“Cases should not be transferred from a judge without good reason [...]”

4.2.4 Presidents (chairpersons) and senior judges: appointment, status, role and powers

4.2.4.1 Appointment of the presidents

“[...] [T]he power of the President to appoint the chairmen of all courts without any involvement of the Council of Justice [...] appears to be problematic.”
“[…] The possibility for appointment of the First President [of the Supreme Court] ad interim should be limited to situations of real emergency; the Draft Act should provide for an automatic solution (like the appointment of a most senior amongst the Presidents of the Chambers, which does not involve the exercise of the discretion by the President of the Republic) and be limited in time. […]

In principle, the appointment of the First President by the President of the Republic is within the range of acceptable solutions, as long as the judiciary is meaningfully involved in the process. […]”

CDL-AD(2017)031, Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, §§73 and 75
See also CDL(1995)074rev, Opinion on the Albanian law on the organisation of the judiciary, p. 2

“[The draft according to that] Chief Judges of the various courts with the exception of the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court are elected by [the parliament…] is problematic from the point of view of judicial independence. The election of the respective Chief Judge by his peers would be preferable.”

CDL-INF(2000)005, Opinion on the draft law of Ukraine on the judicial system, p.3
See also CDL-AD(2013)005, Opinion on Draft amendments to Laws on the Judiciary of Serbia, §71; CDL-INF(1998)015, Opinions on the constitutional regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chapter B.I, §9

“[…] Indeed, the Commission had indicated in former opinions that granting the final decision on both the appointment and the dismissal of the President of the Supreme Court to the Parliament conveyed the impression of political control. This proposed amendment fully takes such criticism into account, and eliminates any political intervention in the choice of the President of the Supreme Court. In this respect, the transparency of the procedure for appointment and dismissal of the President of the Supreme Court by the two-third majority of the Judicial Council, at the proposal of the Supreme Court’s judges, should be ensured.
As concerns the proposal set out in the second set of amendments, the requirement of a two-third majority represents an improvement compared to the present situation; however, the Venice Commission considers that the first proposal – election and release from duty by the Judicial Council - is more appropriate and should be retained.”

CDL-AD(2012)024, Opinion on two Sets of draft Amendments to the Constitutional Provisions relating to the Judiciary of Montenegro, §§16-17

“The President of the Supreme Administrative Court is elected for a nine-year term of office by a two-thirds majority of the members of the National Assembly […]

[…] Efforts should be made, therefore, to ensure that the conditions of election help to minimise the political aspect while at the same time avoiding deadlock. To achieve this, it is important to strictly circumscribe the conditions of eligibility to the office, among which the question of experience is paramount. In the new system introduced in Hungary, while the appointment of judges with administrative experience is to be welcomed, at least five years’ experience as a judge should be required for appointment to the post of President of the SAC. […]
The condition laid down in Article 44 § 1 b) should thus be amended, within the framework of the Fundamental Law, so that a person appointed judge because of his or her lengthy experience in the public administration could not be appointed President of the SAC until several years after their recruitment as an administrative judge. One may note in this connection that appointment
by an executive authority, such as the Head of State, with proper guarantees, may be less political in nature than election by Parliament.”

CDL-AD(2019)004, Opinion on the law on administrative courts and the law on the entry into force of the law on administrative courts and certain transitional rules of Hungary, §§95 and 97

“Given this involvement of the Jogorku Kenesh in the appointment and dismissal of Supreme Court judges, it is not apparent why it would, in addition, be necessary for it to also select the Chairperson and deputy chairpersons of the Court. The current procedure, whereby this is left up to the members of the Supreme Court, would appear to be the more reasonable manner of selecting the Chairperson/deputies, since the other members of the Court will be more familiar with the requirements of the post, and the qualifications needed to fill this post. […]”

CDL-AD(2015)014, Joint Opinion on the draft law “on introduction of changes and amendments to the Constitution” of the Kyrgyz Republic, §78

“Appointment to the positions of administrative court president and vice-president also comes within the Minister’s purview […]”

[...] It is recommended that the procedure be reconsidered so as to involve the Personnel Council of the NAJC [National Administrative Judicial Council], in an effective role, in the Minister’s final decision and to provide for judicial remedy against such decisions.”

CDL-AD(2019)004, Opinion on the law on administrative courts and the law on the entry into force of the law on administrative courts and certain transitional rules of Hungary, §§61 and 64

“The appointment of court presidents by the organs of judicial self-administration […] would go too far as well if this term were to refer only to the Congress of Judges. […] Such appointments should be rather made by the High Judicial Council, which has a higher democratic legitimacy than the organs of judicial self-administration. If the term ‘organs of judicial self-administration’ were to include the High Judicial Council then this should be spelled out explicitly.”

CDL-AD(2013)034, Opinion on proposals amending the draft law on the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §18

“The Venice Commission and the Directorate welcome the proposed system of election of court presidents by the judges of the same court by secret ballot which is in line with the requirements of the principle of internal independence of the judiciary […].”


“Paragraph 13/2 sets out that candidates for president of courts, in addition to having the normal qualifications, competence, and worthiness to perform the judicial function, must also have the capacity to manage and organise the activities of the courts. […] All these criteria appear to be appropriate to take into account in choosing a president of a court. It is also to be welcomed that
these prerequisites are set out in a normative text, which is far from being the case in all member States.

[...]

Nevertheless, the question is once again the manner in which these criteria are evaluated. This is all the more important as, by definition, a person who is a candidate for president of courts for the first time will not have had the opportunity to show his or her managerial skills. This means that the criteria seem to be subjective [...] This might be revisited.”

CDL-AD(2009)023, Opinion on the Draft Criteria and Standards for the Election of Judges and Court Presidents of Serbia, §§50, 52

4.2.4.2 Term of appointment, tenure, re-appointment

“[…] [A]ppointing court presidents with administrative functions for a limited period of time does not violate the European standards. However there is not a single standard – in several European countries the principle is that also court presidents are irremovable.”

CDL-AD(2014)021, Opinion on the draft law on introducing amendments and addenda to the judicial code of Armenia (term of Office of Court Presidents), §41

“[…] [T]he limitation of the term of office of chairpersons appears to be a guarantee of independence where the executive authorities have a decisive influence on the appointment procedure for chairpersons. In this latter case, according to the Venice Commission, appointments should be for a fixed term and there should be a limit on possible renewals. The influence of chairpersons may grow ever stronger over a long period of time and renewable terms of office may also substantially jeopardise the independence of a Chairperson, who may at some point be influenced in his/her work by the desire to be reappointed by the executive.

However, a short-term appointment risks undermining courts presidents’ possibilities to realise effective leadership and to ensure a solid and strong courts’ organisation.

[…] It is recommended that immediate reappointment be excluded from the draft law. [...] [T]he Venice Commission and the DHR cannot see the reason why the term of office of court presidents which is five years in the current system, is reduced to three years in the draft amendments. On the contrary, in an appointment system which guarantees better internal independence as the newly proposed one, the court presidents may even have a longer term of office to ensure a solid and strong courts’ organisation.

Having regard in particular to the proposed appointment system of court presidents, three years term appears rather short. The Commission and the Directorate recommend thus the extension of the term of office of court presidents.”


See also CDL-AD(2014)021, Opinion on the draft law on introducing amendments and addenda to the judicial code of Armenia (term of Office of Court Presidents), §§30, 31

“[…] [T]he term of office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is of 10 years. In the current situation in Georgia, which is at a point of transition to a larger and newly constituted Supreme
Court, the appointment of a Chief Justice for as long as 10 years might be too long. Therefore, to facilitate a staggered appointment, [...] a shorter term of office for the Chief Justice might be considered.

CDL-AD(2019)009, Urgent Opinion on the selection and appointment of Supreme Court judges of Georgia, §53

"[...] The provisions providing for the automatic termination of the mandates of court chairperson upon the enactment of the draft amendment law is problematic and should be removed."


4.2.4.3 Powers of the presidents

"[...] [T]he competence of the court chairperson should stay purely administrative and should not interfere with the judicial functions of judges."

See also CDL-AD(2014)038, Opinion on the draft laws on courts and on rights and duties of judges and on the Judicial Council of Montenegro, §§23, 24

"[...] [A] president should not be seen as being hierarchically superior to ‘ordinary’ judges: s/he should not be in a position to give them directions concerning their cases – neither de jure nor de facto. Therefore, it is important that powers of the presidents are formulated with sufficient precision, so as to limit any possibility of abuse. [...]"

