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EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION)

IN CO-OPERATION WITH

THE PERMANENT ELECTORAL AUTHORITY OF ROMANIA

COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR LA DEMOCRATIE PAR LE DROIT (COMMISSION DE VENISE)

EN COOPERATION AVEC

L'AUTORITE ELECTORALE PERMANENTE DE ROUMANIE

13th EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES "NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN ELECTIONS: PUBLIC TRUST AND CHALLENGES FOR ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES"

13e CONFERENCE EUROPEENNE DES ADMINISTRATIONS ELECTORALES « ELECTIONS ET NOUVELLES TECHNOLOGIES : CONFIANCE DU PUBLIC ET DEFIS A RELEVER PAR LES ADMINISTRATIONS ELECTORALES »

Bucharest, Romania/Bucarest, Roumanie, 14-15 April / 14-15 avril 2016

REPORTS OF THE CONFERENCE / RAPPORTS DE LA CONFERENCE

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Thursday, 14 April 2016

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09.30-10.00 Opening session

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Moderated by **Ms Ana Maria Pătru**, President of the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania

- Address by **Ms Ana Maria Pătru**, President of the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania
- Address by **Ms Elena-Simina Tănăsescu**, Counsellor of the President of Romania
- Address by **Mr Ioan Dragoş Tudorache**, Head of Prime Minister's Chancellery
- Address by **Mr Thomas Markert**, Secretary, Director of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe

10.00-10.15 Photo group

10.15-10.45 Presentation of the conclusions of the first Electoral Expert Debates "Electoral Law and new technologies: legal challenges"

Nicolae Iorga

Moderated by **Ms Ana Maria Pătru**, President of the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania

Presented by **Mr Oliver Kask**, Judge, Vice-Chair of the Council for Democratic Elections, Member of the Venice Commission, Estonia

10.45-11.15 Coffee break

11.15-12.15 First plenary session
Legal framework of new technologies in elections: implementing international principles

Nicolae Iorga

Moderated by **Mr Chemavon Chahbazian**, Head of the Division of Election Observation and Interparliamentary Cooperation, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe

– *Towards updating the Recommendation of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on e-voting*, by **Mr Gregor Wenda**, Deputy Head of the Electoral Administration Department at the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) Department III/6, Electoral Affairs, Chair of the Council of Europe Ad-hoc Committee of Experts on electronic voting (CAHVE)

– *New technologies in elections: implementing international principles*, by **Ms Beata Martin-Rozumiłowicz**, Director for Europe and Eurasia at International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)

– *Legal framework of new technologies, Belgium case*, by **Mr Régis Trannoy**, Head of Elections Unit at the Directorate General *Institutions & Population* of the Federal Public Service Home Affairs of Belgium

12.15-13.15 Working sessions

I. 1) *Can the secrecy of the vote be challenged?* Moderated by **Mr José Antonio Dias Toffoli**, Justice of the Supreme Court of Brazil

Meeting room: Nicolae Iorga

I. 2) *The issue of personal data protection*, moderated by **Mr Akyn Mambetaliev**, deputy Director of the State Company *Infocom* under the State Registration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic *(with **Russian** interpretation)*

Nicolae Bălcescu

I. 3) *The neutrality of authorities*, moderated by **Ms Beata Martin-Rozumiłowicz**, Director for Europe and Eurasia at International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)

Human Rights

13.15-14.30 Lunch break

14.30-15.00 Presentation of the project "Improving electoral management: the organisational determinants of electoral integrity"

Nicolae Iorga

Moderated by **Mr Andreas Kiefer**, Secretary General of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Council of Europe

Presented by **Mr Toby James**, Senior Lecturer in British and Comparative Politics, and **Ms Leontine Loeber**, PhD Research Student, University of East Anglia, United-Kingdom

15.00-16.00 Second plenary session
New technologies applied to the pre-electoral period

Nicolae Iorga

Moderated by **Mr Andreas Kiefer**, Secretary General of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Council of Europe

- *Impact of new technologies in electoral observation by the European Union*, by **Mr Emanuele Giaufret**, European External Action Service of the European Union

- *Observation of new technologies in electoral processes within the OSCE area*, by **Mr Steven Martin**, Senior Adviser on New Voting Technologies, OSCE/ODIHR Election Department

- *Biometric voter registration, Kyrgyz case*, by **Mr Akyn Mambetaliev**, deputy Director of the State Company *Infocom* under the State Registration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic

- *IVXV: fresh wave of Estonian internet voting*, by **Mr Priit Vinkel**, Head of Elections Department, National Electoral Committee, Estonia

16.00-16.30 Coffee break

16.30-17.30 Working sessions

II. 1) *Challenges regarding voter registration and voter lists*, moderated by **Mr Robert Krimmer**, Professor of e-Governance at Tallinn University of Technology, Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Estonia

Nicolae Iorga

II. 2) *Monitoring media and social media*, moderated by **Ms Katharine Sarikakis**, Professor in political processes and political economic dimensions of media and communications governance, University of Vienna, Austria

Nicolae Bălcescu

II. 3) *Observing and reporting on new technologies in electoral processes*, moderated by **Mr Steven Martin**, Senior Adviser on New Voting Technologies, OSCE/ODIHR Election Department *(with **English** interpretation)*

Human Rights

17.30-18.00 Feedback from the working sessions and closing remarks of the first day

Nicolae Iorga

Moderated by **Mr Tiberiu Csaba Kovacs**, General Secretary of the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania

18.30-19.30 Official Reception

Friday, 15 April 2016

09.00-10.30 Third plenary session
New technologies on E-Day and during counting phases

Nicolae Iorga

Moderated by **Ms Elena Calistru**, President of Funky Citizens Organization, Romania

– *Verifiability – a new concept challenging or contributing to existing election paradigms?*, by **Mr Robert Krimmer**, Professor of e-Governance at Tallinn University of Technology, Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Estonia

– *The use of ICTs in nationwide elections in Spain: data collection and dissemination of preliminary results*, by **Ms Ana Cristina López López**, Head of Electoral Co-operation Unit, Deputy Directorate General of Internal Policy and Electoral Processes, Directorate General of Internal Policy, Ministry of the Interior, Spain

– *Use of Electronic Voting Devices: An Overview of the Latin American Situation*, by **Mr Carlos Navarro Fierro**, Director for international studies and projects at the National Electoral Institute of Mexico (INE)

– *Brazilian 20-year experience on e-voting*, by **Mr José Antonio Dias Toffoli**, Justice of the Supreme Court of Brazil

10.30-11.00 Coffee break

11.00-12.15 Working sessions

III. 1) *New voting technologies, voting procedures*, moderated by **Ms Siri Dolven**, Head of Election Section, Acting Deputy Director at Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, Norway

Nicolae Iorga

III. 2) *Voting abroad*, moderated by **Mr Carlos Navarro Fierro**, Director for international studies and projects at the National Electoral Institute of Mexico (INE)

Nicolae Bălcescu

III. 3) *Voting procedures, technicalities*, moderated by **Mr Peter Wolf**, Technical Manager, Electoral Processes at International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) *(with **English** interpretation)*

Human Rights

– *Technicalities of voting, Belgium case "Electronic voting with paper trail"*, by **Mr David van Kerckhoven**, IT Project Manager in the Elections Unit at the Directorate General *Institutions & Population* of the Federal Public Service Home Affairs of Belgium

12.15-12.30 Debriefing session following the working sessions

Nicolae Iorga

Moderated by **Mr Cristian Leahu**, Director of the Department of Legislation, Parliament Liaison and Electoral Dispute Resolution, Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania

12:30-14:00 Lunch break

14.00-15.30 Special event
25 years of international election observation

Nicolae Iorga

Moderated by **Mr Andreas Gross**, Political Scientist, former member of the Swiss Parliament and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Election Expert of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe

Thoughts for the debate:
How do you observe domestic and international election observers?
To which extent are they useful?
How do you evaluate the work of the election observers?
How do you take into consideration the election observation reports?

What would be your proposals to improve the election observation process?

– *Observation of elections by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities*, by **Mr Andreas Kiefer**, Secretary General of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Council of Europe

15.30-16.00 Coffee break

16.00-17.00 **Closing session**
Discussion on and adoption of the conclusions of the 13th European Conference of electoral management bodies

Nicolae Iorga

Moderated by **Mr Tiberiu Csaba Kovacs**, General Secretary of the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania

and **Mr Pierre Garrone**, Head of the Elections and Political Parties' Division, Venice Commission

II. Programme de la conférence (version française)

Jeudi 14 avril 2016

08.45-09.30 Enregistrement des participants

09.30-10.00 Session inaugurale

 *Salle de réunion : Nicolae Iorga* 

Session animée par **Mme Ana Maria Pătru**, Présidente de l'Autorité permanente électorale de Roumanie

- Intervention de **Mme Ana Maria Pătru**, Présidente de l'Autorité permanente électorale de Roumanie
- Intervention de **Mme Elena-Simina Tănăsescu**, Conseiller du Président de la Roumanie
- Intervention de **M. Ioan Dragoş Tudorache**, Chef de cabinet du Premier Ministre
- Intervention de **M. Thomas Markert**, Secrétaire, Directeur de la Commission de Venise du Conseil de l'Europe

10.00-10.15 Photo de groupe

10.15-10.45 Présentation des conclusions des premiers entretiens de l'Expert électoral sur "Droit électoral et nouvelles technologies : défis juridiques"

 *Nicolae Iorga*

Session animée par **Mme Ana Maria Pătru**, Présidente de l'Autorité permanente électorale de Roumanie

Conclusions présentées par **M. Oliver Kask**, Juge, vice-président du Conseil des élections démocratiques, membre de la Commission de Venise, Estonie

10.45-11.15 Pause-café

11.15-12.15 Première session plénière
Le cadre juridique des nouvelles technologies appliquées aux élections : la mise en œuvre des principes internationaux

Nicolae Iorga

Session animée par **M. Chemavon Chahbazian**, Chef de la Division de l'observation des élections et de la coopération interparlementaire, Assemblée parlementaire, Conseil de l'Europe

– *Vers une révision de la Recommandation sur le vote électronique du Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe*, par **M. Gregor Wenda**, Chef adjoint du Service de l'Administration électorale au ministère fédéral de l'Intérieur (BMI) Service III/6, Affaires électorales, Président du Comité ad hoc d'experts sur le vote électronique du Conseil de l'Europe (CAHVE)

– *Nouvelles technologies appliquées aux élections : la mise en œuvre des principes internationaux*, par **Mme Beata Martin-Rozumiłowicz**, Directrice pour l'Europe et l'Eurasie à la Fondation internationale pour les systèmes électoraux (IFES)

– *Cadre juridique et nouvelles technologies, le cas de la Belgique*, par **M. Régis Trannoy**, Chef de l'Unité des élections à la *Direction générale Institutions et Populations* du Service public fédéral Intérieur de Belgique

12.15-13.15 Sessions de travail

I. 1) *Le secret du vote peut-il être mis en cause ?* Session animée par **M. José Antonio Dias Toffoli**, Juge à la Cour suprême du Brésil

Salle de réunion : Nicolae Iorga

I. 2) *La question de la protection des données personnelles*, animée par **M. Akyn Mambetaliev**, Directeur adjoint de la compagnie d'Etat *Infocom* sous la responsabilité du Service national d'enregistrement des électeurs du Gouvernement de la République Kirghize *(avec interprétation **russe**)*

Nicolae Bălcescu

I. 3) *La neutralité des autorités*, session animée par **Mme Beata Martin-Rozumiłowicz**, Directrice pour l'Europe et l'Eurasie à la Fondation internationale pour les systèmes électoraux (IFES)

Human Rights

13.15-14.30 Pause déjeuner

14.30-15.00 Présentation du projet "Améliorer le management électoral : les déterminants organisationnels de l'intégrité électorale"

Nicolae Iorga

Session animée par **M. Andreas Kiefer**, Secrétaire général du Congrès des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux, Conseil de l'Europe

Projet présenté par **M. Toby James**, Conférencier en politique comparée et politique Britannique, et **Mme Leontine Loeber**, doctorante chercheur, Université d'East Anglia, Royaume-Uni

15.00-16.00 Deuxième session plénière
Les nouvelles technologies appliquées à la période préélectorale

Nicolae Iorga

Session animée par **M. Andreas Kiefer**, Secrétaire général du Congrès des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux, Conseil de l'Europe

- *L'impact des nouvelles technologies sur l'observation électorale par l'Union européenne*, par **M. Emanuele Giaufret**, Service européen d'action extérieure de l'Union européenne

- *Observation des nouvelles technologies dans les processus électoraux au sein des Etats participants de l'OSCE*, par **M. Steven Martin**, Conseiller principal en nouvelles technologies de vote, Service Elections de l'OSCE/BIDDH

– *L'enregistrement biométrique des électeurs, le cas Kirghize*, par **M. Akyn Mambetaliev**, Directeur adjoint de la compagnie d'Etat *Infocom* sous la responsabilité du Service national d'enregistrement des électeurs du Gouvernement de la République Kirghize

– *IVXV: la nouvelle vague du vote électronique estonien*, par **M. Priit Vinkel**, Chef du département des élections au Comité national électoral, Estonie

16.00-16.30 Pause-café

16.30-17.30 Sessions de travail

II. 1) *Les défis concernant l'enregistrement des électeurs et les listes électorales*, session animée par **M. Robert Krimmer**, Professeur d'e-gouvernance à l'Université technologique de Tallinn, Ecole d'innovation et de gouvernance Ragnar Nurkse

Nicolae Iorga

II. 2) *Supervision des medias et des médias sociaux*, session animée par **Mme Katharine Sarikakis**, professeur en processus politiques et en gouvernance des médias et communications, Université de Vienne, Autriche

Nicolae Bălcescu

II. 3) *Observer et assurer le suivi des nouvelles technologies dans les processus électoraux*, session animée par **M. Steven Martin**, Conseiller principal en nouvelles technologies de vote, Service Elections de l'OSCE/BIDDH *(avec interprétation en anglais)*

Human Rights

17.30-18.00 Feed-back des sessions de travail et remarques conclusives du premier jour

Nicolae Iorga

Session animée par **M. Tiberiu Csaba Kovacs**, Secrétaire général de l'Autorité permanente électorale de Roumanie

18.30-19.30 Réception officielle

Vendredi 15 avril 2016

09.00-10.30 Troisième session plénière
Nouvelles technologies le jour du scrutin et durant les phases de dépouillement

Nicolae Iorga

Session animée par **M. Cristian Petraru**, Chef du Service de l'organisation des processus électoraux de l'Autorité permanente électorale de Roumanie

- *Vérifiabilité – Un nouveau concept défiant ou contribuant à l'existence de paradigmes électoraux ?*, par **M. Robert Krimmer**, Professeur de e-gouvernance à l'Université technologique de Tallinn, Ecolé d'innovation et de gouvernance Ragnar Nurkse

- *L'utilisation des nouvelles technologies de vote dans les élections nationales en Espagne : collecte des données et diffusion des résultats préliminaires*, par **Mme Ana Cristina López López**, Cheffe de l'unité de coopération électorale, Direction générale adjointe de politique intérieure et des processus électoraux, Direction générale de la politique intérieure, Ministère de l'Intérieur, Espagne

- *L'utilisation des systèmes de vote électronique : vue d'ensemble de la situation en Amérique Latine*, par **M. Carlos Navarro Fierro**, Directeur pour les études internationales et les projets à l'Institut national électoral du Mexique (INE)

- *20 ans d'expérience brésilienne du vote électronique*, par **M. José Antonio Dias Toffoli**, Juge à la Cour suprême du Brésil

10.30-11.00 Pause-café

11.00-12.15 Sessions de travail

III. 1) *Nouvelles technologies de vote, procédures de vote*, session animée par **Mme Siri Dolven**, Cheffe de la Section Elections, Directrice adjointe *ad interim* au ministère norvégien des autorités locales et de la modernisation

Nicolae Iorga

III. 2) *Voter à l'étranger*, session animée par **M. Carlos Navarro Fierro**, Directeur pour les études internationales et les projets à l'Institut national électoral du Mexique (INE)

Nicolae Bălcescu

III. 3) *Procédures de vote, techniques*, session animée par **M. Peter Wolf**, Directeur technique, Processus électoraux à Institut international pour la démocratie et l'assistance électorale (International IDEA) *(avec interprétation en **anglais**)*

Human Rights

– *Techniques de vote, le cas de la Belgique*, par **M. David van Kerckhoven**, *Direction générale Institutions & Population* du Service public fédéral Intérieur de Belgique (à confirmer)

12.15-12.30 Session de débriefing suite aux sessions de travail

Nicolae Iorga

Session animée par **Mr Cristian Leahu**, Directeur du Service juridique, liaisons avec le parlement et résolution du contentieux des élections à l'Autorité permanente électorale de Roumanie

12:30-14:00 Pause déjeuner

14.00-15.30 Manifestation spéciale
25 ans d'observation internationale des élections

Nicolae Iorga

Manifestation animée par **M. Andreas Gross**, Politologue, ancien membre de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe, expert électoral de la Commission de Venise of the Council of Europe

Réflexions pour le débat :
Comment voyez-vous le travail des observateurs nationaux et internationaux d'élections ?
Dans quelle mesure leur travail est-il utile ?
Comment évaluez-vous le travail des observateurs d'élections ?
Comment prenez-vous en considération les rapports des observateurs d'élections ?
Quelles seraient vos propositions pour améliorer le processus d'observation électorale ?

– *Observation des élections par le Congrès des Pouvoirs Locaux et Régionaux*, par **M. Andreas Kiefer**, Secrétaire général du Congrès des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux, Conseil de l'Europe

15.00-15.30 Pause-café

15.30-17.00 Session de clôture
Discussion et adoption des conclusions de la 13e Conférence européenne des administrations électorales

Nicolae Iorga

Session animée par **M. Tiberiu Csaba Kovacs**, Secrétaire général de l'Autorité permanente électorale de Roumanie

et par **Mr Pierre Garrone**, chef de la Division des élections et des partis politiques de la Commission de Venise

III. Программа конференции (русская версия)

Понедельник, 14 апреля 2016 г.

08:45-09:30 Регистрация участников

09:30-10:00 **Открытие**

Зал: «Николае Йорга»

Модератор: г-жа Ана Мария ПЭТРУ, Председатель Постоянного Органа Румынии по организации выборов (ТВС)

- Приветственное слово г-жи **Аны Марии ПЭТРУ**, Председателя Постоянного Органа Румынии по организации выборов;
- Выступление г-жи **Елены-Симины ТЭНЭСЕСКУ**, советника президента Румынии;
- Выступление г-на **Йоана Драгоша ТУДОРАКЭ**, руководителя канцелярии премьер-министра Румынии;
- Приветственное слово г-на **Томаса МАРКЕРТА**, Директора, Секретаря Венецианской комиссии Совета Европы

10:00-10:15 - Фото участников конференции

10:15-10:45 **I. Представление выводов 1-ых дебатов, организованных журналом «Эксперт по выборам»: «Закон о выборах и новые технологии: правовая проблематика" (12-13.04.2016)**

Зал «Николае Йорга»

Модератор - г-жа **Ана Мария ПЭТРУ**, Председатель Постоянного избирательного органа Румынии (ТВС)

Презентация - г-н **Оливер КАСК**, судья, заместитель председателя Совета по демократическим выборам, член Венецианской комиссии, Эстония

10:45-11:15 Перерыв на кофе

11.15-12.15 Первое пленарное заседание « Правовая основа использования новых технологий в проведении выборов: внедрение международных принципов »

Зал «Николае Йорга»

Модератор - г-н **Шемавон ШАХБАЗЯН**, руководитель Отдела наблюдения за выборами и межпарламентского сотрудничества Парламентской Ассамблеи Совета Европы.

- «На пути к обновлению Рекомендации Комитета министров Совета Европы по вопросам электронного голосования», г-н **Грегор ВЕНДА**, заместитель главы Отдела Администрации Выборов, Федеральное Министерство Внутренних Дел Австрии (BMI), Отдел III/6, Проблематика выборов, Председатель Временной комиссии экспертов Совет Европы по электронному голосованию (CAHVE);

- «Новые технологии в выборах: внедрение международных принципов», г-жа **Беата МАРТИН-РОЗУМИЛОВИЧ**, Директор, Отдел Европы и Евразии Международного фонда избирательных систем (IFES);

- «Правовая основа новых технологий, пример Бельгии», г-н **Режи ТРАННОЙ**, руководитель Отдела по выборам, Генеральный директорат «Учреждения и население» Федеральной Государственной Службы Внутренних дел Бельгии

12.15-13.15 Рабочие группы

I. 1) «Может ли секретность голосования быть поставлена под сомнение? »
Зал: «Николае Йорга»

I. 2) «Вопрос о защите персональных данных»
Зал: «Николае Бэлческу»
Модератор- г-н **Акин МАМБЕТАЛИЕВ**, заместитель директора Государственной компании «Инфоком» при Государственной регистрационной службе Кыргызской Республики (с переводом на русский язык)

I. 3) «Нейтралитет властей»
Зал: «Права человека»
Модератор - г-жа **Беата МАРТИН-РОЗУМИЛОВИЧ**, Директор, Отдел Европы и Евразии Международного фонда избирательных систем (IFES);

13:15-14:30 Перерыв на обед

14.30-15.00 Презентация проекта «Совершенствование управления выборами: организационные детерминанты целостности выборов"

Зал: «Николае Йорга»

Модератор - г-н **Андреас КИФЕР**, Генеральный секретарь, Конгресс местных и региональных властей, Совет Европы

Презентация - г-н **Тоби ДЖЕЙМС**, Старший преподаватель британской и сравнительной политологии, Университет Восточной Англии, Соединенное Королевство, и г-жа **Леонтина ЛЁБЭР**, аспирант, Университет Восточной Англии

15.00-16.00 Второе пленарное заседание «Новые технологии, применяемые в предвыборный период»

Зал: «Николае Йорга»

Модератор - г-н **Андреас КИФЕР**, Генеральный секретарь, Конгресс местных и региональных властей, Совет Европы

- «Влияние новых технологий в наблюдении за выборами Европейским Союзом», г-н **Эманюэль ЖОФРЭ**, Европейская Служба Внешних Связей

- «Наблюдение за новыми технологиями в избирательных процессах в регионе ОБСЕ», г-н **Стивен МАРТИН**, старший советник по вопросам новых технологий голосования, Департамент ОБСЕ / БДИПЧ по выборам;

- «Биометрическая регистрация избирателей, пример Кыргызстана», г-н **Акин МАМБЕТАЛИЕВ**, заместитель директора Государственной компании «Инфоком» при Государственной регистрационной службе Кыргызской Республики при Правительстве Кыргызской Республики;

- *IVXV:*новая волна интернет-голосования в Эстонии, г-**н Прийт ВИНКЕЛЬ**, начальник отдела по выборам Республиканского избирательного комитета Эстонии;

16:00-16:30 Перерыв на кофе

16:30-17:30 II. Рабочие группы

II. 1) «**Проблемы, связанные с регистрацией избирателей и списками избирателей**»
Зал: «Николае Йорга»
Модератор - г-н **Роберт КРИММЕР**, Профессор, Управление при помощи

электронных средств, ТТУ, Школа инноваций и управления Рагнар Нурксе, Эстония

II. 2) «**Мониторинг средств массовой информации и социальные сети**»,
Зал: «Николае Бэлческу»
Модератор - г-жа **Кэтрин САРИКАКИС**, профессор, Политические процессы и политические и экономические аспекты СМИ и управление коммуникациями, Венский Университет, Австрия

II. 3) «**Наблюдение и отчетность по новым технологиям в избирательных процессах»**
Зал: «Права человека» (с английским переводом)
Модератор - г-н **Стивен МАРТИН**, Старший Советник по новым технологиям голосования, Департамент ОБСЕ / БДИПЧ по выборам

17:30-18:00 **Отзывы членов рабочих групп и итоги первого дня**

Зал: «Николае Йорга»

Модератор - г-н **Тибериу Чаба КОВАЧ**, Генеральный Секретарь Постоянного Органа Румынии по организации выборов

18:30-19:30 Официальный прием

Пятница, 15 апреля 2016 г.

09:00-10:30 **III. Третье пленарное заседание: «Новые технологии в день выборов и подсчет голосов в течение различных фаз»**

Зал: «Николае Йорга»

Модератор - г-жа **Елена КАЛИСТРУ**, президент «Funky Citizens Organization», Румыния

- «Проверяемость - новая концепция, которая усложняет или содействует существующим избирательным парадигмам?», г-н **Роберт КРИММЕР**, Управление с помощью электронных средств, ТТУ, Школа инноваций и управления Рагнар Нурксе, Эстония

- «Использование новых технологий голосования в общенациональных выборах в Испании: Сбор и распространение предварительных результатов», г-жа **Ана Кристина ЛОПЕС ЛОПЕС**, руководитель группы по сотрудничеству в области выборов, заместитель Генерального директора по вопросам внутренней политики и избирательных процессов, Генеральный директорат внутренней политики, Министерство внутренних дел, Испания

- «Использование электронных устройств для голосования: Обзор ситуации в Латинской Америке, г-н **Карлос НАВАРРО ФИЕРРО**, директор по международным исследованиям и проектам, Национальный институт Мексики по выборам (INE);

- 20-летний опыт Бразилии в электронном голосовании, г-н **Хосе Антонио Диас ТОФФОЛИ**, судья Верховного суда Бразилии

10:30-11:00 Перерыв на кофе

11:00-12:15 **III. Рабочие группы**

III. 1) «Новые технологии голосования, процедура голосования»
Модератор - г-жа **Сири ДОЛВЕН**, руководитель избирательной секции, исполняющая обязанности заместителя директора Министерства местного самоуправления и модернизации, Норвегия
Зал: «Николае Йорга»

III. 2) «Голосование за границей»
Модератор - г-н **Карлос НАВАРРО ФИЕРРО**, директор по международным исследованиям и проектам, Национальный институт Мексики по выборам (INE);
Зал: «Николае Бэлческу»

III. 3) «Процедуры голосования, формальности»
Модератор - г-н **Питер ВОЛЬФ**, технический менеджер избирательных процессов в Международном институте демократии и содействия выборам (International IDEA)
Зал: «Права человека» - (с английским переводом)

- «Процедура голосования, технические аспекты, пример Бельгии "Электронное голосование с бумажным следом" - г-н **Дэвид ван КЕРКХОВЕН**, IT- менеджер проекта в Группе по выборам, Генеральный Директорат учреждений и населения Федеральной государственной службы внутренних дел Бельгии

12:15-12:30 **Итоговое заседание: Подведение итогов рабочих групп**

Зал: «Николае Йорга»

Модератор - г-н **Кристиан ЛЯХУ**, Директор Департамента по вопросам законодательства, связям с парламентом и разрешения избирательных споров, Постоянный Орган Румынии по организации выборов

12:30-14:00 Перерыв на обед

14:00-15:30 **Специальное мероприятие: «25 лет международного наблюдения за выборами»**

Зал: «Николае Йорга»
Модератор - г-н **Андреас ГРОСС**, политолог, бывший член швейцарского парламента и Парламентской ассамблеи Совета Европы, эксперт Венецианской комиссии Совета Европы в области выборов

Вопросы для дискуссии:

- Как вы наблюдаете за местными и международными наблюдателями?
- В какой степени они полезны?
- Как вы оцениваете работу наблюдателей за выборами?
- Каким образом вы учитываете доклады по наблюдению за выборами?
- Каковыми были бы ваши предложения по совершенствованию процесса наблюдения за выборами?

