Strasbourg, 17 December 2003

CDL-AD (2003) 21
Or. Engl.

Opinion no. 269/2003

JOINT RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ELECTORAL LAW AND THE ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION IN ARMENIA

by
the Venice Commission
and
the OSCE/ODIHR

on the basis of comments

by

Mr Michael KRENNERICH (Venice Commission, expert, Germany)

Table of contents

I. Introduction

1. These comments identify the most problematic issues concerning the electoral law in the Republic of Armenia and provide recommendations both on the legal and the administrative framework of the elections. However, the emphasis is on improvements to the Electoral Code.

2. The analysis and the recommendations are based on:

- the Constitution of Armenia;
- the Universal Electoral Code adopted by the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia on 5 February 1999, as the version of the Code was on 3 August 2002, CDL (2003) 52;
- the Joint Assessment of Amendments to the Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia adopted in July 2002 by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission, CDL-AD (2002) 29;
- the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Guidelines and Explanatory Report, adopted by the Venice Commission on 18-19 October 2002, CDL-AD (2002) 23 rev; and
- further documents and election observation reports indicated in the Appendix.

3. The present document cannot take into account election-related provisions in other laws, e.g. the Law on Political Parties, the Law on Mass Media, the Law on Local Self-Government, the Criminal Code, etc.

II. General remarks

4. Since independence in September 1991, several elections have been held in the Republic of Armenia. The most recent elections – and the first elections held since the Republic of Armenia joined the Council of Europe in January 2001 – were the local elections of October 2002, the presidential elections of February/March 2003 and the parliamentary elections of May 2003.

5. Although important improvements have been made, the elections held since independence have fallen short of international standards for democratic elections, according to international observer reports. This was most recently true for the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2003, which were conducted under the Electoral Code, as amended in 2002.

6. The Electoral Code, as amended in 2002, constitutes in general the basis for the conduct of democratic elections. However, some provisions (or lack of provisions) can be considered as problematic or debatable. Furthermore, in the past, the electoral law has not been appropriately implemented or respected. These comments evaluate the electoral law against the background of both international standards for democratic elections and the conduct of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2003. Most recommendations of the Joint Assessment made by OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission, CDL-AD (2002) 29 have been incorporated into these comments.

7. As regards the key issue of composition and decision-making of election commissions, it should be noted that any legal solution can be undermined in the absence of political will to conduct democratic elections.

III. The Electoral Code: Issues for discussion

8. Composition of Electoral Commissions: The Electoral Code provides for a three-tier commission structure: the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), Territorial Electoral Commissions (56 TECs, one for each single-mandate constituency) and Precinct Electoral Commissions (PECs, one for each electoral precinct). According to the Electoral Code, the CEC is comprised of three members nominated by the President of the Republic, and one member from every faction (party or alliance of parties) established at the start of the current or dissolved National Assembly, appointed by the decision of permanently functioning bodies (Art. 35.1). Currently the CEC has nine members in total. TECs are formed in accordance with the same procedure (Art. 36.1). Members of the PECs are appointed by the respective TECs, according to the principle "one member of the TEC – one member of the PEC" (Art. 37.1).

9. Despite several improvements to the Code by the July 2002 amendments, e.g. not allowing political parties and the government to recall members of electoral commissions (in the case of its appointee) (Art. 38.2), the Code does not guarantee the appointment of sufficiently pluralistic election commissions. Although the formalities of appointment are not necessarily problematic, in practice the presidential administration still greatly influences the work of commissions. Significantly, the appointees of the President and the government parties held *de facto* the majority (and in almost all cases, also the chairpersons) of the CEC and TECs in the 2003 elections. This is particularly troublesome in the second round of a presidential election, where an incumbent is guaranteed "representation" by at least three election commission members plus any other commission members representing parties that support the incumbent. The opponent, however, may (and indeed did in the last election) have no representation. In conjunction with the lack of transparency in the commissions' operations and decision-making processes (see below), the failure to create election commissions representing adequate balance of major political interests (which may not necessarily coincide with registered parties and coalitions) can be regarded as a serious obstacle to the impartiality of the electoral administration that must be addressed before the next elections.

10. For the reasons given, it is recommended that a review be undertaken of the method of nomination and appointment of the members of electoral commissions, in particular the CEC, to strengthen the impartial performance of the electoral administration. Even if the issue of the composition of electoral commissions is politically very delicate and has to be handled with great care, reform should be considered. It might be considered, for example, whether to implement a pure "partisan balance model" according to which all commissioners are nominated by political parties, or to apply an impure "partisan balance model". In the latter, some seats might be reserved in the CEC for non-partisan individuals, who are not proposed and appointed by the government, but instead by the Judiciary (e.g. Constitutional Court) or by Parliament (for example, with a qualified majority). At any rate, in order to reduce the president's influence on the commissions' work, the administration should not have more than one representative in each election commission. In summary, the

composition of the election administration should be inclusive of all major political forces in such a way that no political interest has control of decision-making authority.

11. Organisation of activities of the Electoral Commissions. According to Article 39.7 the decisions of electoral commissions are valid if more than half of the members of the commission have participated in voting. The decision is considered to be adopted with more than half of the votes cast. In the event of a parity of votes, the vote of the commission Chairman is decisive. Thus, in the case that only five or six members participate in the voting, even key decisions can be approved by only three of the current nine members.

12. Although it is not uncommon by international comparison that an electoral commission decision requires only the presence of the majority of its members and the votes of the majority of the members present (and that the chairperson has a decisive vote in the case of parity), these provisions might perhaps be reconsidered in view of the Armenian political situation. Taking into account the problems of creating election commissions representing an adequate balance of major political interests in Armenia, it might be advisable to consider the introduction of a higher quorum with the aim of the commissions' decision-making process being based on more general agreement. In several countries, a meeting of the election commission has legal authority, for example, if no less than two-thirds of the members attend it. (In a few countries, even the presence of all members is required which is not recommended due to the high risk of the commissions' work being blocked).

13. During recent elections, it was observed in several precincts that the membership of the PEC was changed shortly before the elections. In some cases, members were dismissed the day before voting and new appointees were not registered in time as members of the commission. The Code should be amended to either prohibit dismissal of an election commission member shortly before the day of voting or delay the effectiveness of the dismissal until the new member has been properly registered.