CDL-AD(2017)018, Opinion on the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria, §83

"[...] It is thus welcomed that the High Council of Justice is indicated as the unique authority in the draft Law, to formally initiate disciplinary proceedings against judges. The limitation of court presidents’ competence to ‘inform’ the High Council on disciplinary misconduct of a judge is also a positive step which strengthens ‘internal’ judicial independence."

See also CDL-AD(2017)018, Opinion on the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria, §84; CDL-AD(2008)041, Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitutional Law on the Supreme Court and Local Courts of Kyrgyzstan, §17

"[...] It is not clear why the President of the court should be deciding on the timing and frequency of the assessment. He or she may have the power to signal the need for an assessment or request for a disciplinary investigation. However, it should not be the President’s responsibility to make decisions on those issues."

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §86
“Article 8.3 sets out what judges should do when there are any attempts to influence them or put undue pressure on them. It might be useful to recommend that the president of the court in question act in support of the individual judge concerned when notifying the judicial community and the law enforcement agencies of this situation.”

CDL-AD(2013)035, Opinion on the draft Code on Judicial Ethics of the Republic of Tajikistan, §51

4.2.5 Remedies against the problem of the length of procedure

“[…] In parallel to introducing the right of a fair trial within reasonable time, the respective superior court or directly the Supreme Court should be entrusted with a specific compensatory and acceleratory remedy against the excessive length of procedure.”

CDL-AD(2013)034, Opinion on proposals amending the draft law on the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §10

“[The law] enables the President of the NJO to designate another court based on the vague criterion of ‘adjudicating cases within a reasonable period of time’. This relates to Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of the Act on Transitional Provisions of 30 December 2011, which were adopted on the constitutional level in order to overcome the annulment of a similar provision on the legislative level by Constitutional Court judgment no. 166/2011 of 20 December 2011. The Constitutional Court had found that provision contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. […] Even though the reasonable time requirement is part of both Article XXVIII Fundamental Law and Article 6.1 ECHR, it is not absolute, but forms a field of tension with the often conflicting right to a fair trial with respect to the fact that having and exercising more procedural rights necessarily goes hand in hand with a longer duration of the proceedings. Taking into account the importance of the right to a lawful judge for a fair trial, the state has to resort to other less intrusive means, in particular to provide for a sufficient number of judges and court staff. Solutions by means of arbitrary designation of another court cannot be justified at all.”


“[…] It seems that the aim of these Articles is to address the serious problem of dilatory or vexatious proceedings and thus protect the right to a fair trial. Such an aim should be welcomed. The possibility to apply to a higher court with the request to remedy unjustified delay can be an effective tool for the protection of the right to a fair trial. However, the reasons for the dilatory or vexatious proceedings could be many: inefficient and/or cumbersome regulations, increased caseload, lack of training or recourse, etc. Thus, in order to eliminate the problems, the reasons for such delays need to be analysed in order to be addressed correctly.

The basis for this set of provisions is the obligation of a member state, under Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to provide an effective remedy including, as a last resort, paying damages if a violation of the Convention occurs. […]

The starting point for a regulation should be to view financial compensation as one of several remedies. Financial compensation must thus not be the only remedy or the remedy to be considered first. It all depends on the circumstances of the specific case. […] This means that, as far as possible, violations should primarily be redressed or remedied within the framework of the process in which they arise. For this to be possible, courts and administrative authorities must be
aware of all the issues that concern the European Convention on Human Rights in both procedural and material terms. At the same time, individuals cannot remain passive in their contacts with courts and authorities.

It should be emphasised that the Contracting States have great freedom to choose how they fulfil their commitments in this regard. There are various alternatives for damage-regulation for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights, for example a reduction of a criminal sentence could be an effective remedy in certain cases.

The legislation of a state may also contain a number of proactive safeguards to ensure that judges handle cases without undue delay. For instance, there could be provisions giving a party the right to request the acceleration of the proceedings of a case in court. If a case has been unreasonably delayed, the case could be given priority in the court. Under such provisions the president of a court may have the responsibility to intervene in situations where there is a serious risk that a single case cannot be settled within a reasonable period of time. If a case or matter is not moved forward to a ruling within a reasonable period of time, the president of the court could be obliged to have another judge take over the case.

[...] [D]raft Article 8A – 8C also introduces a procedure where a request for and a decision on damages are interlinked with the concept of the acceleration of the case handling. The damages, or 'the appropriate indemnity', will be decided beforehand and a system with parallel processes is introduced accordingly.

This decision on damages will serve as a sort of penalty or fine, forcing the judge to deal with the case. This could put him/her under pressure, which in turn could endanger the principle of a fair trial. The principle of state liability followed by the liability of the judge under certain conditions set out in Article 6 of the Law on judges, could also increase this pressure. In following the management of and decision-making in a case, new and unforeseen facts or aspects may be brought into the case or otherwise change the conditions under which justice is or should be rendered in that case. It is therefore important to underline that it is the State that is responsible under the European Convention on Human Rights and not the individual judge.
should allow deciding similar cases more quickly. Given that uniformisation judgements are not abstract but are given in individual cases, the Venice Commission’s delegation did not object to this practice.

[...]

[Another] solution [to reduce backlog] was to transform the Supreme Court into a real cassation court, which should not take any evidence and look into points of law only. In addition, any first instance jurisdiction should be removed from the Supreme Court. The Venice Commission’s delegation supported this idea.”

CDL-AD(2014)016, Opinion on the draft amendments to the criminal procedure and civil procedure codes of Albania, §§22-23 and 25

4.3 Budgetary and staff autonomy

“It is the duty of the state to provide adequate financial resources for the judicial system. Even in times of crisis, the proper functioning and the independence of the Judiciary must not be endangered. Courts should not be financed on the basis of discretionary decisions of official bodies but in a stable way on the basis of objective and transparent criteria.

International texts do not provide for a budgetary autonomy of the judiciary but there is a strong case in favour of taking views of the judiciary into account when preparing the budget. […]

Decisions on the allocation of funds to courts must be taken with the strictest respect for the principle of judicial independence and the judiciary should have an opportunity to express its views about the proposed budget to parliament, possibly through the judicial council.”


“[…] It is welcome that the Council is competent to prepare the budget of the judiciary. However, in order to strengthen the independence of the Judiciary, the Council should also be enabled to present this draft and to defend it directly to Parliament. […]”

CDL-AD(2015)037, First Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitution (Chapters 1 to 7 and 10) of the Republic of Armenia, §184

“Additional guarantees may also be applied to ensure financial independence of the judiciary, such as the prohibition of reducing the budget of courts in comparison to the previous financial year or without the consent of the HJC, except in the case of a general reduction of the State Budget.”

CDL-AD(2013)005, Opinion on Draft amendments to Laws on the Judiciary of Serbia §125
“[The practice according to which, contrary to the principle of budgetary autonomy of the magistracy, the Ministry of Justice in fact controls every detail of the courts' operational budgets] contains obvious dangers of undue interference in the independent exercise of their functions.”

CDL(1995)074rev, Opinion on the Albanian law on the organisation of the judiciary, p. 3

“As regards the development of the overall budget of the judiciary, the Ministry of Justice may play some role in this process; for example, the Ministry may be allowed to present to Parliament objections or amendments to the budget proposed by the SJC for adoption.”


“[…] The parliamentary budget battles […] are undoubtedly of a political nature. […] While wanting to ensure greater independence of judges and courts, and thus to bring about their depoliticization, [by involving the Council of Justice into these battles] it may turn out that they will, quite to the contrary, be engulfed in the political debate. Without deviating from the principle of having a separate budget for the judiciary and, in order to allow for a de facto judicial independence, these of powers and budgetary struggles could rather be left with Minister of Justice or the Cabinet as a whole which will feel politically responsible for the treatment eventually accorded to the judiciary in the matters of proper funding.”


“[…] The independence in financial matters, i.e. the right of the judiciary to be granted sufficient funds to properly perform its functions and to have a role in deciding how these funds are allocated, is one of the main elements of the institutional (and also individual) independence of the judiciary. […]

The budgets of courts and prosecutors' offices are determined at the level of the State (state courts), the Republika Srpska (RS courts), the Federation (Central FBiH Courts), the cantons (cantonal courts), and the Brčko District (BD courts). The Federation, due to its structure, bears the brunt of the budget fragmentation, which directly undermines the efficiency of the judiciary of the Entity.