- «Наблюдение за выборами Конгрессом местных и региональных властей», г-**Андреас КИФЕР**, Генеральный Секретарь Конгресса местных и региональных властей Совета Европы

15:00-15:30 Перерыв на кофе

15:30-17:00 Заключительное заседание: Обсуждение и принятие окончательных выводов 13-ой Европейской конференции

Зал: «Николае Йорга»

Модератор - г-н **Тибериу Чаба КОВАЧ**, Генеральный Секретарь Постоянного Органа Румынии по организации выборов

и г-н **Пьер ГАРРОНЕ**, Руководитель Отдела выборов и политических партий, Венецианская комиссия Совета Европы

IV. Address by Ms Ana Maria Pătru, President of the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania

Ladies and gentlemen, dear guests,

I am Ana Maria Pătru, President of the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania.

It is my great pleasure to welcome you all to the 13th European Conference of Electoral Management Bodies, organised by the Venice Commission in partnership with the Permanent Electoral Authority.

We are honoured by the presence of high representatives of Romanian Presidential Administration and Government. Please allow me to introduce their Excellences: Mrs. Elena Simina Tănăsescu, presidential counsellor, head of the Institutional and Constitutional Reform Department, and Mr. Ioan-Dragoş Tudorache, Minister and Head of Romanian Prime Minister Chancellery.

It also gives me great pleasure to greet Mr. Thomas Markert, director, Secretary of the Venice Commission.

As you know, the European Conference of Electoral Management Bodies is an annual event organised by the Venice Commission. The Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania is very proud to have been chosen to host this year Conference that gathers electoral officials and practitioners from all over the world, representing international organizations and electoral management bodies.

We are also honoured by the presence of representatives of several Romanian public institutions, national NGOs, universities and of the Diplomatic Body accredited to Bucharest.

This year Conference addresses the topic of *New Technologies in Elections: Public Trust and Challenges for Electoral Management Bodies.*

Improving the electoral process represents a permanent goal of any electoral management body. We all try to do that every day in different ways, from training the human resource to introducing and using new technologies.

Technology is changing the world and we need to take into account its role in our lives for the well-being of our citizens.

EMBs all around the globe show a growing interest in implementing technology in elections. We always learn about various ICT based solutions regarding voters' registration, authentication and eligibility verification, boundary delimitation, vote casting and counting.

Both election practitioners and voters from all over the world are interested and concerned in the same time by the introduction of ICT in elections, whether we are talking about a basic automatic tool or a more developed one.

Gaining the public trust in election related technologies is a challenge itself for the EMBs. There are different causes that make the public distrust these kinds of technologies,

most of them being issues related to personal data protection, secrecy and freedom of the vote and security vulnerabilities of electronic systems.

In general, we are wired to fear what we don't understand. And even though we use technology on a daily basis, we have yet to see it next to the voting process.

This is why I believe trust is essential. We need to focus on helping voters to trust technology in the process of electing their leaders.

And, for example, I think one of the best ways to gain voters' trust in using new technology in elections is to facilitate them an actual interaction with that particular technology before it is used in the electoral process.

We also live in an era of scientific progress. What is new today is history tomorrow.

This is why we believe the biggest challenge for the EMBs that want to introduce ICT in elections is to proper assess the sustainability and the cost-effectiveness of the technology.

All that I have presented so far represents the actual experience that the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania went and is still going through.

Now, please allow me to point out some of our achievements regarding ICT.

We have successfully implemented the Electronic Electoral Register in the 2014 Euro parliamentary and Presidential elections. The Electoral Register is a nationwide database holding the identities of all Romanian citizens of voting age and their allocation to polling stations.

This year we upgraded the Electoral Register for out of country voting. Starting April 1st Romanian voters who legally reside abroad can register accordingly. All Romanians can access the webpage of the Electoral Register to check whether they are registered to vote.

The successful implementation of the Electoral Register opened up a new frontier and allowed us to implement the ICT system for monitoring the turnout and preventing the illegal voting.

This system will be used at the upcoming general local elections in June, this year.

The system was designed to ensure transparent and credible elections, by preventing illegal voting, speeding up the voting process, offering a real time turnout and a quick transmission of the results.

All these represent the outcome of 5 years of hard work and efforts to bring it under regulation and for this I want to thank all my colleagues.
Beside the ICT system that assures interconnectivity between the polling stations and the Electoral Register, there is also need for around 23.000 operators.
In order to ensure this number of operators, the Permanent Electoral Authority began a recruitment public campaign in the last months of 2015.

By now, more than 37.000 people applied to become polling station operators. Since January 2016, thousands of training and examination sessions have been conducted by

the PEA staff. The IT devices which are going to be used on Election Day were handed over to the participants during these sessions. The feedback provided by the participants was encouraging: they trust the system, consider it is user friendly and appreciate the immediate response it gives.

The Permanent Electoral Authority is currently setting up an ICT system designed to monitor the specific activities regarding funding of the political parties electoral campaigns.

I have shared with you so far some of our practices, the efforts of a smart and committed team of wonderful people.

As an independent EMB, we are guided by the belief that it is our role to contribute to a strong, transparent and sustainable democracy in our country.

And in the last 4 years we have done our best to make visible and tangible steps in this direction. We have come a long way and still have a long way to go.

I am sure your practice and experiences regarding the implementation of new technologies in elections are rich. I can hardly wait to hear and learn more about them during these two days of the Conference.

In the end I want to welcome you all here, to Romania. It is a great privilege to have so many experts under one roof and I hope we will all make the best of our time together.

Thank you very much!

V. Address by Address by Mr Thomas Markert, Secretary, Director of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe

Ms Counsellor,
Ms Chairwoman,
Dear Sir,
Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues,

I am very pleased to address you at the occasion of the 13th European Conference of Electoral Management Bodies on behalf of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. This year, our annual electoral event is devoted to "New technologies in elections: public trust and challenges for electoral management bodies".

Before going into substance, let me first thank the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania and its Chairwoman, Ms Ana Maria Pătru, for hosting the 13th EMB Conference. The number of participants – around 160 – and the variety of EMBs, countries, continents and international institutions taking part in the Conference shows the increasing interest in our regular annual EMB Conference.

I am particularly pleased that thanks to the Venice Commission's efforts, many non-European countries take part in this Conference. I find it very useful since outside Europe, we can find particularly advanced solutions concerning
e-voting in countries such as Brazil.

The Council of Europe has always been active in the field of e-voting. Its different institutions, such as the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly or the Venice Commission issued reference documents in this respect.

The Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe from 2004 (Rec(2004)11) on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting remains the only source of reference on the subject. It is used in national jurisprudence even in non-member States, as well as by other relevant international actors.

Since its adoption, the Recommendation has been subject to biennial review meetings. Discussions in the Council of Europe's competent Rapporteur Group (GR-DEM) as well as a recent expert meeting on the Recommendation have also shown a growing consensus as to the need to update the present Recommendation, given newer technological and societal developments over time.

It is in this context that the Committee of Ministers decided to set up the Ad hoc Committee of Experts on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting (CAHVE) in order to redesign the Recommendation and to establish an international document in line with the current new voting technologies.

This ad hoc Committee is a forum where senior officials from member States' election management bodies meet to discuss technical and legal development on e-enabled elections in the Council of Europe member States.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also issued documents in the field of e-voting. In its Resolution 1653 of 2009, the Parliamentary Assembly calls the national parliaments to improve their domestic legislation in order to remedy democracy's deficits,

especially with regard to voter participation. In particular, the Parliamentary Assembly calls on national parliaments and their members to make full use of the opportunities offered by ICTs with a view to improving the quality of representative democracy and in particular to "[…] review national legislation with a view to introducing legal standards for using e-tools in the political process, and to eliminating the risks of their misuse, both technical and political, notably as regards human rights and security issues, including data protection and the security of documents, voting, networking and information […]." In this document, the Parliamentary Assembly also covers difficult issues such as compatibilities of such use with human rights and personal data protection, issues that will be debated during these two days.

Based on this Resolution, the Parliamentary Assembly recommended in its Recommendation 1860 of 2009 to enhance e-democracy by calling upon the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to initiate further regulations in the field of e-democracy at the pan-European level.

The Venice Commission issued in 2004 a reference document in the field of electronic voting: the Report on the compatibility of remote voting and electronic voting with the standards of the Council of Europe. Despite this Report is old, it remains relevant for a number of reasons. The Report defines remote voting by stating that "there are at least two different concepts of remote voting in Council of Europe Member States:
- remote voting in a controlled or supervised environment (e.g. voting in an embassy abroad or polling station outside a voter's polling district) and
- remote voting in an "uncontrolled" or non-supervised environment, i.e. there are no election officials present (e.g. sending your vote by mail)." The forthcoming debates during the Conference will concern both concepts.

The Venice Commission's Report recalls the Council of Europe's standards in the field of free elections, i.e. Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters. After a comparative analysis of remote voting in Europe, the Report concludes by confirming the compatibility of the remote voting with the Council of Europe's standards, "provided that certain preventative measures are observed in the procedures for either non-supervised postal voting or electronic voting." In its conclusions, the Report adds that "for non-supervised e-enabled voting, technical standards must overcome different threats to those which exist for postal voting. This form of voting must only be accepted if it is secure and reliable. In particular, the elector must be able to obtain confirmation of his or her vote and, if necessary, correct it without the secrecy of the ballot being in any way violated. The system's transparency must be guaranteed. Insofar as an e-enabled voting system meets these conditions, it is compatible with the European standards on electoral matters, and in particular with Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights."

As you can see, international documents exist and I limited my intervention to the documents of the Council of Europe. Other international institutions, case-law and election observation reports complement and reinforce such documents. The plenary and the working sessions of the Conference will review the various situations and challenges that you have all to face in your capacity of electoral management bodies in order to make an effective use of new technologies in elections. Additionally, it remains a necessity to reinforce at the same time public trust in electoral processes. New technologies in elections cover not only E-Day but many phases of electoral processes, such as voter registration, media supervision, counting procedures, etc.

Among other issues, we will debate these two days on the practical implementation of international principles in electoral laws surrounded by new technologies; the secrecy of the vote and personal data protection that can be challenged by the use of new technologies in elections. It will also be question of the neutrality of authorities vis-à-vis new technologies applied to elections as well as observation of new technologies in electoral processes.

We are also proud to host a special event during the Conference, moderated by Mr Andreas Gross, which will debate on 25 years of international election observation. This special event is organised in the context of the future report of Mr Gross on this topic, which will provide an overview of the situation in Europe with regard to international election observation. This forthcoming debate and its subsequent report will especially raise questions from the perspective of electoral management bodies, such as how EMBs observe the work of election observers, how they evaluate such work and how such international election observation missions can improve electoral processes based on the observers' recommendations.

Lastly, I would like to underline that the Venice Commission promotes all means to enhance democracy including new technologies in elections, which aim at facilitating electoral processes and increasing turnout. New technologies in elections are fantastic tools but they are not necessarily a panacea. Citizens need trust in such technologies and in their practical application, and more largely trust in electoral processes in order to secure genuine and credible elections. This Conference should definitely participate in this global objective.

I do not want to take more time. A photo group is waiting for us after this opening session. I therefore wish us all fruitful debates.

Thank you for your attention!

FIRST PLENARY SESSION: LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN ELECTIONS: IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES

VI. Towards updating the Recommendation of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on e-voting, by Mr Gregor Wenda, Deputy Head of the Electoral Administration Department at the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) Department III/6, Electoral Affairs, Chair of the Council of Europe Ad-hoc Committee of Experts on electronic voting (CAHVE)

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LEGAL, OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR E-VOTING

Recommendation Rec(2004)11 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 30 September 2004

Towards updating the Recommendation of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on e-voting

Gregor Wenda
Federal Ministry of the Interior
Republic of Austria

Bucharest,
14 April 2016

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How it started …

- The new Millennium: Governments increasingly think about ICT in elections

  → hopes and expectations (new technologies attractive; high expenses should pay off in the long run)

- First pilots/tests using internet voting
- Relatively little controversy, trust surprisingly high
- No guidelines or standards to draw upon
- International institutions or fora not yet active

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Council of Europe

"Making democratic institutions work"

- Integrated Project from 2002 to 2004 (**IP 1**)
- 1st Exploratory Meeting on e-voting: 1-2 July 2002
  - UK Paper: *"Urgent need for an internationally agreed set of standards on e-voting to guide member states; standards should embrace legal, technical and operational standards"*
- Experts' meetings to be initiated

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Ad-hoc group of experts

"E-Voting Committee" at the Council of Europe

- 13 Meetings from July 2002 to July 2004
- Sub groups: legal & operational standards; technical standards
- **Goal: Recommendation**
- **Challenges**:
  - Broad variety of different legal and administrative systems
  - Little to no practical experience in e-voting
  - Remote internet voting and machine voting covered
  - How will technology change?

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Recommendation Rec(2004)11

- Intergovernmental format for decisions
- Proposal for a recommendation by experts in July 2004
- Adopted by Committee of Ministers on 30 September 2004
- Relatively short text: 112 standards + Explanatory Memorandum
- Non-binding document (no Convention!)

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Recommendation Rec(2004)11

- Structure of Document



Source: A. Driza-Maurer (for IRIS 2016)

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Recommendation Rec(2004)11

Key elements (inter alia):

- "States should consider **reviewing their relevant domestic legislation** in the light of this Recommendation"
- **No need to change** domestic legislation "as long as these domestic voting procedures comply with all the principles of democratic elections and referendums"
- E-voting to be **as reliable and secure** as non-electronic elections
- **Additional and optional** voting channel
- **Checklist** for all stages of the electoral process
- Minimum standards for **remote and non-remote e-voting**
- **Interoperability** of e-voting systems to be promoted and ensured

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"Good Governance in the Information Society"

New Council of Europe Project from 2005 to 2010 (end)

E-Voting

- Review Meetings of Rec(2004)11
- Working on papers, evaluation reports, commentaries, etc.

E-Democracy

- Working Group CAHDE (Council of Europe's Ad Hoc Committee on e-democracy)
- Recommendation Rec(2009)1 on e-democracy (adopted by Committee of Ministers in 2009)

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Where is Rec(2004)11 used as a reference?

- **Norway:** incorporated most of Rec's standards into regulatory framework for 2011 and 2013 internet voting trials.
- **Belgium:** 2007 study on e-voting (reference, benchmark)
- **Estonia:** Supreme Court considered Recommendation when deciding about the constitutionality of e-voting.
- **Finland:** 2008 pilot took Rec. into account.
- **Switzerland:** Recommendation "on the radar"
- **Austria:** drawn upon for 2009 Students' elections e-voting
- **OSCE/ODIHR:** Reference when monitoring "New Voting Technologies"

Also used by other int'l organizations and countries overseas.

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Towards an update?

- No more Council of Europe project after 2010.
- Competent division in the Council of Europe: "Division of Electoral Assistance and Census" (Directorate of Democratic Governance as part of Directorate General of Democracy)

- **4th Review meeting in Lochau/Bregenz in 2012:**
  - Rec(2004)11 still precious but number of issues outdated or not dealt with any more.
  - Member States "agreed to recommend that the 2004 Committee of Ministers' Recommendation (...) should be formally updated.".
  - "... biennial review meetings were highly useful and should be continued (...)"

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Review Meetings re: Rec(2004)11

Para. v. of Rec(2004)11:

First review after two years ***"in order to provide the Council of Europe with a basis for possible further action on e-voting"***

1st Review Meeting: 23-24 November 2006, Strasbourg

Rec. accepted by member states "as a valid and currently the only internationally agreed benchmark by which to assess and evaluate e-voting systems."

2nd Review Meeting: 15-17 October 2008, Madrid

3rd Review Meeting: 16-17 November 2010, Strasbourg

4th Review Meeting in 2012 ***(see later)***

5th Review Meeting in 2014 ***(see later)***

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Finishing the Project "Good Governance in the Information Society" (until end of 2010)

- **"Certification"**: 3 expert meetings in Strasbourg and discussions at E-VOTE Conference in Lochau/Bregenz in July 2010
- **"Observation"**: 1 expert seminar in Oslo and discussions at E-VOTE Conference in Lochau/Bregenz in July 2010
- **3rd E-Voting Review Meeting** (16-17 November 2010, Strasbourg): Reports of countries and organisations;
  no official mandate for change of Recommendation ("still considered useful instrument")

- **New Documents:**
  - "Guidelines on transparency of e-enabled elections"
  - "Guidelines on certification of e-voting systems"
  - "E-Voting Handbook" of the Council of Europe

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Informal Experts' Meeting in Vienna

- **19 December 2013:** Informal experts' workshop in Vienna organized by Secretariat of Council of Europe in co-operation with Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior.
- Report "on the possible update of Rec(2004)11" commissioned by the Council of Europe (author: Ardita Driza Maurer).
- **Outcome:** *" … there are a number of strong and valid reasons for updating Recommendation Rec(2004)11." (…) "Do no rewrite Recommendation but update where necessary."*
- Future budget should allow work on updates of Rec(2004)11.
- Exact terms of update should be left to the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

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Further steps in 2014

- Ministers' Deputies/Rapporteur Group on Democracy (GR-DEM) on 20 May 2014 discussed report of Vienna

  →but: No final decision; **future of e-voting activities remained uncertain.**

- Austria sponsored non-paper with Belgium, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Switzerland → call for a 5th Review Meeting to take place in Autumn 2014.

- GR-DEM Meeting on 17 June 2014: Council of Europe confirmed further support and organization of another Review Meeting (scheduled for 28 October in Austria).

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5th Review Meeting

- Organized on 28 October 2014 in Lochau/Bregenz (Austria as co-host), right before EVOTE2014.

- **Conclusions:**
  - "... update of CM Rec(2004)11 should be **undertaken in a concentrated way** by a special ad hoc group of experts, as soon as possible, but at the latest in the intergovernmental structure within the next Programme and Budget 2016-17."
  - "... group of experts should be composed of government **representatives from election management bodies** supported, as necessary, by other relevant stakeholders such as academia, industry, and civil society."

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Foundation of "CAHVE" (1)

- 13 January 2015: „GR-DEM" in Strasbourg endorsed the conclusions of the 5th Review Meeting
- Agreement that experts of **competent EMBs** in the different member states should lead the update process (no deferral to another committee or group)
- Secretariat was asked to prepare a draft for the creation of an „Ad-hoc Committee of Experts" and terms of reference

  → group to be placed directly under Committee of Ministers

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Foundation of "CAHVE" (2)

- **GR-DEM Meeting on 17 March 2015**:

  Draft of "Terms of Reference" was presented by the Secretariat and unanimously adopted.
- 1 April 2015: Ministers' Deputies approve the Terms of Reference without further debate.
- **Creation of CAHVE** ("Ad hoc committee of experts on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting")

  → at the beginning meant to operate until the end of 2015 but terms of reference were extended to 2016 (due to new budget cycle)

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Foundation of "CAHVE" (3)

Terms of Reference

- Goal: Finalising a "**draft Recommendation updating Recommendation Rec(2004)11** of the Committee of Ministers to member States on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting" as well as the "explanatory memorandum to the updated Recommendation"
- Members: "**Representatives of highest possible rank from election management bodies** with direct experience or specialised knowledge on e-voting" (nominated by Member States)
  → voting right
- Further participants without the right to vote.

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Foundation of "CAHVE" (5)

- Draft to be prepared with the help of a "Legal expert"
- Online platform to be set up, working over the internet when possible to save costs
- Work can continue throughout the whole year of 2016 (another physical meeting is possible)
- **Questionnaire disseminated** on 22 June 2015: Member States/EMBs had to answer 8 questions regarding the future of the Rec.

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First CAHVE Meeting (1)

1st Meeting in Strasbourg on 28-29 October 2015

- Approx. 50 participants from 25 countries were present, organisations/institutions and academia.
- Estonian proposal: Austria elected as Chair (Gregor Wenda)
- Austrian proposal: Sweden as Vice-Chair (Kristina Lemon)

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First CAHVE Meeting (2)

- Actual approach regarding the update of Rec(2004)11 was discussed
- Presentation of results of the questionnaire (19 nationale delegations and representatives of three institutions had answered).
- Issues:
  Definition of E-Voting; Role of EMBs; notion of risk/risk assessment to be included?; new structure (core layer and additional layers), categorization of standards (classification of categories), need to introduce a definite review process.

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First CAHVE Meeting (3)

- **Change of e-voting defintion:**

  Optical scanners to be included in the future as well.

- **EMB Responsibility:**

  To be addressed in all phases, somestimes stronger focus

- **Notion of Risk/Risk assessment:**

  instead of absolute wording of standards

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First CAHVE Meeting (4)

- **One core layer:**

  Main standards, mostly „timeless“ and stable (as far as possible), legal standards

- **Additional layers:**

  Second layer specific to methods (guidelines),
  third layer may include additional documents (good practices)

- **Questions when re-organizing standards:**

  “What?“, “How?“ and “Check?“

- **Review process** to be institutionalized

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Proposal of a new structure for the Recommendation



Source: A. Driza-Maurer (for IRIS 2016)

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Next CAHVE Steps

2nd Phase of Update of Rec(2004)11 has begun:

- CAHVE decision: Ardita Driza Maurer acts as lead legal expert
- Core group of experts provides input from different areas, at least two member states involved from the start (Chairs)
- "Drafts" to be discussed by CAHVE participants through an online platform (review, proposals, working on final draft)
- Terms of reference for 2016 allow for another plenary meeting and additional informal meetings or core group meetings (until end of 2016)

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Council of Europe and E-Voting

- **Council of Europe continues to play strong role** in the field of e-voting → Ad-hoc Committee under Committee of Ministers

  Recommendation Rec(2004)11 is still the only international (intergovernmental) "soft law" instrument regarding e-enabled voting, covering legal, technical and operation standards

- 1st Electoral Expert Debates in Bucharest on 12-13 April 2016
- EMB Meeting in Bucharest on 14-15 April 2016
- Council of Europe Internet Governance Strategy 2016-2019 ("E-Voting" explicitly mentioned as future topic)

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Towards updating the Recommendation of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on e-voting

Thank You!

gregor.wenda@bmi.gv.at

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VII. New technologies in elections: implementing international principles, by Ms Beata Martin-Rozumiłowicz, Director for Europe and Eurasia at International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)



Background

- 1975 first US government report to evaluate computerized voting technology (paper initiates the federal Voting Systems Standards program)
- 1990 FEC releases first standards (Voting Systems Standards (VSS) for computer voting
- 2000 Presidential Election Highlights Ballot Problems and in 2002, FEC updates VSS
- Internet voting systems have gained popularity. Used for elections in UK (not presently), Estonia and Switzerland. Municipal elections in Canada and party primary elections in the United States and France.

International Standards

- NVT systems are intended to fulfil the same functions as paper-based systems; therefore, same standards apply:
  - Universality
  - Equality
  - Secrecy
  - Casting, counting and tabulation in an honest, transparent and accountable manner.

Good Practice Documents

- 2004 CoE CoM Rec(2004)11 and VC report on e-voting compatibility with CoE standards
- 2011 CoE Certification Guidelines
- IDEA 2011 policy paper on Introducing E-Voting
- IFES/NDI publication on e-voting and counting
- IFES' 2011 Guide to Conducting Feasibility Studies
- ODIHR, OAS and Carter Center publications
- Proceedings of Electronic Voting conf (2004-14)
- ECtHR cases: Austria, Estonia, Germany, Finland

Principles for Digital Development

- Endorsed by USAID / IFES, *et al.*, lay out some other considerations to be taken into account, especially from a technical perspective:
  - Technological solutions to be designed with user in mind
  - Solution to be developed with understanding of existing ecosystem in country/region
  - Solution should be sustainable and designed for scaling
  - The solution must adhere to open standards, use open data wherever possible, be built with open source code, and support further innovation (open innovation)
  - Ideally solutions should reuse and improve existing solutions rather than reinventing the wheel
  - Solutions must address privacy and security issues
  - Solutions should ideally be data-driven.
  - Solutions to be collaborative to utilize expertise/knowledge for greater impact

IFES' Direct Democracy Book

- More technical overview of what considerations to keep in mind when discussing new technology (including NVT):
  - New technology should be introduced, whenever possible, in the post-electoral period to allow enough time for feasibility studies, pilot projects and modifications of procedures and trainings
  - All projects must plan for the technology life cycle (keeping in mind that technology does not end with initial procurement)
  - All projects should also keep in mind the broad planning view of all elements in a technology project: from design, procurement, deployment, management, civic education, training and disposal.
  - All projects must also consider whether the technological solution is appropriate for the problem at hand.

Benefits and Challenges

- Desired Benefits:
  - Removing human error
  - Reducing transmission time
  - Perceived saved costs and increased participation
- Potential Challenges:
  - Medium-long term costs often not factored
  - Studies seem to indicate participation static
  - Possibly undermine confidence in fragile systems

IFES' Work in E&E

- Albania 2013 – IFES worked with regional developers on an elections results management system to more efficiently and transparently transmit election results.
  - System managed several election processes, most notably the Election Day functions of polling station status, the tracking of election materials, and preliminary results transmission.
  - IFES trained regionally-based operators who entered the data into a system with validation checks, which were then tabulated immediately at the central level.
  - IFES also designed a results display website linked to the CEC central site, which provided citizens with real-time, updated results information down to the polling station level. The information on the website was mirrored on a mobile app for smartphones.

IFES' Work in E&E

- Kyrgyzstan 2015 – introduction of biometric registration, optical scanning and e-transmission of results, but:
  - Short timescale implementation,
  - High costs 'leased' by ouside provider (question of ownership),
  - Large number of citizens disenfranchised,
  - Important security measures disregarded.
- Armenia 2016 – intend legal changes by April, 70% pilot in locals Nov, full-scale for elections 2017.

IFES' Work Globally

- **Kenya 2013**
  - Over a 15 month period, IFES worked with the IEBC to introduce three NVTs in response to some of the transparency/credibility concerns arising from the violent aftermath of the 2007 elections:
    - Biometric Voter Registration (BVR)
    - Electronic Voter ID (EVID)
    - Results Management System
- **Nigeria 2015**
  - Assisted INEC with introduction of two new voting technologies:
    - Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs), which have an embedded chip containing the biometrics of the holder (including fingerprints and facial images)
    - Electronic Card Readers to be used on Election Day to authenticate the voter's PVC

IFES' Work Globally

- **Burkina Faso 2015**
  - IFES worked with the CENI to support deployment Results Transmission System that provided real-time provisional results to the public.
  - Initial results transmitted from over 18,000 polling centers to central center in Ouagadougou
  - One of the most rapid and transparent examples of transparent election results delivery to the public in the region.
- **Myanmar 2016**
  - IFES supported development of the country's first computerized and centralized voter list
  - Implemented a results management system based on scanning of results forms.

IFES' Foci

- Helping build electronic results management systems to allow EMBs to publish timely and credible election results
- Developing EMB institutional IT strategies that addresses all aspects of election administration
- Assisting in IT solutions that capitalize on new IT infrastructure / tools that streamline elections services:
  - voter registration,
  - voter education,
  - political party and candidate registration,
  - political party finance,
  - organizational duties (finance, logistics, procurement, human resources, data analytics, etc.)
  - election results.