14. Redrawing of constituencies. With regard to the delimitation of constituencies, the Electoral Code stipulates that constituencies shall contain an equal number of votes while allowing differences of up to 15% in the number of voters (see Chapter Three of the Electoral Code). International observers have criticised the fact that the Electoral Code does not specify the procedure to be used to calculate the differences. According to OSCE/ODIHR (2003b: 5) it is not possible to confirm whether the sizeable factual differences that exist between constituencies are within the limits permitted by law.

15. Although from reading Chapter Three of the current Electoral Code it is clear that the constituencies are formed and numbered by the CEC on the basis of the number of registered voters, as submitted by the Marzpets/Governors, it is recommended that the procedure for drawing and re-drawing the constituencies be more precisely and transparently regulated by the Electoral Code. A reduction of the maximum deviation, from 15% to 10% would be worth considering here.

16. Time for establishing the electoral constituencies. According to Chapter Three of the Electoral Code, the CEC defines the constituencies at least 90 days prior to election days. It is important that electoral constituencies be established sufficiently in advance of an election. This is necessary to ensure that political parties and prospective candidates have the opportunity to become familiar with the demographics of constituencies in order to determine

the viability of competing in a particular constituency and to engage in preliminary planning for the election campaign. The time frame of 90 days is rather short. It is recommended that the Code provide that all constituencies must be established and published at least six months before an election.

17. Requirements for candidates: "permanent residency". The requirement for candidates to prove a certain period of "permanent residency" in the Republic of Armenia was highlighted as a problem by international observers in 2003 since the law regulating residency issues, the Civil Code of Armenia, seems not to contain such a concept (see OSCE/ODIHR 2003b). These comments cannot evaluate whether the Electoral Code is consistent with the Civil Code of Armenia. However, in any case it is important that the concept of "permanent residency" is clearly defined, if it is to be used as a requirement for candidates.

18. Ineligibility to be elected. Articles 97.2 and 97.3 prevent certain persons who hold public office to stand as candidates in National Assembly elections, unless they resign from office before registration. However, the cases for ineligibility are not the same for the proportional and the majority contests. Thus, for example, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, the Mayor of Yerevan, Deputy Mayor Governors, Deputy Governors, Community Leaders and insurance agents (social security employees) are not allowed to stand as candidates in the majority elections, unless they resign from office (Article 97.2). They are, however, allowed to stand in the proportional elections (Art. 97.3) without resigning from office. Thus, the eligibility provisions are not consistent for the National Assembly elections. The restrictions differentiate in an inappropriate manner between the majority and the proportional part of the parliamentary elections. The Electoral Code should therefore be amended to establish equal eligibility conditions for candidates for the National Assembly.

19. Nomination of candidates. The Electoral Code provides that registered parties as well as registered initiative groups of at least 50 citizens have the right to nominate candidates for the National Assembly majority elections (Art. 104 and Art. 105). However, the second sentence of Article 104.1 does not allow party alliances to nominate such candidates. The justification for such a prohibition is far from clear. Thus, the Electoral Code should be amended to allow also party alliances to nominate candidates, not only for the proportional, but also for the majority contests of the National Assembly elections.

20. Minimum number of signatures. With regard to the proportional part of the National Assembly elections, the amount of 30,000 signatures required for registration of party lists is relatively high. According to the "Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters" (I.1.3.ii) of the Venice Commission, the law should not require the collection of the signatures of more than 1% of the voters in the constituency concerned. However, using the upper bound is not an obligation. In the 2003 parliamentary elections the total number of registered voters was approximately 2.3 million. Thus, it would seem to be advisable to reduce significantly the required number of signatures for party lists. According to the 1% principle, even the 500 signatures required for majority candidates might be too many.

21. Signature verification. The Electoral Code prescribes a procedure for verifying the signatures necessary for the nomination of candidates or party lists. It requires only 2% to be checked by the CEC (in the case of presidential or National Assembly proportional elections) or by the TECs (in the case of National Assembly majority elections) (see Art. 70.3, in conjunction with Art. 100.10 and Art. 107). According to Article 70.3, "...[t]he relationship of

valid and invalid signatures in the two per cent of the total number of signatures proportionally extends to the total numbers of signatures, thus getting the number of valid and invalid signatures within the total number of signatures". This means that the number of invalid signatures, which has been determined by a 2% selective verification, is multiplied by 50 to assess proportionally how many invalid signatures are present in the entire list submitted.

22. This verification procedure cannot be regarded as being appropriate. It is strongly recommended that all signatures be checked – at least until the required minimum number is reached. This opinion corresponds to the "Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters" of the Venice Commission, which stipulates that the checking process must in principle cover all signatures. Only if it is not in doubt that the required number of valid signatures has been reached, need the remaining signatures not be checked (CDL-AD (2002) 23 rev, item I.1.3). In practice, there should not be too many problems in checking all the signatures, especially with regard to the submission of both presidential candidates and majority candidates for the National Assembly, given the relatively small number of signatures (500) needed by them. It should also not be difficult to check completely the minimum number of signatures required for the registration of party lists running in the election of the National Assembly by way of the proportional system.

23. Property declaration. The nomination of candidates for President and for the National Assembly also requires a declaration about their private property and their family members' income over the last year (Art. 67.7, Art. 100.7, Art. 106.6). The property declaration requirements should be specified in more detail. Furthermore, consistent and uniform guidelines should be established by the electoral commission on what has to be declared. In practice, the property declaration criteria were not applied clearly and consistently throughout the country during recent elections.

24. Withdrawal of candidates. In view of the high number of withdrawals of candidates in the parliamentary elections, in particular in the majority contests, the Electoral Code should be amended to forbid the withdrawal of candidates or party lists, except under clearly defined criteria for doing so (see also CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 12).

25. Pre-election campaign. In the elections of 2003, especially the presidential elections, there was widespread (ab)use of public resources in support of incumbents during the pre-election campaign period. It is welcomed that the Electoral Code prohibits that state and local self-governing bodies (as well as their staff whilst performing duties) conduct pre-election campaigns or disseminate campaign documents (Art. 18.4). Further, Article 22.2 of the Electoral Code prohibits officials and staff of the state and public media institutions from using their powers to create uneven conditions between candidates. It is recommended that this provision be broadened to expressly state that this prohibition also applies to the news coverage of the campaign by state and public media institutions. The Electoral Code also forbids states and local self-governing bodies to make contributions to the election funds of particular candidates or parties (Art. 25.2). However, no law is self-enforcing, and the effectiveness of these provisions depends much on the bona fide commitment of officials to enforce the law.