No uniform rules exist in this area with the result that there are quite different budgets allocated to different courts and prosecutors’ offices. Moreover, judicial bodies become easily vulnerable to pressure from the institution deciding on the budget.

The HJPC has made an initiative aimed at centralising the financing of the judiciary and bringing it to the state level. So far, this initiative has not been implemented, although the centralisation of the financing could be counted among the most important steps to be taken. On a lower scale, consideration should be given by the Federation, in the long run, to the financing of the judiciary (both courts and prosecutor’s office) being concentrated at the entity level. In the short run, the Federation might consider at least bringing the financing of salaries of judges and prosecutors to the Federation level and leaving, for the time being, the financing of the expenditure relating to the running of courts to the cantonal levels.”

CDL-AD(2012)014, Opinion on Legal Certainty and the Independence of the Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, §§95-98
“Article 35(4) stipulates that ‘Legal associates, senior legal associates and legal advisors shall be appointed by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council’. As far as legal associates and legal advisors shall assist judges in their work, it may be advisable to allow the involvement of the Court and the judges in the selection process. The advisors shall closely work with judges and the operation of the Court may be more efficient if the judges have a say in the selection of their advisors.”

CDL-AD(2013)015, Opinion on the draft law on the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §72

“According to Article 48(5), ‘At the end of each budget year, the Presidents of the Courts shall inform the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the execution of the budget of the respective court’. The rationale for such a procedure is questionable, and it may also have a negative impact on the independence of the judiciary. The President of the Court should be relieved from such a legal obligation and, at the same time, the highest possible standards of transparency for budgetary expenditures by the courts should be provided.”

CDL-AD(2013)015, Opinion on the draft law on the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §81

V. COUNCIL OF JUSTICE

5.1 Functions, remit and duties

“There is no standard model that a democratic country is bound to follow in setting up its judicial system. With the exception of very few countries where the independence of the judiciary is maintained by other checks and balances, most European countries have established an independent judicial council which has the task of ensuring the proper functioning of an independent judiciary within a democratic state.”

CDL-AD(2018)003, Opinion on the Law on amending and supplementing the Constitution (Judiciary) of the Republic of Moldova, §46
See also CDL-INF(1998)009, Opinion on recent amendments to the law on major constitutional provisions of the Republic of Albania, §5

“To sum up, it is the Venice Commission’s view that it is an appropriate method for guaranteeing for the independence of the judiciary that an independent judicial council have decisive influence on decisions on the appointment and career of judges. Owing to the richness of legal culture in Europe, which is precious and should be safeguarded, there is no single model which applies to all countries. While respecting this variety of legal systems, the Venice Commission recommends that states which have not yet done so consider the establishment of an independent judicial council or similar body. In all cases the council should have a pluralistic composition with a substantial part, if not the majority, of members being judges. With the exception of ex-officio members these judges should be elected or appointed by their peers.”


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5 This section speaks of specialized bodies which deal with judicial appointments, promotions, disciplinary proceedings against judges and, more generally, secure autonomy of the judicial system vis-à-vis other branches of the Government. These bodies are often called “councils of justice” but the name, as well as composition and powers may vary from one country to another. Some countries have no councils of justice at all.
“[…] [I]n the previous opinion the Venice Commission recommended not to overburden the Judicial Council with purely administrative tasks, such as ‘judicial administration, including salaries, court buildings etc.’.

[…] [T]here are different models of distribution of administrative functions […]. The only important requirement is that the most important administrative functions should belong to a body or bodies enjoying a significant degree of independence.

[…] That solution does not exclude that some specific administrative functions connected to daily operation of the judiciary may be performed by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). […] That being said, all administrative support functions which may have effect on the independence of the judiciary should be performed by a body independent from the MoJ and, as stressed above, accountable to the SJC.”


“[…] The Venice Commission maintains its position that there is no need for two separate bodies [i.e. judicial council and the judges’ qualification commission] […]”

CDL-AD(2013)014, Opinion on the Draft Law on the amendments to the Constitution, Strengthening the Independence of Judges and on the Changes to the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Assembly of Ukraine, §40

“It is thus a positive step that the High Council of Justice be the sole authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against judges, which would provide for more guarantees compared to a system of plurality of disciplinary authorities competent to initiate those proceedings. […] The proposed system provides also for a clear division of tasks between the body in charge of investigating (the High Council of Justice) and the body in charge of deciding on the imposition of the disciplinary sanction, i.e. the Disciplinary Board. This is in line with international recommendations. […]”

See also CDL-AD(2008)041, Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitutional Law on the Supreme Court and Local Courts of Kyrgyzstan, §17

“[…] It is striking that, while the recommendation by the High Qualifications Commission is to be based exclusively on objective criteria, the High Council of Justice can apparently disagree with a recommendation for reasons that are not determined by the law. This opens the door to arbitrary decisions. It is strongly recommended to circumscribe the role of the High Council of Justice in a much more transparent way. Taking into account the characteristics of the decision-making
process before the High Qualifications Commission and the composition of the High Council of Justice, the role of the High Council of Justice should be made of a marginal nature, short of being removed.”

CDL-AD(2010)026, Joint opinion on the law on the judicial system and the status of judges of Ukraine by the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Co-operation within the Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, §50

“It is not uncommon in Europe to have some kind of inspection body that supervises judges […] to some extent, to see if they perform their duties correctly. Some countries have such institutions, others manage without them. However, from a comparative perspective it is clear that the powers of the Turkish HSYK to supervise and control the judges […] are not only greater than in most other European countries, but they have also been traditionally interpreted and applied in such a manner as to exert great influence on core judicial […] powers, in a politicised manner that has been quite controversial. The core issue with regard to the future independence, efficiency and legitimacy of the Turkish judiciary is whether the recent institutional reform will lead to a change in the way the substantial powers of the HSYK are used, or whether the tradition for political interference will be continued within the new framework.”


“The system of judicial self-government is too complicated. There are too many institutions: meetings of judges on different levels, conferences of judges, the Congress of judges of Ukraine, council of judges of respective courts and Council of Judges of Ukraine which is a different organ than the High Council of Justice. The structure should be simplified to be effective. This pyramid structure can become an obstacle for building a real self-government and the scope for ‘judicial politics’ seems enormous. The dispersal of powers through many bodies seems to lead to a potentially confusing situation where different bodies would exercise the same powers.”


“[…] [The] [p]rovisions relating to the training of judges and the establishment of a National Institute of Justice […] should be more detailed and should determine the main action of the Institute. The Institute should be controlled by the Supreme Judicial Council rather than the Ministry of Justice. […]”


“The amendments to Article 128 [of the Constitution] reflect the proposed competences of the Judicial Council to elect and release from duty the President of the Judicial Council and of the Supreme Court, and are therefore to be welcomed. […]”

CDL-AD(2012)024, Opinion on two Sets of draft Amendments to the Constitutional Provisions relating to the Judiciary of Montenegro, §26

“The [High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council] has broad competences […] it appoints judges and prosecutors […], decides on the suspension of judges, determines criteria for the assessment of judges and prosecutors, decides on the appeals in disciplinary proceedings, gives its views on
the annual budget for courts and prosecutors’ offices, gives its opinions on draft laws and regulations concerning the judiciary etc. […].

Article 24 of the draft Law gives the HJPC power to require courts, prosecutors’ offices and state authorities, as well as judges and prosecutors to provide it with information, documents and other materials in connection with the exercise of its competencies. It can also have access to all premises of courts and prosecutors’ offices and their records. Such competences confirm that the HJPC is the central organ within the judiciary.

Under Article 25 of the draft Law, the HJPC prepares a draft annual budget, which is then submitted, through the Ministry of Justice, to the Ministry of Finance and Treasury of BiH for approval. Under Article 23.2 of the draft Law, the HJPC may also make recommendations relating to the annual budgets of courts and prosecutors’ offices. The system of financing the judiciary remains, however, highly fragmented, with the budgets determined at several different levels (BiH, the Entities, the FBiH cantons, the District Brčko).

The extent of the competences seems to be in line with European standards, with the exception of the reservations made under Sections D, E and F above.”