Global Trends

1. Many countries going back to traditional voting (Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, UK);
2. Voter verified trails still largely necessary as issue of end-to-end verifiability still not fully solved;
3. Issues of cost analysis and participation rates need to be studied more deeply;
4. Balancing act between 'public' voter registers and personal data protection requirements (recent Philippines hack)
5. Ongoing debate whether such systems should be proprietary or open source. (work of OSET Foundation)
6. Standards still developing (including this VC meeting)


INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
IFES
25 YEARS
Questions?

VIII. Cadre juridique et nouvelles technologies, le cas de la Belgique, par M. Régis Trannoy, Chef de l'Unité des élections à la Direction générale Institutions et Populations du Service public fédéral Intérieur de Belgique

A. *Introduction : La Belgique électorale*

La Constitution belge stipule dans son article 1er : « La Belgique est un Etat fédéral composé de communautés et de régions ».

Ceci a un impact sur l'organisation des élections en Belgique.

Ainsi, l'Etat fédéral organise sur l'ensemble du territoire belge les élections pour le Parlement fédéral, le Parlement européen et les Parlements de régions et de communautés.

De leur côté, les pouvoirs régionaux et communautaires (Région flamande, Région wallonne, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale et Communauté germanophone) organisent les élections locales.



Autre point important à souligner en ce qui concerne les élections de compétence fédérale : celles-ci – depuis 2014 - se déroulent maintenant normalement de manière simultanée. Donc le même jour, l'électeur prend part à 3 élections différentes dans le même bureau de vote.

B. *Aspects principaux concernant les nouvelles technologies en Belgique*

Au niveau de l'utilisation des nouvelles technologies en Belgique lors des élections, deux aspects principaux doivent être relevés :

- Le vote électronique
- La collecte digitale des données et des résultats électoraux

B.1. Vote électronique

Le vote électronique est utilisé en Belgique depuis 1991 (première expérimentation en 1991 – généralisation à partir de 1994).

De 1994 à 2014, un système de vote électronique de 1ère génération a été utilisé (système avec crayon optique pour le vote à l'écran et utilisation d'un carte magnétique

pour l'enregistrement du vote de l'électeur ; carte magnétique ensuite insérée par l'électeur dans une urne électronique enregistrant l'ensemble des votes d'un bureau).

Dès 2012, un nouveau système de vote électronique a été utilisé lors des élections locales. Ce système a été développé suite à une étude d'un consortium d'universités belges en 2007.

La caractéristique principale de ce système est de faire l'usage d'un *paper trail*. Ce *paper trail* a été implémenté afin d'accroître la confiance de l'électeur dans le système (l'électeur peut notamment y lire son vote qui y est imprimé de manière dactylographiée et sous la forme d'un code-barres).

Le cadre légal pour l'utilisation de ce nouveau système a été défini par la loi du 7 février 2014 organisant le vote électronique avec une preuve papier.

Tant pour cette loi que pour le développement même du nouveau système de vote électronique, il a été tenu compte des recommandations du Conseil de l'Europe Rec (2004)11. Ainsi, il était expressément stipulé dans le cahier des charges du marché public pour ce nouveau système que ces recommandations devaient être respectées.

D'un point de vue légal, il est ici important de faire écho aux débats des experts électoraux qui se sont déroulés à Bucarest en prélude à cette conférence. Comme Oliver Kask l'a mentionné dans son exposé à ce sujet, la question de l'interdiction de modifier la législation électorale moins d'un an avant le scrutin s'est posée au cours de ces débats. Sur ce point, la Constitution belge (art. 39ter) empêche depuis 2014 de modifier la législation électorale moins d'un an avant les élections. Pour nous, ceci a toute son importance, particulièrement lors de l'utilisation de nouvelles technologies (comme le vote électronique) lors des élections. En effet, il est primordial pour l'administration organisant les élections de posséder un délai important durant lequel plus aucune modification légale ne peut impacter les logiciels électoraux.

Une description générale rapide de ce nouveau système peut être utile.

Pour effectuer son vote, l'électeur reçoit une smart card activée par le président du bureau de vote.

Il se rend dans un isoloir, insère la smart card dans l'ordinateur et vote au moyen de l'écran tactile.
Après la confirmation de son vote, un bulletin est imprimé avec le vote de manière dactylographiée et sous la forme d'un code-barres.

Il sort de l'isoloir, scanne le code-barres de son bulletin à l'urne électronique et dépose ensuite ce bulletin dans cette urne.
Il rend la smart card au président. Aucune information n'est enregistrée sur cette smart card (il s'agit uniquement d'un token de vote)

Les principes fondamentaux définis par la loi du 07/02/2014 sont les suivants : Suffrage universel, équitable, libre et secret.

- Aucun lien entre le vote et l'électeur. Secret du vote

La loi du 07/02/2014 prévoit l'utilisation d'une smart card pour démarrer le processus de vote. Aucune information n'est enregistrée sur cette smart card après le vote de l'électeur.
Il s'agit uniquement d'un token de vote que le président du bureau de vote peut activer différemment selon le type d'électeur. En effet, comme expliqué en début de présentation, des élections de compétence fédérale sont organisées simultanément en Belgique. Certains électeurs ne peuvent pas voter pour toutes ces élections se déroulant de manière simultanée. Une activation différente de la smart card est donc nécessaire.

De même en vue de ne pas pouvoir différencier un électeur d'un autre, la réglementation définit clairement – pour chaque circonscription – la longueur identique du bulletin de vote qui sera imprimé et mis à disposition de l'électeur. En effet, qu'un électeur vote blanc ou qu'il vote pour l'ensemble des candidats d'une liste, le bulletin imprimé après son vote devra être de longueur identique afin d'éviter que l'on ne puisse retirer certaines informations de cette longueur (si la longueur était différente selon le type de vote émis).

- Procédure de vote claire de bout en bout

La loi du 07/02/2014 définit clairement et précisément de bout en bout la procédure de vote électronique (de la remise d'une smart card, en passant par le vote et jusqu'au dépôt du bulletin dans l'urne après scanning de celui-ci).

La réglementation définit également très précisément le contenu des écrans de vote selon le type de circonscription (nombre de candidats par écran, …).

- Possibilité de vote blanc (pour chaque type d'élection)

La loi du 07/02/2014 prévoit clairement la possibilité pour l'électeur de voter blanc. Et ceci, pour chaque élection.

Lors des élections simultanées, un électeur peut donc voter blanc pour une élection et voter pour des candidats pour une autre élection.

- Vote non modifiable une fois la procédure terminée

Comme prévu par la loi du 07/02/2014 : une fois le vote confirmé pour une élection, il n'est plus possible de modifier celui-ci.

- Possibilité d'annulation du vote dans certains cas définis par la loi

Néanmoins, la loi prévoit des cas précis pour lesquels le bulletin de vote de l'électeur est repris et annulé, l'électeur pouvant voter à nouveau (une nouvelle smart card lui est remise).

Par exemple, si l'électeur détériore le bulletin de vote imprimé de sorte que celui-ci peut être identifié et compromettre le secret du vote, ce vote est annulé.

- Prise en compte des difficultés pour les personnes handicapées

Le nouveau système de vote électronique prévoit la possibilité d'utilisation de système audio permettant à des personnes malvoyantes de voter en écoutant les listes de candidats et en votant au moyen d'un petit clavier braille intégré à l'ordinateur de vote.

- Simulation en ligne possible pour l'électeur (+ vidéo):

Une simulation du vote électronique est mise en ligne avant les élections (+- 1 mois) avec les différents types d'écran selon la circonscription.

De même des vidéos explicatives sont disponibles en ligne. Voir :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8sWrV4S-P4c&feature=youtu.be

L'utilisation de nouvelles technologies lors des élections implique d'atteindre un haut niveau de transparence et d'auditabilité.

Ceci est le point fondamental pour assurer la crédibilité du processus électoral, notamment au moyen d'un système de vote électronique.

A cet effet, la loi du 07/02/2014 a prévu les éléments suivants pour l'électeur :

- Le vote de l'électeur est imprimé sur un bulletin de vote
- L'électeur peut y lire son vote imprimé de manière dactylographiée
- L'électeur peut se rendre sur un autre ordinateur de vote du bureau pour y scanner le code-barres de son bulletin ; son vote apparaîtra alors à nouveau à l'écran (sans possibilité de modification) de cet autre ordinateur (les 5 ordinateurs d'un bureau de vote fonctionnent de manière autonome sans être liés entre eux par un quelconque réseau).
-

Pour le public en général (média, candidat, …), la loi du 07/02/2014 a prévu les éléments suivants :

- Le code-sources du logiciel de vote électronique est publié dans la semaine qui suit les élections. Toute personne peut ainsi aller vérifier le bon fonctionnement de ce logiciel (ainsi en 2014, une société néerlandaise d'origine universitaire a – de sa propre initiative – étudié les codes-sources publiés en ligne et émis des recommandations en la matière).
- Cette loi prévoit également que les partis politiques représentés au Parlement fédéral peuvent désigner (c'est une faculté) un spécialiste en informatique qui se verra remettre les codes-sources du vote électronique 20 jours avant les élections. Ceci doit permettre aux candidats et partis d'avoir confiance dans le système de vote électronique.
- Un organisme indépendant de contrôle est également agréé en vertu de cette loi. Celui-ci doit vérifier le logiciel de vote électronique et remettre un avis au Ministre compétent, en vue de garantir le bon fonctionnement du logiciel.
- Le Collège des experts
-

Conformément à la loi du 07/02/2014, les Parlements (Parlement fédéral et Parlements des entités fédérées) désignent des spécialistes en informatique qui vont constituer le Collège des experts.
Ce collège est formé de deux composantes : une composante non permanente effectuant ses tâches uniquement au moment des élections et une composante permanente compétente pendant et hors périodes électorales.

Ce collège a une compétence très large pour contrôler l'ensemble de la procédure de vote électronique. Cette compétence de contrôle recouvre l'ensemble des logiciels utilisés lors des élections, ceci tant avant, pendant ou après les élections.

Pour le vote électronique, le collège peut notamment effectuer des audits le jour même des élections. Les membres de ce collège peuvent donc se rendre dans un bureau de vote et, au moyen de leur carte d'accréditation, émettre des votes (non comptabilisés) à titre de test.

Le collège a la compétence de procéder à des recomptages d'urnes électroniques. L'objectif de ce collège est en général d'arriver à un recomptage à 100% des urnes, ceci

au moyen d'un logiciel de leur conception. *In fine* cela permet de comparer ces résultats aux résultats officiels publiés.

Une des tâches majeures de ce collège est de rédiger, à l'attention des assemblées parlementaires, un rapport complet et détaillé après les élections sur les constations effectuées lors de leurs missions. Ce rapport contient également toute une série de recommandations en vue d'améliorer le processus électronique de vote.

B.2. Collecte et diffusion des résultats

Depuis début des années 2000, un système de collecte informatique des données et résultats électoraux est utilisé en Belgique

Ce système vise :
- La collecte des données des candidats
- La collecte des coordonnées des différents bureaux électoraux
- La totalisation des résultats (tant du vote papier que du vote électronique)
- La collecte des résultats au niveau central
- La publication des résultats sur un portail web.

Comme pour le vote électronique, cette collecte des données et résultats électoraux fait l'objet, en application du Code électoral :
- d'un contrôle par un organisme indépendant de contrôle
- d'un contrôle et d'un suivi par le Collège des experts
- d'une publication de ses codes-sources après les élections.

B.3. Autres technologies

Par exhaustivité, il faut également mentionner l'utilisation des technologies suivantes en Belgique :

- Logiciel d'aide au dépouillement des bulletins papier

Ces logiciels doivent permettre une totalisation rapide, fiable et aisée des votes émis sur bulletin papier.

Ainsi, les derniers logiciels utilisés en 2014 font l'objet d'une technique de double encodage des bulletins papier via 2 ordinateurs synchronisés. Les différences d'encodage entre un même bulletin sont directement détectées et peuvent être rectifiées et validées par l'ensemble du bureau de dépouillement.

Le Code électoral prévoit également la nécessité d'une vérification par un organisme indépendant de contrôle pour l'usage de tels logiciels.

Le Collège des experts a également contrôlé l'utilisation de ceux-ci en 2014.

- Identification électronique des électeurs au moyen de la carte d'identité

De manière plus limitée, a été testé depuis 2009 un logiciel d'identification électronique des électeurs via leur carte d'identité électronique. Ceci évitant un pointage des électeurs sur liste papier qui est parfois source d'erreurs.

IX. Presentation of the project "Improving electoral management: the organisational determinants of electoral integrity", Presented by Mr Toby James, Senior Lecturer in British and Comparative Politics, and Ms Leontine Loeber, PhD Research Student, University of East Anglia, United-Kingdom

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The number of elections that are held around the world has increased substantially with over 2,600 national contests taking place between 1945 and 2006 (Hyde and Marinov 2012). Conducting an election is a huge logistical challenge which involves the complex management of people, technology and resources. Electoral management boards (EMBs) are the state organisations that are tasked with the administration of elections. Yet EMBs come in many different organizational forms around the world. At the same time, there has been considerable variation in the quality of elections. Alongside many well-run elections, which often use technology, resources and personnel innovatively and efficiently, there are often concerns about administrative problems, technological failures, incomplete electoral registers and opportunities for fraud. This variation is found in both established and transitional democracies (Lehoucq 2003; Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall 2012; Birch 2011; Norris 2014, 2015; James 2014).

This paper outlines a research project whose aim is therefore to increase our understanding of (a) the variation in institutional design of EMBs worldwide, particularly focusing on capacity, personnel, network structure and autonomy; (b) the consequences of EMB institutional design for EMB performance; (c) the impact of EMB institutional design for election integrity, credibility and legitimacy, as well as citizens' and political actors' perceptions of elections; and (d) make recommendations to EMBs about the practices that they can use to improve their performance.

The project's methods involve launching the first-ever cross-national survey of electoral administrators. The survey will capture the variations in capacity, personnel, network structure and independence among election management bodies across Europe. It is proposed that the project works closely with the Venice Commission and the Association of European Election Officials so that results can be fed back to practitioners for their mutual advantage. The project will also work in tandem with the Electoral Integrity Project who are conducting a survey in Africa and Asia with many identical questions to allow international comparisons.

ABOUT US

We are a team of international researchers who are renowned for our research on electoral management.

Dr. Toby S. James is a Senior Lecturer at the University of East Anglia, UK. He holds a PhD from the University of York and has been a visiting scholar at Trinity College, Dublin and the John W. Kluge Center in the Library of Congress, Washington D.C. He has had articles published in international journals such as *Electoral Studies*, *Contemporary Politics*, *Election Law Journal, Policy Studies* and *Parliamentary Affairs* and is the author of *Elite Statecraft and Election Administration* (Palgrave, 2012) and is currently working on a book on *Comparative Electoral Management* (Routledge, forthcoming). Toby is currently an advisor to the UK Law Commission and Lead Fellow on Electoral Modernisation to the UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Democratic Participation. Toby's research has been externally funded by the British Academy, Leverhulme Trust,

AHRC, ESRC, Nuffield Foundation and the McDougall Trust. He has written commissioned policy report for national and international organisations.

Leontine Loeber studied law and has worked as a legislative lawyer at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations of the Netherlands. In this capacity she was responsible for drafting changes in the Election Law. After this, she worked at the Dutch Electoral Council, where among other tasks, she was involved with organizing elections. During this period, the Netherlands switched from e-voting to paper ballot voting. Currently Leontine works at the Council of State as a legislative lawyer. She has obtained a master in Political Science at the University of Leiden and has published articles on e-voting in the Netherlands and voter trust. Currently, she is pursuing a PhD at the University of East Anglia on the topic of election fraud.

Holly Ann Garnett is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at McGill University and a student member of the Centre for the Study of Democratic Citizenship. Her research considers election management bodies and electoral integrity in comparative perspective, examining such topics as the online provision of information, communication with citizens, transparency, registration procedures and early voting opportunities. Holly was a visiting intern at the Electoral Integrity Project in Sydney, Australia in 2014 and has remained active in a number of the project's research activities. Holly holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in History and Political Science, with a minor in French from Nipissing University and a Master of Arts in Political Studies from Queen's University. She has received a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship (SSHRC) at both the Master's and Doctoral Levels, and was a Killam Fellow at Cornell University in 2009.

Dr. Carolien van Ham is a Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of New South Wales, Australia; a senior research fellow at the Electoral Integrity Project at Sydney University and a research associate at the Varieties of Democracy Institute at Gothenburg University. Dr. van Ham is currently working on the Australian Research Council funded research project (2015-2017) "Getting elections right", investigating (a) why and under what conditions electoral reform in electoral democracies and electoral autocracies is successful; (b) how election integrity can be effectively strengthened; and (c) how election integrity affects democratization. Carolien's research focuses on democratization and authoritarianism, electoral integrity and electoral fraud, and political representation and legitimacy. She has published articles on election integrity, democratization and representation in the *European Journal of Political Science, Government and Opposition, Democratization, West European Politics* and *Electoral Studies*, a forthcoming edited volume on democratic legitimacy in advanced industrial democracies, a book on legitimacy in the Netherlands, and book chapters in various edited volumes.

BACKGROUND

While many elections are conducted across the world to very high standards, there remains evidence of problems with poor election quality in both established and transitional democracies (Lehoucq 2003; Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall 2012; Birch 2011; Norris 2014, 2015; James 2014). The design of electoral management boards, the organisations responsible for conducting elections, has become a pressing concern for policy makers. The professionalization of Electoral Management Boards (EMBs) has been defined as an important policy objective by Kofi Annan's *Global Commission on Elections* (2012). National and international organisations have invested significant sums of resources to improve electoral management. For example, the European

Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights spent approximately EUR€307 million on over 700 projects relating to democracy promotion between 2007-2010 (EIDHR 2011, 8), much of which was spent on electoral assistance.

In many countries, independent Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) have been championed as a key institutional reform measure to successfully strengthen election integrity, and as a result independent EMBs are now the most common institutional model for electoral management in the world (Catt et al. 2014; Wall et al. 2006; Lopez-Pinter 2000).

Yet, despite the intuitively appealing assumption that independent electoral management bodies will be better at their task of organizing and monitoring elections in an impartial manner, empirical evidence is mixed. While regional studies have found a positive impact of independent EMBs on election integrity in Latin America and Africa (Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo 2008; Fall, Hounkpe, and Jinadu 2012; Hamberg and Erlich 2013), global comparative studies appear to show that EMB institutional design is either negatively, or only very weakly related to election integrity (Birch 2011; Norris 2015).

Moreover, the emerging evidence is that other aspects of EMBs practices can be important. Emerging scholarship demonstrates that the capacity of electoral management boards (Clark 2015, 2014), the personnel (James 2013b, 2013a), network structure (James 2015, forthcoming) and institutional design (van Ham and Lindberg 2015) of electoral management boards can be key factor shaping the quality of elections.

The ability of policy-makers to improve EMB design and practices is limited by the lack of cross-national data. The only global comparative data on election management bodies' institutional design is the classification by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2014; 2006), which distinguishes three broad types of electoral management: independent, mixed, and governmental. However, the organizational structure of election management bodies is vastly more complex than the three broad categories. In practice, many more differences in functions and accountability exist between countries (Lopez-Pinter 2000; Norris 2015; Elklit and Reynolds 2001).

The aim of this research project is therefore to generate new high quality data on variation in the institutional design of election management bodies worldwide. This will increase our understanding of the consequences of institutional design on election management body performance, credibility and legitimacy, as well as electoral integrity more generally.

THE FOCUS: CAPACITY, HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES AND AUTONOMY

This project addresses the concrete challenge of running high-quality elections, faced by election management bodies around the globe. To do so, this project will be the first study to collect comparative data on the legal, institutional and administrative framework through which election management bodies function. It focuses on three major areas that are of the utmost concern to practitioners and policy-makers:

1. **Capacity.** What resources do EMBs have? Where are the resources spent (e.g. new technology, personnel development, local offices)?
2. **Personnel and management.** How long have staff been in their post? What qualifications and training do they have? What policies are in place to monitor

and improve employee performance? What is the level of job satisfaction among employees?

3. **Autonomy.** To what extent are EMBs formally independent of government? What is the scope of tasks of EMBs? What appointment procedures and tenure rules are used for EMB boards? What formal accountability structures are in place? How does de jure independence vary from de facto independence?

Drawing on these questions, this project will provide policy recommendations on: patterns of spending and resourcing by INGOs and national EMBs on elections; the recruitment, training and management of staff; the involvement of civil society in the electoral process, and the reform of the formal legal structure of existing EMBs.



METHODOLOGY

We propose undertaking a survey of the personnel in electoral management bodies in Europe to gather information on their capacity, human resource practices and autonomy. We propose sending the survey to EMBs in the European states with a population over 300,000.

The project will be run in collaboration with the Electoral Integrity Project who will be conducting a similar survey in Asia and Africa.

The Structural survey

There will be two surveys. The first survey (Appendix A) will require only ***one senior official to complete*** from each EMB. A fillable pdf and/or Word document will be sent to the official to complete. This 'structural' survey will ask information about the EMB and conduct of elections in the country including:

- The organisational design of the EMB
- The volume of staff
- The tasks and responsibilities of the EMB
- The decision making process within the EMB
- The budget and resources of the EMB
- The EMBs involvement with the international community

The Personnel survey

It is proposed that the second survey (Appendix B) is sent to ***all personnel within the European EMBs*** to complete. This will be an online survey and a link to the survey will be provided for distribution within each EMB. The survey covers questions about the individual's:

- Role within the EMB
- Perceptions of the quality of elections in their own country
- Perceptions of the human resource practices and their workplace
- Training and professional development
- Demographic information

The help needed from EMBs

We kindly request that each EMB:

- **Nominates a survey facilitator within their organisation.** This person will be the central point of contact for us with any questions. This will *not* be an onerous task. The survey facilitator will be provided an email to disseminate to employees.
- **Nominates one senior individual to complete the structural survey.**
- **Survey translation.** The survey will be translated into the official language of each country. If the EMB is able to assist with the translation, this would be appreciated.

OUTCOMES

- A policy report will be co-authored by the team with recommendations for 'best practice'. Stakeholder EMBs, INGOs and governments will be provided with an electronic copy. The team will offer to present findings at the next European Conference of Electoral Management Boards.
- Bespoke, confidential advice will be offered to partner EMBs on request.
- Academic conference papers, journal articles/book chapters will be written to advance the scholarship on electoral management.
- The scholars will then seek to apply for a further grant to develop a global survey. A longitudinal survey could include several waves so that the impact of reforms could be traced over time.

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SECOND PLENARY SESSION: NEW TECHNOLOGIES APPLIED TO THE PRE-ELECTORAL PERIOD

X. Impact of new technologies in electoral observation by the European Union, by Emanuele Giaufret, Head of Division Democracy and Electoral Observation, European External Action Service of the European Union

The introduction of new technologies in the electoral process brings potential benefits, but also risks and challenges for the EMBs and other stakeholders, as well as for observers. The use of new technologies in election touches upon the key question of transparency and efficiency in electoral processes. We need to look at it through the prism of various aspects, including the legal framework, the capacity of EMBs and the confidence in the process.

New technologies in elections affect various stages of the process: voters registration, voters identification, voting, counting, transmission and tabulation of results as well as open data and public scrutiny of results. In countries where EU is involved in election observation (Africa, Asia, Latin America), by far the **most common technology applied during the pre-election process is biometrics related to voter registration (BVR). It is meant** to help election management bodies to eliminate duplicate entries in voter registers. Often BVR is perceived by political parties, sometimes also those in opposition, as a solution to problems: a guarantee for the integrity of the registration process.

As a matter of fact, several factors, including ignorance of the technology or exaggeration of BVR benefits – sometimes to justify the high cost - can lead to the perception that BVR can be a panacea addressing all registration flaws. However, biometrics cannot fix all problems associated with voter registration. For instance, biometrics cannot prevent, ipso facto, possible registration by non-citizens, under-age registration, or the presence of deceased voters in a register. It is therefore key to ensure adequate awareness of the functioning of the technology applied and of its limitations.

When observing the use of biometrics in an electoral context, it is useful to assess the level of knowledge of the technology amongst various stakeholders - not only the elections management body which is implementing biometric voter registration - but also political parties, media houses, civil society and citizen observation organisations.

Reputable vendors of biometric solutions are careful not to misrepresent the functionality their solutions offer. Nevertheless, commercial interests can influence the debate on the introduction of these technologies into election processes.

The creation of a biometric voter register by a private company may be seen as a quick fix to get, in theory, a comprehensive and reliable voter register but certain aspects of that process may raise concerns:

- transparency in tender procedures and total amount of the contracts, respect of international norms
- transfer of competences to the national administration as it is essential to build sustainable national capacities.

- Question of confidentiality and access to the biometric data
- Training of the staff on how to use and adequately maintain the equipment
- Overall cost of the support: to cover the full cost of establishing BVR, requires very substantial amount of money

Where an agency other than the elections management body is responsible for the identification of citizens and uses biometrics in order to ensure uniqueness of the civil or population register, the EMB generally has no need for the biometric data - unless there is an intention to use it for voter identification or authentication on polling day.

Many voter registers are based on data extracted from civil or population registries. In many of these cases, the data handed to the EMB will often be a subset of the attributes captured and will often include the facial photograph of the voter. The inclusion of the voter's photograph on the voter lists has long been recognised as a simple but highly effective deterrent to Election Day abuses, such as personation. The EU has been providing support to the modernisation of civil registers (and finger prints digitalisation), namely recently in the Sahel region, but the following elements need to be carefully taken into consideration:

- One of the key issues is, again, the overall sustainability: how to make sure that the national administrations will not only have the financial resources but also capacities to maintain such registers? Otherwise it is a huge cost for a non-sustainable outcome
- In many cases it is highly advisable that if civil registers are established, there should also be the basis for voter registers to avoid duplicating cost and leading to more reliable and sustainable voter registers. In such cases, certain consideration must be taken into account, for instance the need to link each voter to a polling station (or in countries with sophisticated address systems, a detailed address so that this link can be established). Failure to provide this link can lead to serious problems on election day when voters are not informed where they are registered to vote, which was the case for example in Angola in 2007.

A few African countries have managed to have a reliable civic register, which can be the basis for the voter register without requiring biometric technology (e.g. Rwanda or Botswana). This needs a long term engagement and investment from the authorities, namely in building capacities and means to maintain this registers.
The other electoral use of biometrics is in devices to identify or authenticate voters at the polling station on Election Day. Known by various names, including EVID (Electronic Voter Identification) or electronic registers, this technology is seeing increased use. A recent example that will inevitably reverberate in the region and beyond is Nigeria which deployed over 150,000 devices on polling day in 2015. Other examples include Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, Venezuela and Brazil.

Where a country is using electronic voting machines and these include any version of electronic voter identification, there is a significant technical challenge to ensure that there is no possibility of any connection of a voter's record with the vote they case.

As experienced by the EU EOM in Venezuela in 2006, the remote possibility of subsequent reconstruction from even disparate sources of the sequence of voters and votes cast, presents a potential challenge to stakeholder confidence in an election.

Subsequent reports from the Carter Centre in 2012 elaborate how the EMB in Venezuela has addressed these concerns.

Recent EU observation experience has shown that newly introduced technologies often fail, highlighting the need for proper piloting of the technology and for a traditional paper back-up solution, as was the case recently in Peru. Cases in Malawi (2014), Kenya (2013) and Ghana (2012) show how the introduction of election technology into the process caused significant election day problems that negatively affected public confidence.

These experiences also demonstrate the need for observers to be particularly vigilant regarding new election technologies. The biggest challenge for observers is understanding the newly adopted technology and equipment, so that they can properly observe the process. New election technologies may also challenge the transparency of the process, which is crucial for effective observation as well as for public confidence.