26. Media. Though a number of states have no provisions in their electoral laws to regulate the behaviour of the media during the election and pre-election campaigns, there are some areas that an electoral law may cover, for example, with regard to the allocation of time

and space to candidates and parties, political advertising, reporting of opinion polls, voter education campaigns through the media, etc. The Electoral Code of Armenia contains some provisions that aim to regulate the behaviour, in particular of the public media during the pre-election campaign (see Art. 20). However, further provisions might be regarded as appropriate so as to introduce in the law, for example, provisions relating to the behaviour of the private media. Of particular importance is also the question of how to control media-related provisions of the Electoral Code and how to sanction their non-respect. It could be worthwhile improving the Electoral Code and/or the Law on Mass Media in this respect.

27. Voting rights. As already mentioned by the Joint Assessment (CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 30), "...[t]he code makes no provision for special voting procedures, such as the use of early, proxy, mobile, postal or other extraordinary procedures. Such procedures were omitted from electoral legislation when the Code was adopted in 1999 in an attempt to reduce the incidence of fraud. However, the inevitable result is that large numbers of voters are now excluded from exercising the vote". Since voters are allowed to vote only in the electoral precincts where their names are included in the voter lists, all those voters who are unable to attend their polling station (e.g. hospitalised persons) are, in fact, excluded from voting. The only exceptions are members of the military as well as citizens who are residents of or staying in foreign countries (see above). According to the Joint Assessment (CDL-AD (2002) 29) it could be desirable to find mechanisms to reduce the number of voters excluded in this way, but this depends on the actual risk of fraud.

28. Taking into account the risk of fraud, it might be desirable to consider whether the correct balance has been found between the need to be rigorous in order to ensure the integrity of the voting and the need to be flexible in order to ensure that citizens' rights to vote are protected. At least, if the risk of electoral fraud were to be reduced, e.g. by the introduction of other means to prevent multiple voting ("inking" etc.), it may be appropriate to consider the (re-) introduction of well-monitored special voting procedures for those citizens who are unable to attend their electoral precincts. The PACE Ad Hoc Committee for the Observation of the Presidential Election in Armenia and the PACE Ad Hoc Committee for Observation of the Parliamentary Elections in Armenia suggested to the Armenian Parliament that it adopt provisions in the Electoral Code to provide for mobile ballot boxes (Doc. 9742, item 42; Doc. 9836, item 47). In any case, it seems to be inconsistent that citizens abroad are able to vote but not citizens within the country who are unable to go to the polling station. The same inconsistency exists between members of the military and, for example, policemen on duty on election day.

29. Voting rights for members of the military and for citizens abroad. Members of the military are given opportunities to vote, but only in presidential elections and in the proportional part of parliamentary elections. The Electoral Code provides that citizens who are military servicemen performing their military service or participating in military training cannot participate in elections to local self-governing bodies and National Assembly elections under the majority system (see Art. 2.6 and Art. 10.1). The same is true for citizens of the Republic of Armenia who have the right to vote but live or are staying in foreign countries (Art. 51).

30. Although it is welcomed that members of the military and citizens abroad are given the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, it has to be noted that this right is restricted to non-constituency based elections. The reason for this restriction might be the practical problems in defining constituencies for military and overseas voting or by the assumption

that members of the military or citizens abroad may have only a tenuous connection with a particular constituency. On the other hand, especially with regard to the parliamentary elections, the restriction infringes on the principal of equal suffrage (which is stipulated in Art. 1 and Art. 4 of the Electoral Code), since members of the military and citizens abroad are only allowed to participate in the proportional part, and not in the majority part of the parliamentary elections. Thus, it might be considered whether members of the military and citizens abroad should also be allowed to have a constituency vote as well. In such a case, it would be necessary to find mechanisms to define the constituencies in which members of the military and/or citizens abroad are able to vote. (Several countries apply elaborate provisions for military and/or overseas constituency voting). For example, non-resident voters could be registered in those constituencies where they lived before they left the country, and members of the military in the constituencies in which they are permanent residents or, possibly, where they are performing their military service.

31. Compilation and review of voter lists. According to Article 9 of the Electoral Code, voter lists are permanently managed documents and are compiled in communities, by electoral precincts. They are compiled and maintained by community leaders and are to be reviewed in December and June of each year. According to the Joint Assessment of OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission (CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 24), one review of the voter lists, if conducted effectively, would be sufficient in principle, as soon as the registration process is improved. Therefore, it is recommended to maintain a review of the lists twice a year in the next five years and to consider going towards an annual review later.

32. Control over voter lists. The CEC and the TECs are to exercise control over the compilation and maintenance of voter lists in accordance with procedures set down by the CEC. It is specified in the law how citizens, proxies and commission members may check preliminary voter lists and apply to community leaders to make corrections in the voter lists (see Art. 9.9, Art. 12, Art. 14). There is also a provision that inaccuracies in voter lists can be appealed to the court (Art. 14.3). In a welcome development, the provision that voter lists are not subject to change within two days prior to voting, as well as on the day of voting, not even by a court decision, was overruled by a Constitutional Court decision of 1 October 2002 (CCD-389). According to this decision, a voter can apply to the court even on the day of voting to be included in the voter list for his/her precinct.

33. Nevertheless, it is insufficiently specified in the Electoral Code how the electoral commissions, in particular the CEC, may exercise control over the voter lists. The Community leaders are obliged to submit the voter lists by precincts only to the head of the institution administering the territory of the precinct centre and to the TECs 40 days before elections (Art. 9.8). With regard to the voter lists, it seems that the CEC only has the power to set out the procedure for the compilation, the verification and the correction of the voter lists (see also Art. 41.4 and Art. 41.8), but not to implement and control that procedure.

34. Lack of national voter register. From reading the Electoral Code, it is unclear how multiple entries of the same voters in the voter lists across community borders can be prevented, given the fact that Armenia has no centralised civil or voter register. Serious efforts should be made to create a regularly updated national civil/voter register.