“The structural unit of the High Council of Justice provided for in draft Article 351(1) seems to be an investigative body with very wide and discretionary powers. It is absolutely free to search all possible information on candidates [to judicial positions], without almost any restriction, since these research powers, including those concerning personal details, are covered by the candidate’s consent (draft Art. 35(4)). First, it is by no means clear in the draft law how the structural unit of the High Council of Justice will be composed and which working methods will be used. For dealing with highly confidential information, special requirements for the members of such a unit must be laid down in the legislation and also the conditions for their appointment/selection by the High Council and their responsibilities must be made clear.”

“In the Commission’s view, this provision enables the High Council of Justice to determine its own rules of procedure by adopting an appropriate ‘statute’, but does not allow for important matters governing its powers and affecting the rights and duties of magistrates to be so regulated. These matters should rather be regulated by a law adopted by Parliament.”

“The obligation [of the Council] to provide an annual report to the National Assembly seems reasonable.

The information provided to the public on the activities of the Council will also assist in rendering the judges’ work at the Council more transparent. It will notably allow the public to see that there are sanctions against judges that have committed disciplinary offences etc.”
5.2 Composition of the judicial council

5.2.1 General approach

“There is no standard model that a democratic country is bound to follow in setting up its Supreme Judicial Council so long as the function of such a Council fall within the aim to ensure the proper functioning of an independent Judiciary within a democratic State. Though models exist where the involvement of other branches of power (the legislative and the executive) is outwardly excluded or minimised, such involvement is in varying degrees recognised by most statutes and is justified by the social content of the functions of the Supreme Judicial Council and the need to have the administrative activities of the Judiciary monitored by the other branches of power of the State. It is obvious that the Judiciary has to be answerable for its actions according to law provided that proper and fair procedures are provided for and that a removal from office can take place only for reasons that are substantiated. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that the main purpose of the very existence of a Supreme Council of the Judiciary is the protection of the independence of judges by insulating them from undue pressures from other powers of the State in matters such as the selection and appointment of judges and the exercise of disciplinary functions.”

“[…] Involving only judges carries the risk of raising a perception of self-protection, self-interest and cronism. As concerns the composition of the judicial council, both politicisation and corporatism must be avoided. An appropriate balance should be found between judges and lay members. The involvement of other branches of government must not pose threats of undue pressure on the members of the Council and the whole judiciary.”

“[…] [P]oliticisation can be avoided if Parliament is solely required to confirm appointments made by the judges.”

“[…] [A] substantial element or a majority of the members of the Judicial Council should be elected by the Judiciary itself. In order to provide for democratic legitimacy of the Judicial Council, other members should be elected by Parliament among persons with appropriate legal qualification taking into account possible conflicts of interest.”
“In addition, the Constitution does not define precisely the number of members of the HJC. [...] It is quite unusual for a constitutional body to exist without the number of its members being clearly fixed (or at least without having a clear method of defining this number). The very idea of an “institution” implies that its composition is defined either in the law or in the Constitution, and is not left to the discretion of one person, even if this is the head of the State. Absence of a fixed composition undermines the legitimacy of the decisions taken by the body.”

5.2.2 Judicial members of the Council and lay members: search of appropriate balance

“[...] The primary role of judicial councils is to be independent guarantors of judicial independence. However, this does not mean that such councils are bodies of judicial ‘self-government’. In order to avoid corporatism and politicisation, there is a need to monitor the judiciary through non-judicial members of the judicial council. Only a balanced method of appointment of the SCM members can guarantee the independence of the judiciary. Corporatism should be counterbalanced by membership of other legal professions, the ‘users’ of the judicial system, e.g. attorneys, prosecutors, notaries, academics, civil society.”

“The European Charter on the statute for judges [...] states: ‘In respect of every decision affecting the selection, recruitment, appointment, career progress or termination of office of a judge, the statute envisages the intervention of an authority independent of the executive and legislative powers within which at least one half of those who sit are judges elected by their peers following methods guaranteeing the widest representation of the judiciary’ [...] The CCEJ commends the standards set by the European Charter ‘in so far as it advocated the intervention [...] of an independent authority with substantial judicial representation chosen democratically by other judges’.”

“Under current international standards, there is no uniform model for the composition of judicial and/or prosecutorial councils. [...]”

Several international instruments, however, provide that when a judicial council is established, a substantial part of its members should be recruited from among judges. [...]”

6 This section should be read in conjunction with section 4.2.4 below on lay members of the judicial councils
on the draft Act to amend and supplement the Constitution (in the field of the Judiciary) of the Republic of Bulgaria, §§38 and 39

“It is recommended that a substantial element or a majority of the members of the HJPC be elected by their peers and, in order to provide for democratic legitimacy of the HJPC, other members be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly among persons with appropriate qualifications. […]”

See also CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §45

“Amendment XIII proposes that the HJC be composed of ten members: five judges elected by their peers and five prominent lawyers elected by the National Assembly. […] Having an even number of members in the HJC is less usual than having an odd number, which is the current trend in many European states – there are only a few that have an even number of members in their judicial councils. […]”

See also CDL-AD(2018)011, Opinion on the draft amendments to the constitutional provisions on the judiciary of Serbia, §59

“[…] Among the judicial members of the Judicial Council there should be a balanced representation of judges from different levels and courts, and this principle should be explicitly added.”

See also CDL-AD(2012)024, Opinion on two Sets of draft Amendments to the Constitutional Provisions relating to the Judiciary of Montenegro, §23

“The number of judges in the entire composition of the Council (only 8 out of 24 members) does not seem to be adequate. The limitation of the number of judges to one third falls short of the standards requiring a substantial judicial representation within such institutions. The Venice Commission has stressed that ‘[i]n all cases the council should have a pluralistic composition with a substantial part, if not the majority, of members being judges’.”

See also CDL-AD(2011)022, Opinion on the draft Act to amend and supplement the Constitution (in the field of the Judiciary) of the Republic of Bulgaria, §40; CDL-AD(2011)012, Joint Opinion on the constitutional law on the judicial system and status of judges of Kazakhstan, §20; CDL-AD(2011)010, Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitution of Montenegro, as well as on the Draft Amendments to the Law on Courts, the Law on the State Prosecutor’s Office and the Law on the Judicial Council of Montenegro, §39

“The [High Judicial Council] would thus have 11 judges among its 15 members. This proportion seems even too high and could lead to inefficient disciplinary procedures. While calling for an appeal to a court against disciplinary decisions of judicial councils is required, the Venice Commission insists that the non-judicial component of a judicial council is crucial for the efficient exercise of the disciplinary powers of the council.”

See also CDL-AD(2013)034, Opinion on proposals amending the draft law on the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §41

CDL-AD(2014)026, Opinion on the seven amendments to the Constitution of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” concerning, in particular, the judicial Council, the competence of the Constitutional Court and special financial zones, §§74-76
“[...] [A] structure containing only judges with more than 15 years of experience may not be regarded as properly representative.”


“Article 10.1 provides that members of the Disciplinary Board from among judges shall be elected by the General Assembly of Judges, as follows: 2 judges from the Supreme Court of Justice, 2 judges from the Courts of Appeal and 1 judge from the courts. It is to be welcomed that judges are elected by their peers. However, it is not clear what the rationale is for composing the Disciplinary Board mainly of representatives of the senior judiciary. Why are the judges requested to elect 4 out of 5 judges from the Supreme and appellate courts? Furthermore, it should be expressly mentioned that election is done by secret ballot.”


5.2.3 Representation of the executive in the Council; ex officio members

“Although the presence of the members of the executive power in the judicial councils might raise confidence-related concerns, such practice is quite common. [...] Such presence does not seem, in itself, to impair the independence of the council, according to the opinion of the Venice Commission. However, the Minister of Justice should not participate in all the council’s decisions, for example, the ones relating to disciplinary measures.”

See also CDL-AD(2010)026, Joint opinion on the law on the judicial system and the status of judges of Ukraine by the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Co-operation within the Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, §97; CDL-INF(1998)009, Opinion on recent amendments to the law on major constitutional provisions of the Republic of Albania, §16

“It would also be possible to include ex-officio members in the HJC, such as the Minister of Justice or the President of the Supreme Court. This can be useful to facilitate dialogue among the various actors in the system. However, care must be taken that including ex officio members does not increase the risk of domination of the HJC by the political majority. If the Minister of Justice were to be included as an ex-officio member, he or she should not have the right to vote or participate in the decision-making process if it is a decision concerning the transfer of judges and disciplinary measures against judges.”