Other associated problems that have been observed with the introduction of new election technologies include compressed election timetables because of late procurement processes, as was the case in Kenya, and the failure to properly update election legislation to reflect the adoption of new technologies, as was the case in Uganda earlier this year, where approximately 500,000 potential first time voters were disenfranchised because the legislation did not take into account the change from an active to a passive voter registration system.

When observing counting, EU EOMs can trace polling station results up to final results, so that observing processes is crowned by credible assessment of outcomes.

However, assessing voter registration procedures in the pre-electoral period is a more complex issue. The EU and other international observer are not in a position to deploy observers staying at VR centres over the full registration period to keep a parallel tally of entered records to match the collected dataset against the final list used for polling. The EU EOM scale samples –even when assessing the voter registration such as in Soudan in 2010 - remain limited, unless several hundred VR centres were observed throughout the entire registration period. More importantly, observation of registration procedures fails to detect deceased, displaced, multiple, fictitious or otherwise illegitimate entries or omissions on the register—the types of flaws that often dominate opposition allegations.

Observation of registration processes can assess only the regularity of procedures themselves, as measured against the legal framework, but not the integrity of the final voter register per se.

Still, the EU is increasingly following voter registration processes, for instance by deploying dedicated Election Expert Missions for this purpose, as was the case last year in Nigeria and Tanzania. These missions were able to collect much relevant information on the newly introduced biometric voter registration systems that was then fed into the full-scale election observation missions that followed. The EU is also focusing on how EU EOMs can better analyse publicly available voter registration data, to make more comprehensive assessments of the voter registration process.

New technologies do not make elections better or worse. It depends on the conditions applied. It is clear that a proper legal framework is a pre-condition. Adequate transparency in the selection and implementation of the new technologies is required to ensure confidence by all stakeholders. Finally, domestic capacity needs to be adequate

to manage the new technologies in an accountable manner. Finally, from the observers perspective, long term presence, awareness of the systems and technical knowledge are necessary to be able to assess the performance of new technologies.

XI. Biometric voter registration, Kyrgyz case, by Mr Akyn Mambetaliev, deputy Director of the State Company Infocom under the State Registration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic

Отчет о составлении списков избирателей на базе биометрических данных и Единого Государственного Регистра Населения (ЕГРН) Кыргызской Республики

Государственной регистрационной службой при Правительстве Кыргызской Республики (далее - Служба) за 2015 год проведена колоссальная работа, так Службой разработана базовая модель архитектуры Единого государственного реестра населения (ЕГРН), для создания единого источника данных о населении, в том числе для совершенствования избирательной системы, путем формирования актуального списка избирателей.

Архитектура ЕГРН представляет собой комплексный технический проект и состоит из следующих компонентов информационных систем Службы:

- Биометрические данные граждан старше 16 лет;
- База данных паспортов;
- АИС «ЗАГС»;
- АИС «Адресный регистр».

Указанные системы представляют особое значение в избирательной системе, так как все необходимые персональные и биометрические данные используются для формирования списков и идентификации избирателя.

При этом важнейшим элементом является персональный идентификационный номер (далее – ПИН), который выступает в роли сквозного идентификатора, связывающего персональные данные человека в указанных системах и базах данных.

Также в настоящее время Службой реализуются более 20 ИТ – проектов. При поддержке Фонда «Сорос-Кыргызстан» разработана платформа «открытых данных» на базе системы Адресного регистра. В рамках Стратегии по внедрению электронного управления в государственных органах и органах Местного самоуправления (МСУ) на 2014-2017 годы, между ГРС и Кыргызской ассоциацией разработчиков программного обеспечения и услуг (КАРПОУ) при поддержке Фонда «Сорос-Кыргызстан» (ФСК) был запущен проект по созданию портала открытых данных. Для реализации данного проекта был использован опыт других стран в разработке платформы открытых данных, в частности английской платформы ckan.org.

Данные по улицам Кыргызстана были разделены на 5 дата сетов для удобства поиска по населенным пунктам, районам, городам, областям. Также, был создан модуль поисковой формы улиц, размещенный на портале.

На сегодняшний день завершена подготовка портала для развертывания на сервере. Сейчас происходят последние этапы тестирования.

Сегодня ГРС является самым крупным держателем данных, начиная от регистра населения, дипломов и заканчивая водительскими правами. В начале года ГРС сделала важное политическое решение – выложить как можно больше данных в открытый доступ (за исключением персональной информации). Одной из задач ставилось консолидация и перевод в машиночитаемый вид самой крупной базы данных – **Адресный регистр страны**. В этом регистре собраны все данные об улицах и номерах домов по всей стране. Этот проект даст разработчикам (компаниям и отдельным программистам) возможность создавать приложения для бизнеса, населения а так же самим государственным учреждениям на основе данных, предоставленных ГРС. Такие как навигационные сервисы, и т.д. По мере того, по мере публикации данных будет увеличиваться разнообразие сервисов.

Справочно: Открытые данные – глобальное мировое движение, направленное на социально-экономическое развитие через предоставление общественно значимой информации населению. Большинство из стран, присоединившихся к движению Открытые данные, наблюдают существенный экономический рост, усиление взаимодействия между гражданским обществом и государством, качественное улучшение государственных и муниципальных услуг, прозрачность и подотчетность правительства, рост участия СМИ и граждан в преобразованиях национального масштаба.

Открытые данные — это информация, которую кто угодно может свободно использовать и распространять. Допустимы лишь требования указывать источник данных и распространять их на тех же условиях, что и исходные.

Во исполнение пункта 4 постановления Правительства Кыргызской Республики «О Едином реестре населения Кыргызской Республики и автоматизированной системе записей актов гражданского состояния Кыргызской Республики» от 21 октября 2013 года 573 Службой разработана автоматизированная информационная система записей актов гражданского состояния (далее – АИС «ЗАГС»).

Внедрение АИС «ЗАГС» является своего рода фундаментом и первым шагом для создания ЕГРН, который может обеспечить доступ различных государственных органов к необходимой информации и возможность информационного обмена данными на основе персонального идентификационного номера (ПИН). АИС «ЗАГС» позволит улучшить качество демографической статистики как инструмента управления страной, повысит эффективность управленческих решений, минимизирует коррупционные схемы в процессе регистрации актовых записей о

гражданском состоянии и станет основой при формировании списков избирателей.

В результате внедрения АИС «ЗАГС» проведена реформа, по переходу от бумажного метода работы на автоматизированный, что привело к сокращению времени обслуживания населения, учету всех произведенных видов регистрации в разрезе отделов ЗАГС, районов, областей за любой период времени и, следовательно, обеспечению органов ЗАГС актуальной и достоверной информацией об актах гражданского состояния, повышения качества предоставляемых услуг органами ЗАГС, сокращению количества ошибок при регистрации актов гражданского состояния.

Сведения по всем видам регистрации хранятся и обрабатываются в централизованной базе данных, что позволяет обеспечить контроль за

произведенной регистрацией актовых записей, производимой в любом из 58 территориальных отделов ЗАГС республики.

В рамках подготовки к внедрению АИС «ЗАГС» в отделения ЗАГС по республике:

- разработано и утверждено Техническое задание на разработку системы;
- осуществлен перевод системы на новую платформу;
- выполнена интеграция с АИС «Адресный регистр Кыргызской Республики», для ввода адресной части;

В целях внедрения АИС «ЗАГС» по всем территориальным отделениям ЗАГС, Службой заключен договор с ОАО «Кыргызтелеком» для подключения к VPN-каналам. Исходя из проведенного анализа по определению потребностей в технической оснащенности ОЗАГС, закуплено оборудование для внедрения АИС «ЗАГС» (90 компьютеров, коммуникационное оборудование, 90 лазерных принтеров, 90 источников бесперебойного питания) на общую сумму порядка 6 млн. сомов.

Так, на сегодняшний день автоматизированная информационная система «ЗАГС», внедрена в промышленную эксплуатацию в 58 территориальных ОЗАГС, обучены все 161 сотрудников.

В рамках финансовой помощи из средств ПРООН для установки и подключения Айыл окмоту (МСУ) к АИС «ЗАГС» закуплено необходимое компьютерное оборудование (компьютер, принтер, УПС, модем) для 10 АО, в процессе подготовки заключение договора по закупке модемов. Службой прорабатывается вопрос подключения к ВПН каналам в пилотных АО где имеется возможность подключения к ВПН.

Поставленные задачи по автоматизации органов ЗАГС выполняется в полном объёме и в рамках установленных сроков. Вместе с тем, принимаются меры по реализации 2-го этапа проекта, по разработке в системе формирования всех отчетов, технологии по учету и выдаче гербовых свидетельств и других бланков строгой отчетности.

За 9 меяцев 2015 года из общего количества произведенных записей об актах гражданского состояния произведено 85920 записей с использованием электронной регистрации в АИС «ЗАГС».

В целях реализации Плана форсированных мероприятий Правительства Кыргызской Республики по созданию Единого государственного реестра населения Кыргызской Республики, исполнения распоряжения Службы 22 мая 2014 года № 73 ГП «Инфоком» разработано и утверждено Техническое задание на разработку автоматизированной информационной системы «Адресный регистр населения КР». АИС предназначена для сбора, ведения, хранения обработки и выдачи сведений об адресах объектов недвижимости находящихся на территории КР. С июля текущего года проведено обучение системных администраторов центральной избирательной комиссии КР по работе с программным обеспечением «Адресный регистр КР».

Так по 1-му этапу проекта реализовано:

- «Рабочее место оператора» - ввод данных;

- формирование базы данных адресов по всей республике;
- «Рабочее место администратора» - администрирование пользователей, редактирование записей, логирование, сохранение истории по изменению наименований и статусов;
- запущен информационно-поисковый сайт для клиентов www.darek.kg для проверки наличия улицы и правильности ее названия с возможностью направления электронной заявки о включении улицы в адресный регистр;
- разработаны задачи дальнейшего развития системы.

На текущий момент в процессе реализации 2-ой этап системы:

- формирование выходных форм;
- действия с населенными пунктами (объединение / разъединение / упразднение / изменение статуса и статуса подчиненных единиц)
- работа по заявлениям, поступающих от клиентов на получение справок и выписок, предоставляемых в ДКР по объектам недвижимости.

Разработан интерфейс для присвоения почтовых адресов объектам недвижимости. Проводятся работы по актуализации, сверке и объединению базы данных Адресного регистра и базы данных улиц и объектов недвижимости, имеющихся в Департаменте кадастра и регистрации прав недвижимости (ДКР). Структуры баз данных ДКР и Адресного регистра приведены в соответствие.

Осуществлен ввод в базу данных названий населенных пунктов на кыргызском языке (Интернет-ресурс www.darek.kg).

Для подключения к АИС «Адресный регистр КР» всех заинтересованных государственных органов и органов местного самоуправления разработан «Регламент подключения и использования АИС «Адресный регистр КР».

В настоящее время, работы по присвоению почтовых номеров и загрузке адресов из кадастровой базы данных в Адресный регистр завершены. Всего загружено в базу Адресного регистра 2,7 млн. объектов недвижимости, из них 1,39 млн. объектов недвижимости населенных пунктов жилого назначения, что способствует точному определению границ Участковых избирательных комиссий и составлению списков избирателей.

В перспективе проект Адресного регистра позволит формировать базу данных актуальных и прежних адресов объектов недвижимости, в том числе неуточненых населенных пунктов и улиц, по которым уполномоченным органам необходимо вести работу.

Адресная информация является ключевой в большинстве информационных систем государственного и муниципального уровней. Использование информационных технологий позволит в будущем привязать адресные данные и объекты к географическим данным, с возможностью визуализации местоположения объекта.

Важно отметить, что Адресный регистр является ключевым звеном и компонентом в базовой модели архитектуры Единого государственного реестра населения Кыргызской Республики. На сегодня Адресный регистр интегрирован и используется во всех ключевых компонентах ЕГРН, таких как:

- в системе биометрической регистрации граждан для учета адреса официального и фактического места жительства;
- в базе данных ЗАГС для учета актов гражданского состояния;
- в базе данных адресного-справочного бюро (АСБ) для учета постоянного и временного места жительства гражданина.

Во всех этих системах, Адресный регистр используется для учета адреса официального и фактического места жительства гражданина по единому формату.

В целях реализации Плана форсированных мероприятий Правительства Кыргызской Республики по созданию Единого государственного реестра населения Кыргызской Республики, исполнения распоряжения Службы от 28 мая 2014г. №82, ГП «Инфоком» разработана система для ввода сканированных актовых записей о смерти ЗАГС, хранящихся на бумажных носителях, с созданием базы данных в электронном формате.

Сканирование, ввода и контроля актовых записей выполнено согласно установленному сроку. Общее количество записей о смерти составляет 346 966, из них:

- 345 175 записей с наличием ФИО;
- 1 791 записей с отсутствием ФИО.

База данных актовых записей о смерти используется для вычищения списков при формировании избирателей по УИК.

С целью обеспечения реализации постановления Правительства Кыргызской Республики от 15 июня 2015 года № 359 **«**О вопросах

обеспечения паспортами и общегражданскими паспортами граждан Кыргызской Республики**»**, внедрения новых технологий в процессе обеспечения населения национальными паспортами, а также эффективного взаимодействия Департамента регистрации населения и актов гражданского состояния (далее – ДРНАГС) и Государственного предприятия «Инфоком» при Государственной регистрационной службе при Правительстве Кыргызской Республики разработана АИС «Паспорт». АИС «Паспорт» упрощает систему оформления анкеты-заявления на получение паспорта гражданина Кыргызской Республики и общегражданского паспорта.

При обработке анкет-заявлений в электронном виде в АИС «Паспорт», должностными лицами ОПВРР ДРНАГС используется электронная цифровая подпись, что исключает возможность подделки подписей и оттисков печатей на бумажных носителях. Внедрение АИС «Паспорт» позволит исключить необходимость использования печатных бланков анкет-заявлений, экономить средства за счет отказа от процесса транспортировки и доставки анкет-заявлений, что в свою очередь ускорит процесс изготовления паспортов.

При использовании разработанной системы проверка данных заявителя осуществляется при приеме и оформлении документов на получение (обмен) паспорта по базе данных изготовленных паспортов, начиная с 2005 года, а также по базе данных ПИН.

В целях взаимодействия с порталом электронных услуг Службы и с системой электронных платежей проводится модификация системы, разработана опция рассылки «смс» уведомлений о статусе изготовления паспорта гражданина.

В соответствии с распоряжением Государственной регистрационной службы при Правительстве Кыргызской Республики (далее - Служба) от 20 октября 2014 года №199, в рамках пилотного проекта АИС «Паспорт» запущен в межрегиональном отделении Департамента регистрации населения и актов гражданского состояния и отделениях паспортно-визовой и регистрационной работы Первомайского и Октябрьского районов города Бишкек. Процесс тестирования и отладки проходил в интенсивном режиме.

С 30 октября 2014 года АИС «Паспорт» запущен с реальными анкетами - заявлениями параллельно с бумажными. В г.Ош АИС «Паспорт» запущен и функционирует начиная с мая 2015 года.

В рамках постановления Правительства Кыргызской Республики «О вопросах обеспечения паспортами и общегражданскими паспортами граждан Кыргызской Республики» от 15 июня 2015 года № 359 и исполнения распоряжения Службы №121 от 14 июля 2015 года АИС «Паспорт» внедрена в промышленную эксплуатацию.

С апреля по сентябрь 2015 года с помощью АИС «Паспорт» изготовлено 5 138 общегражданских паспортов и 12 890 паспортов гражданина Кыргызской Республики.

Разработана автоматизированная информационная система «Адресно – справочное бюро» (далее – АИС АСБ). Проект АИС АСБ является приоритетным, так как позволит дополнительно использовать учетные данные граждан, регистрируемых по месту пребывания и по месту жительства, а также позволит оперативно использовать данные единой базы данных.

Автоматизация процесса регистрационного учета граждан позволит повысить эффективность информационного обеспечения и качество предоставления государственных услуг гражданам, создать единую информационную базу с привязкой к системе ЕГРН.

АИС АСБ будет построена как компонент Единого государственного реестра населения Кыргызской Республики и будет учитывать потребность разных государственных органов к совместному доступу к информации для верификации регистрационных данных граждан.

Объектом автоматизации является деятельность Адресно - справочных бюро Департамента регистрации населения и актов гражданского состояния ГРС при ПКР и взаимодействующих с ними паспортных подразделений и ЦОН для решения задач регистрационного учета населения по месту жительства и по месту пребывания в Кыргызской Республике.

Также, разработанная автоматизированная информационная система «Адресно – справочное бюро», использовалась для актуализации и использования адресных сведений граждан, регистрируемых по месту пребывания и по месту жительства при формировании списков избирателей.

Согласно Указу Президента Кыргызской Республики «О мерах по совершенствованию избирательной системы Кыргызской Республики» от 22 мая 2013 года №109 и Распоряжения ГРС «Об утверждении Положения о Государственном реестре национальных паспортов граждан Кыргызской Республики» от 11 марта 2015 года №38 разработана автоматизированная информационная система Государственный реестр национальных паспортов граждан Кыргызской Республики с целью обеспечения заинтересованных государственных органов, органов МСУ, юридических и физических лиц актуальной и достоверной информацией о действительных и недействительных национальных паспортах граждан Кыргызской Республики. Реестр содержит данные о гражданах, подающих документы на изготовление национальных паспортов, информацию о гражданах, вышедших из гражданства Кыргызской Республики, сведения об утере паспорта, лиц получивших гражданство Кыргызской Республики и записей актов гражданского состояния о смерти.

В соответствии с распоряжением Государственной регистрационной службы при Правительстве Кыргызской Республики от 11 марта 2015 года № 38 разработано и утверждено Техническое задание на разработку АИС «Государственном реестре национальных паспортов» (ГРНП). В настоящее время АИС «Государственный реестр национальных паспортов» разработан

и готов и используется для сверки данных при формировании списка избирателей, а также используется в других информационных системах Службы.

Во исполнение Решений №3 Национального совета по устойчивому развитию Кыргызской Республики от 27 октября 2014 года, Службой выполнена большая работа по подготовке и проведению выборов в Жогорку Кенеш Кыргызской Республики с использованием биометрических данных граждан Кыргызской Республики.

По состоянию на 26 сентября 2015 года число граждан, сдавших свои биометрические данные, составило 2 849 542, из них 2 761 297 включены в списки избирателей.

Работы по приему заявлений на внесение дополнений и изменений в списки избирателей Кыргызской Республики, представленные Центральной избирательной комиссией по выборам и проведению референдумов Кыргызской Республики (далее - ЦИК) завершены в срок и сформированные окончательные списки избирателей в соответствии с границами избирательного участка 26 сентября переданы Актом в ЦИК.

Для проведения предстоящих выборов, впервые в истории нашей страны было принято решение использовать новые технологии на основе биометрических данных, существенно ограничивающие риски фальсификаций и злоупотреблений в избирательном процессе. Основной принцип выборов **«один избиратель - один голос»** и список избирателей, сформированный на основе биометрической регистрации.

В мае 2015 года база избирателей ЦИК в количестве 2 633 420 записей была передана Службе для проведения сверки и присвоения соответствующих избирательных участков избирателям.

При сверке основного списка избирателей предоставленного ЦИК с базами данных Службы отсутствовали 800 тысяч граждан, которые присутствовали в списках Службы сформированных на базе биометрических данных, в связи с чем, были проведены мероприятия по уточнению списков избирателей совместно с представителями органов местного самоуправления.

В целях оперативного решения ситуация по формированию списков избирателей Правительством Кыргызской Республики было принято решение о привлечении ресурсов ЦИК на районном уровне, органов местного самоуправления и Службы для проверки правильности присвоения избирательных участков избирателям.

Выявлены 4 441 граждан без точных адресов (0,02% от всего количества избирателей). При сдаче биометрических данных эти граждане не указали точный адрес, только название города или район. Для решения данной проблемы совместно с системными администраторами ЦИК на местах проведена работа по распределению данных лиц по избирательным участкам.

При уточнении списков избирателей предоставленных ЦИК с данными системы ЗАГС о смерти идентифицировано - 6 245 записей, которые исключены по причине смерти граждан.

Также при обработке биометрических данных выявлено 667 персональных идентификационных номеров (ПИН) которые имеются у двух и более граждан.

Службой совместно с Социальным фондом проводятся работы по уточнению и сокращению количества граждан имеющих одинаковые ПИН. Службой подготовлен и передан в Социальный фонд список граждан, прошедших биометрическую регистрацию и имеющих одинаковый ПИН. Социальным фондом ведутся работы по обеспечению граждан удостоверениями социальной защиты с правильным ПИН.

В тоже время основой формирования списков избирателей являются биометрические данные граждан, и они уникальны, поэтому все граждане прошедшие биометрическую регистрацию включены в списки избирателей.

В случае не прохождения идентификации избирателя по пальцам использовалась идентификация по ПИН. При сравнении количества избирателей, разница между списком избирателей ЦИК и новым списков сформированных на основе биометрической регистрации, составила 124 412 избирателей и в процентном соотношении больше на 4,7 % то есть на 124 412 избирателей в списке Службы больше чем в списке ЦИК.

Количество новых избирателей, ранее никогда не включенных в базу данных ЦИК составило 909 718 человек. Это составляет 33% от общего числа избирателей, т.е. одна треть.

Таким образом, сформированный на базе ЕГРН и биометрических данных граждан, список избирателей является наиболее полным и актуальным на момент проведения выборов в Жогорку Кенеш Кыргызской Республики.

Процесс сверки и уточнения списков избирателей достаточно трудоёмкий, так как по республике отмечалась активная внутренняя и внешняя миграция граждан. При

этом учитывались данные граждан по адресу паспорта и наличию биометрической регистрации для включения в список избирателей.

Так, в дополнительные избирательные участки в г. Бишкек было включено 79 195 избирателей и г.Ош 27 157 избирателей, общее количество по дополнительным участкам составило 106 352 избирателей, подавших заявлений по форме №2.

По данным МИД за границей официально находится более 130 909 граждан, при этом при проведении прошлых выборов за границей в списках избирателей значилось 31 141 избирателей, из которых в голосовании приняло участие порядка 6 000 избирателей. В настоящее время количество граждан сдавших биометрические данные составляет около 16 000 граждан, из которых в списки включены 15 312.

В период с 27 июля по 10 августа 2015 года системы «Учёта и управления списками избирателей, идентификации личности избирателя по отпечатку пальца» прошли пилотную апробацию по всей республике. Пилотное тестирование включало комплексную апробацию комплекта оборудования, состоящего из ноутбука, сканера отпечатков пальцев и принтера чеков, и информационной системы идентификации избирателей по персональным и биометрическим данным.

В тестировании системы по первому этапу приняли участие порядка 167 тыс. избирателей в 2 048 избирательных участках по всей республике. Порядка 5,9% от всего количества избирателей не смогли пройти идентификацию по причине их отсутствия в базе, порядка 4,4% не смогли идентифицироваться по отпечатку пальцев.

В тестировании системы по второму этапу приняли участие порядка 880 тыс. избирателей в 2 276 избирательных участках по всей республике. Из которых 9,9% не смогли пройти идентификацию по причине их отсутствия в базе, порядка 25,06% не смогли идентифицироваться по отпечатку пальцев, но прошли идентификацию по ПИН.

При тестировании избирательного процесса не все собранные биометрические данные были загружены и обработаны на центральном уровне. В связи с этим избиратели не смогли пройти идентификацию по причине их отсутствия в базе.

На сегодняшний день проблемы, возникшие в ходе тестирования информационных систем учёта и управления списками избирателей, идентификации личности избирателя по отпечатку пальца учтены и внесены соответствующие изменения.

Также, Службой создан Колл-центр для обращения граждан, в который можно звонить на короткий номер 119. В Колл-центре граждане могут получить информацию о включении себя в список избирателей, о процедуре голосования, о возможности голосования в случае изменения избирательного адреса, о пунктах приёма биометрических данных и др. Звонок бесплатный для всех операторов сотовой связи. Колл-центр работает без выходных.

Проведена разъяснительная работа в средствах массовой информации, на телевидении, радио и в сети интернет среди избирателей о преимуществах

использования биометрических данных, математически считывающих урн для проведения честных и справедливых выборов.

Для обеспечения доступа к актуальным спискам избирателей и проверки статуса включения в списки избирателей, в том числе биометрической регистрации, Службой запущен Портал http://shailoo.srs.kg, где граждане могут проверить свой статус прохождения биометрической регистрации и принадлежность к избирательному участку.

Службой проведены технические и организационные меры по бесперебойной и слаженной работе оборудования и лиц, задействованных в

избирательном процессе, а также обеспечению безопасности и сохранности используемых систем в день выборов.

Мероприятия по подготовке к выборам 2015 года велись круглосуточно и без выходных дней. Сотрудниками выполнялись ряд технических работ, связанных с подготовкой и отправкой оборудования для процесса идентификации избирателей в день выборов.

Впервые в истории страны парламентские выборы 4 октября 2015 года прошли с применением биометрических технологий идентификации граждан и автоматических считывающих урн для голосования и подсчета голосов избирателей.

В день выборов в республике работали **2 тысячи 338** избирательных участков и **36** за рубежом. По республике были задействованы 9 884 оператора и **5 801** комплект по верификации избирателей, сдавших биометрические данные.

На парламентских выборах проголосовали по данным на 18:00 5 октября **1 млн 600 тыс. 104** человека, что приблизительно составляет **57,94 %** от общего числа прошедших биометрическую регистрацию (2 млн 761 тыс. 297 человек).

По данным МИД Кыргызстана, за рубежом на выборах депутатов Жогорку Кенеша КР проголосовало всего **2 тысячи 570** кыргызстанцев или **17 %** от общего количества включенных в списки избирателей.

Отчет подготовлен:

Заместитель директора ГП «Инфоком» при Государственной регистрационной службе при Правительстве Кыргызской Республики
07.04.2016 Мамбеталиев А.

XII. IVXV: fresh wave of Estonian internet voting, by Mr Priit Vinkel, Head of Elections Department, National Electoral Committee, Estonia

Annotation
This paper gives an integrated overview of the technical and organisational aspects of the framework of electronic voting („IVXV"), and the implementation of the framework at the national elections in Estonia. It is meant for the general public and does not require any detailed technical preliminary knowledge from the reader. For more detailed requirements and descriptions, see the technical source documents. This paper gives a general description of the system; implementation of the system in Estonia is discussed in the appropriately marked sections.

1) Introduction

In this paper, electronic voting (e-voting) denotes the method of voting where the voter gives their vote **from a computer via the Internet**. This method of voting may also be called 'i-voting' in order to make a distinction from other methods of voting using information technology, like the use of electronic voting machines, in the international context.

The i-voting framework described here is universal and can be applied in different types of elections. This paper focuses on the national elections (the Riigikogu elections, the local government councils' elections and the European Parliament elections) and referendums held in Estonia. Therefore, besides the description of the general framework, the circumstances arising from the Acts of Estonia and their implementation acts are explained in the text below.

This paper:

- defines the scope of the i-voting system, that is, delimits the role of i-voting in the whole voting process;
- summarises the requirements for the i-voting system;
- defines the parties of the system and describes their activities;
- describes the principal processes of i-voting;
- gives an overview of the possibilities of checking the correctness of the system and its compliance with the basic requirements.