35. In order to avoid voters going to the wrong polling station or not voting because of lack of information, they should receive notification of the precinct in which they have to vote.

36. "Inking". In an attempt to reduce incidents of multiple voting, it is advisable to introduce a provision into Section Three of the Electoral Code whereby voters' fingers will be marked with indelible ink at the polling station. In many transition states "inking" is regarded as an important step towards reducing the risk of multiple voting.

37. Ballot paper. In the amendments of 2002, Article 49.4, which provided that candidates' names appear on the ballot paper in alphabetical order, was deleted. According to the Joint Assessment of OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission "... [t]his seems to leave open the question of how the candidates (and parties) will now be ordered on the ballot paper" (CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 25). However, Article 82.1 provides that the candidates' last names are entered in alphabetical order onto the ballot for the elections of the President of the Republic. Article 114.2 provides for the alphabetical order of the names of the parties/alliances on the ballot for elections to the National Assembly by proportional system. Article 114.4 does the same with regard to the candidates for elections to the National Assembly by the majority system. The same applies to elections to the local self-governing bodies (Art. 130.2, Art. 130.3).

38. It is not known why Article 49.4 was deleted. A systematic reason might be that it provides for the alphabetical order only of the names of candidates, but not of parties/alliances. Thus, the general provision might have been misleading with regard to the proportional part of National Assembly elections. In any case, the deletion of Article 49.4 cannot be regarded as problematic as long as the order of candidates or party/alliance names are regulated by the specific provisions for the different elections in the Electoral Code. An additional option to alphabetical ordering could be use of a lottery.

39. Ballot security measures. Cases of the fraudulent use of ballots, e.g. pre-marked stamped ballots appearing prior to the voting day, have been reported in past elections. The introduction of perforated ballots with serial numbers printed on the stubs should be considered. In this way, the number of ballots issued and used can be tracked and accounted for at all times. To ensure transparency of the printing process, information on the printing house(s) involved in printing of ballots, as well as on the quantity and serial number of ballots allocated to TECs/PECs should be required to be published. For accountability purposes, it is suggested that separate protocols are completed on the number and serial numbers of ballots printed and number and serial numbers of sent/received ballots at each level of the electoral commissions.

40. "Voting against all". Still unusual for established democracies is the possibility of casting a negative vote ("I am against all"; "I am against" : see Art. 57.1, Art. 57.2). The negative vote stems from the communist tradition of non-competitive elections and is still used in a number of post-communist states. It gives the voter the possibility of expressing their annoyance with the candidates and parties/blocs on the ballot paper. In this way, however, political and party apathy in the population can be strengthened if the voters can simply reject candidates and parties instead of making the (often not so easy) decision as to who is better (or best of the worst) candidate or party/bloc. It is therefore recommended that this option be removed from the ballot paper.

41. Procedure for marking the ballot. It is recommended that a general provision be introduced into Article 57 of the current Electoral Code, setting out that the ballot paper is

correctly marked and the vote is valid if the voter's intention is clear and unambiguous (see CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 27).

42. Electoral observers. According to Article 30.4 of the Electoral Code, "on the day of voting, proxies and observers monitor the work of the electoral commission. To that end they can present their remarks and proposals to the Chairman of the Commission, who then takes appropriate measures". The Venice Commission has already pointed out that observers should not be given the right to monitor the commissions' work since the role of observers is neutral: it is to observe, not to monitor. In general, it would be appropriate to treat the rights and responsibilities of proxies, observers and representatives of mass media separately. The rights of election observers have often been interpreted restrictively; the provisions on election observation should be revised in order to allow for observers, both domestic and international, to have unrestricted access to the polling stations and to be present during the returning operations including aggregation and tabulation of results; the same is true for proxies.

43. Art. 30 also provides for unimpeded access of observers and proxies to the electoral documents, ballot specimens, decisions and protocols of commissions. No restrictions of the rights of proxies and observers are allowed. The same article defines that the observers and proxies have no right to intervene in the work of the electoral commissions. However, it was observed in the last elections that this article was misinterpreted by several election commissions, which did not allow observers and proxies to observe the process at a close distance. The wording of Article 30 should be clarified to make clear that observers and proxies have the right to move freely within the precinct, as long as this does not disturb the work of the commission and, in particular, to be able to watch the vote counting at a close distance, so that the ballots and the ballot box are clearly visible. In addition, in regard to domestic observers, it was reported that in a number of cases, CEC certificates for domestic observers presented during the recent elections were believed to be fake. It is therefore recommended that a provision be introduced requesting that the NGOs deploying domestic observers stamp the certificate with their NGO stamp.

44. Violation of voting procedures. According to Article 57.5, during voting, all cases of violation of the voting procedure laid down by the Electoral Code are recorded in the register upon the request of two members of the commissions or two proxies, as are all the decisions of the PEC. Thus, any alleged violation of the voting procedure to be recorded in the register requires the support of at least two proxies or PEC members. The provision was particularly problematic during the second round of the 2003 presidential elections, when there were only two proxies present at polling stations (see OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: 6). Thus, Article 57.5 should be amended to allow a single commission member or proxy to announce a violation of the voting procedure.

45. Publishing the preliminary results. There are several provisions in the Electoral Code, as amended in 2002, that provide for the prompt publishing of preliminary results by the CEC (Art. 63.1, Art. 63.8), by the TECs (Art. 42.8, Art. 62.2) and even by the PECs (Art. 61.6). In practice, however, the announcement and publication of preliminary electoral results was not regarded as satisfactory by international observers, for example, in the 2003 presidential elections. There were uncertainties whether not only the CEC, but also the TECs are required by law to publish preliminary results. Moreover, there was a discussion as to whether the electoral commissions are obliged to publish a full breakdown of results by polling station when they announce the preliminary results. In the May 2003 parliamentary elections,

therefore, the CEC formally instructed TECs to publish the preliminary results of both the proportional and the majority part of the elections broken down by polling station (in violation of this instruction, however, most TECs provided only summarised preliminary results). Moreover, the CEC committed itself to publishing the preliminary results of the proportional election broken down by polling station. Although this is a positive development, the regulations on the publishing of the preliminary results on the different levels should be more clearly and explicitly prescribed in the Electoral Code. The law should require publication of the detailed preliminary election results at all levels and their immediate display in front of the polling station.