CDL-AD(2018)011, Opinion on the draft amendments to the constitutional provisions on the judiciary of Serbia, §63
See also CDL-AD(2018)003, Opinion on the Law on amending and supplementing the Constitution (Judiciary) of the Republic of Moldova, §§58-60

“[...] The Proposal [...] removes all participation of prosecutors from the HJC but retains powers of the HJC in respect of prosecutors (incompatibility requirements and discipline). However, the HJC should have no such powers if there is a separate prosecutorial council.”

CDL-AD(2013)034, Opinion on proposals amending the draft law on the amendments to the constitution to strengthen the independence of judges of Ukraine, §42
“[…]. It seems that the Volkov judgment does not rule out ex officio members. They could be members of the HCJ without a right to vote.”

CDL-AD(2013)014, Opinion on the Draft Law on the amendments to the Constitution, Strengthening the Independence of Judges and on the Changes to the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Assembly of Ukraine, §57

5.2.4 Lay members: importance of having the civil society represented

“[…]. The management of the administrative organisation of the judiciary should not necessarily be entirely in the hands of judges. In fact, as a general rule, the composition of a Council foresees the presence of members who are not part of the judiciary, who represent other State powers or the academic or professional sectors of society. This representation is justified since a Council’s objectives relate not only to the interests of the members of the judiciary, but especially to general interests. The control of quality and impartiality of justice is a role that reaches beyond the interests of a particular judge. The Council’s performance of this control will cause citizens’ confidence in the administration of justice to be raised. Furthermore, in a system guided by democratic principles, it seems reasonable that the Council of Justice should be linked to the representation of the will of the people, as expressed by Parliament.

[…] A basic rule appears to be that a large proportion of the membership [of the Supreme Council of Justice] should be made up of members of the judiciary and that a fair balance should be struck between members of the judiciary and other ex officio or elected members. […]”

CDL-INF(1998)009, Opinion on recent amendments to the law on major constitutional provisions of the Republic of Albania, §§9-12

See also CDL-AD(2007)028, Report on Judicial Appointments by the Venice Commission, §§27 and 30

“[…] It is common practice that ‘judicial councils include also members who are not part of the judiciary and represent other branches of power or the academic or professional sector’ and the Venice Commission even recommends that a substantial part of the members be non-judicial. […]

[…][I]Instead of excluding legal professionals altogether, consideration might be given to adding members on behalf of the professional community, which would not excessively broaden the size of the HJPC, while ensuring the representation of the users of the judicial system.”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §§30,31

“Corporatism can be avoided by ensuring that the members of the Judicial Service Commission, elected by their peers, should not wield decisive influence as a body. They must be usefully counterbalanced by representation of civil society (lawyers, law professors and legal, academic or scientific advisors from all branches).”


“ [...] It is advisable for judicial councils to include members who are not themselves representatives of the judicial branch. But, such members should preferably be appointed by the legislative branch instead of by the executive.”


“In the Venice Commission’s view, this composition of an equal number of judges and lay members would ensure inclusiveness of the society and would avoid both politicisation and autocratic government.

A crucial additional element of this balance would be that the President of the Judicial Council should be elected by the Judicial Council from among its lay members (with the exception of the Minister of Justice) by a majority of two thirds, and should have a casting vote. […] Like for the Plenary, among the judicial members of the disciplinary panel there should be a balanced representation of judges from all different levels and courts (see infra the comments on the amendments to the laws).”


“With the proposed new composition of the Judicial Council, a parity between judicial and lay members is sought to be achieved. The Venice Commission welcomes this new composition, which would avoid both the risk of politicisation and the risk of self-perpetuating government of judges.

However, the parity of judicial and lay members would not pertain in disciplinary proceedings, as the Minister of Justice could not sit and vote in such cases and, as a consequence, the judges would have a majority […]. Therefore […] a crucial additional element of this balance would be to add a provision in Article 127 of the Constitution on a smaller disciplinary panel within the Judicial Council with a parity of judicial and lay members (with the exclusion of the Minister of Justice). The details concerning this disciplinary panel could be regulated by the Law, taking into account the importance of reconciling the independence of the judiciary and at the same time ensuring accountability.”

CDL-AD(2012)024, Opinion on two Sets of draft Amendments to the Constitutional Provisions relating to the Judiciary of Montenegro, §§20, 21

“ [...] The organisation of a competition to choose the civil society representatives on the Disciplinary Board is to be welcomed. However, it would be desirable that the criteria for selection of candidates as well as the mechanism for the appointment and functioning of the Commission which is intended to select candidates be specified in the law itself rather than in a regulation. Furthermore, it should be made clear that the Minister’s function in appointing these persons is a formal one and that the appointment is carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission which selects candidates.”
“[…] The Venice Commission has never been in favor of systems where all members of the body were elected by the judges. Given that now the CDF [The Council for Determination of Facts] has obtained very important powers in the sphere of the judges’ discipline, it is recommended that a significant proportion of its members are appointed by democratically elected bodies, most preferably by the Parliament with a qualified majority of votes. […]”


4.2.5 Qualification requirements for the candidates to the council; incompatibilities and quotas

“It is vital that the members of the Council have sufficient practical experience to carry out their work. Therefore, the requirement of seven years’ experience provided […] seems adequate.”


“The requirement of 10 years of experience for judges [to be eligible at the Council] should be reconsidered because it will make the election of qualified candidates from all levels of the judiciary, especially from first level courts, very difficult.”

CDL-AD(2011)019, Opinion on the introduction of changes to the constitutional law “on the status of judges” of Kyrgyzstan, §36

“[…] As regards members elected by the National Assembly, the criteria raise the question as to why only those who have passed the Bar exam fall within the category of ‘prominent lawyers’. This would exclude law professors, for instance […]”

CDL-AD(2018)011, Opinion on the draft amendments to the constitutional provisions on the judiciary of Serbia, §60

“[…] The amendments could provide that should a chairman of a court be elected in the Council, he or she would have to resign from his or her position as chairman while of course retaining his or her position as an ordinary judge.”


“[…] In order to insulate the judicial council from politics its members should not be active members of parliament.”


“[…] Out of 15 members [of the Judicial Council] 4 must belong to the non-majority communities, and, in addition, three more must be elected by the double majority vote by the Parliament. In its 2005 Opinion, the Venice Commission stated that the provisions concerning representatives of the non-majority communities ‘are to be welcomed’ (§ 40). The question is whether the direct ethnic quota for selecting candidates is still an acceptable solution in the present-day conditions.
Mechanisms of power-sharing between different ethnic communities are to be assessed in the light of the country’s recent history; ethnic criterion for eligibility to political posts may be defendable in the aftermath of a civil war but must be reconsidered after a passage of time - see, in particular, the 2005 opinion on the constitutional situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. […]

In the Macedonian context the proposed Amendment serves to protect non-majority communities. Furthermore, ethnic quotas do not close access to the JC for the candidates from the majority communities. Consequently, the case of Sejdic and Finci cannot serve as a precedent. That being said, the method of the Court’s reasoning, namely the ‘dynamic’ approach to the analysis of the ethnic-based election criteria, still applies.

The Venice Commission recalls in this respect that Point 10 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary requires that judges are appointed without discrimination based on the ground of ‘national origin’. Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe no. R(94)1224 calls for merit-based appointment of judges with regard to ‘qualifications, integrity, ability and efficiency’ (see Principle 1, point 1(2)-c). Similar principles are proclaimed by the European Charter on the statute for judges […]. The principle of ‘merit-based’ appointment is cited with approval by the Venice Commission in its Report on Judicial Appointments, §§ 10 and 36-37.

[…] The ‘double majority’ principle can hardly be applied in the context of election of judicial members of the JC. Further, the Commission reiterates that the ethnic quota in the specific context of the country is supposed to protect minorities and may thus be regarded as a sort of a ‘positive discrimination’. Therefore, direct ethnic quotas remain another possible mechanism securing adequate representation of non-majority communities. The authorities must consider, however, whether ethnic quotas should exist in relation to the lay members of the JC elected by the Parliament.”

See also CDL-AD(2019)008, Opinion on the Draft Law on the Judicial Council of North Macedonia, §19

“[…] The draft Law indicates that the composition of the [High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council] needs to reflect the ethnical composition of BiH, with at least six members of each of the Constituent Peoples and an appropriate number of members from among Others. Equal gender representation should also be ensured. […]

[…] In a country of the size of BiH, using a requirement for a certain ethnic composition for the HJPC will make it very difficult in practice to also meet the requirement of ensuring an equal representation of the sexes. The Venice Commission strongly supports policies aimed to ensure gender balance in public institutions and believes they should be welcomed and that all efforts in this direction should be praised. However, an inflexible legal provision setting a quota along ethnic and gender lines over those of professional competence - taking the country’s size and population into account - may undermine the effective functioning of the system”.