This paper does not aim to define the specific security level of the system components, data structures, software and hardware platforms used, or the detailed technological structure.

When reading the paper, it should be taken into account that the amount of detail increases gradually so that the issues described generally at the beginning may be explained in more detail further on.

In Estonia

I-voting has been used in Estonia since 2005. Each person who has the right to vote in Estonia can cast their vote in a secure way via the Internet at the elections and referendums, because:

- there is a legal basis for the use of digital signature, and all Acts concerning elections provide for a legal basis for the conducting of i-voting;
- most of the persons who have the right to vote possess an ID card that enables secure electronic identification and giving digital signature; many people also

have an additional legally backed electronic ID document, like Digi-ID or Mobile-ID.

2) Scope of the i-voting system

I-voting is a part of the voting process. Elections consist of the following principal stages:

- declaration of elections;
- registration of candidates;
- preparation of lists of voters;
- voting;
- counting of votes;
- announcement of election results.

The i-voting system partially covers only the three last stages, i.e. the voting via the Internet, the counting of votes and, after the announcement of election results, the destruction of the key necessary for counting the i-votes.

Prerequisites for the i-voting system are that:

3) the lists of voters (with the polling division and electoral district linked to the voter) have been prepared and are available in a suitable format;
4) the lists of candidates (by electoral districts) have been prepared and are available in a suitable format;
5) i-votes are counted separately, and the results are later added to the results of the counting of paper votes, keeping in mind that the votes of one person (the electronic vote and the paper vote) are not counted twice.



Figure 1. Scope of i-voting

6) Principal requirements for i-voting

I-voting must adhere to all Acts concerning elections and must follow all election principles, and be at least as secure as regular voting. Thus, i-voting has to be uniform and secret, only the persons who have the right to vote may (i-)vote, every person has one vote, and it must be impossible for voters to prove for whom they cast their vote.
The main difference between i-voting and voting with paper ballot is that the voter can vote repeatedly electronically; only the last vote cast is counted. This principle enables to

protect i-voters against coercion. A coerced voter can vote again after becoming free from coercer, invalidating the vote cast under pressure.

I-voting takes place before the election day, during the period specified by law. If something unexpected happens to the i-voting system (large-scale attack, serious software error, etc.), the organiser of the election may annul a part or all of the i-votes in extreme cases. In such a case those who i-voted can vote again at the polling station.

If advance voting at polling stations takes place at the same time as i-voting (**parallel voting**), then it may happen that a voter votes in two ways. In that case, only the paper vote is counted, and all i-votes of the voter are annulled. This principle also protects the voters against coercion.

Another important requirement of i-voting is the use of digital signature. The voter has to confirm their choice with a legally accepted **digital signature**. Compliance with the provisions of the Digital Signatures Act ensures the fulfilment of the main security requirement of i-voting – secure personal identification of voters.

The voter must have the possibility to **verify** whether their i-vote has arrived safely. This can be done with the help of a separate smart device (mobile phone, tablet). A device different from the computer used for i-voting should be used for checking the arrival of i-vote. In this way it is possible to increase the probability of detection of attacks (primarily against the voter's computer) directed against the i-voting system.

When building up an i-voting system, its *auditability* must additionally be taken into account – the system must be technically sufficiently simple so that a widest possible range of specialists could audit it.

In Estonia

In Estonia, i-voting takes place during seven days, and it starts ten days before the election day. Parallel voting is used. Identity document (ID card), Mobile-ID, and digital identity document (Digi-ID) can be used as tools for giving digital signature. Starting from 2015, the organiser of the election is required to provide the voter with the possibility to check the integrity of the recorded vote.

7) Envelope Scheme

I-voting system is based on so-called "envelope scheme", which is known from voting by paper mail, where an anonymous closed envelope with the vote is placed into an outer envelope with the voter's name and signature. With the help of the programme used for i-voting (so-called *Voter Application*), the i-voter:

1) encrypts the vote and the random number generated by the computer with the elections-specific public key, forming the "inner envelope";
2) signs the encrypted vote by using a digital signature tool, forming the "outer envelope".

A vote encrypted with the public key can be decrypted only with the private key.



Figure 2. Envelope Scheme

Encrypted and signed votes are collected and sorted, the eligibility of voters is checked, and repeated i-votes and the i-votes of the persons who also voted at a polling station during advance voting are removed.
Before the counting of i-votes they are sorted by electoral districts, the list of i-voters is compiled, and then the digital signatures are removed.
During the counting of votes, anonymous and mixed votes are decrypted with the elections-specific private key, and the summarised results of i-voting are issued.

8) Stages of i-voting

Organisationally, i-voting can be divided into four stages.

1. During the **pre-voting stage**, the system is set ready for use, which includes the following:

- lists of electoral districts, polling stations, candidates and voters are prepared;
- public and private keys for votes are created for each voting;
- the voter application, the individual verification application, and relevant instruction materials are published. Data necessary for verifying their authenticity and integrity are published in a separate information channel.

2. During the **voting stage**, i-voting takes place. In case of parallel voting, it is also possible to vote at polling stations.

3. During the **processing stage**:

- the integrity and authenticity (digital signature) of i-votes is checked, and whether all i-votes that have been cast still exist is checked;
- the votes are sorted, and the repeated i-votes of one and the same person are annulled;
- in case of parallel voting, the lists of i-voters are drawn up for each polling station. Polling station committees identify the voters who have voted both

electronically and at the polling station, and prepare lists of them for annulling their i-votes;

- the i-votes of persons who cast double votes are annulled, and the votes that go to counting are anonymised.

4. In the counting stage, the anonymised votes opened with the private key and added up to ascertain the voting result.

In Estonia

In Estonia, i-voting is opened ten days before the election day, on Thursday at 9 a.m., and closed four days before the election day, that is, on Wednesday of the election day week at 6 p.m. It is possible to vote round the clock via the website www.valimised.ee.

Possible changes in the list of voters are entered in the i-voting system at least once every twenty four hours according to the data received from the Population Register.

Parallel voting takes place, the list of i-voters is sent to the polling station committees via the county electoral committees; the i-votes of the persons who cast double votes are annulled just before the counting of i-votes.

The results of i-voting must not be published before the time provided for by law.

9) Parties and components of the system

The most important role in i-voting belongs to the **Organiser** who appoints the persons for all other roles. Generally, the Organiser also holds the fundamental secret of the i-voting system, i.e. the private key, and thus performs also the role of the opener and adder-up of the votes, that is, the role of the **Tallier**.



Figure 3. The principal parties of the i-voting system

The principal parties of the system and their actions are the following:

- The **Voter** makes their choice with the help of the Voter Application in the computer, encrypts it, signs it digitally and sends their choice to the Collector. The Voter can check if his choice arrived intact with the help of a separate smart device.

- The **Collector** is a server system that helps the Voter to form the i-vote (issues the list of candidates to the Voter, helps with digital signature) and accepts i-votes. The Collector also answers verification queries on the integrity of the vote,

made by the Voter. The provider of collection service digitally signs the data (i-votes and logs) handed over to the Processor at the end of the voting period.

- The **Processor** processes the i-votes collected during the voting period, and among other things:
  - verifies the digital signatures and the integrity of the data received from the Collector;
  - annuls repeated i-votes and, in the case of parallel voting, also the i-votes of those who voted at a polling station during advance voting;
  - sorts the i-votes by electoral districts and anonymises them by removing personal digital signatures from them;
  - mixes anonymised votes in an appropriate way and sends them to counting. This can also be regarded as a sub-role; in such a case, the performer of the role is called the **Mixer**.

- The role of the **Tallier** is performed by the Organiser, who holds the private key. The Tallier opens the anonymised and mixed votes and adds them up as the results of i-voting.

In addition to the principal parties, the system has the following parties.

- The **Auditor** checks the integrity and completeness of the data published by the Organiser of the system, as well as the data moving between the principal parties.

- The **Client Desk** is the party whom the Voter contacts in case of problems. The Client Desk helps the Voter with the information received from the Collection Service, and registers all the received questions and their solutions in its database.

- The **compiler and updater of the list of voters** compiles the lists of persons with the right to vote depending on how the elections are organised. The list may change during the voting period.

Important external services are the following.

- The **Identification Service** is used to identify the Voter, if necessary.

- The **Signature Service** depends on the signature tool. It helps the Voter in the signing and the obtaining of the validity confirmation for a digital signature.

- With the help of the **Registration Service**, the Collector registers all the votes received from the Voters. After the end of the voting period, the service provider forwards all the registrations to the Processor.

To fulfil these roles, tools are needed that the performers of the roles use in their procedures. The software components of the system are defined in what follows.

- The **Voter Application** runs in the computer of the Voter, communicates with the Collector, and allows the Voter to make their choice, to encrypt it, and to sign it digitally. The Voter Application displays a QR code on the basis of which the

Voter can check with the Verification Application whether his i-vote has reached the Collector correctly.

- The **Verification Application** allows the Voter to check on a smart device platform that his i-vote has reached the Collector and has expressed his wish correctly. The device used for checking is different from the device used for voting.

- The **Key Application** is the main tool of the Organiser. It is used to generate a public and a private key for every voting. The Key Application is also used to count the votes and issue the results.

- The **Collection Service** is the central component of the system, operated by the Collector. The Service assists the Voter in composing an i-vote, and registers it before saving it into the i-ballot box. The Collection Service uses external services (identification, signing, registration). The Collection Service has other administrators besides the Collector itself (Organiser, Client Desk), and the Collection Service has separate administration interfaces for them.

- The **Processing Application** is the main tool of the Processor. It is used to check the individual integrity of votes and the integrity of the i-ballot box, to annul votes, to compile lists of persons who voted and lists of anonymised votes grouped by electoral districts. The Collector, the Registration Service and the Organiser provide the input for the Processing Application. The Processing Application can also be operated by the Auditor to check the results of the work of the Processor.

- The **Mixing Application** is a tool for the Processor or the Mixer. Its input consists in the anonymised encrypted votes grouped by electoral districts, and it issues the mixed votes in such a way that they cannot be linked back to the input. Mixing must be carried out in such a manner that the decrypting and tallying of both input and output votes give the same result. In addition, the Mixing Application issues a *mix-proof*.

- The **Audit Application** is a tool for the Auditor. It allows to check the correctness of the work of the Counter and the Mixer. The correctness of the work of the Counter can also be checked publicly.

10) Main Processes

This chapter describes the actions of the parties of the system, explaining the general functionality of the system components and the general requirements for the external parties of the system.

Key management

The key management procedures and the security scheme used are among the most crucial parts of the i-voting system. They are instrumental for the fulfilment of the main requirements of the elections – the secrecy and correctness of voting, and the independence of the Voter.

Secrecy is guaranteed by encrypting the votes with asymmetric cryptography tools. For every voting, the key pair of the system – a public key (encryption key) and a private key (decryption key) is created with the help of the Key Application.

The Voter Application uses the public key of the votes to encrypt votes. The private key is used in the Key Application to decrypt votes. After the voting results have been announced, the private key is exterminated.

The generation of the key pair and the use of the private key are organised by several *keyholders* together. The number and list of keyholders is determined under the established rules. The private key can only be activated if the previously agreed number of keyholders are present. Keyholders receive physical and knowledge-based **keyshares** (e.g. chip card and password) to activate the private key.

Actions of key management, including the generation of the key pair and the passwords, the keeping and duplicating of the private key, and its use in the Key Application are audited by the Auditor.

Voter identification

Identification of the Voter by the Collector is necessary for the preliminary check of the right to vote, as well as for obtaining the list of the candidates of the electoral district. A Voter can be identified by asking them to submit their personal identification code; however, it is more expedient[1] to request identification by an authentication tool.

The Collector supports a variety of authentication methods that the Voter can choose from depending on the authentication credentials at his disposal. These credentials can be simply knowledge-based (user name/password, PIN); however, stronger identification security is ensured by a physical authentication token (e.g. chip card, SIM-card, etc.) combined with a knowledge-based PIN.

Depending on the authentication method used at the elections, it might be pertinent to involve the external Identification Service which either confirms the validity of the authentication tool used (Validity Service) or asks the Voter for an authentication credentials. The Voter Application and the Collection Service serve as mediators between the Voter and the Identification Service in a suitable manner. As a result of the process, the Collection Service learns the identity of the Voter.

Admissible authentication credentials and the corresponding Identification Services are determined by the Organiser.

Signing of votes

The Voter signs the encrypted vote to ensure its authenticity and integrity. The personal identity proven by the digital signature is the basis for taking the i-vote into account. This means that the identity determined in the identification of the Voter is not taken into account during the further handling of the digitally signed vote.

To give a digital signature, the Voter uses a signature tool which is a combination of the physical (e.g. chip card, SIM card) and the knowledge-based (PIN) parts.

1 An electronic authentication tool is usually linked to a signature tool in the same data carrier (ID card). In such a case, it is expedient to use the same data carrier for both purposes.

The creation of a digital signature consists of the following:

- creating of a cryptographic signature with the private key contained in the signature tool of the Voter – the Voter uses a relevant PIN-code for that. The Voter Application checks the integrity of the signature created;

- obtaining a validity confirmation that proves the validity of the certificate corresponding to the private key used in creating the signature. The query for and reply to validity confirmation can also include the message digest of the signature created.

The manner in which the Voter Application and the Collection Service use the Signature Service depends on the signature tool used. One part of the Signature Service – validity confirmation service – must always be used.

As a result of the process, the Collection Service forms a digital signature containing the Voter's signature, his certificate, and the validity confirmation of the signature.

The signature tools used and the corresponding Signature Services are determined by the Organiser on the basis of the legislation concerning digital signature.

Registration of votes

All the i-votes sent to the Collector must be registered. The Registration Service is an independent party that registers and confirms every encrypted vote (message digest of thereof) forwarded by the Collection Service, and produces a *time-mark* by adding time value to it.

The Registration Service securely identifies all the queries by the Collector. After the end of the voting, the Registration Service hands all the time-marks over to the Processor.
The Registration Service can be combined with a validity confirmation service used to create a digital signature.

The Organiser chooses the provider of the Registration Service, keeping in mind that the Service must meet the requirements for the provision of trust services within the meaning of Chapter 3 of eIDAS[2].

Voting and vote verification

A Voter uses the Voter Application installed on their computer for voting. The Application communicates with the Collection Service. The Collection Service makes use of the list of voters, the list of candidates, and the list of electoral districts and polling stations. The Collection Service may use the Identification Service to identify the Voter; the Collection Service assists the Voter in digitally signing the encrypted vote by using an external Signature Service. The Collection Service registers the digitally signed vote at the Registration Service. The Voter Application notifies the Voter of the successful recording of the vote by issuing a relevant QR code.

2 Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ET/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0910

To check the vote, the Voter uses the Verification Application downloaded to his smart device. This application also communicates with the Collection Service. The Verification Application receives data necessary for its work from the Voter Application by reading the QR code with the help of the camera of the smart device. The Verification Application notifies the Voter of his choice recorded in the Collection Service.



Figure 4. Voting services and components

The Voter downloads the Voter Application from the web page managed by the Organiser. The Verification Application can be installed on a smart device via the relevant application store, and the installation instructions are also available on the web page. The authenticity and integrity of the web page as well as the Voter Application and the Individual Verification Application can be checked with the help of the data that the Organiser has securely published.

Voting takes place in two stages: the identification and the voting stage.

In the **identification stage**, the Voter is identified, and voting options are sent to the Voter. The following actions take place in this stage.

1. The Voter chooses a convenient authentication tool.
2. The Voter Application contacts the Collection Service using a secure data communication protocol. The Voter is identified with the help of the authentication tool chosen. The Collection Service uses the Identification Service if needed.
3. The Collection Service checks whether the Voter has already i-voted. If the answer is positive, the Voter is notified, and he may nevertheless continue and cast a new vote replacing the prior one.

4. The Collection Service identifies eligibility of the Voter as well as his electoral district. If the Voter does not have the right to vote, an error message is displayed.
5. List of candidates standing in the electoral district of the Voter (or choices for the referendum question) is sent by the Collection Service to the Voter Application.



Figure 5. Identification of the Voter

The identification stage is followed by the voting stage, unless the Voter interrupts the voting. The voting stage proceeds as follows.

1. The Voter makes their choice among the candidates displayed. The Voter Application encrypts voter's choice along with a *random number* with the help of the public key.
2. The Voter signs his encrypted vote according to section 0 and sends it to the Collection Service along with his certificate. The Collection Service checks for existence of the Voter in the list of voters, and appends the vote with a validity confirmation.
3. The encrypted and signed vote must be registered. For that, the Collection Service uses a separate Registration Service or reuses the time-mark within the validity confirmation if applicable.
4. The Collection Service notifies the Voter via the Voter Application that his vote has been successfully received and recorded. A QR code is issued to the Voter, that includes the *random number* used in the encryption, as well as the one-off *vote identifier* generated by the Collection Service in the registration of the vote.



Figure 6. Voting stage: dispatching the vote

In the **verification phase**, the Voter can make sure that his vote has integrally arrived the i-ballot box of the Collector, by using a separate smart device. The smart device must have a camera and Internet connection, and the Verification Application must be installed into it configured with parameters and trust anchors necessary to carry out the verification.

The arrival of the vote is checked as follows:

1. The Voter starts the Verification Application and scans the QR-code displayed by the Voter Application.
2. The Individual Verification Application makes a query concerning the i-vote from the Collecting Service by using the *vote identifier* contained in the QR-code to identify the vote. The Collection Service returns the i-vote Together with the i-vote, the Collecting Service sends the list of candidates options to the Voter.
3. The Verification Application checks the authenticity of the Collection Service, the digital signature of the vote, and the time-mark therein received upon registration.
4. Knowing the *random number* used in the encryption of the vote, and the public key, the Verification Application calculates a cryptogram for every candidate.
5. The Verification Application displays the number and/or the name of the candidate whose calculated cryptogram corresponds to the cryptogram contained in the i-vote.



Figure 7. Vote verification

The arrival of the vote can be checked for a certain number of times for a limited period. Limits are established by the Organiser.

After the end of the voting period, the Collector gathers the votes collected in the i-ballot box into a set, and signs them digitally. The signed set of votes is forwarded to the Processor. The technical logs created in the voting process are given to the Organiser who may use the help of the Auditor to check them.

The provider of the Registration Service gives to the Processor all time-marks, attaching a digital signature to them.

Processing of votes

The processing of votes takes place after the end of the voting period and before the counting of votes. Stages of processing are performed by the Processor. Final stage – mixing – may also be performed by a separate party: the Mixer. The Processor signs the results of all stages. The processing of votes is carried out in an off-line environment.



Figure 8. Stages of vote processing

The stages of processing are the following:

I stage: checking of the integrity of the i-ballot box

1. The Processor checks the digital signature of every individual vote, and the existence of the time-mark therein in the information received from the Registration Service.
2. The Processor checks the existence of all time-marks received from the Registration Service in the set of votes.

The result of the stage is the votes of the i-ballot box for which matches are found in the data set received from the Registration Service. At the end of this stage, digital signatures may be removed from the votes, integrally preserving the connection between the encrypted vote, the person who cast it, and the time of casting the vote.

II stage: annulment of recurring i-votes

Recurring votes cast by the voter are removed, preserving only one, the last i-vote. At the end of the stage, the time of giving the vote may be removed, preserving the connection between the encrypted vote and the person who cast it.

In the event of parallel voting, a list of persons who have i-voted, sorted by polling stations, is drawn up by the end of the stage, and it is sent to polling stations for identification of double voting (i-vote and paper vote). On the basis of the double votes identified, an *annulment list* is drawn up of persons whose i-vote is to be annulled. The Organiser signs the list.

III stage: annulment of the i-votes of persons who cast double votes (only in the event of parallel voting)

I-votes are removed from Voters whose name appears on the *annulment list*.

Unique personalised i-votes remain. Before they are counted, they must be anonymised, preserving the connection between the vote and the electoral district.

IV stage: anonymisation of i-votes

1. The Processor groups i-votes by electoral districts.
2. The Processor removes personal data from i-votes.

The result of the stage is anonymous i-votes grouped by electoral districts (encrypted votes).
In order for the counting of votes to be publicly verifiable, cryptographic mixing can be used.

V stage (optional): mixing

The Processor (or the Mixer authorised therefor) mixes anonymous i-votes grouped by electoral districts, using the Mixing Application. Mixing consists of random shuffling and cryptographic re-encryption of votes. A precondition for using the latter technique is the use of a homomorphic cryptosystem in the encrypting of votes. Mixing must be carried out so that the decryption of both the input and the output would give the same result. As a side-result of the process, a mix-proof is issued which can be used, with the help of the Audit Application, to prove the correctness of the process.

Both mixed and unmixed votes may be sent to counting. If the Organiser wishes to prove the correctness of the use of the private key in his or her possession in the counting process, it is necessary to also go through the mixing stage.

Counting of votes

Votes are opened and counted with the help of the Key Application in an off-line environment. Counting is organised by the Tallier together with the keyholders between whom the private key has been distributed.

1. Both the list of candidates and the list of electoral districts are loaded into the Key Application.
2. Anonymised (and mixed) votes are loaded into the Key Application.
3. To activate the private key, the keyholders use the keyshares distributed to them in the course of the generation of the key pair.
4. Votes are decrypted. If, as a result of the decryption of the votes, it appears that the candidate is not listed among the candidates standing as candidates in the relevant electoral district, the vote is deemed invalid.
5. Eligible votes are summed by candidates and electoral districts. The counting process also issues a zero-knowledge *tally-proof*[3], which can be used to prove the correctness of the opening of votes.
6. At the end of the process, the private key is deactivated.

3 To produce a proof, a specific homomorphic cryptosystem shall be used in the encrypting of votes.

The Auditor monitors the process. The tally-proof allows to verify the mathematical correctness of the process with the help of the Audit Application. If the votes that went to counting were mixed, the correctness of the counting can also be verified publicly.
The Tallier signs the results of the counting digitally.

11) Security and auditing

The i-voting system described in this document ensures full compliance with the basic requirements for elections and, in addition, is **end-to end verifiable**: the input and output of all processes can be verified mathematically.

Upon application, the security of the system depends on the usage environment, the quality of the information technology system, the correctness of following procedures, etc.

Cryptographic security

In terms of cryptography, the i-voting system is exceptional as the majority of the security characteristics of the votes collected in a voting must be preserved only until final election results are announced, which generally is 30 days after the election day. Thereafter the private key is exterminated, and the personalised and encrypted votes become unusable.

At the same time, a theoretical risk remains that someone is able to copy personalised i-votes from the system and attempts to guess the private key over time, by using remarkable computer resources over a long period of time.

When choosing the crypto algorithm for encryption of votes and the length of the key, the Organiser must take account of the abovementioned risk, and must rely on up-to-date studies on the security of crypto algorithms.

When choosing the digital signature methods and tools, reliance on everyday practice is sufficient, keeping in mind that the signature tools should be in use also in other important spheres of life.

Compliance with basic requirements

The **secrecy of voting** is ensured with encryption of the vote by the Voter. An asymmetric crypto algorithm is used, so that votes encrypted with the public key cannot be decrypted with the same key. Adding a random number to the vote is directly necessary to ensure the secrecy of the votes, in order that the cryptograms of the votes cast for the same candidate were different.

For decryption, the private key is needed, but it cannot be used before the process of counting of votes. The Tallier decrypts only anonymous votes, from which personal data have been removed. To activate the private key, cooperation of several keyholders is needed.

The system described supports repeated voting, i.e. the Voter can vote repeatedly, and only the last cast vote is taken into account. Thus the time of the last cast vote represents certain voting secret. For example, in the event of malevolent influencing of a voter or an attempt to buy a vote, the persons who know the time of the last voting of the Voter would have the possibility to check if such vote was taken into account in the

counting. Therefore, the circle of persons who have contact with the personalised votes (Collector, Processor, Auditor, Registration Service, Signature Service) must be contained.

The **correctness of voting** (taking into account the right to vote, “one person – one vote” principle) is ensured by personal identification of the Voter with the help of a secure and widely used signing tool.

The **independence of the Voter** (safeguarding the free will) is ensured with the possibility of repeated voting, i.e., a person who has voted under pressure can vote again after becoming free of the pressure, by invalidating the earlier votes cast under pressure. In addition, the Voter can vote at a polling station during advance voting, as a result of which all i-votes cast by the Voter are annulled.

Verifiability

I-voting consists of several basic processes which are described in Chapter 7. The processes can be verified by mathematically checking the concordance between the input and output of the process. Depending on the party who carries out verification, verification is:

a) individual – checking is carried out by the Voter,
b) delegated – checking is carried out by the Auditor,
c) public/universal – checking can be carried out by all who are interested.

The Voter can individually verify the arrival of his or her personal vote in the i-ballot box of the Collector, and the registration of the vote at the Registration Service.

The Auditor can, by repeating the processes, verify all the processes of the Processor and the Counter, with the exception of mixing and counting. For the latter, the Auditor uses the special proof issued by these processes, and the Audit Application.

If the anonymised votes were additionally mixed before counting, it is possible to also disclose the cryptograms that went to counting, and it is possible to verify the work of the Tallier in a public manner by using the relevant auxiliary tools and data.

Auditing and observation

The Auditor is the party appointed by the Organiser who carries out process and data audits to check the integrity of the system. On the same bases with the Auditor, observers can also carry out similar checking procedures on a voluntary basis.

The Auditor and observers handle personalised encrypted votes, one component of which is the time of casting the vote. It is possible for them to track the fact and time of voting by the Voter. These data may not be copied or used for other purposes than audit in an environment controlled by the Organiser.

Process audits are applied to acts that are connected with the private key. These acts are carried out with the Key Application, with the exception of extermination of the private key (rendering it unusable).

Data audits are used to check the mutual concordance between the input and the output of processes, and the integrity and authenticity of the data signed digitally in the course of the processes. The main inputs and outputs of processes are the following:

- The input of the Collector: lists of voters, electoral districts and polling stations, the authentication and signature tools used, public key, and the parameters of the crypto algorithm used;
- The output of the Collector: votes collected into the i-ballot box;
- The output of the Registration Service: time-marks issued to the Collector;
- The outputs from the work stages of the Processor: checking of the integrity of the i-ballot box, annulment of repeated votes, anonymisation of votes, mixing;
- The output of the counting process: voting results.

In the course of data audit, the Auditor checks the integrity of the i-ballot box, and the correctness of the annulment of repeated votes and of the anonymisation of votes, by repeating the process with their tool that behaves in the same way as the Processing Application.

To verify the mixing and counting, the Auditor uses the mixing or tallying proof, in addition to the input and output. Mutual concordance between these data sets is checked with the help of the Audit Application; the Auditor is responsible for ensuring the reliability thereof.

XIII. Monitoring media and social media, moderated by Ms Katharine Sarikakis, Professor in political processes and political economic dimensions of media and communications governance, University of Vienna, Austria

A. Introduction

One of the most problematic stages in the cycle of elections was found to be the media campaign coverage (Norris 2014).

This working session focuses on the media and in particular social media in pre-electoral times and asks: what might be the role of social media in these times; should EMBs be interested in those; what is some of the scientific knowledge about social media and elections in relation to enhancing and securing democratic environments; what might be the connections between established i.e. traditional media and social media and elections?

Starting with the role of established media helps us move to the discussion on social media because:

a. a great deal of content circulated and re-distributed in social media derives from established media
b. social media user-generated content engages with media content either in a critical or positive manner to express political sentiments
c. the context within which social media are used and are permitted to function in societies is partly similar to the context and conditions that underpin established media.
d. Social media have not and will not – in the foreseeable future- replace established media, they rather compliment the diet of communicative spaces and information flows.