46. Summarisation of election results. Article 83 should refer to Article 63 only (and not Article 60).

47. Election Results (Local Council Members). The Joint Assessment of OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission mentioned a minor inconsistency in the Electoral Code: "Article 120 has been amended to increase the size of the community council in a community with a population of up to 3,000 from five members to seven members. The fourth paragraph of Article 134 should similarly be amended to provide for the allocation of mandates to the top seven candidates instead of the top five candidates" (CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 33). However, since there are still five members to be elected in those larger communities where several multi-mandate majority constituencies exist (see Art. 121.2, paragraphs 2 and 3, and Art. 121.3, paragraphs 2 and 3), Article 134.4 should be amended as follows: "The first five candidates, in the case of five-member constituencies, and the first seven candidates, in the case of seven-member constituencies, for the community council members, who have received the maximum number of "yes" votes, are considered elected in the given multi-mandate majority constituency".

48. Complaints and appeals. The management of complaints and appeals is an essential part of democratic elections. According to the Joint Assessment (CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 36), the procedures in the Code for dealing with complaints and appeals are not clearly defined and are very complicated. The Joint Assessment recommends that Article 40.1 be rewritten as a general statement dealing with complaints and appeals and that all provisions relating to complaints and appeals be drawn together in one chapter. International observer reports also characterise the complaints and appeals procedures as being inadequate and confusing.

49. According to the Electoral Code, in general, an appeal lies from decisions, activity and lack of activity of electoral commissions to a superior electoral commission or a court of first instance (Art. 40; see also Art. 41.11 and Art. 42.7). Disputes over the election results, with the exception of those over elections of local self-governing bodies, are resolved by the Constitutional Court (Art. 40.4). However, from reading the Electoral Code, several aspects remain unclear or debatable. At the 2003 parliamentary elections, for example, there was confusion as to whether TEC decisions relating to the majority contest could be appealed to the CEC. From the reading of the Electoral Code, it is unclear why these decisions were not considered by the CEC to be within their jurisdiction. Even more important, the choice in the Electoral Code of appealing either to an election commission or to a court is not a good solution (Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, II.3.3.c).

50. Significantly, in many new democracies, the appeals review by the electoral administration bodies follows a single hierarchical line and is used before any appeal to the

courts. Within the electoral administration, the superior election administration body, e.g. the CEC, therefore takes final administrative decisions about electoral complaints. In some countries, an appeal lies from decisions of the CEC to a court, but in general only to a special court, the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court. An alternative approach would be that all electoral appeals may be dealt with by the judicial system. Such an approach, however, may only be a reasonable option in countries where there is great confidence in the professionalism and independence of the judicial system. In such a case, it would be important for an appeal to lie from the decisions of lower courts to higher courts. The Armenian Electoral Code seems to mix the appeal procedures. A complaint against a decision of an election commission may be lodged with a higher level election commission or with the Court of First Instance with jurisdiction over the election commission making that decision. Decisions of Courts of First Instance are not subject to further judicial review in Armenia. The Electoral Code should be amended to provide clear and consistent complaint and appeal procedures and to avoid any conflicts of jurisdiction (see also CDL-AD (2002) 23 rev, chapter II.3.3).

51. Appeal of court decisions. Even if the current appeal system is maintained, it must be guaranteed that electoral appeals are decided consistently throughout the country. At the moment, it is problematic that almost all decisions of election commissions can be appealed to a court of first instance only, but no further. Since decisions of the courts of first instance cannot be appealed across the country, there is the risk that the electoral law may not be applied consistently. This is exactly what happened, for example, during the 2003 elections. Thus the Electoral Code should be amended to allow appeals against decisions of the Courts of First Instance. Alternatively, the CEC should be provided with more responsibilities to ensure that electoral complaints are decided consistently throughout the country.

52. Electoral violations. In this context, it should be noted that the Armenian Electoral Code – in contrast to many other electoral laws – includes a short chapter on accountability for violations of the Electoral Code. Article 139 renders persons liable for a number of actions. However, it is open to question whether the list of electoral violations is complete since some aspects, e.g. the misuse of state funds or undue behaviour of the media, are not mentioned there. Furthermore, some of the violations are formulated in a very vague way (e.g., Art. 139.13: "Hindering the free expression of the voters' will"; Art. 139.15: "Hindering the election-related functions", Art. 139.17: "Hindering the normal operation of electoral activities by members of the electoral commissions, civil servants, or officers of local self-governing bodies"; Art. 139.25: "Hindering the normal process of the pre-election campaigns") (see also CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 36). Finally, the electoral violations are not "weighted". There is no distinction between electoral crimes and electoral administrative violations. These comments cannot verify whether the electoral violations that are mentioned in the Electoral Code are recognised as crimes or as administrative legal violations by the Criminal Code or any other law of the Republic of Armenia. In any case, it is important that electoral violations are specified in a complete and detailed way by the Electoral Code and/or other laws.

53. Sanctions for election violations. International observers criticised the fact that the Electoral Code does not provide adequate sanctions for election violations. Indeed, there are no sanctions provided in the Electoral Code. This is, however, not uncommon by international comparison. In many countries the sanctions for electoral crimes are described in the Criminal Code or other laws. However, in the face of the non-prosecution and non-punishment of widespread electoral violations, for example, after the 2003 presidential

elections in Armenia, it would be appropriate to amend Chapter 31. For example, the Electoral Code could provide that electoral crimes will be prosecuted by the state and that they will be punished according to the law. It could also oblige the chairs or members of electoral commissions to inform prosecutors of all election-related crimes that are committed within their area of responsibility. It could even establish the amounts of penalties for administrative legal violations. Finally, the matter should be regulated as to which organ – the electoral commission and/or a court – has the power to sanction which electoral violations and by which means. To mention explicitly in the Electoral Code the way in which electoral violations are prosecuted and sanctioned may have some positive effects on attempts to reduce widespread electoral violations (of course, it is much more important to take effective measures against election violations and to implement the law effectively: see below).