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §§32 and 35
5.2.6 Chairperson and vice-chairperson of the Council

5.2.6.1 Appointment/election of the chairperson and vice-chairperson

“It is necessary to ensure that the chair of the judicial council is exercised by an impartial person who is not close to party politics. Therefore, in parliamentary systems where the president / head of state has more formal powers there is no objection to attributing the chair of the judicial council to the head of state, whereas in (semi-) presidential systems, the chair of the council could be elected by the Council itself from among the non-judicial members of the council. Such a solution could bring about a balance between the necessary independence of the chair and the need to avoid possible corporatist tendencies within the council.”


“[…] [T]he President should be elected from among the lay members with the 2/3 majority of all the members, in order to give the JC more democratic legitimation and credibility before the public and to remove the impression of a corporatist management of the judiciary. […]”


“[…] It is true that the Venice Commission has stated that ‘the chair of the council could be elected by the council itself from among the non judicial members of the council.’ However, this recommendation by the Commission is primarily aimed at situations where judges elected by their peers have the majority in a council and is not applicable if it increases the risk of domination of the HJC by the current majority in parliament. “

CDL-AD(2018)011, Opinion on the draft amendments to the constitutional provisions on the judiciary of Serbia, §66

“It is welcome that the chairpersons of the SJC are elected by rotation from amongst judge members and lay members, for a term of two and half years (Article 81). This method gives a democratic legitimation to the SJC before the public.”


“There may be different approaches with regard to the role of presidents of supreme courts within judicial councils. Some countries choose not to impose any restrictions and allow the President of the Supreme Court to be elected/appointed President of the Council and hold both positions simultaneously (as still is the case in Serbia, but is now proposed to be abandoned). In view of enhancing the independence of the judiciary others may prefer to separate the administrative positions within the judiciary and the membership in the Council; and therefore, should the president of the court be appointed President of the Council, this person should then resign from his or her position at the Supreme Court […].”

“It is to be welcomed that under new Article 47(2) of the Law, the chairperson of the Supreme Court will no longer be the ex officio chairperson of the HCJ. The election of the chairperson by the members of the HCJ is in line with international standards."

CDL-AD(2018)029, Opinion on the provisions on the Prosecutorial Council in the draft Organic Law on the Prosecutor’s Office and on the provisions on the High Council of Justice in the existing Organic Law on General Courts of Georgia, §48

“[…] Entrusting the Minister [of Justice] with the presidency of the SJC Plenum (and perhaps also
the mere participation to the meeting of the two Chambers) is likely to interfere with the autonomy
and independence of the judiciary from the political power. Even the appearance of such influence
has to be avoided in order to ensure public trust in the judiciary."

CDL-AD(2015)022, Opinion on the draft Act to amend and supplement the Constitution (in the field of the
Judiciary) of the Republic of Bulgaria, §§69 and 71
See also CDL-AD(2002)015, Opinion on the Draft Law on Amendments to the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria,
§5; CDL-INF(1999)005, Opinion on the reform of the judiciary in Bulgaria §§34-35

“The election of the Chairman of the Board by its members, by secret ballot […] is to be welcomed. However, it would be desirable for the Board also to elect a Vice-Chairman to act in the absence of the Chairman rather than the arrangement provided for in Article 12.3 that in the absence of the Chairman the oldest member present should take the chair.”


“[…] [I]t is not appropriate for the President and the Vice Presidents of the [High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council] to be chosen along ethnic lines and the decision on their election should not be left to the Parliamentary Assembly. In addition, this system of rotating presidents weakens the HJPC.”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §47

5.2.6.2 Removal of the chairperson and vice-chairperson

“With regard to the provision for the removal of the Chairman, as well as a reasoned proposal from three members (Article 12.4) there also needs to be a vote of the members of the Board, who should not have to wait for three months of inaction before taking action themselves. A 2/3 majority could also apply as in the case of the removal of ordinary members.”


[…] [I]t is important that the draft Law provide restrictive grounds for which the Parliamentary Assembly may decide to dismiss the president and vice-president [of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council]. […] **There should be input from an expert body before Parliament takes a decision.** In addition, unlike the election process where there is a prior selection limiting the choice of the Parliamentary Assembly, **in the decision on dismissal, the Parliamentary**
Assembly is not limited and acts on its own. This is inappropriate and needs to be reconsidered.”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §48

5.2.7 Structure and working methods of the Council

“[…] Taking into account the powers granted to the HCJ, it should work as a full time body and the elected members, unlike the ex officio members, should not be able to exercise any other public or private activity while sitting in the HCJ.”


“The work of the [High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council] should be as transparent as possible; it should be accountable to the public through widely disseminated reports and information. The duty to inform may also include an obligation to submit the report to the Parliamentary Assembly about the state of affairs in the judiciary or prosecution service. However, this should not be transformed into a formal accountability of the HJPC to the legislative or executive branches of power.

In this respect, Article 25.3 is clearly problematic as it stipulates where reports receive a negative assessment, the Parliamentary Assembly ‘may remove the Presidency or a member of the Presidency from the Council’. […]”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §§71, 72


“The 2004 Law created the [High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council] as a single and uniform body. Although this is not entirely unusual, ideally the two professions – judges and prosecutors – should be represented by separate bodies. For this reason the initial structure of the HJPC had been criticised and it was recommended that it be sub-divided into two sub-councils.

However, if both professions are to be represented in a same structure, that structure must provide a clear separation between the two professions. The Venice Commission’s requirement is that: ‘If prosecutorial and judicial councils are a single body, it should be ensured that judges and prosecutors cannot outvote the other group in each other’s appointment and disciplinary proceedings because due to their daily ‘prosecution work’ prosecutors may have a different attitude from judges on judicial independence and especially on disciplinary proceedings’.

The Venice Commission therefore welcomes the establishment by the draft Law of two sub-councils: one for judges and one for prosecutors. It seems to be a balanced solution which, on the one hand, prevents excessive interference of one of the legal professions into the work of the other while, on the other hand, making it possible to maintain the current structure of the HJPC as a common organ of/for judges and prosecutors.”

5.3 Procedural aspects of appointment/elections of the members of the council

“The National Assembly should not be given a real choice of candidates and the ‘authorised nominators’ should only propose one candidate per vacant position. In this way, the National Assembly will have a right of veto. This seems to be the only solution which would avoid political considerations being taken into account in the nomination of the Council members.”


“[The Commission] considers however that the non-judge members should rather be elected by Parliament than by the President of the Republic.”


“[…] [T]he delegation reiterated the proposal of the Commission to have the parliamentary component of the Council elected with a qualified majority. This would make sure that this component reflected the composition of the political forces in Parliament and would effectively make it impossible that the majority in Parliament fills all positions with its own candidates as it had been the case in the past.”

CDL-AD(2003)012, Memorandum: Reform of the Judicial System in Bulgaria, §15

“The Venice Commission is of the opinion that elections from the parliamentary component should be by a two-thirds qualified majority, with a mechanism against possible deadlocks or by some proportional method which ensures that the opposition has an influence on the composition of the Council.

It is a matter for the Georgian authorities to decide which solution is appropriate, but the anti-deadlock mechanism should not act as a disincentive to reaching agreement on the basis of a qualified majority in the first instance.”

“As to the lay members, the process of their nomination is as important as the method of their election. Their detachment from politics may be ensured through a transparent and open nomination process, at the initiative of autonomous nominating bodies (universities, NGOs, bar associations, etc.) and completed by the Judicial Appointments Council, which is composed of the members of the judiciary. Such nomination process should ensure that the Parliament has to make a selection amongst the most qualified candidates, and not political appointees.”

“... Quasi-total (excluding ex officio members) renewal of the composition of the HJC every three years may affect the institutional continuity of this body. The Concept Paper proposes a mid-term renewal of a part of the composition of the HJC [High Judicial Council]; the Venice Commission is in favour of this proposal but recommends also to extend the duration of the mandate of the HJC members.”

“The Venice Commission is of the opinion that when using its legislative power to design the future organisation and functioning of the judiciary, Parliament should refrain from adopting measures which would jeopardise the continuity in membership of the High Judicial Council.