B. The role of (all) Media in pre-electoral periods

Historically, the role of the media in pre-electoral periods has ranged from 'simply' providing information about parties, candidates, political manifesta, the electoral process to the very shaping of public opinion through active shaping of representations of parties.

Broadcast and print media are in a position and are tasked with the mission to provide general information about the elections, provide access to representations of political views, actively construct and frame social issues as addresses by candidates, provide checks on the election system and the institutions surrounding the process and facilitate the expression of Q&A on behalf of voters through journalism.

For electoral integrity purposes, Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) are engaged in some form of media monitoring, either through systematic study of representation of elections and the EMB and/or careful observation without study of the media coverage or EMB and the election process.

This monitoring involves – or should involve- not only domestic but also international media. The importance of such monitoring is to:

i. identify international media sentiments toward national elections;
ii. contextualise possible political pressures on domestic election processes;

ii. acquire information about problems domestic media cannot report, in cases of troubled political systems.

The media are relied upon for further information and functions and in particular to identify issues related to electoral authorities; processes involving electoral management bodies; and the degree of electoral integrity. These functions are neither exclusive nor equally spread within the media institutions repertoire in the pre-electoral periods. Although in theory the expectations from and moral obligations of the media and journalism is to act as watchdogs on behalf of citizens by respecting the principles of objectivity, neutrality and critical disposition to power, this is rather a set of principles that may or may not correspond to the practice of media. The degree to which the media will adhere to these standards and maintain the principles of quality journalism depends on:

a. The existence of independent and sustainable Public Service Media
b. The broader media landscape of the country and relations of dependency between media, government, market actors
c. Media ownership patterns
d. The role of Media regulatory bodies
e. The role of Civil Society in holding media accountable
f. Freedom indices in the country, including press freedom and protection of journalists
g. Development indices, including gender equality

The above points refer predominantly to the familiar landscapes of established broadcast and print media. In the era of social media, which of these issues still hold true and what changes?

C. Social Media and Elections

The advent of social media and their role in political change across many regions in the world and especially in emerging and transitioning Democracies has stirred the interest of researchers, political actors, citizens, journalists and regulatory bodies.

For a start, all above points with regard the context and role of media in pre-electoral periods are also to be found in the context of social media. As far as the regulatory regimes surrounding social media are concerned, briefly, there is little established i.e. constitutional based protection of free speech for social media use, although, due to recent and sustained crackdowns on such media the Council of Europe has insisted on an adequate freedom campaign.

A core difference between a media landscape before the advent of social media and one after, is that both information and exchange of opinion reached citizens at slower pace and at a greater expense on resources i.e. time and financial resources. These two major changes meant that over the course of the adaptation of social media in our societies, political parties, governments and private companies are engaged also in a struggle to attract and keep the attention of citizens who are engaged actively in social media or who simply follow the flow of information and opinion.

It is important to not assume all social media are the same or similar, as their technological design and social uses are being transformed continuously and by competing populations: FB users are becoming older, former FB users are migrating to new social media, Twitter users are predominantly interested in politics and to share alternative view and sources of information, and so on.

Media and social media firmly belong to electoral cycle as objects of observation and for measuring electoral integrity, hence the debate about social media's place and role in elections has to be viewed systematically through the following issues, from the perspective of a free citizenry and its right to unbiased and objective media campaign coverage as well as exchange of opinion:

a. Free access to and use of social media
Recent cases of censorship and shut-downs of social media, persecution of citizens and journalists for expressing views or distributing critical content in several countries has been a worrying trend. Pre-electoral and post-electoral periods are especially vulnerable stages or public debate and for information regarding electoral integrity.

b. Monitoring of views on political opinion by State authorities, when combined with loss of privacy or punitive behaviour of authorities is a prohibitive factor to democratic elections. The loss of privacy and hence of voters' anonymity (with regard their likely voting behaviour) endangers free expression, affecting elections integrity.

c. In terms of predicting election results on the basis of social media activity, research tells us clearly that no conclusions can be drawn: prediction possibilities is rather inconclusive and contested.

d. There is some suggestion that engaging citizens by political candidates in social media may have an impact in preferential voting. The research derives largely from established and non-fragile democracies.

e. There is an ongoing – an increasing- 'struggle' on behalf of political parties eager to publicise their campaigns, by engaging citizens as micro-aggregators, in order to influence public opinion

f. An important function of social media is its agenda setting function, which may enhance established media agenda-setting or seek to undermine and promote an alternative one. In a recent referendum, the exposure (passive or active engagement) to social media coincided with the voting behaviour and final result. This needs to be seen in conjunction with the lack of trust in established media discourses and campaign coverage.

g. The question of trust in social media is an important one: citizens seem to refer to the importance of reliability of sources on social media, rather than "trust" per se. This means that a. citizens will engage with and will follow accounts and sources proven to provide reliable information, either individual accounts or those of organisations, such as Amnesty International and b. will intellectually connect reliability to established media outlets (either negatively or positively).
Citizens are not only used as micro-aggregators of information. They are also themselves active to influence political opinion and as information and other activists are interested in and motivated to enlighten the public and raise issues that neither politicians nor the media do.

h. Another issue is the use of technology to distort information flows and attract voters' attention: so called 'bombs" - twitter bombs and google bombs being the most recent examples - are used to alter impression of receivers forcing their attention. Social media companies actively intercept such activities, yet not before possibly thousands of users are affected.

i. Social media such as twitter and facebook are by definition international and real time media. Their reach and feedback loop functions are based on an international 'clock', meaning exchange of information and distribution takes place across borders, even when not in dominant languages. Social media reach diasporas directly and immediately, are translatable and translated, and they provide input from international spheres to domestic in real time.

j. The social media offer the possibility for direct response tools for activism, corrective action in cases of non transparent nominations of EMB and electoral Commission officers; establishing fraud or irregularities during election i.e. voting period and so on. They have been used in such manner in recent referenda.

Added to the issues above these questions emerge:

Should EMBs be engaged in systematic monitoring of social media? If yes, should they monitor citizens' debates and/or political campaigns?
Should EMB monitoring be focused on financial transparency only?
How can EMBs coordinate actions to regulate cross-border political campaigning? How can regulation support consistency and adherence to national laws, given the difference among countries?
What role should EMBs play in civic education in relation to social media? Furthermore, should EMBs be involved in the regulation of media and social media for civic education and civic information for the strengthening of transparency and trust?
Should EMBs be engaged in social media communication with citizens?
In the process of monitoring and evaluating media and social media, what can be the role of civil society and academia to support this process?
Should there be an enhanced collaboration between media regulatory authorities and EMBs in order to ensure a pluralistic environment for campaigning, debate, political participation and education?

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Concluding remarks

I. The discussion raised the issue that monitoring of social media and the role of social media in pre-electoral periods are matters of concern for most EMBs.
Challenges reported were mainly focused on

a. transparency of the financing of political campaign
b. adherence of social media to laws regarding pre-electoral and election day silence.

II. Some EMBs reported they already engage systematically with monitoring social media. It was felt that furthering the exchange of information and knowledge about ways to do so is necessary and desired.

III. The discussion pointed to the role of EMBs in enhancing and promoting participation of citizens in the election process. It was argued that the presence of EMBs can enhance civic education, participation and transparency.

IV. EMBs would require resources, from staff to know how and expertise in engaging with social media.

V. Public speech issues were raised and the role of EMBs was discussed in its role to take note of the increased hate speech observed in pre-electoral periods that can be directed against candidates but also against social groups. The protection of the freedom of expression was agreed that it is a paramount goal of institutions involved in elections. Yet also pluralism is important and a safe environment for the expression of opinion and debate.

VI. It was noted that enhanced collaboration between media regulatory bodies and EMBs might be beneficial for the protection of elections integrity.

THIRD PLENARY SESSION: NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON E-DAY AND DURING COUNTING PHASES

XIV. Verifiability – a new concept challenging or contributing to existing election paradigms? by Mr Robert Krimmer, Professor of e-Governance at Tallinn University of Technology, Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Estonia

Abstract
In this presentation a short motivation is given why it is important to look into the latest development around improving the security and transparency of electronic elections: Verifiability. After this a short overview of the roots and the main applications in the area of Internet voting is given. Finally some preliminary research questions are developed that should guide our future research on this topic.

Keywords: Verifiability, E-Voting, New Voting Technologies, Internet Voting

1. Introduction

In the municipal elections on 7 May 1989 the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) organized for the last time. While the electoral system in use didn't follow full democratic principles, but much rather were an administrative process where the goal of a polling stations election administration was to have the highest possible voter turnout and the highest approval rating for the unified party list. Actually, the voters also had no real choice, they could take the ballot paper and put it into the ballot box. But there was one way to make a real choice, by invalidating all candidates on the ballot paper. This was making the rounds and the civil society wanted to show that they are not satisfied with the ruling party by invalidating as many ballot papers as possible. Also, the voters were allowed to stay in the polling station to conduct a domestic election observation activity.

So they stayed and counted the number of invalidated votes. The election authorities, however, didn't report the correct number of invalidated votes (rather ameliorated numbers), and the voters in turn went on the streets a month later in what was known as the election fraud demonstrations. These demonstrations that proved how corrupt the system was.

Picture 1: Domestic Election Observation Effort During 7 May 1989 Municipal Elections in the German Democratic Republic

Picture 2: Demonstrations Against Electoral Fraud in June 1989 in the German Democratic Republic

This experience was a leading motive when the German Constitutional Court had to assess the appeal of a citizen against the 2005 *Bundstag* elections finally in March of 2009. Its ruling came a bit surprising, but was of revolutionary nature: it ruled that voting machines - without the possibility for the voters to count the votes without prior knowledge ("laymen") – were to be considered unconstitutional (and thereby demanded that voter-verifiable paper audit trails would have to be introduced) and that ended the story of e-voting in Germany (Federal Constitutional Court, 2009).

2. Verifiability

Elections are generally considered to be one of the essential elements of modern-day democracy in order to establish "the rule by the people." The procedures by which elections are held have evolved considerably over time and differ depending largely on the context in which they take place and the available technology. Over time, many different methods have been used, including casting votes by shouting, a show of hands, swords, stones, wax tablets, etc. Today, the predominant form of casting votes worldwide in order to participate in elections is to fill out a paper ballot (see, also Krimmer, 2012). Internationally accepted norms depicting the voting process such as the Int. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966) or the Copenhagen Document (OSCE, 1990) are used to establish what constitutes a democratic election. While these do not mention a preference for a particular form of casting a vote, it is clear that they have been developed and written with the paper-based voting process in mind.
The evolution of more-sophisticated voting technology than the paper ballot has its roots in the mid-19th century. This period saw the discussion of mechanical vote-casting devices, which was followed by proposals for electrified voting machines for parliaments.

The US can be considered the forerunner in adopting various forms of mechanical and electr(on)ic vote-casting and counting devices, including pull-lever machines, punch-card systems, direct-recording evoting machines or ballot scanners (Jones and Simons, 2012). Their adoption flourished due to the decentralised nature of US election administration and their decision-making processes (Harris, 1934).

All of these voting technologies have one inherent problem in common: The process from casting votes to counting votes is pretty much unobservable, due to the need to keep the voters' choices secret as well as the problem that one cannot touch bits and

bytes (Lenarčič, 2010). Despite some critical voices (Saltman, 1975, 1988), these technologies were nevertheless considered safe for a long time.

The US presidential elections of 2000, particularly in the state of Florida, changed this picture considerably. In the close presidential race between George W. Bush and Al Gore, the high failure rate of punch-card systems combined with the lack of a robust legal framework led to problems in trying to determine the "original voter intent" and a delayed determination of the election's outcome. Not only did this lead to a decline in the public's confidence in voting technology but also in the validity of calling the US the "greatest democracy on Earth." Contrary to expectations, the US invested even more heavily in voting technology, believing that the source of the problem was the choice of the wrong voting technology instead of a complete overhaul of the way the election administration, legal framework, and voting technology interact. (Saltman, 2006)

This debacle, however, gave impetus to cryptographic researchers who since the early 1980s had been trying to realize fully e-voting processes (Chaum, 1981, 1982). With computer systems, sharing of power is hard to realise. Early on, proposals included functionalities to allow for the public to check whether the election administration reported the results honestly and did not manipulate the elections. In paper-based elections, this can be verified by recounting the ballots. In e-elections, recounting the ballots does not necessarily result in greater confidence in the results, as long as the system being utilized for the count does not use a programming system different from the original tool. Hence, there was a need for a different method for checking the election administrators and of verifying their honest reporting of election results. The concept of verifiability by individual voters and the general public was born (Benaloh, 1987, Schoenmakers, 1998, 1999).

As one of the first, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) took up this development and defined "verifiability on an individual basis [… where] voters are provided with possibilities to verify that their vote was cast as intended, stored as cast, and (ideally) counted as recorded." On a universal (public) level, a voting technology with verifiability "provide[s] means for an independent third party to establish that the result of an election was reported honestly and without manipulation through either manual or mathematical checks" (OSCE/ODIHR, 2013).

With the transformation of transactions in the private and public sector through the general availability of the Internet in the 1990s, it seemed only a matter of time until elections too would be held via the Internet. A real race had begun to see which country would be the first to offer Internet voting (I-voting) to all its voters (Kubicek et al., 2002). Despite promising initial efforts in the US (Gibson, 2001) and Germany (Otten, 2001), it was Estonia that succeeded with a rather simple system in 2005 (Drechsler and Madise, 2004, Madise and Martens, 2006).

However, only a small number of countries followed suit to offer I-voting for first-order elections, including the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, and Norway (Krimmer and Kripp, 2009). Furthermore, most of the algorithms used were rather simplistic in their design and did not offer any possibility for voters to verify their votes (Krimmer et al., 2007).

The 2009 verdict of the German Constitutional Court changed the public view on e-voting machines when the court decided that it must be possible for voters to ascertain for themselves without "prior knowledge" that election results had been reported honestly and that their votes had been entered in the results (Federal Constitutional Court, 2009).

This led the project managers of the Norwegian I-voting project to look for solutions to this problem, and during their procurement process, a verifiable I-voting protocol was proposed by researchers from Estonia (Ansper et al., 2009). The Norwegian elections in 2011 can be considered the first use of verifiability in Europe.

In the same year as the first use of verifiability, an Estonian student managed to program a Trojan horse that would cast a different vote than the one intended by the voter in the 2011 Riigikogu elections. He consequently filed a complaint, which was eventually turned down by the Estonian Constitutional Court (OSCE/ODIHR, 2011). This incident led to an electoral reform process where it was decided to introduce individual verifiability for upcoming elections where I-voting is offered (Vinkel, 2012). It was first used in the 20 October 2013 municipal elections in Estonia. Further, Switzerland has also announced making the introduction of verifiability a requirement for elections with full I-voting (Schweizer Bundesrat, 2013).

3. Some Questions to Put Forward in Regards to Verifiability

Thinking along the lines of the outline above regarding verifiability some questions come into mind that can guide our future investigations on the topic:

1) What are the aims provided in the academic (mainly technical) literature for introducing the concept of 'verifiability' to existing election processes, including I-voting, and what purported use do the decision makers in practice plan to gain from introducing this concept;

2) How does verifiability actually work in practice, and what would a generic process model for individual and universal verifiability look like;

3) Does verifiability as a concept also have applicability for paper-based elections, i.e. without Internet voting?

On the basis of the existing academic literature, one can put forth the following working hypotheses which we will have to investigate further:

1) Verifiability is a new concept that enables voters on an individual level to verify whether their votes were cast as they intended, recorded as cast, and counted as recorded, as well as on a universal level that no manipulations occurred, and the results were reported honestly.

2) Verifiability adds a new paradigm to the world of elections. It has the potential to add a considerable level of control for the general public over the conduct of elections.

3) Verifiability has been invented and defined by cryptographic researchers and hence needs to be translated into the reality of elections, i.e., define a legal framework for its use, make it usable and understandable by voters so that it actually makes a difference, etc.

4) In line with the general trend to provide more accountability to the public, future elections will have to offer voters the potential to control the election administration.

Therefore, in the future verifiability will play an important part not only for election administration of I-voting but also of paper-based elections.

4. Summary

The concept of verifiability is currently our only answer towards trying to solve the dilemma of enabling only eligible voters to cast votes via the Internet and still keeping their votes secret.
In a world with ever increasing capabilities to capture and process information this becomes increasingly difficult. It is therefore important to learn more about the applicability of this new technical method and the possibility to apply it for both Internet voting and existing paperbased voting methods.

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XV. International The use of ICTs in nationwide elections in Spain: data collection and dissemination of preliminary results, by Ms Ana Cristina López López, Head of Electoral Co-operation Unit, Deputy Directorate General of Internal Policy and Electoral Processes, Directorate General of Internal Policy, Ministry of the Interior, Spain






1. EMB SYSTEM AND ELECTIONS.
SPAIN: NATION WIDE ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA
1. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: CONGRESS AND SENATE.
http://generales2015.interior.es/es/las-elecciones-en-cifras/
2. LOCAL ELECTIONS.
http://elecciones.mir.es/locales2015/web/locales2015/home.html
3. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS.
http://elecciones.mir.es/europeas2014/web/europeas2014/home.html
4. NATION WIDE REFERENDA.
http://elecciones.mir.es/eleccanteriores/referendum2005/home.htm


2. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (EMB).
2.1 Ministry of the Interior competences (nation wide elections and referenda):
1. the electoral budget (PE 2015 130 million euros);
2. logistics and management (i.e. The Ministry of the Interior opens several calls for tenders.)
3. voter education campaigns on Public Radio, TV and online (art. 50 Electoral Act 5/1985);
4. all tasks required to ensure that Government makes public the provisional electoral results on election day (art. 98.2 Electoral Act);
5. implementation of regulations related to elections and accessibility;
6. Political Parties Register and public funding of political parties;
7. the coordination of all Administrations which play a role in the managing of elections and referenda;
8. the design and development of strategies to innovate Electoral Management (i.e. the use of ICTs etc.);
9. running pilots in the field of elections (i.e. Electronically Managed Electoral Board -MAE-), with the previous authorization of the Central Electoral Commission (www.juntaelectoralcentral.es)
10. Security.



2. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (EMB).

2.2 Ministry of the Interior. Election day: electronic data collection, transmission and dissemination.

•Portable electronic devices: PDAS/tablets/smartphone send (MAES) –Electronically Managed Electoral Boards- are used to send data from the Electoral boards to the Central Data Dissemination Center (Madrid)

•A Government's representative at every polling station reports turn-out data and preliminary electoral results of one or several Electoral Boards.

•Preliminary electoral results, as well as turn out data, are transmitted electronically via portable electronic devices or via MAES:

a) PE 2008: all municipalities over 50.000 inhabitants (46% of the electoral census).

b) PE 2011: all municipalities over 2.000 inhabitants (86% of the electoral census). In Madrid, Barcelona and the Canary Islands: 100% of the electoral census.

•Municipalities under 2.000 inhabitants (only 14% of the electoral census) used telephones

•MAE (Electronically Managed Electoral Board) 1.753 Electoral Boards in the city of Madrid used MAEs.

c) PE 2015:

Portable electronic devices: 21. 400 (90,96% of the electoral census)

Telephones: 4.169 Electoral Boards

MAE (E-managed Electoral Board) : 3.305 (All Electoral Boards in the municipality of Madrid)


2. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (EMB).
MININT ICTs approach:
• Intensive ICTs use.*
*(N.B. The electoral law does not regulate e-voting)
• Streamlining: rationalization, cost cutting measures and technology updates.
• Increasing competitive concurrence.


2. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (EMB).
2.3 The electoral budget. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.
Electoral Budget | Parliamentary Elections 2011 | Parliamentary Elections 2016
Total | 124.838.130 euros | 130.244.505 euros
Preliminary results 'dissemination and ICTs | 18.925.000 euros | 12.888.000 euros
Electoral Budget | European Parliament Elections 2009 | European Parliament Elections 2014
Total | 136.480.000 euros | 120.584.914 euros
Preliminary results' dissemination and ICTs | 14.630.000 euros | 14.676.618 euros
Electoral Budget | Local Elections 2011 | Local Elections 2016
Total | 112.781.550 euros | 127.990.000 euros
Preliminary results 'dissemination and ICTs | 17.000.000 euros | 15.970.258 euros


3. DATA COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF ELECTORAL RESULTS.
Preliminary tally/counting of the votes:
Electoral Boards.
(57.486 EBs)
Final/definitive tally:
50 Province Electoral Commissions
50
PECS
- On site voting.
- Postal voting:
+ in country postal voting.
+ temporarily out of country postal voting (Voto ERTA).
- Permanently out of country voting (Voto CERA).
- Preliminary counting protocols issued by the Electoral Boards + claims + invalid votes/ballots
Election day: preliminary results dissemination
Ministry of the Interior i.e. PE 2015
http://resultadosgenerales2015.interior.es/#/
Final/definitive results published in the Official Gazette www.boe.es by the Central Electoral Commisaion
www.juntaelectoralcentral.es
http://www.infoelectoral.interior.es/min/


DOCUMENTACIÓN Y MATERIAL MESA
ELEC. GENERALES 2015


2015
ELECCIONES
GENERALES
2015
ELECCIONES
GENERALES


MESA ADMINISTRADA ELECTRÓNICAMENTE (MAE)
The MAE IS NOT AN E VOTING TOOL and consists of:
A tablet with a keyboard + a software application+ an e-car reader + a laser printer + Internet conection
MAE Esencial feature: Helpful e-tools for the Electoral Board members
Only on a second level: a data-sending device.
http://generales2015.interior.es/es/visitas-virtuales/mae/


Mesa Administrada Electrónicamente. (MAE) 2008*-2015
E-managed Electoral Board.
Elecciones Locales 2011
Elecciones Generales 2011
ELECCIONES EUROPEAS 25 MAYO 2014
Elecciones Locales 2015
2015 ELECCIONES GENERALES


GOBIERNO DE ESPAÑA
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR
4. LINKS.
1.Ministry of the Interior: http://www.interior.gob.es/
1.1 Parliamentary Elections 2015 http://generales2015.interior.es/
1.2 Electoral results data base: http://www.infoelectoral.interior.es/min/
1.3 Electoral information permanent web site: http://www.infoelectoral.interior.es/
2. Junta Electoral Central (Central Electoral Commission)
http://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/
3. Oficina del Censo Electoral/Electoral Census Office
(Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness) http://www.ine.es/oficina_censo/presentacion.htm
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation


GOBIERNO DE ESPAÑA
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR
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XVI. Use of Electronic Voting Devices: An Overview of the Latin American Situation, by Mr Carlos Navarro Fierro, Director for international studies and projects at the National Electoral Institute of Mexico (INE)

Common features:

- Geographical contiguity
- Historical and cultural background
- Language (except Brazil)
- Deep rooted socio-economic inequities
- Presidential form of government
- Restored or emerging democracies
- Multiparty systems
- Highly competitive elections
- Lack of confidence in politics and elections

Two broad categories:

Pessimistic approach

- Lack of confidence in electoral institutions, proceedings and results
- Distrust in electronic devices (digital division) +
- Illiteracy in rural areas =
- *Adverse conditions and low prospects for introducing EVD*

Optimistic approach

- This is the era of ICT
- ICT options and solutions are everywhere
- Voting and counting are no exceptions
- *Conducive conditions for introducing EVD and making the voting and counting processes easier, quicker, safer and more cost-effective.*

Use of Electronic Voting Devices

An Overview of the Latin American Situation

What's the evidence?

What's the evidence?

- **Two countries introduced electronic voting machines (DRE) for binding elections in the late 1990´s: Brazil in 1996 and Venezuela in 1998.**
- **Since then, both have used them in every single election that they have held.**

Major differences

INE Instituto Nacional Electoral

Brazil

- The Brazilian device:
  - Designed and developed according to requirements and specifications established by the national EMB
  - Introduced on a gradual basis

Venezuela

- The Venezuelan model:
  - Relies on products available in the market.
  - Since 2004, the DRE voting system is able to produce a paper trail
  - In 2012, the system integrated a biometric device for authentication of voters.

Major differences

Brazil

- The Brazilian device:
  - Designed and developed according to requirements and specifications established by the national EMB
  - Introduced on a gradual basis



Major differences

Venezuela

- **The Venezuelan model:**
- **Relies on products available in the market.**
- **Since 2004, the DRE voting system is able to produce a paper trail**
- **In 2012, the system integrated a biometric device for authentication of voters.**




What's the evidence?

Paraguay

- **Only other country in the region that has used electronic voting devices at national level with binding effects: during three electoral processes held between 2001 and 2006**
- **After new complaints and allegations came up, the project was dropped in 2007.**

What's the evidence?

Peru

- New rising star in the regions´ electronic voting horizon
- Following a similar path to the Brazilians:
  - designed and developed their own DRE voting system
  - included a paper trail like the Venezuelan one
- Introduction has been gradual, used for binding elections since 2011
- In the general elections held last Sunday, the DRE voting system covered major areas in the capital city: nearly 3 out of 23 million voters registered

Peru

What's the evidence?

Ecuador

- Has also made intensive efforts to promote e-voting alternatives
- In 2014, tested three different models with binding purposes at designated local elections
- Despite high expectations for a more extensive usage in the 2017 national elections, project has been postponed until 2019.

Federal States: Two interesting case studies:

Argentina

- Decentralized system
- No legal provisions or initiatives at national level.
- 23 provinces have the power to enact their own electoral laws and proceedings.
- A few (starting with Buenos Aires in 2003) have adopted legal provisions on the subject matter, and tested EVD.
- Most relevant case: the province of Salta. A very *sui generis* semi electronic device has been used for binding elections since 2011.

Federal States: Two interesting case studies:

Mexico

- New legal and institutional arrangements in distribution of electoral powers between federation and the 32 states has put on hold initiatives of e- voting at state (local) level
- E-voting initiatives developed by six states, including three that have used them with binding effects (Coahuila, Jalisco and Mexico City).
- All devices designed and developed in house, and provide paper trails.
- INE has also designed and developed its own DRE voting system; however, no legal provisions for e-voting at national level

What's the evidence?

Mexico (two states for local elections, 2012 and 2015), and Panama (for national elections in 2014)

- **have adopted remote i-voting with binding effects only for OCV purposes.**
- **Figures for both voters registered and votes cast have been somehow disappointing.**

Use of Electronic Voting Devices

An Overview of the Latin American Situation

What does this tell us?

What does the evidence tell us?

- One of the main motivations for the introduction of e-voting devices in the region is its potential for deterring fraud and bolstering confidence in the elections
- The anecdotal evidence suggests that the confidence "issue" is at the same time a driving force and an obstacle for the introduction of e-voting.
- The success of failure of an initiative is highly contextual and depends on different factors, but efforts displayed for building confidence and political consensus play a critical role.

What does the evidence tell us?

- Some research has started to be done in the region examining to what extent voters are familiar with e-voting devices, and what are their perceptions or concerns in terms of the security and reliability of those devices.

National Survey on E-Voting in Mexico (2014)

- Only 26% of the 1,400 surveyed knew what e-voting is
- Only 20% of the total regarded e-voting as reliable, 65% did not.
- 65% thought that DRE devices in designated kiosks are more reliable than remote i-voting.
- Only 15% preferred any other type of remote voting.
- 40% considered that e voting is less reliable than the actual manual and paper based voting.