54. Consequences for electoral rights and electoral commissions. These comments cannot evaluate whether the Electoral Code corresponds with the Criminal Code and other laws of the Republic of Armenia. However, it should be made very clear by the Electoral Code and/or the Criminal Code that persons who have committed (or have attempted to commit) electoral crimes will not only be punished by imprisonment or a fine, but also run the risk of losing their active and passive electoral rights. In any case, electoral violators should not be appointed as members of the electoral commissions. Thus it would be appropriate to amend Article 34 ("Principles for Formation of Electoral Commission") to forbid persons who committed electoral crimes or permitted them to take place to be members of electoral commissions. In the same way, the Electoral Code should be amended to allow for the dismissal of the election officials found by a superior electoral commission or court to have been responsible for an election violation.

55. Report on Elections. In view of the insufficient implementation and respect of the electoral legislation, it was strongly recommended "... that the CEC's obligation should include a duty to provide an analysis of the violations of the code following each national election, an indication of measures taken against violators, remedies provided to those aggrieved and any legislative improvements that may be required" (CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 21). Article 41 should be amended to oblige the CEC not only to make a statement in the National Assembly on the organisation and the conduct of the elections, but also to elaborate on post-election analysis of electoral violations, remedies for them and required improvements to the electoral legislation and administration.

56. Time frames. There are a number of other issues which refer to the time frame established in the Electoral Code, e.g. with regard to the formation and dissolution of the CEC. Article 35.2 of the Electoral Code, as amended in July 2002, provides that the CEC is formed and commences its duties 40 days after the National Assembly elections. While the early formation of the CEC long before the next election takes place is greatly welcomed, it should be carefully re-examined whether the 40-day period is really enough not only for the formation of the new CEC, but also for the outgoing CEC to finish its work properly. The Joint Assessment of OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission has already identified some practical problems in forming the CEC as soon as 40 days after the elections (CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 20).

57. Article 41.3 of the Code requires the chairman of the CEC to report on the election 30 days after it takes place. It is recommended to give the outgoing Commission a little more time than 30 days to finish its work properly.

58. This is particularly important with regard to the time frame of the Overview and Audit Service. According to Article 25.11, the candidates and parties must submit a declaration on the use of the amounts available to them in their pre-election funds to the electoral commission that had registered them not later than 15 days after the election. The electoral commissions send their registered declarations to the Overview and Audit service of the CEC within three days of receipt. Having received declarations on the use of finances in campaign funding of candidates and parties from commissions that have registered them, the Overview and Audit Service, pursuant to procedures established in Article 25.11, checks them and submits the materials to the CEC for discussion within one month. Materials concerning violations discovered as the result of discussions are sent, upon a decision of the CEC, to a court of first instance (see Art. 26). From reading the Electoral Code, it seems that the Overview and Audit processes may not be finished before the 30-day period of the outgoing CEC ends.

59. The timetable seems to be even more problematic, if the 15-day deadline for parties and candidates to submit campaign accounts to the Overview and Audit Service were to be reconsidered. The deadline was recently reduced by the July 2002 amendments from 30 to 15 days. However, according to the Joint Assessment, "[t]he provisions must be carefully monitored to ensure that greater haste does not impinge on the accuracy of the accounts" (CDL-AD (2002) 29, item 11). In the opinion of OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission, the change should only be made if the reduced deadline can be complied with effectively (see also item 32). While there is value in completing these accounting procedures promptly, this should not be at the expense of accuracy and completeness. Thus, a longer time period may be appropriate if practical problems arise.

60. It would also be advisable to revise the time frames provided for in Article 90, 92 and 93 in order to take account of the possibility of an appeal to the Constitutional Court. In that case, a new election should be organised only after the decision of the Court.

61. Incorporating decisions of the Constitutional Court into the Electoral Code. Finally, the Electoral Code should be amended to incorporate decisions of the Constitutional Court that have supplemented or overruled the electoral law. This applies, for example, to Article 14.3.

IV. The Electoral Administration: Issues for discussion

62. General remarks. It is obvious that many problems with elections in the Republic of Armenia are not caused by the Electoral Code, but instead by its insufficient implementation and a lack of political will by the executive to conduct democratic elections. The Electoral Code was not properly or fully applied in the past. Thus not only are improvements to the electoral legislation necessary, but also improvements to the electoral administration. Extensive effort should be made to overcome shortcomings in the process of organising and conducting national and local elections. In light of electoral observer reports, in particular, that of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe (see Appendix), the following problems should be pointed out.

63. The transparency of elections is one of the main provisions of the Electoral Code (see Art. 7). In practice, however, some important provisions to ensure the transparency of elections have been ignored in the past. Practical measures should be taken to improve the

transparency of elections, in particular, with regard to the work of electoral commissions and returning of results, as well as with the regular information on voter turnout, in conformity with Article 7.6. A transparent procedure would be particularly welcome for the revision of voter lists.

64. Meetings of the electoral commissions. The CEC meetings were criticised as being often short and conducted in a manner that was not conducive to debate or discussion. Thus it is important that the CEC holds regular, scheduled and open sessions. The participation of commission members from opposition parties as well as of proxies, observers and the representatives of mass media should be ensured.

65. Decisions of electoral commission. Decisions of the electoral commissions have to be made by the quorum and the majority of votes required by the law. It is not acceptable that most CEC decisions were made by its executive officers and secretariat outside of formal sessions. Complaints should certainly not be decided by individual electoral commission members without a formal vote of the commission, as has still happened in recent elections. A serious effort should be made to ensure that the decision-making process of electoral commissions corresponds to the law.

66. Publication of electoral commissions' decisions. Greater efforts might be made to publicise decisions of electoral commissions, in particular of the CEC, and to disseminate them to election officials, candidates, proxies, observers, and the media. This would contribute towards a more consistent application of electoral rules.

67. Training of election officials. Election training is an essential precondition for consistently applying the Electoral Code throughout the country and for impartial assistance to voters (where necessary). Thus members of electoral commissions should receive appropriate and standardised training at all levels of the election administration. In particular, better training for PEC members is needed.

68. Voter lists. Though there have been a number of elections since independence in Armenia and improvements have been made in many communities, the inaccuracy of voter lists remains a serious concern. It is important to improve the quality and the accuracy of the voter lists. It is advisable to establish a national voter register to be able to check the voter lists for multiple entries.