Removing all members of the Council prematurely would set a precedent whereby any incoming government or any new Parliament, which did not approve of either the composition or the membership of the Council could terminate its existence early and replace it with a new Council. In many circumstances such a change, especially on short notice, would raise a suspicion that the intention behind it was to influence cases pending before the Council. [...]"
“ […] [W]ell-established professional association of lawyers, law schools, etc. should be formally involved in the process of nomination of lay members of the SJC; […]”

CDL-AD(2017)018, Opinion on the Judicial System Act of Bulgaria, §113

“The exclusion of direct reappointment / re-election while prolonging the mandate [six-year term] is aimed at creating more independence for the SCM [Superior Council of the Magistracy] members. This is positive.”

CDL-AD(2018)003, Opinion on the Law on amending and supplementing the Constitution (Judiciary) of the Republic of Moldova, §§52 and 53

“It is not necessary to create an electoral register or directory for the judges who are allowed to vote in the Council elections. It is difficult to see how a president of a court could ignore a colleague in the distribution of ballot papers or how an individual who is not a judge would obtain such a ballot.”


“[…] [D]ecisions on appointments of judges and prosecutors cannot be delegated to commissions. The election of judges and prosecutors is by a majority vote of all members, but for the election of judges the decision must be supported by at least seven judges, and likewise for prosecutors. This prevents either judges or prosecutors from imposing their will on the other profession.”

CDL-AD(2014)008, Opinion on the draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, §57

“[…] The draft Law therefore leaves the entire process of the election of two members of the HJC to the discretion of the Bar Association and the joint session of deans of law faculties. This approach is questionable because – although the respect for the autonomy of these institutions is relevant in the context of self-governance or other internal matters – the election of the HJC member is clearly not an internal matter of the university or the Bar Association. […] The procedures for the election of the HJC candidates as well as detailed requirements for the candidates should be set out in this Law.”


“[…] [T]he procedure of selecting the HJPC members could be regarded as deficient in some respects. Of the 15 members, two are selected by members of the House of Representatives, of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and of the Council of Ministers of BiH; two are selected by the Bar Chambers of the Entities; five or six by prosecutors, and five or six by judges. Due to this procedure, the selection could be vulnerable to inter-institutional and inter-personal rivalries in the judiciary“.

CDL-AD(2012)014, Opinion on Legal Certainty and the Independence of the Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, §88

“[…] It should be expressly mentioned that election [of members of the Disciplinary Board] is done by secret ballot.”

The Venice Commission has continuously objected against the use of psychological tests for the recruitment of judges, and entrusting those tests to external experts in psychology. In addition, it is quite unusual to see these tests as a pre-condition for the election of a judicial member of the JC [Judicial Council]. This mechanism gives the JC the possibility of screening the candidates, who should, normally, be elected by and represent the judiciary. The Venice Commission recalls that all candidates to the positions of judicial members are already active judges, so they normally should have already at least minimal social skills and integrity. This mechanism is likely to replace the free election of the judicial members with a system of co-optation, which does not fit well to the idea of ‘judicial members elected by their peers’. While it is perfectly reasonable to have formal eligibility requirements, and for the JC to control the process of elections, the rationale for the idea of the JC selecting or even shortlisting candidates is not clear nor seems acceptable. The Venice Commission invites the authorities to reconsider this provision.”

5.4 Status of members

“Granting immunity to members of the Council guarantees their independence and allows them to carry out their work without having to constantly defend themselves against, for instance, unfounded and vexatious accusations.”

“[…] It seems to go very far indeed to provide, as Article 38.1 does, that the Plenary of the HSYK must authorise an investigation and prosecution for an offence committed by an elected council member even in the case of personal offences which are nothing to do with the performance of their duties as members of the HSYK. In other opinions, the Venice Commission has been critical of overbroad immunities being granted to judges. In this case, it is difficult to see why members of the HSYK should have an immunity from investigation and prosecution unless this immunity is waived by the HSYK. The only exception to this provision seems to relate to flagrante delicto cases (Article 38.9).”

“[…] The members of the HJC should exercise their functions as a full-time profession.”

“Under the draft Law, members of the [High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council] shall serve a term of four years and may be re-elected once (Article 9). No one may be elected for more than two consecutive terms (Article 3.7). The length of the term of office is a standard one, as in most countries, members of judicial councils are elected for a rather short period of time (three years in the Netherlands, six years in ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ etc.). In some countries, members of the judicial council have life tenure (Canada, Cyprus etc.) or the length of the term corresponds to that of the primary office of the member. All these solutions are legitimate.”
“Councillors who are not ex officio members may be elected for a five-year term, with no possibility for re-election. The preclusion from immediate re-election is destined to enhance the guarantees of independence of the […] members [of the High Council of Justice].

Since there is no gradation in the turnover of the Council, the elected members would end their terms simultaneously. Thus the composition of the Council would change almost entirely, with the exception of the ex-officio members. The influence of the ex-officio members within the Council might thereby be unduly strengthened. In addition, a severe lack of continuity in the Council’s work might result, due to the fact that the new members would have to familiarise themselves with the tasks of the Council and the transition from one composition to another would cause certain initiatives undertaken by previous councillors to be abandoned or forgotten.”

“Members [of the Disciplinary Board as a body which examines disciplinary cases and applies disciplinary sanctions to judges] will be selected for a fixed term of six years (Article 9.4) and this is to be welcomed, as well.

According to Article 9.5 ‘the term of office of a member of the Disciplinary Board is extended de jure until the establishment of a college in a new composition’. It is recommended to extend the term of the member until the examination of the cases, in which the member is involved, is completed.”

“[…] Indeed, conviction of a member of the Council for the criminal offence itself renders him/her dishonourable to exercise the function.”

“[…] Decisions on suspending a member should be linked to the gravity of the charges against him or her and/or be based on the reasoning that suspending the member is necessary for the effective functioning of the HJC. […]

Although according to Article 43, any member of the HJC has the right to initiate the dismissal of any other member, there are no mechanisms in the Draft Law which would provide for the suspension or dismissal of the ex officio (non-elected) members if they act in violation of the Constitution or the law. […]“
“[…] It would […] be more appropriate to deal with ‘breach of duty’ cases through the usual disciplinary procedure, which should be clearly set out by the draft Law and an appeal to a court of law should be provided […]. The proportionality principle should be adequately taken into account and the dismissal [of a member of the Judicial Council] should only be applied as a measure of last resort.”


“According to Article 11.2 the reasoned proposal of the Disciplinary Board to revoke the term of office of a member of the Disciplinary Board shall be submitted to the body that appointed or elected that member in order to revoke and replace him/her with another member. The Board should itself be able to dismiss the member rather than simply remitting the matter to the body which elected the member to revoke the appointment. The credibility of the Disciplinary Board would be undermined if this body failed to do so. However, there needs to be a very clear provision to invoke the procedure where a member fails to attend to duties to ensure that proper notice is given.”


“[…] [The law] seems to mean that a person can be removed from the [High Judicial andProsecutorial Council] for immoral behaviour. This seems to be imprecise and therefore unsatisfactory from the standpoint of legal standards.

Disqualification may be linked to a criminal or a disciplinary offense. Membership may also be suspended where the member’s status as a judge or prosecutor is suspended, for instance due to an on-going criminal investigation or for other reasons under the law.

In addition, the decision on cessation has been transferred from the HJPC to the Parliamentary Assembly. This decision does not seem to require a qualified majority. When taken together with the very vague drafting of certain of the situations (if a member fails to perform duties in a proper, effective or impartial manner; when the member commits an act due to which he or she no longer merits to perform the duties on the Council; etc.), this may lead to politicisation – or the impression of politicisation – of the activities of the HJPC, whose members depend on the Parliamentary Assembly not only for their election, but also when exercising their mandate.

In particular, […] the Parliamentary Assembly is empowered to dismiss the member of the HJPC where ‘the member fails to perform his/her duties in a proper, effective or impartial manner’ […]. However, it is not clear how the effective and proper performance of the HJPC member will be evaluated and what the procedures for such an evaluation are. This needs to be reconsidered.

Article 10.1.e sets out that dismissal may arise ‘if the member fails to fulfil the obligations arising from the function he/she performs due to illness or for other reasons’. The inability of the HJPC member to perform functions should indeed result in dismissal, even if this was caused by objective reasons. However, the period of time he or she is absent should be taken into account: a minimum period of time must be clearly defined after which the dismissal of the member may be sought.
All these provisions should be much more precise and decisions on cessation/dismissal should not be left to the Parliamentary Assembly.”