Use of Electronic Voting Devices

An Overview of the Latin American Situation

Final Remarks

Final remarks

- Feasibility is highly contextual
- Comprehensive and careful needs assessment: what problems need to be solved and their level of priority
- In-house solutions relying on gradual approaches that involve and build confidence among key stakeholders seem to be the benchmark in the region
- Awareness of and committment to international standards.

Final remarks

- Systems that integrate paper audit trail can substantially increase the confidence in e-voting.
- Impact of an e-voting solution in the trustworthiness of the electoral processes and its results are still open to debate
- No evidence of increasing voter turnout
- No doubt, from a logistical and operational point of view, an e-voting solution can greatly facilitates the management of the voting and counting proceedings.

XVII. Brazilian 20-year experience on e-voting, by Mr José Antonio Dias Toffoli, Justice of the Supreme Court of Brazil

Tribunal Superior Eleitoral

VOTO LIMPO

BRAZILIAN 20-YEARS EXPERIENCE IN E-VOTING

13th European Conference of Electoral Management Bodies

Bucharest, 15th April, 2016

Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
O Tribunal da Democracia

About the Brazilian Electoral Justice

2014 Elections

Registered voters	142,822,046
Cities	5,570
Electoral Zones	3,038
Electoral Sections	451,877
Electronic Voting Machines	532,705
Political Parties	32
Staff for the Election	2,435,303

As of 15/MAR/2014

Candidates	26,172

Information – 2014 Elections

Population 202,2768,562

* www.ibge.gov.br OCT/2014

2

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Electoral Court System

Created in 1932 (suspended between 37 and 45).

Judiciary Branch

FUNCTIONS

Administrative - Prepares and organizes elections.

Jurisdictional - Election-related judicial processes.

Regulatory - Issues binding instructions.

Composition of the Electoral Court System

The Superior Electoral Court (TSE)

27 Regional Electoral Courts (TRE)

3,033 Electoral Zones (Electoral Judges)

451,501 Polling Stations

96,146 Polling Places

3

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About the Brazilian Electoral Justice

The Electoral System

- **Majority-based election, with the possibility of two rounds for President, Governors and Mayors, in cities with more than 200.000 inhabitants;**

- **Majority-based election for Senator (three representatives from each State and from the Federal District), 81 (total);**

- **Proportional representation with open list for the Federal Chamber of Deputies, the State Legislative Assemblies and the City Councils. For the Federal Chamber, minimum of 8 and maximum of 70 Deputies per state. 513 (total)**

4

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History of Computerized Vote

- Computerization began in 1986;
- About 70 million voters were registered into one single database;
- The work to implement the electronic voting system began in 1995;
- The IT committee, composed by TSE's technicians and consultants, presented a prototype of an electronic voting machine.

5

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Parameters for the electronic voting system:

1. Standardization
2. Compliance with Brazilian legislation
3. User-friendly process
4. Cost reduction
5. Durability
6. Security
7. Logistical Advantage
8. Autonomy

6

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Implementation Premises

- The Electoral Justice is fully familiarized with the electronic voting process;
- The electronic voting process is not limited to the electronic voting machine;
- The national voting system depends on the:
  - Constitution;
  - Culture and history of the democratic process;
  - Financial capacity;
  - Legislation.

7

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Implementation Premises

- Requirements of any voting system solution:
  - **To be complete**: All possibilities must be identified and worked out;
  - **Operate anywhere**:
    - Indigenous village;
    - Large urban center;
  - **Serve everyone**:
    - Visually impaired;
    - Illiterates;
    - Elders, etc.

8

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Vote Counting – Elections 2014

1st round – 100% of vote counting at 11h11m01s on 6.OCT.2014

2nd round – 100% of vote counting at 00h17m08s on 27.OCT.2014

- **50.47 BU's per second** is the average speed during vote counting.
- **Maximum of 3,813 BU's per second.**
- **At 8 p.m. on the election day, 93.9% of votes were already counted.**

9

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Biometric Identification

EXPECTED BENEFITS

- Improvements in the voter identification process;
- Refinement of Electoral Registration process;
- Reduction of identification fraud.

SCOPE

- Classification of cities by population, infrastructure, distance from the capital, logistical feasibility, state support, and others.

10

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O Tribunal da Democracia

Thank You

11

XVIII. New voting technologies, voting procedures (Working session III 1) Moderated by Siri Dolven, Head of Election Section, Deputy Director at The Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation

The Norwegian ministry has the overall responsibility for election legislation in both national and local elections. We own, develop and maintain the electronic system the municipalities and counties use to conduct the elections. From the first of January this year a new Election Directorate has taken over the responsibility for this system.

The topic for this working session is new voting technologies and voting procedures. As we have heard earlier in this conference that the EMBs meet many different challenges when the idea of new voting technologies are introduced. New voting technology can lead to improvements in efficiency and quality, and could contribute to cost reduction.

As an introduction to this session I would like to share some of the challenges we meet in Norway during the trials with internet voting in 2011 and 2013. I will also explain way these trails were discontinued in 2014.

The idea of voting via the Internet was introduced in Norway when the ministry established a working task group in 2004 to discuss future use of electronic voting in Norway.

In 2008 it was decided to carry out a pilot with internet voting. The reasons for this trial was that we wanted to increase accessibility for voters in general, but also for voters with disabilities. We were motivated by expectations from new generations of voters.

The central conditions for the trials was that the voters trust in the elections and the secrecy of the vote should not be compromised.

We hoped that it could increase turn-out, despite earlier research that showed that electronic voting does not affect turnout in any way.

The Norwegian election law has a provision witch gives us the opportunity to try out other ways to conduct elections than required by law, without making law amendments.

The election law will apply in trials, unless the special regulations states otherwise.

The trials in the local election in 2011 was carried out in 10 municipalities. In the national election in 2013 12 municipalities took part in the trials.

The key premises in designing the e-vote system was:

- Voting from standard computers
- Use of existing authentication infrastructure (IDporten) in Norway.
- A government owned and operated system
- Full transparency of process and solution

In order to maintain the principle of the secrecy of the vote and other standards:

- The Electronic voting should only be a supplement
- Internet voting was only possible in the advance period,

- A possibility for e-voters to vote again as many times as they wished (prevent undue influence and coercion)
- A valid paper vote would always override any electronic vote
- Identification and authentication solution (eID) based on a high level of security
- A technically safe and reliable system; it did not reveal any connection between the voter and his/her vote

The Norwegian e-voting system was a complex system:

It generated mathematical proofs for correctness and integrity that were generated by the counting process.

It was also checked and verified by a 3rd party.

Documentation as to how the system was constructed, how it worked, including detailed specifications and architecture documents, was available to the general public on the Ministry's website.

We had comprehensive research and evaluation projects both in 2011 and 2013

So, what was the learning points from the trials in Norway:

- It was a high level of trust in the technical solution
- It was popular with the voters, but it did not increase turn-out.
- It was also difficult to inform the public about the security mechanisms.

Way was Internet voting possible in Norway?

The legislation for piloting different voting methods was in place, we also have a very high trust in central election administration and elections in general.
There are a relatively low level of political conflict, or no history of electoral fraud.

We had the economical and academic resources to implement a secure Internet voting solution.

About 98% of the population have access to Internet from home, and a lot of public services are commonly available online.

There was heated political debate about the trials. Both times the majority in the Parliament initially wanted to stop the trials mainly based on the principle of a secret ballot and how to prevent undue influence. However, the Government wanted to try out e-voting and convinced the majority to conduct the trials.

In 2014 the Ministry decided to discontinue the trials. The reason behind this decision is that there has been political disagreement about the trials, and in Norway it is a goal to have political consensus on how elections are conducted. The Government also wanted to make sure that the voters' high confidence in the Norwegian election process was safeguarded. The lack of public knowledge of central security mechanisms was also an argument behind this decision.

We do not use technology in the voting process in Norway now, but we still use technology to conduct elections. The municipalities use the electronic administrative system called EVA we have developed to conduct the elections, about 200 municipalities use the solution for scanning the ballots. All tabulation and reporting of

results are done using EVA. We also had trials with electronic mark of in the electoral roll in the last three elections. A few weeks ago we put a proposition before the Parliament to amend the election act so the municipalities themselves can choose to use this in future elections.

This was a short summarize of the Norwegian experience with new voting technology. It would be interesting to hear about other experiences and challenges when new voting technologies are discussed or introduced.

Questions:
What type of new voting technologies has the biggest potential for improving elections?

Voting machines?
Internet voting?
Voting technology for special groups? (citizens that live abroad…)
Administrative systems, scanning etc ?

What considerations should be made when considering to adopt new voting technologies?

- Voters experience?
- Accessibility?
- Safety and trust
- Efficient conduct of elections
- Cost reduction?

Do you see any potential disadvantages in using technology from third parties (private companies)

- Will that compromise safety and trust?
- How can we ensure openness and transparency when using private vendors??
- Who has de facto control over the conduct of elections?

In Norway we had a monopoly situation before the development of the electronic system and the trials. As a consequence the systems were expensive to use for the municipalities. We also experienced that the commercial system not always implemented changes in the election law, and that crucial knowledge on how elections were carried out was concentrated to a few persons in a private company.

- How can the election management bodies ensure that voters trust new voting technologies?

How can the adaptation of new voting technology affect the legislation?

- Should the law adapt to the technology or should technology adapt to the law – the laws are often passed without the use of new voting technologies in mind.

Certification of voting equipment - who should control and "approve" the systems and the machines used for voting?

- How do one ensure trust and transparency?

Are there any potential problems in depending on technological expertise?

- Should the election management bodies recruit personnel with such skills? Or is it ok to rely on consultants and collaboration with private companies?
- Do you have any experiences or advice on how to facilitate for a fruitful and efficient collaboration between different disciplines? Such as IT, Cryptology, social science and law.

XIX. Technicalities of voting, Belgium case "Electronic voting with paper trail", by Mr David van Kerckhoven, IT Project Manager in the Elections Unit at the Directorate General Institutions & Population of the Federal Public Service Home Affairs of Belgium

My name is David Van Kerckhoven and I work for the election department of the Belgian Federal administration.

The purpose of this presentation is to give you a real example of an electronic voting system, which is used in Belgium.

I will talk shortly about the history and the evolution of the electronic voting in Belgium.
Thereafter I'll explain the concept of the Belgian voting system.
I'll say a few words about the security.
And finally there is a conclusion.



An experiment was already held in 2 municipalities in 1991.

But the first real introduction of the electronic voting was in 1994 and was extended in 1999.

This voting system was based on technologies, like a DOS-operating system, floppy drives, etc.
We continued using this system for the next elections.

Since 2012 there is a new voting system, called Smartmatic. This was used during the elections of 2012 and 2014.

The next elections will be held in 2018 and 2019, again with this voting system Smartmatic.

In 2018 there will be municipal elections, the local elections, and in 2019 we will have 3 elections: the European, the federal and the regional elections.



How does a polling station look like in Belgium?

We have a president and his staff, seating at the president's table.

In Belgium we have about 5 voting booths for each polling station and each voting booth contains a voting computer.

So, how does this work? The voter enters the polling station and identifies himself to the president. He gets an activated smartcard (it is like a chip card) and he goes to a voting booth. There he can start the voting process on the voting computer with his smartcard. After he has made his choice and confirmed his vote, he gets a printed paper trail with his vote converted into a barcode and also into a clear text. When he has checked his vote, he folds his ballot and leaves the voting booth. He goes to the ballot box where he scans the barcode of his paper trail and he put his ballot in the ballot box. The scanned vote will then be encrypted and stored on the USB-stick of the polling station.

If the voter has doubts about the content of his barcode, he can go first to a special voting booth containing a bar code reader. There, he can scan himself the barcode of his ballot. The content of the barcode will be shown on a screen so he can compare it with the printed vote in clear text.



What happens afterwards?

In Belgium we always vote on a Sunday, starting from 8 a.m. until mostly 3 p.m.

So after 3 p.m. the president closes the polling station and goes with the USB-sticks containing all the votes to the main polling station of the canton. A canton in Belgium is a group of municipalities.

There, the USB-stick will be checked and the votes will be transmitted to the central authority, in this case the federal administration of Home Affairs. When we receive some preliminary results from the cantons, we publish them immediately on our website.



How can we secure the voting process?

Our security is based on 3 principles:

- IT security
- A lot of procedures
- And transparency



First point is the IT security.

Because of the fast technological evolutions, in each IT-project there is always a battle between the security people on one side and the hackers on the other side.

At our side we have, of course, the security people of our suppliers and from the administration itself.

But very important, we also have an independent counselling body. Before each election, they will test and verify the software and they will give an advice to us if the software can be used for elections.

And last but not least, in Belgium we have an independent college of experts. In Belgium they play an important role. This college consists of the IT-specialists of the different parliaments. During the last elections in 2014, they consisted of about 22 IT-specialists. For each election, they do a full audit and write a report. Depending on this report, the elections will be approved or disapproved.



Our second point concerns the procedures.

If we can prevent the hackers get physical access to the software, there will be no battle! Some examples:

When we prepare all the USB-sticks with the software for all the polling stations, we do it in a secured area. This area is protected by access control, there are cameras to supervise, there is a guard 24h a day, etc.

When the USB-sticks are done, (before they leave the secured area) they are put in a sealed envelope and will be accompanied with a security guard on the transport to the local authorities. The president of a polling station may only open the envelope on the day of the elections and all the polling station staff must be present. The corresponding password will arrive in a separate sealed envelope.



The 3rd point is about the transparency.

It is very important that we explain very well to the people how the system works, but also how we work!

On our website we put a lot of documents describing and explaining the voting process. For each election, we have a helpdesk to answer the questions of the people.

And very important! After each election we do a full publication of the source code of our software.

So everyone can verify or ask a specialist to look at our software.

In addition of the confidence we earn, there is also a 2nd benefit:
We can get feedback!

And with this feedback we can improve our system again about the security elements and about our procedures.

So we can learn and do better each time.



In Belgium we have hold experiments with electronic voting since 1991!

Since 2012, we use a new voting system, Smartmatic.

To keep the voting process secure, there are 3 principles:

- IT security
- Procedures
- And Transparency

XX. Media Special event: 25 years of international election observation:

Observation of elections by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, presentation by Mr Andreas Kiefer, Secretary General of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Council of Europe

Thank you for this opportunity to speak, in the framework of this conference, about the observation of elections at the local and regional level. The 13th European Conference of Electoral Management Bodies was the moment to share expert knowledge and experiences of institutional representatives on new technologies. I appreciate that this special event gives us the chance to highlight also the political dimension of electoral activities in the Council of Europe.

The Parliamentary Assembly – for which you have carried out many important missions – and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities are the two political assemblies of the Council of Europe, mandated by the Committee of the Ministers to observe elections in their respective fields. Election observation by international organisations has become widely accepted as key barometer of the democratic development of a country. In order to protect Europe's electoral heritage and to be ready for innovation, observers need to be informed, independent and impartial. To ensure proper follow-up to the recommendations drafted by the observers, their reports need to be accurate, fair and of high quality. I will cover these aspects in more detail later.

As far as the Congress is concerned, our institutional responsibility includes the observation grassroots' elections as part of our mission to evaluate the situation of local and regional democracy in Europe. Based on this specific mandate, we have organised some hundred missions over the last 15 years – mainly in Council of Europe member states and occasionally beyond, such as in the Palestinian territories in 2008.

As it is the case for many other activities, the Congress has been working in complementary and good collaboration with other key actors in the electoral field, notably the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe Venice Commission, the EU Committee of the Regions and OSCE/ODIHR. The most recent example for this co-operative character is the enlarged Congress' mission to observe the local elections in Ukraine on 25 October 2015. For the first time, 11 members of the Parliamentary Assembly joined the Congress' delegation, together with members of the EU Committee of the Regions; - making it the largest ever observer delegation organised by the Congress involving 57 observers from 25 countries.

In total, the Congress organised four electoral missions in 2015 – in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagausia (MOL), in the Republic of Moldova, in Albania and Ukraine. On an average, the Congress is able to finance between three and five such mission per year. The scope of our missions depends very much of the political context of the respective vote and the interest expressed by a state in the deployment of a Congress' delegation.

Congress' observers are locally or regionally elected representatives from the 47 member countries of the Council of Europe. Many of them are experienced themselves in the practical organisation of elections in their own municipalities. Thus election observation at international level is a possibility for them to share experiences and compare the different systems in use in Europe. This is a win-win-situation for both the observer and the country in which elections are being held, an opportunity to look

beyond one's own nose and a chance to learn from each other. Once they are back in their home country, the discussions with local and regional stakeholders and the information collected on the spot are a source of inspiration for Congress' members.

In order to ensure election observation on a democratic basis, the Congress has established a set of rules for the composition of its delegations which refer to a balanced representation of the different political groups, a fair geographical representation and gender balance. Of course, in our specific case, we are striving also for a balanced participation of members of both the Local Chamber and the Chamber of the Regions. Normally, our delegations are composed of five up to 20 Congress' members and two to five members of the EU Committee of the Regions with whom we have signed a co-operation agreement.

In 2010, the Congress made a major step forward in terms of systematisation of its electoral activities and adopted a proper election observation strategy in its Resolution 306. Through Resolution 353, adopted in 2013, the way was paved towards a more systematic follow-up to the recommendations. In October 2015, the revised Congress' rules and procedures brought into focus targeted activities in the framework of the post-electoral dialogue. During the Fact-finding Mission carried out from 24 to 26 February 2016 in Albania, the Congress, for the first time, engaged in such a post-electoral dialogue, further to the local elections held in June 2015. This is a novelty in the field of elections, complementing existing tools of the Congress to assess the situation of grassroots' democracy.

The progressive structuration of election observation in Congress' reference texts went together with a better organisation of its missions in the field. Over the last ten years, the Congress has been achieving significant progress: it refined its methodology through systematic political and legal briefings for the Congress' observers and the continued incorporation of international standards; it increased co-operation with strategic partners, notably the Council of Europe Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR; and it professionalised the whole observation process through collaboration with academics and electoral experts who are supporting the Rapporteurs of the Congress with the drafting of the reports and recommendations further to an election observation.

This is of particular importance in respect of our co-operation with the Council for Democratic Elections of the Venice Commission and the implementation of its Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters. Reports and recommendations adopted by the Congress systematically refer to such standards thus contributing to the coherence of the Council of Europe related activities.

A concrete sign of the recognition of the efforts of the Congress to further fine-tune its electoral activities was the election of the Dutch member of Congress, Jos Wienen, as new Chair of the Council for Democratic Elections in March 2015, thus succeeding Andreas Gross in this function. The Council being one of the well-established European interfaces to discuss electoral matters, the current chairmanship enables the Congress to foster co-operation, exchange of know-how between strategic partners and tackle horizontal problems and new challenges.

Considering this mandate as a mission to look into the future, the Congress, in addition to the country-specific observations and reports, has developed a strategy to better address problems identified during electoral missions which are of broader relevance. Such recurring horizontal issues include, in particular:

- the accuracy and quality of voters' lists;
- the professionalisation and de-politicisation of the electoral administration at all levels;
- the situation of independent candidates;
- voting rights of internally displaced residing legally for a certain time in municipalities away from their homes in local elections, and – in a similar but still different sense for refugees and migrants residing legally,

as well as,

- the misuse of administrative resources during electoral campaigns.

With regard to the latter, only recently, the Venice Commission has adopted Guidelines for Preventing and Responding to the Misuse of Administrative Resources during Electoral Processes. This issue has been increasingly discussed during election observations and remains very complex. It is of high importance at local and regional level because of the closeness of such resources to potential beneficiaries. It is, of course, also linked to the fight against corruption and the ability of voters to make informed choices. Therefore, the Congress is currently preparing a report on misuse of administrative resources and the role of local and regional elected representatives and civil servants. It will be adopted at the 31st Congress Session in October this year and constitutes, at the same time, a contribution to the Congress' general theme in 2016 – "Ethics and transparency at local and regional level".

The recurring issue of quality of voters' lists has been dealt with by the Congress in form of a horizontal report adopted at the 28th Congress Session in March 2015. Also in this case, concrete experiences during observation missions have made us aware of potential electoral fraud related to voters who remain on electoral lists although residing – de facto – abroad. From Congress' perspective, a genuine link between a voter and the municipality in which he (or she) casts the ballot at local level is crucial. This is rooted in our conviction that local questions should be decided by the electorate actually residing in a specific municipality. The Congress is committed to raise this issue with all its interlocutors in order to achieve progress in this respect – and did it, for example, during the Fact-finding Mission in Albania in February.

Against the background of the current refugees' crisis, the Congress is also considering to look more closely into the question of voting rights at local level of internally displaced people, refugees and migrants. The situation of IDPs in Ukraine who were not allowed to vote in the 2015 local elections, is a concrete example and underlines the degree of urgency.

Let me now come back to important components of electoral observation processes and according policies developed by the Congress:

- Firstly, I should like to talk about the experiences, skills and behaviour of international election observers.
- Secondly, this is about the reports stemming from our observations and the implementation of recommendations.

Access to up-dated country files, practical information and regular training are major tools of the Congress to improve the performance of its observers in the field. Particular emphasis is being placed on ethics while observing, in particular in respect of impartiality, conflict of interest and non-acceptance of inappropriate gifts or invitations. A new Congress' Guide on observation of local and regional elections has been produced

and it contains a list of “dos and don’ts” for observers. Thorough preparation prior to a mission and systematic feedback after a mission, at post-electoral briefings and through forms, are preconditions of successful observation of elections and constitute the basis of high-quality reports and meaningful recommendations to member states.

As I said, the Congress attaches great attention to the follow-up of its election observation missions and to the implementation of recommendations emerging from such observations. As a consequence, and in complementarity to the political monitoring process of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, it has introduced a procedure to open a post-electoral dialogue. In co-operation with state authorities, political forces, national associations of local and regional self-government and other relevant stakeholders, the Congress highlights specific issues detected during election observations and offers support to work on suitable solutions. This will also be ensured by the continued participation of the Congress in post-electoral conferences organised by the Directorate General of Democracy of the Council of Europe.

All in all, we can acknowledge that many member states have made considerable progress over the last years to ensure free and fair electoral processes. The professionalisation of the electoral administration and the drafting of electoral laws in line with international standards are major achievements in this respect. However, there is still room for improvement in respect of key elements of the process, notably the further de-politicisation of the administration and the elimination of inconsistencies in the legislation.

Moreover, media freedom is a key condition of fair and free elections. During many missions, the Congress has observed that the role of media to inform citizens is being challenged by oligarch structures and insufficient legislation on transparency of media ownership. This is a threat to independent journalism and deprives voters of their right to make an informed choice based, not least, on unbiased media content.

Criteria to stand in elections and, in particular, the possibility of independent candidates to compete in electoral processes are also crucial. At local level, this entails a fair representation of communities and should allow candidates to run in elections without the political and financial support of the political establishment.

The question of financing of electoral campaigns and political parties has been covered by the Venice Commission through the Code of Good Practice in the field of Political Parties. However, the implementation of standards on financial reporting is in many countries still very poor. It also intersects with other issues already mentioned – notably the misuse of administrative resources in electoral processes.

In many countries the progress achieved in electoral matters is also a consequence of regular observation of elections at all levels of government. This can be a source of pride for us and remains, at the same time, our duty and mission. The Congress, in co-operation with our strategic partners, is committed to continue supporting those countries who are interested in welcoming international observer delegations on their territory. It is our duty to prepare our observers in the best possible way. It is our mission to draft, based on concrete observations, meaningful recommendations which can contribute to the consolidation of electoral processes on the path towards genuine democracy at local and regional level.

XXI. Report by Andreas Gross, Political Scientist, former member of the Swiss Parliament and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Election Expert of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe

In my introduction I stressed the special opportunity this event represents to the representatives of the EMB's, because for the first time they are invited to share their observations about the work of the election observers with colleagues and people who do and did observation missions since many years.

But in order to come immediately to the conclusion of this special event: This oportunity was missed; this observation mission of the observer failed. We did not manage to come to a real debate. Most probably because among the 17 countries where the PACE observed elections in the recent years (10 under the Monitoring Process, 4 partners of Democracy, 3 under post-monitoring) only 4 countries under the Monitoring Process were present at the conference in Bucharest (AZ, AR, UA, Georgia) , only 2 of the four partners (Kyrgyzstan, Tunisia) and 2 of the three under post-monitoring (Bulgaria, Turkey). From these nevertheless 8 countries only the representative of Bulgarian made use of this opportunity; but his intervention was a questions based on a misunderstanding of a introductory remark which could be easily settled. Representatives of the other 21 countries showed not very much interest to reflect on the work of the observation missions they only knew from past times. So in order to get feedbacks from the observed countries we have to address the directly. The good idea to try to do this at this conference failed.

In my introduction I underlined the fact, that elections are long term processes, which can not be evaluated looking the electoral weekends only. As a consequence I stressed that the short term PACE-observers, although they often have deep insights over some time because they discuss most of the countries they observe in the Monitoring Committee, are only able to realise their observations in their partnership with the Osze/Odhir-colleagues who are often two months in the country.
Andreas Kiefer, the Secretary General of the Conress of local and regional authorities, described the Congress' representatives' concept in their observation missions of local elections. They follow the same standards as the Osce/Odhir. 2015 missions lead them to Moldowa, Georgia, Albania and Ukraine – latter in a special cooperation with the PACE. 2016 an observation mission is foreseen in Voyvodina, the Hungarian speeking region of Serbia.
Mr. Kiefer stressed how useful it is when people who face elections at home themselves observe other elections. Their seriousness cannot be put into doubt.
Problems the Congress' observers face, are similar to the ones of all observers: The quality of the voter's list, the role of the voters residing abroad, the publication of the addresses of the ballot stations, the independence of the ballot station authorities, the access of media, the process of candidate's selection, the voting rights of IDP's, the right to vote for refugees, the misuse of administrative resources.
Mr.Kiefer underlined that the Congress wants to assist the observed countries and trys to be helpful in order to improve the quality of the elections.

In the discussion the representative of Croatia stressed how important he thinks the presence of international observers is for the citizens in the country. They feel not only honoured by the observers but also supported to have free and fair elections. Concerning the recommendations of the missions he stressed that they often touch issues for which the Electoral Management Bodies are not competent and which requie legal actions. I answered that we are often aware of this and do address the legislators improve the electoral laws. And as a legislator I underlined, that the concerned political

affairs committee in Switzerland also got such recommendations of the Odhir electoral observers of the Swiss elections; but the majority of the Parliamentarians were not ready to live up to them and revise the laws in the sense of the Odhir-recommendations.

In a other contribution to the debate a colleague stressed the sensibility of the conclusions of the observers for the authorities concerned and how difficult it sometimes is to write them under such a pressure without closing the doors to the authorities which would prevent any improvements to be considered.

I concluded the special event by saying that we could not address those we wanted to invite for comments and that we have to try this in a other way. The people present agreed and encouraged us to do so.

XXII. Synopsis

The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe organised in co-operation with the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania the thirteenth European Conference of Electoral Management Bodies in Bucharest, Romania, on 14-15 April 2016.

The topic of the Conference was "**New technologies in elections: public trust and challenges for electoral management bodies**". The participants debated more specifically on three main issues:

- Legal framework of new technologies in elections: implementing international principles;
- New technologies applied to the pre-electoral period; and
- New technologies on E-Day and during counting phases.

Ms **Ana Maria Pătru**, President of the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, Ms **Elena-Simina Tănăsescu**, Counsellor of the President of Romania, **Mr Ioan Dragoş Tudorache**, Head of the Prime Minister's Chancellery on behalf of the Prime Minister, opened the Conference, followed by Mr **Thomas Markert**, Director, Secretary of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.