69. As noted above, the voter lists used during the recent elections, though far from being entirely accurate, showed certain improvement. The problems encountered in the process of compilation and maintenance of the voter lists are connected with the problematic and often inadequate system of communication between different agencies involved in the administration of voter lists. It is critical that authorities work on creating an effective mechanism to ensure continuous flow of information and its proper processing. Furthermore, the procedures regulating inclusion of citizens on the lists on the voting day need to be reconsidered. Observers reported that on the day of voting a number of individuals received permission to vote through the courts, which do not however check personal data with local authorities and consequently, in many cases, provide an opportunity to vote to those without citizenship or those mistakenly not found on the voter list in the precincts. Based on the experience of the recent elections, it is recommended that on the day of voting, court decisions on inclusion of voters on the voter lists are not made without consultation with the

relevant department of the local authorities that is responsible for the maintenance of the voter/population registers and voter lists.

70. Voter information and education. Voter education campaigns should be intensified. It is of utmost importance that voters understand the basic rules of elections. Voter education should not only provide information on the elections, but should also address the voters' motivation to participate in the electoral process. In light of the problems of voter registration, voter education should also call upon voters to check their registration entries on the voter lists before polling day. State media could be used for the purposes of voter education, even if there is no such provision for this in the Electoral Code.

71. Guidelines for the nomination of candidates. In order to avoid the inconsistent application of provisions related to the nomination of candidates, it is advisable to draw up clear and detailed guidelines and to distribute them to TECs and candidates etc. In particular, the criteria for declaration on property ownership and permanent residency must not differ between constituencies.

72. Accessibility of polling stations for disabled persons. Although both the Electoral Code and the electoral administration recognise the problems disabled persons have in exercising their right to vote, efforts should be improved to ensure the accessibility of precinct centres by persons with disabilities.

73. Neutral coverage of the electoral process by the publicly owned media. During the last electoral campaigns, public media were often biased in favour of the incumbents. The neutrality of these media should be ensured.

74. Restricted movement of proxies and observers. According to a CEC decision from August 2002, only one proxy at a time is allowed to move around the precinct centre (see OSCE/ODIHR 2003b). This decision inappropriately restricts the rights of proxies, set out in the law, to observe the voting and counting procedure. This situation should be addressed, and it is recommended that the CEC provide additional instructions to members of election commissions to follow the provisions of the Code and not restrict the activities of observers and proxies as long as such activity does not disturb the work of the commission.

75. Unauthorized persons. In order to ensure the normal course of voting in the precinct centres, the presence of unauthorised persons in polling stations should be prohibited effectively. It might be helpful if electoral commission members, proxies and observers were to wear identity badges at all times. This would make it easier to identify unauthorised persons in the polling station.

76. Behaviour of armed forces. There were reports of police presence (without invitation by the PEC chair) in various polling stations during the 2003 elections. It is recommended that members of police forces be instructed more systematically as to how to behave during elections. The same would be useful with regard to members of the military.

77. Electoral fraud. Fraud has been reported during recent elections, including ballot box stuffing and falsification of result protocols. In a welcome development, some corrective steps were taken in the 2003 parliamentary elections, e.g. re-runs of majority elections in a few constituencies. Intensified training of election officials and effective measures against electoral violations from the very beginning are essential to avoid fraud. In particular, there

should be a means to ensure that no secretly printed ballot papers are added, for example, through their numbering. The same approach is valid for the seals to be used to express the validity of ballot papers.

78. Publication of provisional results. In violation of the Electoral Code and CEC instructions, many TECs did not publish detailed preliminary results in the 2003 parliamentary elections. Instructions to do so should be made even more explicit.

79. Complaint and appeal procedures. The inadequate and confusing appeal procedure led to an inconsistent interpretation and application of legislation. Besides necessary improvements to the Electoral Code (see above), clear and detailed practical guidelines should be drawn up on how to lodge complaints, and how to respond to them.

80. Insufficient measures against violations of the Electoral Code. Authorities failed to take action in the face of clear violations of the Electoral Code. Perpetrators must effectively be held accountable so to abolish an atmosphere of impunity with regard to electoral crimes.

V. Summary of recommendations

81. Considering possible amendments to the Electoral Code, the recommendations are made :

- to review the provisions regarding the composition of the electoral commissions to reduce the presidential administration influence on the commissions' work and to strengthen the impartial performance of the electoral administration (Chapter Eight of the Electoral Code);
- to prohibit dismissal of an election commission member shortly before the day of voting or delay the effectiveness of the dismissal until the new member has been properly registered (Chapter Eight);
- to introduce a higher quorum to increase the representativeness of the electoral commissions' decisions (Art. 39);
- to regulate more precisely and transparently the procedure for drawing and re-drawing the constituencies, to reduce the maximum deviation from 15% to 10% in the number of voters between the constituencies and to require that constituencies be established 180 days before an election instead of 90 days. (Chapter Three);
- to (re-)establish the constituencies independently from the date of elections on the basis of the periodical review of the voter lists (Chapter Three).;
- to define clearly the concept of "permanent residency", if it is used as a requirement for candidature (Art. 65.1, Art. 97.1);
- to establish identical eligibility conditions for candidates to both the proportional and the majority part of National Assembly elections (Art. 97.2, Art. 97.3);
- to allow party alliances to nominate candidates not only for the proportional, but also for the majority contest of the National Assembly elections (Art. 104);
- to reduce the minimum number for the registration of party lists for the National Assembly proportional elections to a maximum of 1% of the registered voters (Art. 101.1);
- to fix the number of signatures required for majority candidates in single-member constituencies to not more than 1% of the registered voters in each constituency;