“Article 18 of the Draft law deals with the dismissal of a Judicial Council member. According to Article 18, para. 1 the grounds for dismissal are: ‘1) he/she discharges his/her duties unconscientiously and unprofessionally; 2) he/she is convicted of an offence which makes him/her unworthy of discharging duties of the Judicial Council member’.

The notions ‘unconscientiously and unprofessionally’ and ‘unworthy of discharging duties’ are too vague, and can lead to an arbitrary application of the power to dismiss members of the Judicial Council. It is strongly recommended to define these dismissal grounds more closely.

Council’s members are also dismissed if a disciplinary sanction is imposed (Article 18, para. 2). However, in some cases disciplinary sanctions may be imposed for relatively minor matters, in which case dismissal will be a disproportionate measure.

It is important to make it clear in the law that the Council’s motion concluding that a Council member has to be dismissed should not be based on the substance of the position/decision of the concerned member in respect of individual files. This is essential for ensuring the independence and autonomy of the Judicial Council.”

“A procedure on the preservation of confidence is specific to political institutions such as governments which act under parliamentary control. It is not suited for institutions, such as the {High Judicial Council}, whose members are elected for a fixed term. The mandate of these members should only end at the expiration of this term, on retirement, on resignation or death, or on their dismissal for disciplinary reasons.

A disciplinary procedure can only be applied in cases of disciplinary offences and not on grounds of ‘lack of confidence’. Article 41 clearly defines the reasons that can lead to a dismissal of the HJC members. The disciplinary procedure must only focus on the question whether the HJC member failed to perform his or her duties ‘in compliance with the constitution and law’. This question must not be confused with the question whether said member still enjoys the confidence of the judges who participated in his or her election. In addition, the disciplinary procedure has to guarantee the HJC member a fair trial. It is noted that a general reference to a fair trial is made under Article 46a, but further details on related guarantees would be needed.

[…] Members of judicial councils are independent and often have to make decisions that are unpopular or will not please judges. In subjecting them to a vote of no confidence, their independence will be reduced, making them too dependent on the wishes of the judges and removing them from their role of pursuing the goals of an independent and efficient judiciary for the state as a whole. Furthermore, such a vote is difficult to reconcile with the disciplinary functions of a judicial council. The Venice Commission therefore strongly recommends for such a procedure not to be introduced.”

“[…] The members of the HJC elected by the National Assembly may be dismissed by the Assembly by a 5/9th majority regardless of the majority with which they were elected. This should be revised, the majority required for dismissal should be higher, or at least equal to, the majority required for election. It is important that criteria for dismissal (and procedures) be laid down in the Constitution and not just left to legislation.”

CDL-AD(2018)011, Opinion on the draft amendments to the constitutional provisions on the judiciary of Serbia, §68

5.5 Other self-regulatory bodies of the judiciary

“The Law on Bodies of Judicial Self-regulation is relatively short and establishes two bodies of judicial self-regulation: (1) the Congress of Judges and (2) the Council of Judges. […]

[…] It seems, therefore, that the idea is to provide a framework to form coherent standpoints for the judicial community with respect to all questions concerning judges.

Regulating self-regulation seems to be a contradiction, however, if such a law is deemed necessary its provisions should not be too rigid. Although it is important to provide a solid basis for judges’ self-regulation, it is important not to suffocate it.

In this respect, there are a number of provisions that raise doubt. First, Article 4.4 provides that the status of individuals exercising the activities of judicial self-regulation is governed by the Law on civil service. The content of this Law is not known to the Venice Commission, but it might be too rigid if it provides for strict regulations on responsibilities or perhaps even regulations subordinating the representatives to the administration.

Second, it seems unnecessary for the Congress to be convened by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, as foreseen by Article 6.2. This provision contradicts the very idea of self-regulation.

Third, Article 8.4 sets out that ‘The organisational, technical, material, financial and methodological resources for the activity of the Council of Judges shall be provided by the Judicial department of the Kyrgyz Republic.’ This could create a strong dependency that would be incompatible with the idea of self-regulation.

Fourth, the rules for the election of the representatives are also very rigid, for instance, the prohibition of the re-election of members of the Council of Judges for a second consecutive term (Article 8.8). This means a complete turnover in the membership every three years. Some continuity may be desirable, perhaps the terms of office could be staggered (partial renewal).

The Venice Commission would […] recommend the following: […] [i]nclude, in this Law, how the Council’s various representational and advisory functions are to be carried out. It should also be clarified in which cases binding decisions are adopted and what the legal consequences of those binding decisions are.”
“[…] Concerning Article 127.5.1 item 1, which refers to meetings of judges of local and appellate courts, these apparently can discuss the performance of specific judges and take decisions on these issues binding for the judges. This does not appear to be an appropriate provision. Judicial independence requires that judges should not be subjected to peer pressure in relation to any specific cases. Article 127.5.2 also provides that the judges’ meetings of the Supreme Court and the high specialized courts have the same powers. This should be deleted or at least clarified to make clear that pressure may not be brought on a judge concerning an individual case.

In relation to Article 130, which provides for a number of persons to be present at the Congress of Judges (including the President of Ukraine, the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, and the Minister for Justice), it is not clear why politicians should be present at these meetings. The presence of politicians may well lead to political pressure being brought. While it is specified that the invited persons may not participate in the voting, it is not clear why their presence is necessary at all.

Draft Article 131 provides for a new system for the election of delegates to the Congress of Judges. The Venice Commission has previously recommended a proportionate representation of the various orders of jurisdiction (CDL-AD(2010)026, para. 96). The same comment could be made here concerning the representation on the basis of the meetings of judges.”

“The proposed administration of the judiciary is complicated and involves no less than five agencies: the Council of Justice, the Judicial Administration, the Judges Qualification Board, the Judges Disciplinary Board and the Conference of Judges.

[...] The problems which may be involved accordingly do not relate to the number of institutions as such but mainly to the question whether the overall power vested in the system may be too great.

[...] The acceptance of parliamentary control over the disciplinary board is inconsistent. On one hand there is the far-reaching solution concerning the judicial administration and the rights of the Council of Justice while on the other hand there is the far-reaching role to be played by the parliament in staffing issues and judicial oversight. That is, in issues strictly linked to independence and judicial adjudication.”

“Indeed, some level of institutional complexity is needed in order to avoid conflicts of interest and introduce checks and balances. For example, in disciplinary proceedings a person who initiates the inquiry should not decide on the case and should not sit on an appeal panel. However, this does not always require creating special institutions. The same may be achieved by splitting the functions within the same body or introducing conflict of interest rules. Again, the necessary checks and balances may be achieved by pluralist internal composition of the single body, and not necessarily by creating external controlling institutions. […]"
The Venice Commission understands that the creation of the new constitutional bodies will automatically terminate the mandate of certain already existing bodies with similar functions [...]. In the opinion of the Venice Commission, this is positive, since co-existence of several inspectorates creates parallelism and it is better not to have different bodies with similar or overlapping functions.”

See also CDL-AD(2015)045, Interim Opinion on the Draft Constitutional Amendments on the Judiciary of Albania, §§75, 80-82

“[...] Both the Ethics Commissions and the Disciplinary Commission seem to be composed solely of judges. This may give an impression that the question of disciplinary liability is decided within the judicial corporation by bodies which have no external elements and no links to the democratically elected bodies or the broader legal community. [...]”

See also CDL-AD(2015)045, Interim Opinion on the Draft Constitutional Amendments on the Judiciary of Albania, §76

“Indeed, any kind of control by the executive branch or other external actors over Judicial Councils or bodies entrusted with discipline is to be avoided. As noted in the 2014 Joint Opinion, the composition of a disciplinary body is key to guaranteeing its independence and impartiality. In that context, a composition comprising civil society representatives, thus ensuring community involvement in disciplinary proceedings, was noted by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission as a particularly welcome development. The rules pertaining to the composition of the disciplinary commission should be amended to ensure that the legislative and/or executive branches do not have decisive influence over such body, while ensuring an adequate representation of civil society/community and a generally gender balanced composition.”

CDL-AD(2016)025, Endorsed joint opinion on the draft law “on Introduction of amendments and changes to the Constitution” of the Kyrgyz Republic, §76
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