160 participants attended the Conference. The participants came from national electoral management bodies and other bodies involved in the electoral field from 23 European countries and 9 other countries. In total, 32 countries participated in the Conference.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Election Observation and Democratic Support (EODS) of the European Union also participated in the Conference. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF), the Association of European Election Officials (ACEEEO), the Network of Francophone Electoral Skills (RECEF) and several other institutions active in the electoral field also took part in the Conference.

Representatives of the Venice Commission, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities also contributed to the Conference.

The **conclusions** of the Conference are appended to this synopsis.

The Conference

1. *Took note* of the conclusions of the first Electoral Expert Debates "Electoral Law and New Technologies: Legal Challenges" held in Bucharest on 12-13 April 2016 and *encouraged* further editions of the Electoral Expert Debates;

2. *Took note* of the Research Project "Improving electoral management: the organisational determinants of electoral integrity" presented by the University of East Anglia, United Kingdom; *endorsed* the project to undertake a survey of electoral management bodies' personnel in Europe; *encouraged* electoral management bodies to nominate a survey facilitator and to complete the survey; *agreed* to follow up the survey at a next European Conference of Electoral Management Bodies;

3. *Recalled* the conclusions adopted by the ninth European Conference of Electoral Management Bodies devoted to "Innovative solutions for elections", held in Tallinn on 4-5 June 2012;

4. *Commended* the review and the forthcoming publication of a report on 25 years of international election observation;

5. *Recalled* the relevance of existing international standards for democratic elections and their applicability to new technologies in elections;

6. *Underlined* in particular the importance of Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers to member states on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting;

7. *Commended* the on-going update of this Recommendation;

8. *Recalled* the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1653(2009) on electronic democracy;

9. *Acknowledged* the potential of new technologies for improving public trust in and efficiency of electoral processes, *inter alia* to enhance turnout, including of vulnerable groups;

10. *Noted* that this potential can only be realised if adequate conditions are in place in terms of legal framework as well as of capacities of electoral management bodies, and if introduced and implemented with full transparency and as part of a gradual and comprehensive approach;

11. *Noted* the wide range of existing voting methods and *recognised* the right of countries to choose traditional means of voting or e-voting technologies, starting where appropriate with pilot projects;

12. *Underlined* the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the whole electoral process when new technologies are used;

13. *Stressed* that the use of new technologies should not undermine the secrecy of the vote;

14. *Underlined* the importance of balancing transparency of electoral processes and

protection of personal data therein;

15. *Recommended* in this respect to ensure the compatibility of e-enabled elections with the Council of Europe's Convention No.108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data;

16. *Stressed* the importance of the possibility for voters to review the use of their personal data for electoral purposes, especially regarding voters' lists;

17. *Took note* of the importance of the proper use of new technologies in maintaining the accuracy of voters' lists and registers;

18. *Pointed out* that the electoral management bodies' choice of new technologies should be guided by the needs of the electoral process and not by the interest of technology providers;

19. *Pointed out* the importance for electoral management bodies to gain proper expertise in directing and supervising the use of new technologies during electoral processes, including through building up capacity and appropriate training programmes;

20. *Recommended* raising awareness of voters regarding the use of new technologies in elections, including through civic education and public outreach programmes;

21. *Pointed to* the issue of verifiability of the vote if electronic voting is used and the importance of providing effective means of verification whilst conducting e-enabled elections;

22. *Noted* that electronic voting poses a challenge to traditional methods of election observation and *underlined* the need to ensure the effectiveness of domestic and international election observation where electronic voting is used;

23. *Recognised* the importance of identifying and promoting new initiatives facilitating voter registration, voting procedures and an increased voting turnout for voting abroad where applicable;

24. *Underlined* the importance of secure procedures when using new technologies in elections;

25. *Recognised* the inherent cost for ensuring security in elections when using new technologies and the necessity to proceed to risk assessment before introducing such technologies;

26. *Encouraged* exchange of information on good practice concerning the use of new technologies.

The date and venue of the fourteenth European Conference of Election Management Bodies will be confirmed at a later stage.

XXIII. Carnet de bord

La Commission de Venise du Conseil de l'Europe a organisé, en coopération avec l'Autorité électorale permanente de Roumanie, la treizième Conférence européenne des administrations électorales à Bucarest, en Roumanie, les 14 et 15 avril 2016.

Le thème de la Conférence était « **Elections et nouvelles technologies : confiance du public et défis à relever par les administrations électorales** ». Les participants ont plus spécifiquement débattu de trois thèmes :

- le cadre juridique des nouvelles technologies appliquées aux élections : la mise en œuvre des principes internationaux ;
- les nouvelles technologies appliquées à la période préélectorale ; et
- les nouvelles technologies le jour du scrutin et durant les phases de dépouillement.

Mme **Ana Maria Pătru**, Présidente de l'Autorité électorale permanente de Roumanie, Mme **Elena-Simina Tănăsescu**, Conseillère du Président de la Roumanie, et M. **Ioan Dragoş Tudorache**, Chef de la Chancellerie du Premier ministre, au nom du Premier ministre, ont ouvert la Conférence, suivis par M. **Thomas Markert**, Directeur, Secrétaire de la Commission de Venise du Conseil de l'Europe.

160 participants ont participé à la Conférence. Les participants provenaient d'administrations électorales nationales et d'autres institutions impliquées dans le domaine électoral de 23 pays européens et de 9 autres pays. Au total, 32 pays ont participé à la Conférence.

Le Service européen d'action extérieure (EEAS) et le Service d'observation électorale et de soutien démocratique (EODS) de l'Union européenne ont également participé à la conférence. L'Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe/Bureau des institutions démocratiques et des droits de l'Homme (OSCE/BIDDH), la Fondation internationale pour les systèmes électoraux (IFES), l'Institut international pour la démocratie et l'assistance électorale (International IDEA), l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), l'Association des administrateurs européens d'élections (ACEEEO), le Réseau des compétences électorales francophones (RECEF) et plusieurs autres institutions actives dans le domaine électoral ont aussi pris part à la Conférence.

Des représentants de la Commission de Venise, de l'Assemblée parlementaire et du Congrès des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux ont également contribué à la Conférence.

Les **conclusions** de la Conférence sont annexées à ce carnet de bord.

La Conférence

1. *A pris note* des conclusions des premiers entretiens de l'« Expert électoral » intitulés « Droit électoral et nouvelles technologies : défis juridiques », tenus à Bucarest les 12 et 13 avril 2016 et *a encouragé* la tenue d'autres éditions des entretiens de l'« Expert électoral » ;

2. *A pris note* du projet de recherche « Améliorer le management électoral : les déterminants organisationnels de l'intégrité électorale » présenté par l'Université d'East Anglia, Royaume-Uni ; *a avalisé* l'enquête menée par le projet auprès du personnel des administrations électorales européennes ; *a encouragé* les administrations électorales à nommer un facilitateur et à répondre à l'enquête ; *a convenu* d'assurer un suivi de l'enquête à l'occasion d'une prochaine Conférence européenne des administrations électorales ;

3. *A rappelé* les conclusions adoptées par la neuvième Conférence européenne des administrations électorales dédiée aux « Solutions innovatrices dans les élections », qui s'est tenue à Tallinn les 4 et 5 juin 2012 ;

4. *A salué* la prochaine publication d'un rapport sur 25 ans d'observation internationale des élections ;

5. *A rappelé* la pertinence des standards internationaux existants pour des élections démocratiques et leur applicabilité aux nouvelles technologies dans les élections ;

6. *A souligné* en particulier l'importance de la Recommandation Rec(2004)11 du Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe aux Etats membres sur les normes juridiques, opérationnelles et techniques relatives au vote électronique ;

7. *A salué* la mise à jour en cours de cette Recommandation ;

8. *A rappelé* la Résolution de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe 1653(2009) sur la démocratie électronique ;

9. *A reconnu* le potentiel des nouvelles technologies pour améliorer la confiance du public dans les processus électoraux et l'efficacité de ces derniers, notamment afin d'améliorer la participation électorale, y compris de groupes vulnérables ;

10. *A noté* que ce potentiel ne peut se réaliser que si des conditions adéquates sont mises en place à la fois en termes de cadre juridique et de capacité des administrations électorales, et que si ces conditions sont mises en œuvre en toute transparence et comme élément d'une approche graduelle et exhaustive ;

11. *A noté* le large éventail de méthodes de vote existantes et a reconnu le droit des pays de choisir des méthodes de vote soit traditionnelles, soit par vote électronique, en commençant, lorsque cela est approprié, par des projets pilotes ;

12. *A souligné* la nécessité d'assurer l'intégrité de l'ensemble du processus électoral lorsque de nouvelles technologies sont utilisées ;

13. *A souligné* que l'usage de nouvelles technologies ne devrait pas remettre en cause le secret du vote ;

14. *A insisté sur* l'importance d'un équilibre entre transparence des processus électoraux et protection des données à caractère personnel ;

15. *A recommandé* à ce titre que soit assurée la compatibilité des élections tenues par voie électroniques avec la Convention n°108 du Conseil de l'Europe pour la protection des personnes à l'égard du traitement automatisé des données à caractère personnel ;

16. *A insisté sur* l'importance pour les électeurs de pouvoir contrôler l'usage de leurs données à caractère personnel à des fins électorales, en particulier en ce qui concerne les listes électorales ;

17. *A pris note* de l'importance d'un usage approprié des nouvelles technologies dans la tenue à jour et l'exactitude des listes et registres électoraux ;

18. *A indiqué* que le choix de nouvelles technologies par les administrations électorales devrait être guidé par les besoins identifiés dans les processus électoraux et non par les intérêts des fournisseurs de technologie ;

19. *A indiqué* l'importance pour les administrations électorales d'acquérir une expertise appropriée dans l'usage et la surveillance de l'usage de nouvelles technologies dans les processus électoraux, y compris en renforçant leurs capacités et par des programmes de formation appropriés ;

20. *A recommandé* la sensibilisation des électeurs à l'usage de nouvelles technologies dans les élections, y compris par des programmes d'éducation civique et de sensibilisation du public ;

21. *A souligné* la question de la vérifiabilité du vote si le vote électronique est utilisé et l'importance de fournir des moyens de vérification efficaces lors de la conduite d'élections par voie électronique ;

22. *A noté* que le vote électronique pose un défi aux méthodes traditionnelles d'observation électorale et *a souligné* le besoin d'assurer l'efficacité de l'observation nationale et internationale des élections lorsque le vote électronique est utilisé ;

23. *A reconnu* l'importance d'identifier et de promouvoir de nouvelles initiatives facilitant l'enregistrement des électeurs, les procédures de vote et une participation accrue pour le vote à l'étranger, lorsque celui-ci s'applique ;

24. *A souligné* l'importance de procédures sécurisées lors de l'usage de nouvelles technologies dans les élections ;

25. *A reconnu* le coût inhérent à la garantie de la sécurité d'élections faisant usage de nouvelles technologies et la nécessité de procéder à une évaluation du risque avant l'introduction de telles technologies ;

26. *A encouragé* l'échange d'informations sur les bonnes pratiques concernant l'usage de nouvelles technologies.

La date et le lieu de la quatorzième Conférence européenne des administrations électorales seront confirmés à un stade ultérieur.

XXIV. СИНОПСИС

Венецианская комиссия Совета Европы в сотрудничестве с Постоянным органом Румынии по организации выборов провела 13-ю Европейскую конференцию органов по организации выборов в Бухаресте, Румыния, 14-15 апреля 2016 года.
Тема конференции была следующей: "Новые технологии в организации выборов: общественное доверие и проблемы, стоящие перед органами по организации выборов". Участники обсудили три основных вопроса:

- юридические рамки использования новых технологий на выборах: соблюдение международных принципов;
- новые технологии, применяемые на предвыборном этапе; и
- новые технологии в день выборов и во время подсчета голосов.

На открытии конференции выступили г-жа Анна Мариа Пэтру, председатель Постоянного органа Румынии по организации выборов, г-жа Елена-Симина Таназеску, советник Президента Румынии, г-н Иоан Драгош Тудоракэ, руководитель канцелярии Премьер-министра от имени Премьер-министра, а также г-н Томас Маркерт, директор, Секретарь Венецианской комиссии Совета Европы.

В конференции приняли участие 160 участников. Они представляли национальные органы по организации выборов и другие органы, участвующие в процессе выборов, из 23 европейских и 9 неевропейских стран. В целом, в конференции приняли участие 32 страны.

В конференции участвовали также Европейская служба внешних связей (EEAS) и Организация по наблюдению за выборами и демократической поддержке (EODS) Европейского союза. В конференции приняли также участие Организация по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе – Бюро по демократическим институтам и правам человека (ОБСЕ/БДИПЧ), Международный фонд избирательных систем (IFES), Международный институт демократии и содействия выборам (Международный IDEA), Международная организация франкоговорящих стран (OIF), Ассоциация организаторов выборов стран Европы (AOBCE/ACEEEO), (Сеть ресурсов в области выборов на французском языке (RECEF) и ряд других организаций, действующих в сфере выборов.

Свой вклад в конференцию внесли также представители Венецианской комиссии, Парламентской ассамблеи, Конгресса местных и региональных властей Совета Европы.

К данному тексту прилагается Итоговый документ Конференции.

ИТОГОВЫЙ ДОКУМЕНТ
Конференция

3. Приняла к сведению итоги первых дискуссий экспертов по выборам "Избирательное право и новые технологии: проблемы в области права и правоприменительной практики ", состоявшихся в Бухаресте 12-13 апреля 2016 года, и призвала проводить новые дискуссии экспертов по выборам;

4. Приняла к сведению исследовательский проект "Совершенствование организации выборов: организационные факторы обеспечения честности выборов", представленный Университетом Южной Англии, Соединенное

Королевство; поддержала проект по проведению опроса среди сотрудников органов по организации выборов в Европе; призвала органы по организации выборов назначить координаторов опроса и провести данный опрос; согласилась подвести итоги опроса на следующей Европейской конференции органов по организации выборов;

5. Напомнила о итогах, принятых на 9-й Европейской конференции органов по организации выборов, посвященной теме "Инновационные решения для выборов", которая состоялась в Таллине 4-5 июня 2012 года;

4. Приветствовала проведение обзора и предстоящую публикацию доклада по итогам 25 лет международного наблюдения за выборами;

5. Напомнила об актуальности существующих международных стандартов в области проведения демократических выборов и их применимости к новым технологиям на выборах;

6. Подчеркнула, в частности, важность Рекомендации Rec(2004)11 Комитета министров Совета Европы государствам-членам о юридических, оперативных и технических стандартах электронного голосования;

7. Приветствовала осуществляемое обновление данной Рекомендации;

8. Напомнила о Резолюции Парламентской ассамблеи Совета Европы 1653(2009) об электронной демократии;

9. Признала потенциал новых технологий для повышения уровня общественного доверия к избирательным процессам и их эффективности, в том числе для повышения уровня явки, включая явку представителей уязвимых групп;

10. Отметила, что данный потенциал может быть реализован только в том случае, если будут созданы соответствующие юридические рамки и для органов по организации выборов, и если данный потенциал новых технологий будет внедряться и реализовываться при полной прозрачности процесса и как часть постепенного и комплексного подхода;

11. Отметила широкий круг существующих методов проведения выборов и признала право стран на то, чтобы выбирать традиционные средства голосования или же электронные технологии, начиная с соответствующих пилотных проектов;

12. Подчеркнула необходимость обеспечения честности всего избирательного процесса при использовании новых технологий;

13. Подчеркнула, что использование новых технологий не должно подрывать тайного характера голосования;

14. Подчеркнула важность обеспечения равновесия между прозрачностью избирательных процессов и защитой при этом персональных данных;

15. Рекомендовала в этой связи обеспечить соответствие выборов с использованием электронных средств Конвенции Совета Европы № 108 о

защите физических лиц при автоматизированной обработке персональных данных;

16. Подчеркнула важность предоставления избирателям возможностей анализировать использование их персональных данных в целях проведения выборов, прежде всего в отношении списков избирателей;

17. Приняла к сведению важность должного использования новых технологий при поддержании точности списков и реестров избирателей;

18. Отметила, что при выборе новых технологий органам по проведению выборов необходимо руководствоваться потребностями избирательного процесса, а не интересами провайдеров технологий;

19. Отметила важность для органов по организации выборов накапливать должную экспертизу при регулировании и надзоре за использованием новых технологий во время избирательных процессов, в том числе путем наращивания потенциала и проведения соответствующих программ по повышению квалификации;

20. Рекомендовала повышать информированность избирателей в отношении использования новых технологий на выборах, в том числе с помощью гражданского воспитания и программ информирования общественности;

21. Отметила вопрос о возможности проверки голосования при использовании электронных средств голосования, а также важность предоставления эффективных средств проверки при проведении выборов с использованием электронных технологий;

22. Отметила, что электронное голосование создает ряд проблем для традиционных методов наблюдения за выборами и подчеркнула необходимость обеспечения эффективности национального и международного наблюдения за выборами при использовании электронного голосования;

23. Признала важность определения и продвижения новых инициатив, способствующих упрощению регистрации избирателей, процедуры голосования и повышению уровня явки при голосовании за границей, когда это применимо;

24. Подчеркнула важность безопасных процедур при использовании новых технологий на выборах;

25. Признала соответствующую стоимость обеспечения безопасности на выборах при использовании новых технологий и необходимость оценки рисков до внедрения таких технологий;

26. Приветствовала обмен информацией об эффективной практике в отношении использования новых технологий.

Дата и место проведения 14-й Европейской конференции органов по организации выборов будут подтверждены позднее.

XXV. List of participants

ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES

ARMENIA
Central Election Commission
Ms Lilia Hakobyan, Head of Legal Department
Mr Georgi Martirosyan, Member

AUSTRIA
Federal Ministry of Interior
Mr Gregor Wenda, Deputy Head of the Department of Electoral Affairs

AZERBAIJAN
Central Election Commission
Mr.Rashid Yusifbayli, Head of International Relations Department
Mr.Farid Orujov, Head of Information Department

BELGIUM
Federal Ministry of Interior, Directorate General "Institutions & Population"
Mr Régis Trannoy, Advisor, Head of Elections Unit
Mr David Van Kerckhoven, Attaché ICT, Elections Unit

BRAZIL
Superior Electoral Court
Mr Jose Antonio Dias Toffoli, President
Mr Tarcisio de Lima Ferreira Fernandes Costa, International Advisor

BULGARIA
Central Election Commission
Ms Rumyana Stoeva-Siderova, Member
Mr Metin Syuleyman, Member

CROATIA
State Election Commission
Ms Janja Horvat Drobnjak, Member

DENMARK
Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior
Mr Soeren Stauning, Special advisor

ESTONIA
National Electoral Committee
Mr Vinkel Priit, Head of Administration
Mr Koitmäe Arne, Advisor

FINLAND
Ministry of Justice
Ms Heini Huotarinen, Senior officer

GEORGIA
Central Election Commission
Ms Tamar Zhvania, Chairperson
Ms Sophio Sitchinava, Head of Coordination, Planning and Reporting Department
Centre for Electoral Systems Development, Reforms and Trainings
Ms Natia Zaalishvilli, Director

GERMANY
The Federal Returning Officer
Ms Sarah Klemm, Member of academic staff

KOSOVO
Central Election Commission
Ms Valdete Daka, President
Mr Florian Dushi, Member
Mr Ercan Spat, Member

KYRGYZSTAN
State enterprise "Infocom" under the State Registration Service
Mr Akynbek Mambetaliev, Deputy Director

LATVIA
Central Election Commission
Mr Cimdars Arnis, Chairman
Mr Kamradzis Kārlis, Deputy Chairman

LITHUANIA
Central Election Commission
Mr Vaigauskas Zenonas, Chairman
Mr Stabingis Rokas, Member
Mr Jonas Udris, Member

LUXEMBOURG
State Ministry
Ms Anne Greiveldinger, Legal Officer in charge of institutional relations

MALTA
Electoral Commission
Mr Joseph Church, Chief Electoral Commissioner
Mr Michael Borg, Projects Manager
Ms Maria Bonnici, Secretary to the Chief Electoral Commissioner

MEXICO
National Electoral Institute
Mr Carlos Marino Navarro Fierro, Director for international studies and projects

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Central Election Commission
Mr Iurie Ciocan, Chairman

NETHERLANDS
Ministry for Interior and Kingdom Relations, Electoral Council
Mr Henk Kummeling, Chairperson
Mr Melle Bakker, Secretary-director

NORWAY
Norwegian Directorate for Elections
Mr Bjørn Berg, General Director
Ms Kristin Skorpen, Senior Advisor
Ms Lise Merkesdal, Advisor

Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation
Ms Siri Dolven, Acting Director
Ms Benedicte Bergseng Mælan, Senior Advisor
Ms Sissel Lian, Advisor
Ms Marianne Ovestad, Advisor
Ms Else Muri, Advisor

PORTUGAL
National Elections Commission
Mr João Almeida, Member

ROMANIA
Permanent Electoral Authority
Ms Ana Maria Pătru, President
Mr Dan Vlaicu, Vicepresident
Mr Constantin-Florin Mituleţu-Buică, Vicepresident
Mr Csaba Tiberiu Kovacs, General Secretary
Mr Cristian Petraru, Head of Department for organising electoral processes
Mr Daniel Duţă, Director of Management, monitoring and electoral logistics Department
Mr Ivan Iulian, Director of Electoral control, training and regional activity coordination Department
Mr Cristian Leahu, Director, Legislation, Parliament liasion and election dispute resolution Department
Mr Marian Muhuleţ, Director of Communication and international affairs Department
Mr Adrian Dragomir, Director of IT Department
Mr Cosmin Pintea, Head of Office of IT Department
Mr Constantin Chiriac, Director of North- East Branch
Ms Nicoleta Grigore, Director of Ilfov Branch
Mr Emanuel Palea, Director of South Muntenia Branch
Mr Nicolae Amzoi, Director of West Branch
Ms Oana Tuluc, Director of North-West Branch
Mr Andi Mihalache, Director of South-East Branch
Ms Lidia Vilău, Director of South-West Branch
Mr Laszlo Farkas, Director of Central Branch
Mr Octavian Onogea, Deputy Director of Financial administrative Department
Ms Cătalina Moraru, Senior Adviser to the President
Ms Roxana Torosian, Adviser to the President
Mr Răzvan Iordache, Adviser to the Vicepresident
Mr Vlad Jipa, Adviser, Adviser to the Vicepresident
Mr Andrei Dimitriu, Adviser to the Vicepresident
Mr Vlad Tobă, Adviser to the Vicepresident

Mr Anca Bara, Adviser to Vicepresident
Ms Luiza Nedelcu, Adviser, Communication and International Affairs Department
Ms Anamaria Revnic, Adviser to the Vicepresident
Ms Valeria Dorneanu, Adviser, Communication and International Affairs Department
Ms Delciza Mareș, Adviser, Communication and International Affairs Department
Ms Oana Andrei, Expert, Communication and International Affairs Department
Mr Răzvan Cincă, Expert, Communication and International Affairs Department
Ms Ingrid Bicu, Adviser, Communication and International Affairs Department
Mr Larisa Călin, Adviser, Department of Control of financing political parties and electoral campaigns
Ms Loredana Luca, Adviser, Electoral control, training and regional activity coordination Department
Ms Andrada Mateescu, Adviser, Management, monitoring and electoral logistics Department
Ms Daniela Andrei –Department of Control of financing political parties and electoral campaigns
Ms Alexandra Iancu, Adviser, Management, monitoring and electoral logistics
Mr Ely Hîrtopanu, Adviser, IT Department
Mr Andrei Petrică, Adviser, IT Department
Ms Cristina Moldoveanu, Expert, IT Department
Mr Andrei Fulop, Expert, Electoral control, training and regional activity coordination Department

SLOVAKIA
Ministry of Interior
Ms Eva Chmelova, Director, Department of Elections, Referendum and Political Parties

SLOVENIA
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Mr Vučko Dušan, Director of Secretariat
Mr Slavko Vesenjak

SPAIN
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Ms Ana Cristina López López, Head of the Electoral Cooperation Unit

SWEDEN
Election Authority
Ms Kristina Lemon, Head of the Section “Elections and Referendums”, Deputy Director
Ms Maria Persson, Administrative Systems Manager

SWITZERLAND
Federal Chancellery, Political Rights Section
Mr Beat Kuoni, Legal Counsel

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Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE)
Ms Khameyel Fenniche, Member

TURKEY
Supreme Electoral Council
Mr Sadi Güven, Head of Supreme Electoral Council
Mr Ibrahim Zengin, Member of the Supreme Electoral Council

UKRAINE
Central Election Commission
Mr Andrii Mahera, Vice-President
Mr Oleh Didenko, Member
Ms Julia Slisarenko, Assistant to the Deputy Chairperson

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

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Mr Zsolt Szolnoki, Secretary General

Community of Democracies
Ms Maria Leissner, General Secretary

European Union, European External Action Service (EEAS)
Mr Emanuele Giaufret, Head of Division Democracy and Electoral Observation

European Union, Election Observation and Democratic Support (EODS)
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International Centre for Parliamentary Studies (ICPS)
Mr Arwind Venkataramana, Director, Research
Mr Matt Gokhool, Chief Executive Officer

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Ms Beata Martin-Rozumilowicz, Director for Europe and Asia
Ms Iuliia Shypilova, Senior Program Officer

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)
Mr Peter Wolf, Technical Manager Electoral Processes

Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)
Mr Cyrille Zogo Ondo, Election Programme Specialist

OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)
Mr Martin Steven, Senior Adviser on New Voting Technologies

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Embassy of France in Romania
Ms Carole Milin

Embassy of Egypt in Romania
Mr. Hatem Hosni Yousri, Counselor

ROMANIAN INSTITUTIONS

National institutions

Prime Minister's Chancellery
Mr Ioan Dragoş Tudorache, Head of Prime Minister's Chancellery

Presidential Administration
Ms Elena Simina Tănăsescu, Presidential Advisor
Constitutional Court
Ms Valentina Bărbățean, Magistrate assistant

National College for Home Affairs
Mr George Marius Țical, Director
Mr Cătălin Andruş, Deputy Head

National Statistical Institute
Ms Elena Mihaela Iagăr, Vice-President
Mr Stefan Emanuel Triga, Expert
Ms Madalina Neacsu Paraschiv, Head of Legislative office

Special Telecommunications Service
Mr Marcel Opriş, General eng., Director
Mr Marius Burlan, Brigade General
Mr Ionuț Axinia, Brigade General
Ms Manuela Sărățeanu, Brigade General

Romanian National Computer Security Incident Response Team (Cert-Ro)
Mr Daniel Ioniță, Director

Universities, academic institutes

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Mr Ştefan Deaconu, Professor, Scientific Secretary

European University Institute
Mr Todor Arpad, Professor

National School of Political Science
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Security and Defense Faculty
Mr Ioan Deac, Professor

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Ms Ana Maria Moşneagu, President

Expert Forum
Mr Septimius Pârvu, Project Manager

Funky Citizens Organisation
Ms Elena Calistru, President

Global Romanian Society of Young Professionals
Ms Anca Ghinea, President

Plenum Association
Mr Mircea Kivu, President

Political Rating Agency
Mr Cristian Andrei, Political consultant

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Ms Anamaria Stanescu, ODA Project Assistant
Ms Teodora Zafiu, ODA Project Assistant

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Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
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