- to check all signatures necessary for the nomination of candidates or party lists, at least until the minimum number is reached (Art. 70.3);
- to specify the property declaration requirements for candidates. (Art. 67.7, Art. 100.7, Art. 106.6);
- to prohibit the withdrawal of candidates or party lists, except on the basis of clearly defined criteria for doing so (Art. 78, Art. 111);
- to broaden the provisions prohibiting the use of state resources for campaign purposes to include news coverage of the campaign by state and public media institutions (Art 22);
- to introduce further media-related provisions, e.g. with regard to the behaviour of private media during pre-election campaigns (Art. 20);
- to (re-)introduce special voting procedures for citizens who are unable to attend their electoral precincts, if further means are adopted to reduce the risk of fraud;
- to allow members of the military and citizens abroad to have not only a party list vote, but also a constituency vote in the National Assembly elections (Art. 2.6, Art. 10.1, Art. 51);
- to specify how the electoral commissions, in particular the CEC, may exercise control over the voter lists (Art. 9.4);
- to create a regularly updated national civil/voter register so as to prevent multiple entries in the voter lists across community borders (Chapter Two);
- to notify the voters of the precinct in which they have to vote (Chapter Three);
- to introduce a provision whereby voters' fingers will be marked with indelible ink at polling stations to reduce the risk of multiple voting (Section Three);
- to introduce ballot security measures such as printing perforated ballots with serial numbers on detachable stubs (Chapter Ten);
- to remove the negative vote ("I am against all"; "I am against") from the ballot paper (Art. 57.1, Art. 57.2);
- to introduce a general provision, according to which a ballot paper is correctly marked and the vote is valid if the voter's intention is clear and unambiguous (Art. 57);
- to treat separately the rights and responsibilities of proxies, observers and representatives of mass media and ensure that both proxies and observers are provided with unrestricted access to polling stations and are allowed to be present during the returning operations including aggregation and tabulation of results (Art. 30);
- to introduce a provision requesting that an NGO deploying domestic observers stamp certificates issued by the CEC with the stamp of the NGO;
- to provide that a report of a violation of the voting procedure be entered into a PEC register on the request of only one commission member or one proxy instead of two (Art. 57.5);
- to require publication of a full breakdown of preliminary results by polling station at all levels (Art. 61, Art. 62, Art. 63 etc.) as well as their immediate display in front of the polling station;
- to abolish stylistic inconsistencies between Art. 120 and Art. 134;
- to provide clear and consistent complaints and appeal procedures (Art. 40);
- to clearly specify a complete list of electoral violations and to differentiate between electoral crimes and electoral administrative violations (Art. 139);
- to specify how electoral violations are to be prosecuted and sanctioned (Chapter 31);
- to forbid persons who have committed electoral crimes or permitted them to take place to be members of electoral commissions and allow for the dismissal of those election

officials found by a superior election commission or court to have been responsible for an election violation (Art. 34);

- to oblige the CEC to provide an analysis of the violations of the Electoral Code following each national election, to report on measures taken against election violators and on the legislative and administrative improvements required (Art. 41.3);
- to revise the time frame for the formation and dissolution of the CEC and the time-frame of the overview and audit processes;
- to take into account the possibility of an appeal to the Constitutional Court before organising new elections; and
- to incorporate constitutional court decisions into the Electoral Code (e.g., Art. 14.3).

82. With regard to the organisation and conduct of elections serious effort should be made:

- to improve the transparency of elections, in particular, with regard to the work of electoral commissions as well as the returning process and voter turnout;
- to hold regular, scheduled and open electoral commission meetings which allow for debate and discussion;
- to ensure that the decision-making processes of electoral commissions correspond to the law;
- to summarise and publish important CEC decisions and to disseminate them to election officials, candidates, proxies, observers, the media etc.;
- to provide election officials with adequate, standardised training;
- to improve substantially the quality and accuracy of the voter lists;
- to establish a central/national civil/voter register;
- to improve voter information and voter education;
- to draw up clear and detailed guidelines for the registration of candidates and parties/ alliances;
- to improve the accessibility of precinct centres to persons with disabilities;
- to ensure neutral coverage of the electoral process by publicly-owned media;
- to repeal the CEC decisions restricting the free movement of proxies in the precinct centres on polling day and provide additional instructions to members of election commissions to follow provisions of the Code and not restrict the activities of observers and proxies as long as such activity does not disturb the work of the commission;
- to prohibit effectively the presence of unauthorised persons in polling stations;
- to instruct members of the police and military forces on how to behave during election campaigns and on polling day;
- to take effective steps against violations of the Electoral Code from the very beginning;
- to enforce instructions to publish detailed preliminary results;
- to draw up clear and detailed guidelines for the complaints and appeals procedures; and
- to hold those persons responsible for electoral violations accountable.

Appendix: Reference documents

Council of Europe 1992: Handbook for Observers of Elections, Strasbourg.
Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe: Report on the Local Elections in Armenia (20 October 2002), CG/Bur (9) 60, Strasbourg, 14 November 2002.
Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) 2002: Amendments to the Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia adopted in July 2002, CDL (2002) 126, Strasbourg, 9 October 2002.
Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) 2003: Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters. Guidelines and Explanatory Report. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 52nd Plenary Session (Venice, 18-19 October 2002). CDL-AD (2002) 23 rev, Strasbourg, 23 May 2003.
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Ad hoc Committee for the Observations of the Presidential Elections in Armenia – First Round (19 February 2003), Doc. 9742, 18 March 2003.
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Ad hoc Committee for the Observations of the Presidential Elections in Armenia – Second Round (5 March 2003), Doc. 9742 Addendum, 31 March 2003.
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Ad hoc Committee for the Observations of the Parliamentary elections in Armenia (25 May 2003), Doc. 9836, 23 June 2003.
International Centre Against Censorship 1994: Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies, London.
OSCE/ODIHR 1999: The ODIHR Election Observation Handbook, Warsaw.
OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: Republic of Armenia. Presidential Election 19 February and 5 March 2003, Final Report, Warsaw, 28 April 2003.
OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: Republic of Armenia. Parliamentary Elections 25 May 2003, Final Report, Warsaw, 31 July 2003.
OSCE/ODIHR and Council of Europe/Venice Commission 2002: Joint Assessment of the Amendments to the Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia adopted in July 2002 by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE and the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission, Council of Europe), adopted by the Venice Commission at its 52nd Plenary Session (Venice, 18-19 October 2002) on the basis of comments by Mr. Jessie Pilgrim and Mr. Bernard Owen, Warsaw/ Strasbourg, 8 November 2002, CDL-AD (2002) 29.
Nohlen, Dieter/ Grotz, Florian/ Hartmann, Christof (eds.) 2001: Elections in Asia and the Pacific. A Data Handbook. Vol. 1: The Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rose, Richard (ed.) 2002: International Encyclopaedia of Elections, Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
Universal Electoral Code. Adopted by the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia on February 5, 1999. As of August 3, 2002, Amendments and Additions made to the Electoral Code of 5 February 1999. (Unofficial translation).